Suez War (October 28-November 3, 1956)


Figure 1.--This unidentified photograph was taken in 1956. I'm not sure, but I believe it shows an Egyptian tank. The sign seems to say something like Infel-Eiemad. Perhaps a reader will know where that is. The photgraph was taken by David Seymour.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the most influential Arab leader. He was determined to defeat Israel and in his view loberate Palestine. He accepted an offer from the Soviets for modern arms including planes and tanks on generous terms (1955). This permitted him to build very powerful forces to attack Israel from Egyptian bases in the Siani. He also allowed the Fedayeen freer reain to carry out terroist attacks. He announced without mincing words, "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel .... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death." (August 31, 1955) At the time, Egyptian intelligence was heavily involved in training and equipping the Fedayeen. This involved Jordan because the Fedayeen operated primarily from bases in Jordan which had seized the West Bank in the 1948 War. Egyptian Sianai was distant from Isreali population centers. The West Bank was, however, was right next to potential Isreali targets. This was the beginning of a familiar pattern. The Fedayeen attacks were largely on Isreali civilians. They violated the 1949 armistice agreement which prohibited provision that prohibited attacks by paramilitary forces. Even so, when Israel struck back it was censured by the U.N. Security Council for its counterattacks. The situation worsened when Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, essentially blockading Elat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Nasser further escalated the situation by nationalizing the Suez Canal (July 1956). Nassar left no doubt about his intentions. "I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." (October 14) The Arab strategy was to launch a combined three prog invasion of Israel. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the front-line states, signed a tripartite agreement (October 25). Jordan and Syria agreed to give Nasser command of their armies. Israel decided to act before the three countries could launch a coordimate invasion.

Egyptiam State of Beligeremcy

Egypt even after agreeing to the 1949 armistice maintained a state of belligerency with Israel. Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. The U.N. Mixed Armistice Commission upheld Israel's complaint that the Egyptian action in closing the Canal was illegal (August 9, 1949). U.N. negotiator Ralph Bunche declared: "There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements." [Ereli, pp. 108-09.] The U.N. Security Council ordered Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. [September 1, 1951.] Egypt adamently refused to comply. Egyptian officials made it clear that Egypt's goal was to destroy Egypt. Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salah al-Din, stated, "The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East." (1954) [Al-Misri] Israel's in ability to use the Canal made the port of Elat on Gulf of Aqaba particularly important. Without Elat, Israel would be largely cut off from a significant share of international trade.

Tripartite Agreement on Weapons (1949)

The United States, Britain, and France formally agreed to embargo arms sales to the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (1949). The three countries established a multinational committee located in Washington to monitor and oversee western arms sales to Middle Eastern countries. The practical outcome of this Agreement was to prevent Isreali arms pitchases while the Arab countries were able to obtain arms through various channels. The United States at the time was not providing foreign aid to Israel for arms purchases. Israeli military officials report being unable to but arms in the United States.

Free Officers Revolt (1952)

Gamal Abdel-Nasser was born in the poverty stricken Alexandrian suburb of Bacos. His parents were from the south, am area looked down on by northern Egyptians as backward. His father had achieved middle-class status for the family. Masser entered the military college (1936) which had opened its ranks to to lower-class applicants. He graduated and entered the Egyptian army on the eve of World War II (1938). He saw with some reason king Farouk as corupt and backward. He also objected to the continuing British influence in Egypt. He played a prominent role in founding the Free Officers (El-Dhobatt El-Ahrar), an underground organization. Nasser and other Free Officers like sadat were impressed by the NAZIs for their military prowess and fight against the British. Nasser as an army officer, fought in the first Arab-Israeli war (1948). This experience made him a fervent bleaveer in the Palestinian cause. The ineffiency of the Government in waging the war with Israel, was a leading reason leading to the The Free Officers led by General Mohammed Naguib seizing power (1952). From the beginning Masser was the heart of the Free Officers, but General Naguib was a respected senior officer who served as a useful figure-head. King Farouk was forced to leave the country. His son Ahmad Fouad, still a todler, was declared King. The new Government asked the British to leave the country and the last British soldier s left (1954). The Free Officers deposed Ahmad Fouad and declared Egypt a Republic (1953). Mohamed Naguib was the first president. He was, however, a conservative man who saw no need for radical change. Nasser deposed him becoming the second president (1954). Nasser proceeded to launch a social revolution aiming to create a modern, state that could bring Egyptiands out of poverty as he saw socialism as the way to accomplish this. Nasser was a gifted speaker and was able to inspire the Egyptian people with a heady brand of nationalism and socialism. He was not, however, a well wducated man. Just as the NAZIs had impressed him and his colleages in the 1930s, the Soviets had impressed them after the War in the 1940s. They saw socialism and economic planning as the way to creade a modern new Egypt. This was not done through any careful study of economics, but rather following an emotional rejection of the British and the West. And a key aspect of Nasser's development plans became a massive new dam on the Nile--the Aswan High Dam.

