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There were hopes for peace at the beginning of the election year. The FMLN offered to participate in elections if the government agreed to postpone them for 6 months, to give them the time neded to prepare a political campign. The Governmentg rejected the demnds. Democrattically conducted presidential elections were held in El Salvador (March 1989). Alfredo Cristiani, a wealthy businessman, of the ARENA party won an impressive first round victory. Also notable was the fact that this was the first time in Salvadoran history that power was transferred from one democratically elected president to another. Numerous people were killed in election-related violence as the country's leftist guerillas refused to take part in the election and staged attacks to disrupt the voting. Still 55 percent of the electorate participated. The election was controversial. Not only because of the left-wing violence, but because there were charges that ARENA was linked to El Salvador’s notorious death squads. The FMLN response was a massive military offensive on the capital, San Salvador (November 1989). The military fought back. One report indicates an estimated 4,000 'leftist sympathizers' were killed. Among the dead were six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter, who were murdered at the Centro Monseñor Romero at the Universidad Centroamerica. The increasingly left leaning American press was not optimistic. [MBC News] Even so, President Cristiani, while not giving into the FMLN, proved a moderating figure. He began engaging the FMLN in the peace process. A factor here was the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany (November 1989). essentially marking the end of the Cold War.
The Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance) was founded by Roberto D'Aubuisson Arrieta who was associated with death squads. ARENA's candidate in the 1989 election, however, was Alfredo Cristiani, a businessman who presented a more moderate image. The American press could not get beyond D'Aubuisson and his reactionary activities. Cristiani campaign provided am imgae of comparative political moderation, support for market capitalism, a policy of reducing but not repeal President Duarte's economic reforms, and a willingness to pursue peaceoptions--even possible negotiations with the FMLN-FDR. ARENA was not united on these policies. The right-wing D'Aubuisson faction wanted to restore--to the old economic order. This meant the economic order and land ownership pattern that existed before the 1980 reforms. Many hard-line Areneros also reportedly favored a 'total war' and military solution. It was called the 'Guatemalan solution. Neigghboring Guatemala also fought a counterinsurgency (mid-1980s). This would have meant expanding the War and more casualties. In the end, it would be the FMLN not ARENA that would opt for total war. D'Aubuisson's reputed ties to right-wing death squads arried with it the specter of expanding human rights violations.
There were hopes for peace at the beginning of the election year. FMLN representatives hinted a degre of flexibility in its negotiation proposals (January). The actual plan they then produced dashed those hopes. Their plan for participating and recognizing results of the presidential election was highly conditional. They stipulated a 6-month postponement of the voting. This was to provide time to prepare an election campaign. Other demands included security guarantees for the CD, a revised Electoral Code, provisions for absentee balloting, and restricting military to their barrcks on election day. The proposal did drop the previous FMLN demand for power -sharing and the integration of guerrilla forces into a reorganoized national military. organization. Outgoing President Duarte rejected the proposal, pointing to its unconstitutional character. It would have meant extending his term past June 1. The U.S. State Department, anxious
to reslove the civil war, expressed an interest-- a spokesman suggested that it was 'worthy of serious and substantive consideration'. Duarte thus kept his options open. A meeting was held in Mexico City (late-February). FMLN leaders Francisco Jovel ('Roberto Roca') and Jorge Shafik Handal and representatives of the major Salvadoran political parties agreed to shorten the postponement demand from 6 to 4 months, but then introduced further demands to restructure the Salvadoran security forces and to reduce the overall military force levels. The Governmentg rejected the additional demands.
Democratically conducted presidential elections were held in El Salvador (March 1989). Alfredo Cristiani, a wealthy businessman, of the ARENA party won a surprising victory, impressive winning amajoriy, negating the expected second round. The ruling Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party--PDC) candidate, Fidel Chávez Mena, garnered only 36 percent of the vote. There was widespread popular disillusionment with the PDC as a result of Duarte's preceived ineffectual rule. The PDC had a strong organizational base and future prpsoects dpning on Cristiani's performance.
Also notable was the fact that this was the first time in Salvadoran history that power was transferred from one democratically elected president to another. Numerous people were killed in election-related violence as the country's FMLN leftist guerillas refused to take part in the election and staged attacks to disrupt the voting. Still 55 percent of the electorate participated. The election was controversial. Not only because of the left-wing violence, but because there were charges that ARENA was linked to El Salvador’s notorious death squads. Cristiani's election had more legitimacy than Duarte's 1984 victory because this time the Democratic Convergence (CD) participatd in the election. The CD ran Guillermo Manuel Ungo Revelo, leader of the FMLN's political arm--the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (Revolutionary Democratic Front--FDR). The CD's disatrous showing of less than 4 percent suggested that the FMLN had very little popular support. This was rarely mentioned in American press reports.
A FMLN terrorist assassinated the country's attorney general (April 19). This meant to President-elect Cristani that negotiation and any attempt at conciliation was fritless. And that the FMNL was going to fight it out. Some observers believed that FMLN would escalate terror attacks to prvoke the extremist Arena right-wing into a repressive actions. This could impair the image of the new administration and improve the popularity of the guerills. It might also affect Congressional support. Any hope for aegotiated settlent was slipping away. Some saw the possivility of another decade of chronic instability and conflict.
