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Once accross the Rhine there were no longer any major geographic barriers to the Western Allies. The destruction of the German petrochemical plants and Allied air superorityb meant that the remaining German units were largely imobilized. This was exploited by highly mobile American armoured divisions which rapidly moved into the German hearland, surrounding and reducing any pockets of resistance encountered. Montgomery's units in the north drove towaed the major German ports: Bremen, Hamburg, and Luebeck. The Ninth Army moved toward Muenster and Magdeburg. Within weeks the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland was surround and huge numbers of Germans soldiers surrendered in the Ruhr pocket. The Ninth and First Army executed a giant pinzer movement which encircled the Ruhr--Germany's industrial heart (April 1). Caught in the Ruhr pocket was the German ?? Army. This was the Wehrmach's last significant force in the west. More than 325,000 German soldiers surrendered. The American First Army then moved further east toward Kassel and Leipzig. Patton's Third Army took Frankfurt and then drove east toward Eisenach and Erfurt. The Third Army then took the shatered city of Dresden and then turned south toward Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Sixth Army Group moved into nto Bavaria, taking Munich and Salzburg. The Allies were concerned that the NAZIs would dry to establish a redoubt in the difficult terraine of the Alps of southern Germany and Austria. The Allies did, not, however, moved toward Berlin. This is a matter of ongoing historical debate. Some say that Stalin hoodwinked Eisenhower. The British concerned with the political connotations were interested in striking at Berlin. Montgomery envisuioned a race accross northern Germmany to Berlin. [Chalfont, p. 271] Eisenhower rejected the drive to Berlin. Eisenhower explained later that he saw it as a waist of Allied manpowe to make a potentially costly drive toward Berlin to take ground that was later to be turn over to the Soviets. (The occupation zones had alreadt been determined by political leaders.) German commanders, however, were later to day that they were anxious to surrender to the Americans and could not understand why the Americans did not come. Instead Eisenhower focused on engaging the remaining remnants of the Wehrmacht not positioned around Berlin.
Once accross the Rhine there were no longer any major geographic barriers to the Western Allies. Not only were there no geographic barriers, but the German Autonahns meant that the Allied mobilized units could rapidly fan out throughout Germany. (At the time no other country had a similar highway system.) The destruction of the German petrochemical plants and Allied air superorityb meant that the remaining German units were largely imobilized. This was exploited by highly mobile American armoured divisions which rapidly moved into the German hearland, surrounding and reducing any pockets of resistance encountered.
German manpower resources were exhausted. The Volksturm was created by the NAZIs to defend the Reich. Surrender was not an option as a result of the Holocaust and NAZI attrocities in the East. The Soviets were bent on revenge and the Western Allies were demanding unconditional surrender. Hitler realized that surrender mean exposure of his crimes and almost certain execution. Boys as young as 16 were inducted into the Volksturm. But as in the photograph here, even younger boys fought in the futile defense of the Reich (figure 1).
We can only wonder why younger boys joined. Partly this can be attributed to the effectiveness of NAZI propaganda and the sense of dutu these boys felt. Some of them were recruited from Hitler Youth groups and many boys were coerced by adult leaders. The idea of not deserting their friends was a powerrful tool used by some adult leaders.
Not all German boys were determined to fight in the defense of Germany. In fact some boys cooperated with the Allied soldiers. Here we do not mean the friendly relations that developed between American soldiers and German children during the occupation. Here we mean cooperation during the fishting as Allied armies crossed the border of the Reich. Here our preconceived concept is that msany young Germns were willing to either fight the Allies in the Volkssturm or at least fearfully watched the Allies roll through German once the Rhine River crossings were forced. We do not know how common it was for German boys to cooperate with the Allied soldiers or indeed what their motivation was.
