Israel and Palestine: Six Days War (June 5-10, 1967)


Figure 1.--This news photo was captioned, "Al Khalil, occupied Jordon: A young Jordanian boy tries to seel souvenir beads to two amused Isreali girls in the Army, one shoulders a rifle while the othefr sniffs a flower during theitr walk through the Isreli-occupied toen of where street vendors have gone back to busuness as usual." This press photo is dated June 26. 1967, two weeks after the conclusion of the Six Days War. The caption refers to Jordan because Jordan after the initial Israel-Arab War in 1948 has annexed the West Bank. Al Khalil is the Arab term for Hebron, a popular tourist site. An important point often ignored in press coverage is that the collapse of the economies in both the West Bank and Gaza did no come with the Isreli victory in the Six Days War, but with the Palestinian Interfada years later.

The Six Days War changed the dynamic of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The United Nations for 8 years patrolled the Isreali-Egyption border in the Siani. Nasser backed with an infusion of Soviet weapons decided to confront Israel militarily. Nasser otganized an alliance with Syria and Jordan. He moved 100,000 troops to the border armed with 1,000 tanks. He ordered the United Nations out. An audacious Isreali air attack destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. Egyptian Air Force commanders were at first afraid to tell Nassar wjat had happened. Radio Cairo claimed that the Isreali Air Firce had been destroyed. The Arab public was estatic. Nassar urged the Syrians and Jordanians to joun the war with Isreal. He assured them that Egypt was winning the war in the Siamai. Israli armor desimated the Egyptians and pushed to Suez. The Isrealkis then turned on the Jordanians and Syrians that had invaded. The Isrealis managed to seize the rest of Jeruselum.

Gambul Ambdul Nassar

Gambul Ambdul Nassar, an Egyptian colonel, overthrew King Farouk. Nassar was a strong proponent of Arab nationalism. They justified their seizure of power by a committed to modernizing Egypt and restoring greatness to the Arab people. His emotional speeches and wide appeal throughout the Arab world. He preached a single, triumfant Aab nation. He gradually raised to great prominance throughout the Arab world. There was even a public realtions union with Syria. Nassar believed in no accomodation with Israel. Differences over the Aswan Dam caused Nassar to move toward the Soviets who offered both enguneers and financing for the dam, but large quantities of weapons. Nassar by 1967 was prepared to destroy the Jewish nation militarily. He and other Egyptian officers considered Egypt's defeat in the First Isrelali-Paleetinian War (1948) and the Suez War shameful and were determined to destroy Israel. Arab leaders have a way of declaring victory after battlefiekld defeats. Nasser was extremely accomplished at this. He claimed that the 1956 Suez War was a victory because he had forced Israel, Britain and France to withdraw. But the UNEF and the movement of Isreli shipping through the Straits of Tiran were a reminder that Egypt had not won the War. And there were intra-Arab politics that pressed on Nasser. He had come to power with a process to make Egypt a modern properous state. Here he made little progress in addressing the deep seated problem of poverty. He also experienced a failed war in Yemen. And he was embarassed by taunts from Fatah and the Muslim Brotherhood to move against Israel.

Yemen

Nasser managed to bog the Egyptian army down in aiding the rebels in Yemen against the monarchy (1960s). Saudi Arabia assistied the monarchy. The Egyptians began bombings Saudi targets. President Kennedy ordered Strike Command to provide a combat squadron to help the Saudis, The rules of engagement included preparations to engage Egyptian planes.

Isreali National Water Carrier Plan

The Israeli National Water Carrier Plan proved controversial. This was a plan to pump water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate farms in southern and central Israel. The project was based on a plan devekoped by U.S. envoy Eric Johnston (1955). Such aplan in a small area required internatinal cobnsultations. Syria, Jordon, and Israel all had an interest in the Sea of Galilee. Arab engineers agreed to the plan. Arab governments refused, however, to participate because this would be a de facto recognition of Israel. Israel and Jordan met secretly and agreed to adhere to the quotas established by the plan. Fatah seized on the Israeli diversion of water, charging that it was an "imperialist event".

