The United States Navy: Inter-War Naval Construction (1920s-30s)
Figure 1.--The United States begimming with the Roosevelt Administratiom (1902) began a huge nacal construction program that proplelled the United States to tht top ranks of navai power, achiebing parity with the Royal Navy. This rapid expansion endedd with the Washing Naval Traeties 1922). The Traries saved money, but it meant that the United Srtatares could not establish naval domimamce overr Japam which coulkd nnot afford to match American spending. Amother impact of the Traties was that they facilitated the birth of baval aviation. The Treaties mean that several vapiral ship hulls could not bbe finished. This mean that hulss were availableb gor conversion to carriers. One was the 'Uss Saratoga' seen here about 1930.
Many naval vessels were decommissioned during the 1920s. The Washington Naval Treaties had placed limits on fleet capacity and Congress severely restricted all military spending. Franklin Roosevelt like his cousin Theodore began his Washington career as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He served during World War I. As President he took a interest in naval affairs, but his initial policy was limiting military spending to focus on the Depression. Developments in Asia and Europe forced a change in priorities. The first military response to Japanese militarism and NAZI military expansion was renewed naval construction. The Washington Naval Treaties did not limit aircraft carriers like battleships. Naval commanders continued to see battleships s the Navy's principal strike force. Even so, the Navy did create a significant carrier arm in the inter-war period. President Roosevelt faced strong opposition to his naval buildup from a powerful pacifist-isolationist lobby. The politics of defense spending was complicated and President Roosevelt had a difficult juggling act. Liberal democrats who supported the New Deals social program were not as enthusiastic about defense spending. Conservative Southern Democrats who were supportive of defense spending were not as enthusiastic about New Deal social programs. In particular, efforts to pursue civil rights or immigration reform would alienate the Southern Democrats the President needed to gain Congressional approval for defense spending. The naval vessels built during this period, however, especially the carriers were the heart of the fleet that after Pearl Harbor managed to stop the Japanese expansion in the Pacific until a vast new fleet could be built to win the War.
Wilson Administration (1912-21)
The Wilsom Administration had been in office when the War broke oit in Europe. President Wilson hoped to keep America our of the War, but even before the War launcheds a massive program of fleet modernization and expamsion (1916). And upon entering the War approived a massive new ship construction program. After the War, the United States and other countries had the problen of what to do with the hige nimbers of ships built to win the war. Mant were scrapped and karge numvers were mothballed for possivle use un future war emergenies, The vGermans as part of the Versailles Treaty had to rurn nost od their shios over to the Allies. They pretended vto do so, but instraad scullted many of them in Scappa Flow. Planners cin all navies began to think about furure needs and fore structure. The big-gun admirals were the most influential, but some were enthusistic about the future of naval aviation and carriers. U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm. William Shepherd Benson (1855 – 1932), a big-gun enthuiast was not at all interested in aviation. He attempted to abolish naval aviation because he could not 'conceive of any use the fleet will ever have for aviation.' Franklin Roosevelt, still Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was imporessedby by the aviation visionaries and reversed Benson's decision. [Underwood. p. 11.] Of cpurse it is easy to second guess Benon with our prespective of history. But given that any navy's largest problem is finding eneny forces in ocean vastnesses. It is difficult to understand why Benson could see any use for aviation. The Wilson Administration's 1919 plan for naval building was to pursue a program to make the United States the world's most powerful navai poweer, essintially replacing the Royal Navy. Congress rejected it because of the cost.
After World War I, the British Royal Navy was no longer able to play its traditional role in controlling the seas. Nruitain was babkrupted by the Wae and no molonger had the economic strength to support the ovewghaealing bacal strength to do so. The German Navy was dismantled. The United States was concerned about the rising power of Japan, a World War I ally. American officials were especially concerned with Japan's designs on China. As part of the World War I settlement, Japan received several Pacific Island territories, former German bases. To prevent a naval arms race the United States sponsored the Washington Naval Conference. The resulting treaties were strongly resented by Japanese nationalists and the military.
Republican Administrations (1921-33)
The Harding Admisnustration sought to sdeline British and Jpanese inistives that would have led to continued commpetitive naional naval building programs. To avoid that, the Harding Adminustration sucessfully concluded the Washington Naval Treaties, limiting vessel construction. The resulting Treaties placed limits on fleet capacity and Congress severely restricted all military spending. This seens a reasonable arrangement in the 1920s when except for the Soviet Union no country was engahed in large-scale military spending. This had one positive conseuence for naval aviation. This incouraged the development of light cruisers and aircraft carriers. The Navy's first carrier, was a converted collier renamed the USS Langley commissioned (1922). It was followed by USS Lexington(1925) and USS Saratoga (1927) which were designed as battlecruisers until the Treaty limits were esrablished. The Navy established the Bureau of Aeronautics (1921) It was decided to refer to naval aviators as members of the United States Naval Air Corps. [Howarth, pp. 341–42.] An imprtant aspect of naval construction is not just about how many vessekls were built, but what typrs of vessels. And in the 1920s a heated debate was underway throughout th military on the value of aviation. Army airman Gen. Billy Mitchell. mow regasrded as the father of the U,S. Aur Force, challenged the Navy by demonstrating that heavily armored navakl bessels could be destroyed by land-based bombers (1921). He kater destroyed his career by publicly accusing senior Army and Navy of for incompetence for their 'almost treasonable administration of the national defense'. [Wildenberg] This led to his court martial. Work began on a fourthy carrier, the first purpose built carrier, but it was not a priority and it took nearly a decade to reach the fleet (1934). Despite being desiugned up as carriuer, it proved less capbable than Lexington and Saratoga. Ranger was designed before repprts from Lexington and Saratoga began to give the Navy important information non carrier design.