Soviet Arms

Egypt negotiated an arms agreement with the Soviet Union (1955). The first Egyptian-Soviet arms deal was thinly disguised as a Egyptian-Czech transaction. Egypt purchased 200 modern battle tanks and other weapons. These tanks potentially made Egypt the diominant military power in the Middle East. They potentically could have made good the constant threats from Nasser and other Egyptian officiaks to destroy Israel.

French Arms to Israel

The Egyotian Soviet arms deal massively increased the Fgyptian military potential. Thus with one stroke the regional arms balance was destabilized. It meat an end to the Tripartite Agreement on Weapons which had prevented Western arms shipments to Israel. France was especially willing to supply Israel. The French thus sold about 200 tanks to Israel, redressing the regional balance.

Aswan High Dam

President Nasser and the Free Officers associated with him saw a projected plan for a Nile River dam at Aswan was critical for the economic development of Egypt. Egypt with a soaring population faced severe economic problems. There were many benefits flowing from the project, including a substantial increase in electrical generation and increased areas to be brought under cultivation through irrigation. It would be the symbol of a New Egypt that Nasser invisioned and promised his countrymen. This was, however, a massive project that would require both foreign financing and technical assistance. It would be the largest construction project in Egypt since the construction of the Pyramids in the Old Kingdom 5.000 years earlier. The United States desired to retain good relations with Nasser and after the Soviet Arms deal saw its influence waining. The United States was still unwilling to supply arms. Thus the United States offered to assist in the construction of the coveted Aswan Dam. The United States agreed to give Egypt an unconditional loan of US$56 million, and Britain agreed to lend Egypt US$14. The British offer was conditiinal on the karger American loan. The World Bank had pledged an additional US$200 million. The World Bank loan, however, carried conditiins. The Banks demanded that that the Egyptian budget be overseen by World Bank officials. Nasser saw these conditions similar to that imposed on Egypt during the British protectorate (1870s). At the same time there were growing problems in the Egyptian-American relationship. Nasser angered American policy makers by recognizing Red China (May 4, 1956). American cotton interests were oposed to rge dam because it would increase Egyptian cotton production. Both the Israel lobby, and the Nationalist Chinese lobby also worked against the proposed loan. Nasser frustrated Secretary of State Dulles' policies. He concluded that Nasser's suposed neutralism was actually enabling the Soviets to penetrate the region. As a result, the United States decided to rescind its loan offer. Secretary of State Dulles met with the Egyptian Ambassador and informed him of the Administration's decesion (July 19, 1956). Subsequentb U.S. statements questioned noth Egypt's ability accomplish the project or repay loans because of the government expenditures on Soviet arms. [Bickerton and Klausner] Soviet diplomats were active in Egypt and other Arab countries at the time. The arms agreement was their first success. The Soviets now offered to both finace the Aswan Dam and provide the necessary technical assistance the Egyptians needed.

President Nasser

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the most influential Arab leader, a proponent pf Pan-Arabism and Arab Socialism. His empassioned speeches inpired Aran audiences. He could talk for hours virtually without notes. He was determined to both build the Aswan Dam and defeat Israel and in his view liberate Palestine. Nasser was attending a meeting with two other third-world leaders (Yugoslav President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Nehru). He was inseced. He saw the political potential of sranding up to the West un The Arab World. And he saw the advantages of the assiarance packet offered by the Soviets. Not only would it give him the financing and assiatance needed t build the Dam, but the Soviets were also offering modern arms in large quantity. He accepted an offer from the Soviets. The West was shiced and as he anticipated, his popularity soared in Egypt and the rest of the Aran world. for modern arms including planes and tanks on generous terms (1955). This permitted him to build very powerful forces to attack Israel from Egyptian bases in the Siani.

