Figure 1.--Despite the extensive German and Japanese bombing of cities early in the War, it was the Axis cities that were the nost vulnerable. Here we see a British home destoyed during the Blitz. Destroying homes, hpwever, does not win a war. Hitler sqandered valuable military asetts to destroy homes which had no impact on the British war effort. And largely pointless. Unlike German cities, London an British cities were spread out over large areas with reltively few multi-story apartment buildings. Thus a far greater German force was needed to achuev comparable results. And Luftwaff losses over Britain would be a factor in the failure of Operation Barbarossa.

With the outbreak of World War II, the NAZIs turned to terror bombing to subdue targeted nations (Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, and other cities). The Luftwaffe flying close air support played a major role in the early German victories. The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe as a terror weapon depended largely on success of ground operations and the absence of a strategic bombing force led to defeat in the Battle of Britain. The fighters and medium bombers could not extend the victory in France across the Channel. Japan it its invasion of China turned to bombing of Chinese cities, apparently believing the terror impact would force the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese bombing killed civilians, but had only a minor impact on the War. The Nationalists simply withdrew into the interior where the the Japanese had difficulty brining their military superiority to bear. Chinese cities did not have industries which were essential to the War effort. More importantly, the Japanese never threatened American industry with a st rategic air campaign that would destroy or even impair the American war economy. Both German and Japanese leaders seemed to assume that only foreign cities would be the target of air raids. What was not clearly understood at the time was during the height of the Blitz, the British were building more planes than the Germans. With America's entry into the War, the initial German and Japanese superiority in the air was soon lost. The assumption that German and Japanese cities would never be bombed proved to be one of the great miscalculations in the history of war. Britain and America had the industrial capacity to build both tactical and strategic forces and the Soviets also had a substantial capacity. Britain and America built substantial forces dedicated specifically to strategic bombing. A major factor in effectuveness was ordinance. Strategic bombing commanders tended to opt for the big bang--high explosives. Only slowly did the far greater destructive capacity of incendaries become accepted. The results were devastating. Some air commanders believed that air power could be used alone to defeat the enemy. This proved to be unrealistic. The role of air power in winning the war, however, was critical.

Axis Strategic Bombing

The Axis countries builr impresive airforces, but not airforces capable of stratehic operations. With the outbreak of World War II, the NAZIs turned to terror bombing to subdue targeted nations (Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, and other cities). Terror bombing is not the same as strategic bombardment. Terror operations are limited air attcks design to to destroy an opponents will to exist. The Luftwaffe flying close air support played a major role in the early German victories. The limited German industrial capacity, however, meant that Germany dud not have the capability of building both a tactical ans strategic airfirce. The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe as a terror weapon depended largely on success of ground operations and the absence of a strategic bombing force led to defeat in the Battle of Britain. The fighters and medium bombers could not extend the victory in France across the Channel. Japan it its invasion of China turned to bombing of Chinese cities, apparently believing the terror impact would force the Chinese to surrender. The Japanese bombing killed civilians, but had only a minor impact on the War. The Nationalists simply withdrew into the interior where the the Japanese had difficulty brining their military superiority to bear. Chinese cities did not have industries which were essential to the War effort.

Axis Victories

The Axis powers scored only one major victory in World War II--the invasion and defeat of France. This was in part because the French were unwilling to resist to the upmost. The threat of German terror bombing caused them to reject bombing the Ruhr, the German industrial heartland because the Germans might retaliate and bomb French cities. For the first 8 months of the War, the Ruhr was wiyhin the rnge of British bombers, but lay untouched. German victories over Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium was not going to win the war nor further victories in the Balkans. There were four importnt countries that Germany faced besides France: Britain with its Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Germany to win the War had to defeat some of those countries. Without a strategic air force, Germany was incable of defeating Britain as long as the United States provided support. And the Germans could not even touch America. This of course left the Soviet Union. Victory here wiuld have findamentally changed the strategic balance. Vut without a strategic air firce, the Wehrmacht would have to slug it out with the Red Army in the ground. And even though the Germans occupied emense Soviet territory, they did not destroy Soviet war industries or conquer the Russian hearland. And without strategic bombers, the Germans were unable to touch the Soviet war industries located beyond the Urals. Japan had an even smaller bomber force than the Germans. And in the case of agricultural China. bombers did not have the same impact as as on an industrial country. Bomb as they may, Japan could not Nationalist China out of the War. Incredably, Japan's answer to the stalemate was go attack the United States, the only countrycapable of brining the air war to Japan.

