Figure 1.--Asia at the time of World War II had economies based on agriculture. Japan was the only industrial country, although the Japanese were industrializing northern Korea which they had seized (1909). As brutal as the Japanese were, the real killer in Asian during World War II was famine and most of it was the direct result of Japanese war and occupation policies. The only exception was Indian Bengal, but even there it was because of the Japanese invasion of Burma. Agriculture throughout Asia was very basic. As a result crop yields were low and in the best of times populations were living on a knife edge. The Japanese invasions of China and other occupied araes well over that knife edge. Here we see Chinese peasant hildren during the war. *There is a Chinese text on the back. Note the girls seems to hsve bound feet. This combined with incredible Japanese brutality created a perfect storm that caused a series of famine of epic proportions--at least until Mao after the war launched the Great Leap Foreard.

As horrendous as the food situation was in Europe, the situation in Asia was even worse. Some 15 million people, probably more, died of hunger and realted diseases because of terrible famines in Japanese occupied Asia. And this does not include the 5 million or more people who perished in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) during the Japanese occupation which we address in the Oceania section. Smaller but not inconsequential numbers of people died in other countries. The primary cause was the Japanese seizure of food which not only denied food to the local population, but discouraged overall food production. Another factor was incompetent Japanese occupation policies. The Japanese got it into their head that each area of their new empire should feed itself -- even though this was not the case before the War. This was partly the result of launching the War with an inadequate maru fleet (merchant vessels). But the Japanese applied this principle even in areas where there was local transport available such as French Indo-China. The result was terrible famines. Another horrendous famine occurred in Bengal, part of the British colony of India. Before the war, Bengal importeng food from Burma. After Japan seized Burma, terrible famine developed in Bengal. Food also becme a terrible problem in China. The Nationlists developed this relatively well intil a comination of Japanese conquest (including food producing areas) and refugees fleeing the Japanese (incraaing the food demand) combined to create famine conditions. Food was not only a problem for the people occupied by the Japanese. None of the Axis countries were prepared to wage an extended war. The most illprepared and vulnerable was Japan. Not only did it have an industrial base a fraction of that of the United States, but it lacked raw materials and an adequate agriculyural sector. And it was also highly dependent on imported food. Seizing China and the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ) was part of the ratinale for war. Within a year of Pearl Harbor, however, the American submarine campaign began to reduce the already inadequate Japanese maru fllet. This meant that the expected shipments of food and raw materials began to rapidly decline. This affected both isolated Japanese garisons and the population on the Home Islands. And as the War continued this situation became worse and worse for the Japanese. At the end of the War, Japanese soldiers were starving throughout the Pacific. And at home the population was reduced to starvation diets. If the War had not ended when it did, the Japanese people themselves would have begun starving in large numbers-- like the people in the countries they had occupied. Only American food shipments prevented this.

China

Food was a major attraction drawing Japan into China. Japan was not slf sufficent in food and needed to import rice and other food stuffs. China across the East China Sea beckoned as a seeminly ineeaustable source of not only raw materials, but food as well.China also offered a market for Japan's expanding industrial economy. Manchuria and Korea only wetted the Japanese ppetite for acuiring sources of raw material and food. And developments in Europe meant that there were few allies that China could turn to help resit the Japanese. Food would proive to be central to the Chinese war effort. Million of Chinese peaants lived on a razor edge of survival, producing just enough to feed themselnes. Thus any decline in production could have dire consequences for the Chinese people. The Nationalist Government did a reasonably good joib of managing food production and distribution in th immeciate afytermath of the Japanese invasion. And at first the Japanese primarily occupied northern China and coastal areas arojnf Shanghai and the major ports. Ax the war dragged on, howeber, the situation worsened. The Japanese seized more inland areas, inckuding important agricultural areas. They also seized food to feed their huge army in China. Shipments make to the Home Islands, one of the goals of invading Chinahowever, proved disappoining. The Japanese advances in China removed sunstantial important agricultural areas from Nationalist comtrol. This mean that the Governmrnt had less food at its disposl at th same time that refugees fleeing the rapacious Japanese flooded into Nationlist areas increasing the mouths to be fed with declining harvests. The Natinalists were unable to even feed its armies properly, let alone the civilian population and refugees. The result in the last years of the war was famine and starbation. Unlike Britain, America had no way to get food into China. The Japanese had cut the Burma Road (1942). Military sypplies were flown in over the Hump, but there wa no way to get in large quantities of food, The Nationalists had to use draconian measures to seize food from the peasantry. The Comminists did to, but wigh more circumspection. The brutality of the Nationslist Army would poroive to be a major factor in the Communist victory after the war. Some food arrived with the opening of the Ledo Road (January 1945). The quantities were, however, very limited. Only with the Japanese surrender (August 1945) and the opning of Chinese ports did American food ship,mrnts begin to reach China in quantity.

