Figure 1.--This image shows a London street scene during the Blitz. The damage has been cleaned up. Wewould guess that the photograph was taken about November 1940. HItler was convinced that bombing London would crack the will of the British people abd force the Government to come to terms. It did not. It was instead, an incredible waste of valuable military resources that could not be weasily reolaced. Leveling home, apartment, and shops did not assist the Luftwaffe in defeating the Rotal Air Force. In fact as the German bombers had to come further north, their fighter esorts could not stay with them. This allowed the British fighters to press their attcks on the vulnerable bombers. Rathr than ending the cmapaign, Luftwaffe losses soared.

Terror bombing was not a new phenomenon to World War II. The Germans in World War I use Zephlin and Gotha Bomber raids to attack London and other British cities. They had no impact on the war, but after the War in an era of military budget cut, motivated the British to build the world's first air defense system, the Chain Home System which would be key to the British victory in the Battle of Britain. The first terror raids associated with World War II were conducted by the Japanese, most prominately bombing Shanghai after the Chinese there protested Japanese actions and attacked Japanese officials. The Germans would be the first to institute terror raids in Europe. Their first terror raid was in Spain (1936) and then Hitler threaten the Czechs with the destruction of Prague (1939). With the onst of the war there were multiple terror raids: Warsaw (1939), Rottersam (1940), London (1940), and Belgrade (1941). Terror bombing conformed perfectly with Hitler inclination for brutality. We are not sure about his peronal involvement in all of these raids, but we know he was involved with threantning the Czechs, bombing London, and Belgrade. Moscow and Stalingrad are other examples. A question arrises,was terrot bombing effective. The Allies (British and Americans) built strategic bombing forces far beyond the capacity of the Germansand Jpanese. And exponentially a far greater tonnage of bombs were dropped on German cities than the Germans dropped in the war. This raises the question as to what extent the Allied strategic bombing campaign can be called terror bombing. Does the fact that the Japanese and Germans began the War and began the indescriminate bombing of cities affect the legitimacy of the immense Allied use of force?. And do the Japanese and German goals in the War affect the legitimate use of force?

World War I

Strategic bombing was not new to World War II. The first strategic bombing campaign was the German World war I campaign aimed at knocking Britain out of the War. The Germans who had expected another quick victory by their well prepared army, were shocked to be stopped at the Marne and the Generals realized by 1915 that they would be unlikely to crack open the Western Front. Given mounting losses and shortages at home as a result of the Allies naval blockade, the Generals realized that aar of attrition was not likely to end in a German victories., The Germans thus turned to technology: poison gas, U-boats, and aerial bombing. The Germans believed that strategic bombing was a possible way to bring the war to a succesful conclusion (1915). At first the Kaiser ordered that the raid be confined to military targets. The generals at first may have believed that this was possible, but it very quickly became obvious that with the technology at hand that it was not. And as the Kaiser lost influence, the genrals adopted the strategy of breaking British civilian morale. And civilians wee terrified, but did not crack. The British after a year of Zeppelins raids developed methods to shoot down the slow, vulnerable Zeppelins. The Germans after sustaining heavy losses retired the Zeppelins, but then introduced the faster Gotha bombers. This time the goal from the onset was to break British civilian morale. The impact was just the opposite. The preceived savagery of the German attacks actually increased support for the War and a desire to punish the Germans. The most significant impact of the German campign ws to instill a fear of aerial bombardment. Thus while the British slashed military budgets, money was found to reserch and develop air defenses. thus when German bombers arrived a second time (1940), the Chain Home Network was operating to help defend Britain.

