Figure 1.--. |
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Both the British and Germans worked n each others naval codes. The German naval code was one of the highest priorities of British code breakers at Blechly Park. The naval enigma machines proved more difficult to crack than the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe enigmas. The Kriegsmarine was more security conscious. Codes were changed every month and security procedures wre very closely foilowed. Finally the Royal Navy succeeded in taking the German weaher boat Munchen off Norway and with it code books (May 7, 1941). The next dy the Navy took the U-110 and with it a priceless enigma machine (May 8, 1941). The Germans were unaware of this and surprised with the U-boats begn to have trouble locating convoys. The Germans had been sinking an average of 58 merchant vessels monthly, but this fill to 17 in July 1941. The Germans 6 months later changed their enigma machines to include a third encryption wheel (November 1941). This change meant that the Blechley Park Ultra team could no longer read neaval nessages. Until the team again unraveled the emigma code, the Royal Navy was in the dark for much of 1942. It took Ultra code breakers 9 months to begin to read the Germn naval code agaun (July 1942). Eventually it was the Ultra decripts that helped the Allies locate the wolfpacks. This allowed naval authorities to route the convoys and to deploy hunter-killer groups. Ultra also helped located the milch-cow U-boats that kelped the wolf-packs supplied. The Germans also worked on British naval codes. The British introduced Naval Cipher 3 (October 1941). The Germans managed to break the code in 3 months. At the height of the Battle of the Atlantic this provided Doenitz's U-boat fleet invaluable information.
Both the British and Germans worked on each others naval codes. The German naval code was one of the highest priorities of British code breakers at Blechly Park. The naval enigma machines proved more difficult to crack than the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe enigmas. The Kriegsmarine was more security conscious. Codes were changed every month and security procedures wre very closely foilowed. Finally the Royal Navy succeeded in taking the German weaher boat Munchen off Norway and with it code books (May 7, 1941). The next dy the Navy took the U-110 and with it a priceless enigma machine (May 8, 1941). The Germans were unaware of this and surprised with the U-boats begn to have trouble locating convoys. The Germans had been sinking an average of 58 merchant vessels monthly, but this fill to 17 in July 1941. The Germans 6 months later changed their enigma machines to include a third encryption wheel (November 1941). This change meant that the Blechley Park Ultra team could no longer read neaval nessages. Until the team again unraveled the emigma code, the Royal Navy was in the dark for much of 1942. It took Ultra code breakers 9 months to begin to read the Germn naval code agaun (July 1942). Eventually it was the Ultra decripts that helped the Allies locate the wolfpacks. This allowed naval authorities to route the convoys and to deploy hunter-killer groups. Ultra also helped located the milch-cow U-boats that kelped the wolf-packs supplied.
The Germans also worked on British naval codes. The British introduced Naval Cipher 3 (October 1941). The Germans managed to break the code in 3 months (January 1942?). At the height of the Battle of the Atlantic this provided Doenitz's U-boat fleet invaluable information. Bletchely Park learned of the German success and informed the Royal Navy Operations Center (May 1942?). Incredibly the Royal Navy does not change its code for another 10 months (March 1943?). It is unclear why the Royal Navy failed to change the code for such a long period. Some argue that it was incompetence. Beaurecratic inertia may have ben a factor and the complications and cost of implementing new codes. A factor may have been that the Royal Navy was not told of the source of the finding that their codes had been compromised because Ultra was such a cloesly guarded secret.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.
Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941 (1976).
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