The Fedayeen

Nasser also allowed the Fedayeen freer reain to carry out terroist attacks. He announced without mincing words, "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel .... There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death." (August 31, 1955) At the time, Egyptian intelligence was heavily involved in training and equipping the Fedayeen.

Jordan

Egyptian support of the Fedayeen involved Jordan because the Fedayeen operated primarily from bases in Jordan. Jordan had seized the West Bank in the 1948 War. Egyptian Sianai was distant from Isreali population centers. The West Bank was, however, was right next to potential Isreali targets. This was the beginning of a familiar pattern. The Fedayeen attacks were largely on Isreali civilians. They violated the 1949 armistice agreement which prohibited provision that prohibited attacks by paramilitary forces. Even so, when Israel struck back it was censured by the U.N. Security Council for its counterattacks.

Straits of Tiran

The situation worsened when Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran. Egyptian forces blocked the Straits. The Straits of Tiran are the narrow waterway that ships to and from Elat must pass. Elat is located at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. This was essentially blockading Elat and closing an Isreali access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Along with seizing the Suez Canal, closing the Straits of Tiran was a major action against Israel threatening the Isrelai economy. Closing the Straits of Tiran was clearly at odds with international law and thus a legitimate causus beli. The same was true of closing the Suez Canal to Isrelai shipping. The Egyptians after the War claimed they were invaded by Israel. Left unsaid are the actions Egypt took against Israel, including: 1) mantaining a state of belgerency, 2) buying massive quantities of arms, 3) encouraging Fedayeen attacks, 4) closing the Straits of Tiran, 5) closing the Suez Canal, 6) siging the Tripartate Agreement. We know of no comparable belligerant actions taken by Israel.

Nationalizing Suez (July 1956)

Nasser further escalated the situation by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Nasser gave a major address to a huge crowd at Muhammad Ali Square in Alexandria (July 26, 1956). This was the fourth anniversary of King Faruk's exile. And it was the site of an 1954 assisination attack on Nasser himself. Nasser had preeranged that when he said the code word "de Lesseps" (the French engineer who built the Canal), engineer Mahmud Yunis who begin to takeover the Suez Canal. Nasser claimed that the Canal's revenues were needed to pay for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The Canal at the time was owned by the Suez Canal Company. This was an international company headquartered in Paris. The British and French were outraged. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden called Nasser's nationalization "theft". The Egyptian people, however, saw the Canal as theirs nd aplauded Nasser's seizure of it. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said Nasser would have to "disgorge" it. The French and British at the time were heavily dependant on the Canal for transporting oil from the Middle East and saw control of the Canal as vital to their nationl security. Eden wanted to used force to seize the Canal back, but his military advisrs told him that the required force was not available for any immediate action. France and Britain negan to coordinate necessary action. They both froze Egyptian assets and ibegan a military build up in the eastern Mediterranean. Masser promised to compensate the Canal stockholders and to guarantee unrestricted access to the ships of all nations. The international community did not react in the same way as the British and French. The Soviet Union, its East European satellites predictably supported the Egyptians. (The Soviets would eventually learn a little about contracts because very little of their massive loans for Aswan and military equipment would ever be paid back.) The Third World countries with strong anti-colonial feeling also supported the Egyptians. The United States opposed the nationalization, but opposed military action..