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Yasser Arafat intensified his call for war to destroy Israel. And Arafat in the Fatah newspaper, Filistinunah, ("our Palestine") began to lampoon Nasser and other Arab leaders for their failure to invade Israel. Nasser controlled the Egyptian media, but Filistinunah was outdide his control. Nasser decided to undercut Arafat and other Palestnian hardliners. Nasser enginnered the foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which he saw, unlike Fatah, a Palestinian group he could control. As the first PLO leader he installed the extremely bombastic Ahmed Shukhairy, who proved to be incompetent.

Terror Attacks


United Nations Observers (UNEF)

The United Nations had after the Suez War maintained observers along the Isreali-Palestinian border. This was part of the arrangements associated with Isrrael's withdrawl from Siani after the Suez war (1956). The United Nations observers for 8 years patrolled the Isreali-Egyption border in the Siani. They were unable to prevent irregular Palestinian attacks, but they did effectively keep the two armies apart.

Military Preparations

The Soviets provided Arab states a wide array of weaponry at favorable terms. This included aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and missles, tanks, and artillery as well as an array of small arms. I am not entirely sure of the financial arrangements, but I believe the Soviets never got paid for much of this weaponry. The backbone of the Arab air forces was the Mig-19, an excellent, tough and manuerable fighter, although sub-sonic. The Soviets had begun to deliver Mig-21s, but the basic plane faced by the Isrealis was the Mig-19. Soviet assistance went primarily to Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. It was Egypt and Syria (front-lines states) that posed the greatest danger to Israel. The Arabs by the time of the 6-Day War had a semingly overwealming 5 to 1 advantage in aircraft and a 2 to 1 advantage in tanks. The Isreali Air Force was based on the French Mirrage III fighter. They purchased 72 Mirrage IIIs in 1962. The French armed the Mirrage with missles. The Isrealis insisted they be modified for cannon. The Mirrage was faster than the Mig-19, but the Mig was more rugged and more maneuverable. The real difference was in the capability of the military planners and the training of the pilots.

Egyptian Actions

Nasser backed with an infusion of advanced Soviet weapons decided Egypt now had the military capability to confront and defeat Israel militarily. Nasser negotiated an alliance with Syria and Jordan. He closed the Straits of Tiran, denying Isreali shipping access to the Red Sea. Nasser ordered the United Nations out as he prepared his attack. He moved 100,000 troops to the border armed with 1,000 tanks (May 1967). Closing the Straits were an act of war. Expelling the UNEP and moving troops to the border were clear indications that Egypt was preparing to attack. One report suggests that Nasser was willing to use poison gas. I can not yet confirm this or have details about Egyptian poison gas weapons.

U.S. Policy

The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s sought to achieve a balance in the Israeli-Arab conflict based on the assuntion that if no country had an advantage, there would be no resumption of fighting. The tripartite U.S.-British-French declaration established the policy of not making arms sales to either side. The Kennedy and Johnson Administratioin continued this policy. Nasser after the War attempted to explain the Egyptian defeat by perpretrating the lie that the Egyptian Aur Force was attacked by the 6th Fleet which was deployed in the Mediterranean. This lie is still widely believed in Egypt. Actually U.S. policy at the time was not at all committed to the defense of Israel. The U.S. Defense Department reportedly secretly drew up operational plans for a military confrontation with the Israel Defense Forces to prevent Israel from occupying territory in Arab countries, especially Egypt. As the crisis developed in May-June 1967, the plan developed by the Defense Department planners involved an attack on Israel in the event it initiated a war with the Arabs. The military plan involved using air attacks, paratroopers, and Marines to stop IDF armored spearheads in the Sinai. This was during the peak of the Viet Nam War. The U.S. military prepares many such contingency plans. I am not sure if there was a similar plan prepared if the Arabs attacked. The primary American effirt at the time to defuse the situation was a diplomativ effort to organize an international convoy to break the Egyptian blockade by sending ships through the Straits of Tiran, suposedly defusing the situation. The plan was code-named Regatta and 26 countries were asled to contribute ships. Congress and 24 of the countries invited rejected the plan.

