Figure 1.--The Germans with their early victories convinced themselves that they had war-winning aircraft and technology. The Luftwaffe did well in France, but more because of Allied tactics than aircraft superiority. TYhe British squadrons were all Huricanes. Churchill ordered Spitfire squadrond based in England to engage for the first time to protect the men on the beaches at Dunkirk. This is Spitfire N3200 flown from RAF Duxford and shot down at Sangatte, near Calais while defending the men at Dunkirk (May 26, 1940). After the evacuastion, it became something of a tourist attraction. Locals and German soldiers came to see it, notice the German soldier here. The Spitfire astonished Luftwaffe pilots like Adolf Guland (who in a confrontastion with Göring asked for a squadron of Spitfires). The Luftwaffe technicians, however, ignoired it and just left it on the beach. They never took it back to Germany to investigate it. The tides soon covered it over with sand. In contrast the British carefully evaluated the host of Germans plnes shot down. Luftwaffe attitudes changed as the War progressed, but at this critical stage of the War, the Germans arrogabnly believed that the British possedd no technology of real interest.
One of the fascinating phenomenon of World War II is that Germany not only began the War with the most modern and effective aircraft in the world aircraft, but also ended the War with the most modern aircraft. But during the War when it really counted, Germany was an aviation black hole. The only plane of real importance that Germany introduced was the FW-190, a superb fighter which for a short period threatened to reverse the Allied developing air superiority (1942). How is it possible that Germany technology was so advanced at the beginning and end of the war, but not during the War. It all comes back to primarily one person Reich Marshall Herman Göring. He was Hitler's closest intimate and given to of the most important jobs that would determine the success of failure of the German war effort--command of the Luftwaffe and management of the German economy meaning the Four Year Plan. (Economic management also affected the air war in that industrial introduction was a major part of who would win the air war.) Either of those assignments would have been a mind-boggling undertaking for any individual, Göring spent much of his time regaling in his wealth. The enormity of his mistakes can easily be seen in the fact that something like half of German industriual output was devoted to the air war. During the critical Battle of Britain, he devoted much if his attention to stealing art from terrified French Jews. His failure in both assignments was arguably the primary reason that Germany lost the War. The enormity of his mistakes can easily be seen in the fact that something like half of the German war economy was dervoted to aviation. Germany lat first led in modern aircraft because the pre-NAZI government gave considerable attention to the civilian aircraft industry which was allowed under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. This meant that Hitler had an established aviation industry and considerable technical skills at his disposable. When he became Chancellor (1933) he turned on the money taps . At the same time, the Western democracies were severely restricting military spending. Britain and France tried to appease Hitler rather than even match NAZI spending. The result was that Hitler acquired the most advanced air force in the world, playing major role in the early German victories. It was, however, a very specialized air force, largely focused on ground support. This was a war-wining tactic against Germany' neighbors, however, proved to be a liability as the war evolved and the the Panzers reached the Channel (May 1940). But rather than building on their huge advantage. Hitler after the fall of France believing that he had won the War, decided to reduce development of new aircraft without immediate benefit. Göring did not object, but was responsible for anthrax huge mistake. He appointed a close friend and another World War I fighter pilot to head the development of new aircraft. Udet was a flashy playboy without the lest understanding of aviation technology. He is arguably the greatest idiot of the War. He was enamored with dive bombing. Dive bombing was important in World War, II but because of the huge stresses involved was only feasible with small aircraft like the Ju-87 Stuka and American Dauntless SBD. Udet incomprehensibly wanted all German bombers to have dive bombing capabilities, including four engine heavy bombers. He severely damaged the promising Ju-88, but the He-177s and Me-210s were real disasters. (The Me-210 fighter actually required a fighter escort.) At the onset of gthe war, the Germns arriogabtly velieved that no air force in the wirld could mastch their technology. The British almost entered the war with bi-wing fihers. But he Huicanes and Spitfired arrived just in time. And the Lufwaffe ignored the British Chinm Home radar network. When Göring eventually recognized the damage Udet had done, he turned on him. Udet committed suicide (November 1941). (Of couse Udet in a suiside note in true NAZI style blamed his demise on the Jews.) His influence on aircrft development meant that the Germans had almost no new aircraft in the critical period when the outcome of the War was decided (1942-43). Because of NAZI arrogance and Udet's incompetence, the Germans woukd fight the War wityhout a heavy bomber and innovative new aurcraft arrived to late to have any impact. But even Udet could not destroy the tremendous technical brilliance of German aviation companies. As a result Germany led in the development of jets. Hitler delayed the process, but at end if the War, Germany had effective jet fighters and bombers, fortunately for mankind, it was too late. In part t because of the Allied strategic bombing campaign and shortage of raw materials, Germany could not produce aircraft in the numbers needed to have any real impact on the War. NAZIn incompetence in the Luftwaffe leadership stasbds in sharp contrast to RAF leaders like Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding.