Hungarian Revolution (October 23-November 10)

The Hungarian Revolution was a spontaneous nationwide revolt in reaction to the Stalinist brutalities of Mátyás Rákosi who ran Hungary as brutally as Stalin had the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Revolution ocurred in the midst of Nikita Khruschev's de-Stalinization program. Hungarians began to expect changes in their country. Rákosi was one of the brutal dictators that Stalin had imposed on the people of Eastern Europe. The Revolution broke out October 23, 1956. Students in Budapest bravely staged a demonstration which attracted others as they marched through the central city to the national Parliament. A delegation of the students went into the Radio Building in an effort to broadcast their demands. They were detailed by authorities which could have meant a long prison term. The demonstrators outside demanded their release. The State Security Police (ÁVH) answered by firing on the demonstrators. The demonstrators moved back, but news rapidly spread throughout the city and soon the city erupted in widespead protests and violence. And the disorders appeared in other cities as well. Anti-goverment groups organized militias and attacked the ÁVH as well as Soviet troops. AVH prisons were opened and Communist officials were jailed. Some officials and AVH men were executed. Quickly organized councils seized control of municicipal goverments all over Hungary. A provisional government disbanded the ÁVH, announced a decesion to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and committed to quickly holding free elections. The new governnment was in control of the country by the end of October. Soviet authorities announced a willingness to withdraw their militart forces. It is unclear if this was a ruse or that the Politburo actually changed its mind. One historian contends that Khruschev did not want to appear weak in the face of Western Operations in Suez, thus explaining the massive use of force in supressing the Hungarian rebellion. [Hitchcock] Soviet forces invaded Hungary (November 4). The Soviets killed thousands of civilians. The poorly armed militias were no match against Soviet tanks and well-armed and trained soldiers. The Revolution was ended by November 10 when organized resistance ceased. Mass arrests began. Hungarians that could, fled to the West. Austria opened its border and about 0.2 million Hungarians fled their country. Assessments of the Revolution vary. It caused many Communists in the West to question their beliefs. The brutality of the Soviet invasion and the Soviet supervised reprisals caused many in Eastern Europe at first to dispair amd conclude that the Soviets could not be confronted. Gradually Eastern Europeans began to conceive of non-violent approaches to challenging the Soviets.

Tripartite Agreement--Egypt, Jordon, and Syria (October 25, 1956)

Nassar left no doubt about his intentions. "I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." (October 14) The Arab strategy was to launch a combined three prog invasion of Israel. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the front-line states, signed a Tripartite Agreement (October 25). Jordan and Syria agreed to give Nasser command of their armies.

Tripartite Understanding--Israel France, and Britain

The Arabs were not the only group reaching a tripartite understanding. Britain France, and Israel came to a secret understnding. Israel was to invade Egypt across the Sinai Desert. Then as Israel approached the Canal, Britain and France would demand an Egyptian and Israeli withdrawal from both sides of the canal. And at this time, an Anglo-French force would occupy the Canal to prevent wardamage and to keep it open to shipping. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion agreed to the plan, but demanded that Britain and France first destroy the powerful Egyptian air force. This would give the British and French just what they wanted--physical control of the Canal. Eventually details of the understanding leaked out. At first Eden and his Conservative government denied that it had used the Israeli attack as an excuse to seize the Canal. Eden was not only acting out of preceived nationalminterest, but out of personal animosity toward Nasser. In reaching the undersanding, he concealed the understnading with Israel from his Parlimentary colleagues and British diplomats as well as the United States.

Israel Strikes (October 28-November 3, 1956)

Israel decided it had to act before the Egypt, Jordan, and Egypt three countries could launch a coordimate invasion. The Arab Armies were much largr and well equipped. Israel would have had a hard time fighting all three at the ame time. The British and French offer was a boon to Israel as the Egyptian Air Force posed a serious threat. Israeli troops launched an offensive into the Sinai (Octiber 28). The Isrealis announced they were destroying the bases of Egyptian commandos. Israeli forces swept into the Sinai and speed towards the canal. One of the Israeli columns was headed by a young brigade commander Ariel Sharon. Isrealis destroyed Egyptian armor deployed in the Sinai. The Egyptians ordered major units to cross the Canal and support units already in the Sinai. After the British-French attack, Egyptian commanders ordered their units to retreat. The Egyptians claimed that they were concerned that their forces would be cut off in the Sinai by the British and French. It is unclear to what extent this order was prompted by the British-French attack or by Isreali successes, perhaps a combination of the two. This was quickly accomplished (November 2). The Israelis continued consolidating its position in the Sinai The Israelis in only about 7 days seized the entire Sinai peninsula (November 3).