Arab Public Pronouncements

Arab media broadcasted public pronouncements by officials that could only be interpreted as preparing their countries for war. The Syrian chief of staff stated, "Our objrective is the freeing of Palestine nd the liquidation of the Zionist existence." The Iraqi president excliamed, "Our goal is clear--to wipe Israel off the face of the map." Efyptian President Nasser described a "total war ... aimed at Israel's destruction." The PLO pedged, "We shall destroy Israel and prepare boats to deport the survivors, if there are any." These and similar statements inspired frenzied mass demonstrations throughout the Arab world. These and similar statements and the public attituides are important. We do not notice any Arab leader speaking pubically for peace and compromoise. Any consideration od the Palestinian-Isreali condlict can ge very complicated. Here the obvious bservation is that Aran leaders and the Arab public wanted war and a military sollution. It is also important to note that the Arab armies prepared detailed war plans. These were not plans on how to resist an Isreali attack, but plans on how to attack Israel.

Soviet Pronouncements

The Soviets who had armed the Arabs to the teeth issued pronouncents firmly supported the Arabs. The Soviets couched the conflict as a stryggle against imperialism. Of course other Soviet bloc stsates endorsed this position.

France

What did surprise the Isrealis was France. The French had been Israel's sole ally. They had sold the Isrealis Mirage fighters which was the back bone of the Isreali Air Force. France on the eve of the 6-Days War switched sides. I'm not sure at this time what prompted the French action.

Israeli Reaction

The Isrealis were unsure how to respond to the Arab preparations. Many did not want to stage a preemtive attack because of the impact on world opinion. A cabinent viote was deadlocked, 7 for and 7 aginst a premtive strike. Moshe Dyan was appointed Minister defense. Dyan was a man of action and believed that Israel had no choice but to strike first.

Israeli Air Attack (June 3)

Egypt especially the powerful Egyptian Air Force was the greatest threat to Israel. Dyan ordered a strike aimed at catching the Egyptians on the ground. The audacious Isreali air attack succeeded in destroying the Egyptian Air force on the ground. Virtually the entire Isrelai Air Force of 1,800 planes was committed to the daring attack. They flew in under the Egyptian radar. Observation of Egyptian air operations noted that most pilots had a coffee break after morning patrols. This was when the Isrealis struck and found virtually the entire Egyptian ait Force on the ground. The Israeli pilots struck with amazing precession. Within 2 hours 85 Egyptian planes, runways, and radar stations were destroyed. Bombing runways meant that the Egyptian planes not immediately destroyed could not take off. Eventually 400 Arab aircraft were destoyed on the ground. Egyptian Air Force commanders were at first afraid to tell Nassar wjat had happened. Radio Cairo announced that the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed. The Arab public was estatic.

The Sinai

The Arabs had a substantial force of modern Soviet tanks. The Arabs has 1,400 tanks compared to 650 Israeli tanks. Again Egypt had the largest force and had led the preparations for the War. Again Dyan struck first at the Egyptians. The open territory of the Sinai was perfect for tank warfare. The Egyotians had, however, heavily fortified the Sinai. Nassar and Egyptian radio reported glorious victories in the Sinai and urged the Syrians and Jordanians to join the war with Israel. In fact, Israeli tanks broke through in Gaza. Egyptian forces which had heard the radio reports that the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed were puzzled when they saw no Egyptian planes to support their attacks. And than the Isreali Air Force began attacking them. The Egyptian High Command ordered the Army in the Sinai to retreat, but there was not orders issued to organize a fighting withdrawl. The retreat soon turned into an unorganized fligt west. The Isrealis monitoring Egyptian military communications instead of attacking the very substantial and well armed Egyptian armor, moved to cloes off the passes and road bottlenecks, thus trapping much of the fleeing Egyptian army. Most of the Egytian armour and vehicles were destoyed and thousands of prioners taken.