The Allies seized the Remagen Bridge (March 7) and pored in a lodgement on the east bank og the Rhine. Allied units prepared other assaults on the Rhine. The failure of the Rhine barrier must have ended any lingerig doubts Hitler had about the outcome of the War. The Siviet seizure of Silesia confirmed this. He issued his decree "Demolitions on Reich Territory" (March 19). It came to be known as the Nero Decree (Nero Befehl) because Emperor Nero was blamed for the fire destroying much of Rome. The German people had put their confidence in Hitler and loyally stood by the Third Reich through 5 years of unrelenting war. Their reward was the Nero Decree, orders to totally destroy the German econommy. Every thing needed by a midern nation was to be destroyed. Hitler throughout the War was quick to take credit for any German success. He was, however, never willing to accept resonsibility for any failure. In his mind at the end of the War, the German people had failed him, he actusly stated that the German people had "proved themselves unworthy of me." He ordered the destruction of any factory, public works, or other facility that the Allies might find of value. The Decree read in part. "It is a mistake to think that transport and communication facilities, industrial establishments and supply depots, which have not been destroyed, or have only been temporarily put out of action, can be used again for our own ends when the lost territory has been recovered. The enemy will leave us nothing but scorched earth when he withdraws, without paying the slightest regard to the population. I therefore order: 1. All military transport and communication facilities, industrial establishments and supply depots, as well as anything else of value within Reich territory, which could in any way be used by the enemy immediately or within the foreseeable future for the prosecution of the war, will be destroyed." I am not sure the action was taken to punish the German people as is often aledged, but it certainly was issued without any concern for their plight. Hitler actually felt of himself as Germany and with his death Germany would cease to exist. The German people were simply immaterial to him. He gave the order to Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, who later wrote that it was then that I realized he had been serving a madman. Hitler found it difficult to execute the order as even committed NAZIs were not all that anxious to blow up what little remained after the Allied bombing. Speer for his part showed remarkable courage in trying to prevent the order from being carried out.
Montgomery's units in the north drove towaed the major German ports: Bremen, Hamburg, and Luebeck. The Ninth Army moved toward Muenster and Magdeburg.
The Ruhr was the industrial hearland of Germany. The Ruhr had been heavily damaged by the strategic bombing campaign, but some factories were still functioning. Without the Ruhr, Germany could not wage war. After crossing the Rhine Allied forces rush to surroud the Ruhr.
British and Canadian units which crossed in the north movd south and American units who crossed in the south moved north. The U.S. First and Ninth Armies within days of crossing the Rhine executed a giant pincer moveement, linking up at Lippstadt (April 1). The Wehrmacht at this stage of the War was largely immombile. The action cut off the
about 430,000 German soldiers of Army Group B (Heeresgruppe B) which consisted of 21 divisions. This was the Wehrmach's last significant force in the west. Montgomery drive his Nritish and Canadian forces east. Frech and Am=erican forces also headed east, but the 1st and 9th American Armies proceeded to reduce the Ruhr Pocket.
The coordinatedoperations to take the Pocket section by section. They succeeded in dividing the Pocket into a western and easter section (April 12). The maller, eastern section surrendered (April 13). General Bayerlein unconditionally surrender the LIII Armee Korps (April 16). He called further fighting futile and would result in "useless bloodshed." The larger western section held out a few more days, but surrendered (April 18-21). The commander Field Marshall Walther Model did not believe German Field Marshall's surrendered. He shot himself in a forest south of Duisburg. More than 325,000 German soldiers surrendered in the Ruhr Pocket. The American First Army then moved further east toward Kassel and Leipzig. German POWs were confined in the Rheinwiesenlager. The task of caring for such a sizeable number of men proved daunting. There were deaths from starvation and exposure.
Patton's Third Army took Frankfurt and then drove east toward Eisenach and Erfurt. The Third Army then took the shatered city of Dresden and then turned south toward Czechoslovakia and Austria.
The Sixth Army Group moved into nto Bavaria, taking Munich and Salzburg. The Allies were concerned that the NAZIs would dry to establish a redoubt in the difficult terraine of the Alps of southern Germany and Austria.
The Allies did, not, however, moved toward Berlin. This is a matter of ongoing historical debate. Some say that Stalin hoodwinked Eisenhower. The British concerned with the political connotations were interested in striking at Berlin. Montgomery envisuioned a race accross northern Germmany to Berlin. [Chalfont, p. 271] Eisenhower rejected the drive to Berlin. Eisenhower explained later that he saw it as a waist of Allied manpowe to make a potentially costly drive toward Berlin to take ground that was later to be turn over to the Soviets. (The occupation zones had alreadt been determined by political leaders.) German commanders, however, were later to day that they were anxious to surrender to the Americans and could not understand why the Americans did not come. Instead Eisenhower focused on engaging the remaining remnants of the Wehrmacht not positioned around Berlin.
Beavers, Anthony. The Fall of Berlin 1945.
Chalfont, Alun. Montgomery of Alamein (Atheneum: New York, 1976), 365p.
Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.
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