The Berlin Air Lift: Magnitude--Food and Fuel

Figure 1.--Stalin ordered the land lines into West Berlin closed at the beginning of summer (June 1948), but by Winter it was Soviet-controlled East Berlin that was suffering from food hotage, not blockaded West Berlin. The press cation here read, "Berlin's Growing Army of Hungary Children: The horror that was war, can esily be matched by the horror of recovery for German children for German children in the Soviet sector of Berlin, weakened by lack of sufficient food. Many German parents are sending their children into the american sectorof Berlin to beg for food as a last resort against the slow death they are experiencing at home. The fces of the two children (above) who came into the American one tired and hunfary wearing rags and learning too early in life that food too belongs to the victors. This slowly growing army of childrn are fed when possible, but the next mealtime finds theem forced to beg for their food and a chance to sleep in some one's hallway." The photograph was dated January 21, 1949. Photographer: Allyn Baum. Here the journalist writing the caption was wrong about ine thing. Food was not scarce in East Berlin because the Soviet vuictors were keeping it for themslves. Food was scarce because of the ineffiencies of Soviet collectivized agriculture.

West Berlin required a bare minimun of about 4,000 tons of supplies daily just to survive. Food and coal were given the priority. Coal was needed in particular to maintain the electrical generators. Food was one thing, but flying in coal seemed like a major obstacle. Clay initially estimated the most the U.S. Air Force could deliver was about 700 tons. This was based on American aircraft immediately available in Europe. Clay and his advisors assmed that the diplomats would sort out the problem in a few weeks. The Soviets calculated it was impossible to supply an entire system by air. Stalin's World War II experience told him that a large military garrison, nmely the Germn 6th army in stalingrad, could not be supplied by air. Supplying an entire city was an absurdity. As a result, when the diplomts filed, the Allies had to begin thinking about a long term, large scale effort. Before the Air Lift, the food situation in East and West Berlin was not greatly different. With the land lines closed, the people of West Berlin had no way of obtaining food. The Allies named the effort to supply West Berlin, 'Operation Vittles'. Supplying food to the 2 million people of West Berlin was a daunting undertaking and it had to begin with no prior planning. Foirtunately for Berliners, the Soviets began restricting access a few months earlier and Gen. Clay had begun taking counter measures as part of a secret plan to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. . Soviet authorities informed the Western Allies that of planned restrictions on Western military and civilian passenger traffic between the American, British and French German occupation zones and Berlin (March 25). [Miller, p. 20.] These restructions went into effect (April 1). The Soviets also announced that thy would not permit cargos to leave Berlin by rail without permission from the Soviet commander in Berlin. The Soviets insisted on searching every departing train and truck. Gen. Clay responded by ordering that military trains be halted rather than permit Soviet inspection (April 2). He also ordered that supplies to the Berlin grrison begin to be delivered by air. This vecame known as the 'Little Air Lift'. The Soviets in respone began to limit restrictions on Allied military trains (April 10). They continued, however, to occassionally interrupt rail and road traffic for the next 2 months. Gen. Clay decided to continue supplying the merican military garrison by air. [Miller, p. 26.] The outcome of all of this was some 20 flights a day which helped build up stocks of food against possible Soviet actions. As a result, there were some 18 days supply of major food types stockpiled when Stalin closed the land routes to the city. [Miller, p. 27-28.] This gave Gen. Clay and the U.S. Air Force a precicious few day to organize what became the Berlin Air Lift. Gen. Clays staff working with West Berlin authorities estimted that the city's daily food ration would be 646 tons of flour and wheat; 125 tons of cereal; 64 tons of fat; 109 tons of meat and fish; 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes; 180 tons of sugar; 11 tons of coffee; 19 tons of powdered milk; 5 tons of whole milk for children; 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking; 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables; 38 tons of salt; and 10 tons of cheese. This meant something over 1,500 tons were needed daily to supply West Berlin with just a basic food ration. Fuel primarily coal would ultimately be the biggest problem because of the quantity required-some 2,000 tons daily. But there there were larger stockpiles of coal on hand as it was not a perhisable commodity. It would be food thazt was the most immedite problem. What the Soviets considered to be impossible ultimately not only matetialized, but food thanks to the air lift and despite the blockade would be more available in West Berlin than Soviet controlled East Berlin. West Berlin would become the only beseiged city in history in which food became more available during the seige than before it. It would be the Soviets bczuse of the ineffifencies inherent in Communism that would have difficulty suppying their sector with food.

Sources

Miller, Roger Gene. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (Texas A&M University Press: 2000).

Created: 7:20 AM 7/19/2017
Last updated: 7:20 AM 7/19/2017