Jordan (June 5)

Nassar assured King Hussein that Egypt was winning the war in the Sinai. Israel had attempted to convince King Hussein to stay out of the War. Jordanian public opinion, however, strongly favored joining Egypt in the War. Thus King Hussein ordered his army to attack. The priority Jordanian target was Jerulsalem. Jordan had seized parts of Jerusalem in the 1948 fighting and still controlled the Old City with the Temple Mount and Wailing Wall. The Isrealis after the Jordanian attack on Jerulsalem struck back. Israeli Army (Isreli Defense Force) doctrine strongly avoided being drawn into urban warfare because this negates the IDF's superority in mobile warfare. Dyan ordered Israeli paratroopers into Jurulselum. By this time the Arabs were asking for a ceasfire. Aba Eban in the United Nations delayed action to give the paratroopers time to seize the rest of Jerusalem. The Isrealis also seized the West Bank from Jordon.

Syria

Syria to support the Egyptianns and Jordanians begins shelling Isreli ettlments from the Golan Heights. Dyan ordered Isreali paeatroopers to seize the Heights. They also destroyed Syrian border defenses leaving the road to Damascus wide open to them. For the first time since the 1948 War, the Jewish settlements in northern Israel were free of Syrian shelling.

U.N. Security Council

Nasser who days before had expelled the U.N. observers in his preparation to attack Israel, now demanded U.N. intervention to stop the Isrealis. In radio broadcasts he claimed that the battle-field disasters were part of a Western conspiracy. He claimed that the United States nd Britain had aided the Isrealis. In particular the Egyptians charged that the U.S. 6th Fleet had participated in the Israeli air strikes, an outright lie. The Soviets supported the Arabs in the United Nations. Israel delayed U.N. action to give the IDF time to seize the Old City of Jerusalem. Few people have suffered from incompetent leadership more than the Palestinians and Arabs. Arab leaders after the 6 Days War, just as after each of the previous wars, insisted that Israel should simply return any land that had been lost. It never seems to occur to Arab leaders who after repreatedly tried to destroy Israel through military action, that there are adverse consequences to making war. The Arabs have repeatedly maintained that it was only reasonable for Israel to return territory lost in these wars.

USS Liberty (June 8, 1967)

The Isreali attack on the USS Liberty during he Six Days war (1967) is still unexplained. The USS Liberty was an surveilance vessel collecting electronic intelligence off Sinai. There were 34 Americans (33 sailors and 1 one Arab-language specialist of the National Security Agency) killed and 171 wounded. The Isrealis claim it was a tragic mistake. Many in the CIA including Richard Helm believe that the Isrealis attacked the Liberty on purpose, although they are baffled as to why. [Helms] Survivors of the attack complain that the U.S, authorities never persued the incident properly with the Isrealis.

Palestinian Villages (June 8)

The Isreali Army occupied large numbers of Palestinian villages during the Six Days War. Almost all were basically untouched. The Army did destroyed three villages---Imwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba (June 8, 1967). The 6,000 residents were deported. [Kenan] Israel knocked the houses down, and later the area became part of the Ayalon Park (known as Canada Park). I am not yet sure why the Isrealis took this action. one of the destroyed villages, Imwas, is thought to be a possible site of Emmaus of Christian scripture. The villages were treated differently because they were an actual military threat. They commanded the road to Jerusalem. Lots of Israelis were killed along that road, particularly during the the 1947-48 siege of Jerusalem. In a sense, the destruction of the villages in 1967 was a final phase of the 1948-49 War, when Israel tried and failed a number of times to capture the Latrun salient. The Army acted here because of the strategic position of the villages.