Alfredo Cristiani was inagurated with a string mandate (June 1). His electoiral victory was impressive. A first round victory had not been expected. His ARENA Party controlled all three branches of the government. Judicial appointments in El Salvador come from the egislative Assembly. And the appointment of an aggressive chief of the Joint General Staff, Colonel René Emílio Ponce Torres, meant that there would be support from the military. The United States was more of a question. If Congress cur off support as it did in South Vietnam, the FMLN could have won. And some Congressmen were very concerned about ARENA human rights abuses and uncomcerned about what a FMLN victory would mean. Support from President Bush and the majority in Congress, however, meant that American support continued. It is unnknown what would hve occurred during a Carter or Clinton presidency. American offiials, however, made it clear that continued aid was conditioned on Salvadorans efforts to stem human rights abuses. The newpresident's intentions toward the future conduct of the militry campaign was not immeiately apprent. He followed Duarte's position on possible negotiations with the FMLN. "We are willing to talk," he was quoted as saying during the presidential campaign, "but not to negotiate any platform." He insisted that the Salvadoran Constitution and government are established institutions that had to be respected. As a result his position was that the only purpose for negotiation was the method for integrating FMLN into that system. The FMLN leadership, however, showed no interest in this process. They had rejected several times in the past. The poor showing of CD-FDR in the election did nothing to change this.
The FMLN began a series of high-profile attacks. This began with an attack on the home of the commander of the Third Infantry Brigade in San Miguel Department (late-September) FMLN gunmen shot to death the daughter of another army colonel (mid-October). Right-wing paramiliary groups bombed the homes of leftist politicians, including that of Rubén Zamora Rivas, the vice presidential candidate of the CD in the 1989 elections. Another attack targeted the union headquarters, killing ten people and wounding 30 others, a response to a failed FMNL mortar attack on the San Salvador headquarters of the Joint General Staff. Tensions mounted as these attacks continued throughout October.
The FMLN deciced to suspnd peace negotinions with the Critiani dministration and launch massive military offensive on the capital, San Salvador (November 11). Until this offensive,nost of the fighting was in the countryside. Now there was fighting in the capital for the first time. The issued a communique announcing the abandonment of the peace talks and cited the bombing of a union headquarters (October 31). As a union facility was the target, it waspresumably the work of a right-wingparamiloitary group. Sespite the FMNLstatement justifing their offensive -- presumably by a right-wing group--the offensive had clearly been in the planning stages for months prior to that event. The late October seizure by Honduran authorities of a weapons cache in a van en route to El Salvador from Nicaragua strengthened the claims of the Salvadoran armed forces that the Sandinista government continued to provide material aid to the FMLN despite numerous denials of such support from Managua.
The military fought back. One report indicates an estimated 4,000 'leftist sympathizers' were killed.
The bulk of theFMLN effort fell on San Salvador, but they also lunched coordinated attacks in the departments of La Paz, Morazán, San Miguel, Santa Ana, and Usulután. The FMLN fighters stood and fought in several San Salvador neigborhoods. This was a rare event s ausually the FMLN staged hit and run attacks and far from the capital. Some civilians helped the FMLN fighters in building emplacemnts. Most reports claim that theywere pressed into this effort, but some civilians got their hands on weapons and joined the FMLN fighters. Many of these were members of 'popular organizations' (mass organizations). These included labor, human rights, and other groups that were legal fronts associated with the FMLN. Heavy fighting in San Salvador continued for more than a week with substntial casualties on both sides. The Salvadoran military was primarily experienced in rural counterinsurgency. They had little training in city, house-to- house close combat. They turned to air fire support from their helicopters and fixed-wing gunships to destroy FMLN positions. This was a way of limiting their casualties, but greatly increased civilian losses and property destruction. Estimates suggested tht about 1,000 people were killed and 30,000 civilians displaced from destoyed are bdly damged homes. The FMLN fighters briefly occupied some homes in the esclusive Escalón neigborhood. This was an exclusive area of expensive home where the wealthy lived. It was the first time the vilolence had reached the upper class.
The fighting in San Salvador did jnot make huge headlines in the States. But just as the gighting in Sa Salvador was dieing down, a mindless actof violence did. Unidentified gunmen, presumbly right-wing paramilitaries, shot six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter at the Centro Monseñor Romero at the Universidad Centroamerica (November 16). These were not collateral damage fromthe fighting, but untentil murders. The six, including the rector and vice rector of the university, were prominent leftist intellectuals. They sympathized with the FMLN ieology and maitained contacts with them. As a result they were seen as Ccommunists" by the right wing. The shooting took place after curfew imposed by President Cristiani when he imposed a state of emergency (November 12) in an area under Army control. As a result, the military was largely blamed. President Cristiani condemned the shooting and and attended the funeral. The wantin killing and the presumed involvement of military doubts about his control over the army. There was a furor in the Unoited States raised by the U.S. media. Some Congressmen demanded curring suport the Salvasoran military or requiring a thorough investigation. President Cristiani announced the result of the ensuing investigation (January 7, 1990). The investigation conducted with the assistance of police officials from Britain, Spain, and the United States found that the military personnel were involved. The Goverment arrested nine members of the army (a colonel and four lieutenants). The leader was Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, commander of the Captain General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy. He was a member of the same graduating class (the so-called Tandona, or big class) as the chief of the Joint General Staff, Colonel Ponce. This meant that they were personally close. Reports sufaced that that some officers wee outraged that Co. Ponce was 'betraying'" a fellow officer in the middle of a war by acquiescing in Benavides's detention.
Colonel Benavides and the lieutenants were the first Salvadoran officers prosecuted for human rights abuses.
NBC News. "Alfredo Cristiani Wins El Salvador Presidential Election". The controversial and anticipated presidential election in El Salvador has yielding a victory for Alfredo Cristiani. Many believe he has ties to Roberto D'Aubuisson, a leader of the infamous death squads and
leader of political party ARENA. (March 20, 1989).
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