Axis Bombing

The first terror raids associated with World War II were conducted by the Japanese (1931). This was of course before the NAZIs seized power and the Axis allince formd. Japan most prominately bombed Shanghai after the Chinese there protested Japanese actions in Manchuria and attacked Japanese officials. The Italians followed with terrror bombing in Ethiopian (1935). The Germans would be the first to institute terror raids in Europe. Their first terror raid was in Spain (1936) and then Hitler threaten the Czechs with the destruction of Prague (1939). With the onset of the war there were multiple terror raids: Warsaw (1939), Rottersam (1940), London (1940), and Belgrade (1941). Terror bombing conformed perfectly with Hitler inclination for brutality. We are not sure about his peronal involvement in all of these raids, but we know he was involved with thretening the Czechs, bombing London, and Belgrade. Moscow and Stalingrad are other examples. And German air power was a major factor in convincing the Czechs, Dutch, and Yugoslavs to surrender and convincing the French not to continue the War. Here an exchange between Primier Reynard and Gen Pétain is pertinent. :General, you think we are facing the old Kasser, what we are facing now is Atilla." The French chose not to have Paris and their other beautiful cities destroyed. Notably these countruies also faced advancing German ground forces. In fact, the Luftwaffe did not have a strategic bombing capbility. Luftwaffe bombers were designed to support for tactical operations. They could execute terror raids and do great damage, but they did not have the ability to destroy defended cities by air. (The same was also true of Germany's Axis partners Italy and Japan.) The Blitz damaged British cities, but in the process it seriously weakened the Luftwaffe because it was not destined for strategic bombing. A poor military trade off in that it affected the Luftwaffe's ability to support the coming German invasuon of the Soviet Union.) The Czechs, Poles, Dutch, and Yugoslvs had no means to respond to the German terror raids. The British did. And the Blitz would teach the British a great deal about strategic bombing and how to destroy enemy cities. It also ignited a burning desire to do just that. Shortly after becoming Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Arthur Harris asked Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal to join him on the roof of the Air Ministry to observe the NAZI Blitz. The Old City surounding St. Paul's was in flames. They watched without comment for a while. Harris remembers speaking first, 'Well ... they are sewing the wind." 【Harris】 Portal was Chief of the Air Staff for most of the War and would strongly support Harris and the Strategic Bombing Campaign. And the British air campaign would be no mere terror raids, it would be a strtegic campaign of unoprecedented proportions to destroy NAZI Germany's ability to wage war.

Allied Bombing

The Allies (British and Americans) built strategic bombing forces far beyond the capacity of the Germans and Japanese. And exponentially a far greater tonnage of bombs were dropped on German and Japanese cities than the Germans and Japanese dropped in the war. Modern woke critics try to create a non -existent equivalency between Axis and Allied bombing. The Allied bombing varies in duration. For the Germans it was an extended period, for the Japanese only about 6 months. The Japanese thought thast they couldnot be reached by any bombing force. And for most if the War they were right. This all raises the question as to what extent the Allied strategic bombing campaign can be called terror bombing. Does the fact that the Japanese and Germans began the War and began the indescriminate bombing of cities affect the legitimacy of the immense Allied use of force? Does defence from a ruthless aggressor nation affect the legitinm=macy of the biombing? And for the Germans it was not just indescriminate bombing, genocide consucted through a wide range of killing operations was a prinmary war goal. For the Germans it was not all terror bombing. Many German bombing missions had legitimate military targets. For the Japanese it was virtually all terror bombings. Rarely was there a legitimate target. PearlHarbor of course was an exception. Often the Allies, especially the Amricans bombing during the day, had specific, legitimate targetrs. The British bombing at night has no way of hitting specifuc targets away from the coast. The inaccuracy of high-level bombing often meant that there was only limited differences between American 'percession' bombing and British area bombing. But the overiding issue here is that the German and Japanese war goals was mass murder, which has to affect the legitimacy of the use of force?

Effectiveness

A question arrises, was terror bombing effective? This varrid. It certainly worked for the Germans. The Czechs surrendered (1939) as did the Dutch (1940). The British were another matter. The difference was that Czechoslovalia and the Netherlands were small countries. The Czechs had virtually no airforc nd the Dutch only a small air force. Neither had an air defense system of any kind. The British had a substantial air force and poorly understood by the Germns, an effective air defense system. As a result, terror bombing did not work in the Battle of Britain. In fact, Hitler's penchant for violence was an important factor in the British victory. Bombing houses, apartments, and shops not did not help the Luftwaffe defeat the Royal Air Force (RAF), but it forced the Luftwaffe bombers to come further north where they were more vulnerable to the RAF fighters. Not only was it poor tactics, but it was an incredible waste of valuable and not easily replaceable military resources. As a result, not only did the RAF prevail in the Battle of Britain, but it affected the Luftwaffe force available for Barbarossa. We constanly hear that strategic bombing was ineffective and that morale never cracked. That certainly was the case of Britain, but the KLuftwaffe was not designed for strategic boming. And while the Luftwaffe destiyed British homes, it adversely affected German mikitary capability. This was in part they were atrempted to conductt strateguic bombing with bombers designed for tactical operations. Critics also say that German and Japanese morale never cracked. This simply is not true. Now it is true that the population did not demand pdeace, but this is because any one that did had a Gestapo agent showung up on their door step to escort them to a concentration camp or simply being hung up on a lamp post. In Japan it was the Kempeitai. But look at the mindset of the German and Japanese period after the War. They were mirculously transformed into a people rsolutely opposed to war as an elementb of national policy. This was one of the most remarable transformations in in history.

Sources

Harris, Arthur. Bomber Offensive.

Created: 8:57 AM 7/18/2017
Last updated: 8:26 AM 12/28/2023