Anglo-American Strategic Bombing

While the Axis countries did not have the industrial apabilty of building and operating strageic air forces, to of the countries they made war on did: Beitain and the United States. Britain and America had the industrial capacity to build both tactical and strategic forces and the Soviets also had a substantial capacity. Britain and America built substantial forces dedicated specifically to strategic bombing.Britain did not have an industrial capability equal to Germany and especially the German Grossraum resulting from the early Wehrmacht victories. But the British were able to focus their war economy on building a massive strategic bommber firce--RAF Bomber Command. The United States did not have to focus its energies. The emense industrial capacity of America was not only able to build a mssive strategic bomber force, but a tactial airforce as well, insdition to a huge navy and army weapons and equiment for its own army as well as its allies, especially Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain began the campaign with the Avro Lancaster (1942). Presidebt Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Cgurchill at the Casablanca Conference agreed on an around the clock campign (January 1943). The destruction of German industry bcame a joint Anglo-American effort. And Britain served as a huge unsinkable aircraft carroer off northern Europe from which Britain and america would evntually smash German cities into ensense piles of rubble. Bomber Command bombed by night and the Amerixan Eighth Airfirce by day.

Objectives

The stated objectives of Allied bombing was to destoy German war industries. Briitish Bomber Command bombing at night, however, could not even begin to target industrial sites. All they could do was to find cities. Using incendaries, war industries could be damaged or destroyed. But Air Marshall Harris also spoke of 'dehosing' to weaken the German war economy. The U.S. Army Air Corps optimiticall thought they could target industrial sites. They believes tht their Nrden Bombsites could drop boms in a pickle barrel. It was a closely guarded secret. The Germans managed, however, to acquire it even before America entered the War. Even though bombing during daylight hours, the accuracy of the bombing was far below expectations. World War II technology simply did not permit accurate bombing. But the massive armadas of bombers ensured that German industry was gradually destoyed. Once P-51 long-range escorts ere availanle (Devember 1943), the gial changed. The primary objective came to be to estoy the Luftwaffe. The D-Day invasions could not suceed unless the Allies had arir superority. And the in the first four months of 1944 the Luftwaffe fighters wjich came up to oppose reids on German cities were shot down in large numbrs, essentially destroying the Luftwaffe. This achieced, Gem/ Eisenhower assumd control of the bombers and the primary task became severing the transport links between the Reich and the invasion beaches. Only after the kiberation of Frnce was operational control returned to the bomber commaders whp resumed the assaults in German cities wuth newbewed firce. .

Axis Impotence

The Axis could not respond to the Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign. Soviet industry was beyond the Urals which after the Red army Winter Offensive was beyond the range of German bombers ith their limited range.(December 1941). And the massive Anglo-American output of fighters meant that Germany after the Battle of Britain was uable to target British industry. Hitler akmost wrecked the Luftwaffe trying. And against America, not even harassing raids were possible. Like Germany, the Japanese never threatened American industry with a strategic air campaign that would destroy or even impair the American war economy. Both the German and Japanese leaders that launched the War seemed to assume that only foreign cities would be the target of air raids. What was not clearly understood at the time was during the height of the Blitz, the British were building more planes than the Germans. With America's entry into the War, the initial German and Japanese superiority in the air was soon lost. The assumption that German and Japanese cities would never be bombed proved to be one of the great miscalculations in the history of war.

Ordinance

The ordinance that most terrified the public and Allied leaders was poison gas. As the war played out, it was never used by the Germans even though they had developed nerve agaents. These agents were much more deadly than Wirld War I agents. The Japanese dud use both chenical and bilogical weapons aginst the Chinese. A major factor in effectuveness was ordinance. Strategic bombing commanders tended to opt for the big bang--high explosives. Only slowly did the far greater destructive capacity of incendaries become accepted. The results were devastating. The resut was firestorms which could reduce eben major cuties to cinders.

Vulnerability

It is amazing that German and Japanese leders thought that they were invulnerable. In Wotld War I the Germany Army and Navy guaranteed victory. The German military in World War II was more sober. It was the NAZI politicl leader ship that guaranteed victory. Reich Marshall Göring the Führer and the German people that poweful Luftwaffe would prevent German cities from being bombed. The problem was that German cities were more vulnerable than British cities. his is because the Germans built up. Large numbers of Germans lived in apartment mult-story complexes. This meant that the population was higly concentrated. And the more concentated the population, the more vulnerable it is to strategic bombing. British cities in contrst were built out into suburbs, meaning a miss lesser concentation covering a greater area. The Germans were also vuknerable because of the industrial mismatch. German industry only had a fraction of the capability of British and American industry. This lyed German cities vulnerable to the massive industrial power of Anglo-American industry. Of all the World War II combatants, Japanese cities, were the nost vulnerable. Rather than stone and brick, Japanese city were largely composed of woof an paper buildings--basically kindling. The Japanese militarists who launched the War assumed tht this was not important because no bomber in 1941 could reach Japan. They assumed the War could be won after a short campaign. We are unsure if they even cinsidered the possibility of America penetrating the ring of island bases the Imperial Arny an Navy woul erect or American industry developing a long range bomber.

Assessment

Some air commanders believed that air power could be used alone to defeat the enemy. This proved to be unrealistic. The role of air power in winning the war, however, was critical.

Created: 4:33 AM 8/9/2017
Last updated: 4:33 AM 8/9/2017