The U.S. Navy was not prepared for World War II, but of all the services it was probably the best prepared. The Treaty Navy in the 1920s was limited by arms limitations treaties and Congressional resistance to defense spending. As a result, the United States began the 1930s with a sizeable fleet of battleships which were seen as the key capital ships. The American battleships were, however, were World War I-era ships. The Navy was badly in need of modernization Most of the battleships sunk at Pearl were older classes from World War I and early 1930s. The failure of efforts to renew the Washington Arms Treaties at the London Talks, because the Japanese wanted to expand naval construction, meant that America had to proceed with the expansion and modernization of the fleet. Franklin Roosevelt like his cousin Theodore began his Washington career as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He served during World War I. As President he took a interest in naval affairs, but his initial policy was limiting military spending to focus on the Depression. Developments in Asia and Europe forced a change in priorities. The first military response to Japanese militarism and NAZI military expansion was renewed naval construction. The Washington Naval Treaties did not limit aircraft carriers like battleships. The Navy would begin to construct newer and larger classes of battleships and innovative air craft carriers. President Roosevelt was a strong proponent of a strong Navy. Funds were at first limited by the New Deal's focus on social spending. The United States also began improving their submarine fleet from the small S types to the larger fleet classes that had the range to operate in the Pacific Ocean. Naval construction still left the U.S. Navy dangerously inferior to the Imperial Fleet in the Pacific, but just strong enough to contain the Japanese in the Pacific and keep the Atlantic life lines to Britain open until a massive wave of new ships from American shipyards could reach the fleet (1943).
Politics of Naval Spending
President Roosevelt faced strong opposition to his naval buildup from a powerful pacifist-isolationist lobby. The politics of defense spending was complicated and President Roosevelt had a difficult juggling act. Liberal democrats who supported the New Deals social program were not as enthusiastic about defense spending. Conservative Southern Democrats who were supportive of defense spending were not as enthusiastic about New Deal social programs. In particular, efforts to pursue civil rights or immigration reform would alienate the Southern Democrats the President needed to gain Congressional approval for defense spending. It is not accident that some critics of the New Deal complain that Roosevelt did not act on civil rights and emigration.
The immediate problem for the U.S. Navy after World War I was to decommission naval vessels. The U.S. Navy like those of every other navy were convinced that the next naval war would be won by big-gun battle ships.
The Washington Naval Treaties did not limit aircraft carriers like battleships. Naval commanders continued to see battleships s the Navy's principal strike force. Even so, the Navy despite severe budgetary constraints did create a significant carrier arm in the inter-war period. The Navy also created an important submarine force. Both the carriers and submarines were considered support arms of a fleet centered on battleships. They would prove to be the two most important striking forces of the fleet in the upcoming war.
World War II Naval Force
It is often said that wars are won or lost before they begin as a result of preparations before the war. The United States was unprepared for World War II even though it had been raging for two years before America entered the war. The area that the United States was best prepared was the Navy. The stunning Japanese carrier strike on Pearl Harbor, destroyed or sunk the heart of the Pacific fleet--eight battleships.
The naval vessels built during the inter-War era, especially the carriers, became the force that would have to fend off the massive Imperial Navy until a vast new fleet could be built to win the War. The Japanese used their fleet to seize a huge new empire. They failed at what should have been their primary objective, to complete the destruction of the U.S. Navy. The Japanese had a more powerful carrier force with better trained air groups and superior aircraft. Here a muddled strategic vision on the part of the Japanese and a more sound strategic concept and superior intelligence on the part of American naval commanders proved decisive. Not only did the American commanders successfully fend off the Japanese with their six large carriers, but they delivered a decisive blow at Midway that severely reduced the power of the Imperial Fleet. This bought the time that America needed
Sources
Howarth, Stephen (1999). To Shining Sea: a History of the United States Navy, 1775–1998 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).
Underwood, Jeffery S. The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1941 (1991).
Wildenberg, Thomas. "Billy Mitchell takes on the Navy," Naval History (2013) Vol. 27, No. 5.