Btitish and French Strike

The British and French delivered an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel the same day the Isrealis launched their offensive. This was before the Israelis were any where close to the Canal. The conincudence of course raised the possibility of collusion. When the Egyptians failed to accept the British-French demands, The British and French attacked Egyptian airfields and other facilities, largely destroying the Egyptian Air Force. British and French paratroopers seized Port Said and Port Fuad at both ends of the Canal. The Egyptians closed the Canal by sinking ships. There was also fighting in the two ports. About 2,700 Egyptian civilians and soldiers were killed or wounded at Port Said. Meanwhile the

British and French Withdrawl

There was almost universal condemnation of British and French action by the international community. The Soviet Union backed their new Egyptian ally and actually threatened Britain and France with a missle attack. Even the United States supported Egypt. Oreident Eisenhower was angered that he had not been consulted. The United States had opsed Britain and France on a range of colonial issues and this looked to much like imperialism. The United States thus pressureed their allies to withdraw. Not only did they faced international condemnation, but the pound sterling fell drastically on foreign currency markets. Britain and France decided to accept a cease-fire (November 6). They were at the time preparing to move north and south from Port Said and Port Faud to take control of the canal. The British and French final evacuation took place on December 22. The War destroyed relatiins between Egyot and the British and French. Egypt and Britain were not resume diplomatic relations for more than a decade after Nasser was gone (1969).

Israeli Withdrawl

Israel succeeded in seizing both the Gaza Strip and all of the Sinai in 100 hours. This provided a substantial buffer from any future Egyptian attack. Thus Israel was reluctant to withdraw. President Eisenhower pushed Israel to return the captured territory. He threatened sanctions when the Israelis resisted. Finally the Israelis relented. The United States provided an Aide de Memoire that it would support Israel's right to unrestricted access to the straits of Tiran which was in accordance with international law. In addition the UN agreed to maintain an emergency force in Sinai (UNEF). The Isrelis in the process of withdrawing destroyed roads and railroads as well as military facilities.

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

The United Nations rushed the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to the Middle East. The UNEF began arriving in Egypt (November 21). The U.N. peackeepers were positioned on the Egyptian side of the frontier border and alongh eastern coast of Sinai. Israel adamently refused to allow the U.N. personnel on its territory. The U.N. peace keepers were also positioned along the the Gulf of Aqaba to ensure the Egyptians would not block Israeli shipping to Elat. The UNEF remained in Egypt until 1967, when Nasser ordered them out as he was preparing a new attack on Israel (1967).

The Canal

It was a major effort remove the sunken ships and reopen the Canal. Egypt managed to do this in several months. The Canal was reopened (April 1957). The Egyotians ran the Canal without any difficulties for 10 years. The allowed ships from all countries to pass--except Israel. The Canal was to be a casualty of the Six-Days War (1967).

Assessment

In the peculiar politics of the Middle East, Although it was invaded and occupied for a time, Nasser could claim a victory. Even though areas of Egypt had been occupied and the Army and Air Force severely damaged, Nasser could claim that Egypt had been attacked by two powerful imperialtic countries and prevailed. Thus the defeat at Israel's hands could be explained away. The Egyptian and Arab publics applauded his standing up to both the Allies and Israel. He was popular before the War, but the War made him a hero throughout the Arab world. In addition, Egypt's possession of the Canal was unquestioned. Nasser proceeded to nationalize all other British and French assets. And the Soviet Union stepped up militaru assistance ad training, more than replacing the military equipment loSt. This the Egyptian and Syrian militaries that Israel would face in 1967 would be much better equipped and trained. But Israel had gained 10 years to prepare for the next round of fighting. The IDF in 1956 was much better equipped than the rag-tag war that had fought the 1848 War for Indeprndence. It was not yet, however, the dominate regional power. By 1967 it would prove that it was.

Sources

Al-Misri (April 12, 1954).

Bickerton, Ian J.and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th edition.

Ereli, Eliezer. " The Bat Galim Case Before the Security Council," Middle Eastern Affairs, (April 1955), pp. 108-09.






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Created: 8:41 AM 10/16/2006
Last updated: 8:41 AM 10/16/2006