Nasser's Resignation (June 9)

Nasser was sure as he engineered the crisis that Egypt and his Arab allies had the military power to destroy Israel. He and the Free Officers had come to power in part to rectify the humiliation of the 1948-49 defeat. Their defeat in the Suez Conflict (1956) was excused because the British and French had participated in the conflict. The disatrous defeat in Sinai was a huge embarassment. Egypt armed to the teeth by the Soviets had been defeated by tiny Israel. The defeat was humiliating to the Egyotian people and Nasser personally who had been assuring the Egyptians that Israel would be destroyed. He apologized, but blamed the defeat on American and British intervention. (On hearing this, American diplomats contacted the Egyptians asking why Nasser was saying this. The response was that Israel could not possibly destoyed the Egyptian Air Force by itself.) Nasser told the Egyptian public, "I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses, performing my duty in their midst, like any other citizen. This is a time for action, not grief... My whole heart is with you, and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us – hope, light and guidance in our hearts." Millions of Egyptians immediately poured into the streets in mass demonstrations for Nasser to stay. Some of this was organized by Nasser's political party, but much of it was the heart-felt outpouring of support for Nasser. Similar demonstratioins occurred throuout the Arab World. Nasser recinded his resignation.

Lie of American Involvement

Nasser was afraid to tell the Egyptian people the truth. He and the Young Officers had legitimized their regime by a promise to modernize Egypt and defeat Israel. Iseael's victory in the Suez War could be explained because of British and French involvement. The Six Days War was different--only Israel was involved. How could Nasser explain defeat again after more than 10 years in power and massive expenditures for arms. Nasser instead in vented a lie, that American carrier aircraft had joined in with the attacks on the Egyptian air force. The lie worked because Egyptians and other Arabs just didn't believe that the Isrealis by themselves could defeaft the Egyptians. It is a lie still widely believed in the Arab world. In fact, Israel at the time was receiving relatively little American aid, let alone active American involvement in the fighting. When asked about American support in Comgressional hearings, Secretary of State Rusk replied, "No, we have provided tanks and Hawk missiles and certain other kinds of equipment to Israel, but their principal arms supplier has been France ... The Israeli air force is almost all French supplied." [Rusk] Israel had obtained its fighter aircraft from France because the United States had refused repeated requests. American policy at the time was to maintain an arms balance in the region. Soviet policy was just the opposite. They were attempting to arm the Arabs to give them a military advantage.

Threat of Soviet Intervention

The Soviets were astonished at the Isreali military successes. The defeat of their client states (Egypt and Syria) was a deep embarassment. The Isrealis hesitated with Jerusalem, partly out of fear of Soviet intervention. As the fighting continued in the Sianai and the Isrealis moved on the Golan Heights in the north, the Soviets prepared to intervene. Air andd naval units were put on alert. The Soviets considered commiting air force units in Syria and an amphibious attack on Haifa. This was the most dangerous part of the war because it created the potential for super-power conflict. The United States had not supported Israel in the war, but it would not tolerate a Soviet invasion of Israel. The 6th Fleet which had been mocing away from the eastern Meditteranean was given orders to move west to counter any possible Soviet intervention.

Cease Fire (June 11)

With the Egyptian Army defeated, Aran air forces in tatters, and Golan now in Isreali hands, the Isreali were ready for a ceasefire. The Israelis and Arabs finally signed a cease fire (June 11). As a result of the War, Israel seized the entire Sinai to the Suez Canal, the West Bank, the Old City of Jeurusalem, and the Golan Heights. The Arabs had been delt a stunning blow. Nasser was crushed and was never the same man again.

Significance

The 6 Days War changed the dynamic of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Before the War, Isreali was a tiny, isolated and beleagered state. After the War, Israel had become the dominant military power in the Middle East. It also became an occupying power by seizing the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Siani.