Burma

Burma was a hugely productive agriculture country, part of the Southeast Aian rice bowkl which included French Indochina. The Japanese conquest of Burma (1942) was aisater for Bengal. Before the war, much of the rice feeding Bebgal came from Burma. The Japanese conquest meant that this vital resource was suddenly cut off. Crop failures in Korea caused the Japanese to purchase rice in Southeast Asia. Purchases in Indo-China were substantial and the Japanese essentially did not have to pay for them after seizing first North Indo-China (1940) and then the all important rice producing area pf (South Indo-China). Southeast Asia after the crop failures un Korea came to provide thr-fourths of the Japanese rice inorts. After launching the war, getting rice from Burma proved more difficult. This had to be done by sea and unlike the Pacificm control of the Indian Ocean was not as secure as the Pacific and after Midway declined even more. This was one reason the Japanese decided to build the Thai-Burma Railway. Military supplies could be shipped securely to the troops in Burma and rice the other way for shipment to Japan. Despite the availability of food and the importance of the project. The Japanese srarved the Allied POWs and Burmese workers. A dissappointing Japanese and Korean harvest in 1942 intensified efforts to increase to secure supplies from from Southeast Asia, but there was no way of getting the Burmese crop to ports in Indo-China so the Japanese focused on the Indo-China crop and to a lesser extent the Thai crop. The Japanese were never able to utilize the Burmese crop and even the Thai and Indo-China crop became increasingly out of reach as the U.S. submarine cmpaign became increasingly effective (1943). The 1942-43 harvest was the last time the Japanese were able to secure important rice supplies fromn Southeast Asia. [Johnston, pp. 138-40.] The Japanese made a substantial military effort in Burma, but it afforded them vurtually nothing in food and raw material which was the goal of the War.

French Indo-China

As in other parts of the expnded Japanese Empire, food shortahes quickly developed in French IndoChina, especiallin North Vietnam. The initial cause was the Japanese seizure of food which not only denied food to the local population, but discouraged overall food production. In North Vienam the incompetent Japanese occupation policies. The Japanese got it into their head that each area of their new empire should feed itself--even though this was not the case before the War. This was partly the result of launching the War with an inadequate maru fleet (merchant vessels). But the Japanese applied this principle even in areas where there was local transport available such as French Indo China. The result was terrible famines. Before the War, the food surplus from the south and the incresible rich Mekong Delta was shipped north to the heavily populated north. The Japanese stopped this and people in the north began to starve. There is no exact accunt, but 5 million Vietnamese may have peridhed even while Japanese wearhouses were brimming with food. (Because of the American submarine campaign, the food seized from the Vietnamese could not be shipped home.)

India

Another horrendous famine occurred in Bengal, part of the British colony of India. Before the war, Bengal importing food from Burma. After Japan seized Burma, terrible famine developed in Bengal.

Japan

Japan before the War sought to raise agricultural production by imprioving methods, but the miltarists who dominated the govrnment refused a land refirmn that would transfter land tenure from landlors to the peasantry. (The pressure of the War would evebntually force land reform, but it was not until after the Waer abnd American occupation that the peasantry reaped any benefits.) Japan went to War primarily to secure raw materials, especially oil, but food was another item sought in the coveted Southern Resource Zone (SRZ). The Japanese set about seizing available food supplies. These seizures and occupation policies which discouraged farmers from planting caused shortages eve in colonies that before the War prodiced huge uantities of rice ad other foods. And they pursued a policy of aurtrky, expecting each area of its new empire to produce its own food. As a result, of this and military seizure of shipping, cut off traditional food defecit areas from food surplus areas. Japanese policies caused severe food shortages in occupied areaa and deadly famines in parts of Burma, Dutch East Indies, Indochina (Vietnam), and other areas. The American submarine campaign by 1943 was making it difficult to ship rice and other food from the SRZ back to the Home Islands. The American blockade and a poor harvest had Japan on the verge of famine in he final months of the War. Children were set into the countrysideto protect them grom the bombing and to provided needed farm labor. The situation wasfurther exacerbated by the American bombing, disripting the transport system. Japan was essentially saved from one of the terrible famines it caused in occipied areas and the starvation of millions by the American atomic bombs, forcing the country to surrender.

Korea

Thailand

Sources

Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Books: New York, 1962), 634p.

Johnston, Bruce F. Japanese Food Management in World War II.

Created: 5:12 AM 4/26/2013
Last updated: 12:47 PM 7/29/2016