Isreali Peace Offer (June 19)

The Israel unity government, following the fighting of the 6-Day, publically declared it willingness to return the territories occupied (June 19, 1967). The Isrealis offered to return the Golan Heights (to Syria), Sinai (to Egypt) and the bulk of the West Bank (to Jordan). In return it wanted peace treaties (not cease firs) with the waring Arab states, normalization of relations, and guarantee of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Israel rejected thr right of return for The Palestinian refugees nor did it demand reparations for Jewish refugees expelled by the Arabs. This was the "land for peace" policy that Israel has attempted to persue.

Soviet U.N. Resolution (June 19)

The Soviet Union on the same day the Isrealis made peace offers (June 19, 1967), submitted UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 519, demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories with no requirement for peace or negotiations. The UNGA rejected the resolution (July 4).

Khartoum Resolutions (August 29-September 1)

Eight Arab heads of state met for an Arab summit conference held in Khartoum, Sudan (August 29 - September 1, 1967). The Conference is important because it essentually stated the consensus that would become the official policy of most Arab states toward Israel for the following two decades. The essential policy was No to Peace, No to Recognition, and No to Negotiation with Israel. This was a definitive restatement of the Arab policies since the 1949 armistice. This was a sharp rejection od Israel's "land for peace" offer. The Arab heads of state rejected the idea of a petroleum embargo on the West. This had become a major idea floated in the Arab world. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser after the disatrous defeat in the 6 Day War has to find someone to blame the defeat on least the Egyptian people begin to question his leadershipnand policies. The Arab countries had been armed to the teeth with oil money and Soviet aid. There is no doubt that the Arabs had the military forces to destroy Israel. They failed due to poor leadership. When he spoke to the Egyptian people, he blamed the Israeli victory on air-support provided by the United States. This of course was an out right lie. He also orated, "The Sixth Fleet runs on Arab Petroleum." Other resolutions included the creation of a fund to assist the economies of Egypt and Jordan. Another agreement was reached to end the inter-Arab war in Yemen. Currently the Arab Khartoum Resolutions with the "three no's" rejecting peace with Israel are currently being laundered into an attempt at reconciliation with Israel.

Mig-21

One virtually unreported incident during the 6 Days War was that the Isrealis obtained a Mig-21. The Soviets had only began to distribute these advanced aircraft to the Arabs. Thus they were not a factor in the fighting. Mosad managed to convince an Iraqi Christian pilot to defect with his Mig-21. This allowed the Isrealis to cloesly examine the aircraft which would prove of emense importance when they faced the Mig-21 in the Yon Kippur War (1973).

Isreali Views

Most Isrelis see the Six Day War as a just war that the Arabs forced them to fight. It has a hallowed place in the Isreali history. Some left-wing Isreali authors have challened this view of the War. We note one such author who maintains that Israel did not need to fight the War. [Segev] The author provides a perceptive assessment of Israel at the time. He does not provide, however, any information to prove his central thesis that the war could have been avoided. He certainly does not show that the Soviets had not provided the Arabs with a massive arsenal of modern weapons, because they clearly did. He does not provide any evidence that Arab leaders and public did not want a military sollution. It is clear through their public statements and the enthusiatic way theyy were received by the Arab public that there was a desire for war. Nor does he provide any evidence of Arab leaders prepared to negotiate with Israel. They clearly did not want to negotiate, they wanted a military victory. An interesting point to bear in mind here is that the Isreali left is free to persue such views in a democratic society. One has to ask, where is the left in the Arab world? Where is the desire for peace and toleration? What book comoparable to this has been published in an Arab country? And why is there not a similar examination of Arab society and the continued Arab-Muslim persuit of military sollutions?

Sources

Kenan, Amos. Israel: A Wasted Victory (1970). Kenan is a prominent Israeli writer who as a young Isreali Army reservist took took part in the operation destroying the three Palestinian villages.

Rusk, Dean. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, June 9, 1967.

Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East (Metropolitan, 2007), 673p. Segev is a columinist for the left-wing Isreali newspaper Ha'aretz.






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Created: 3:14 AM 10/2/2004
Last updated: 10:40 PM 1/29/2009