*** World War II air campaign -- Battle of Britain commanders








World War II Air Campaign: Battle of Britain -- Commanders


Figure 1.-- The two leading commanders in the Battle of Britain were German Luftwaffe commander Herman Göring and British Air Chief Marshall (ACM) Hugh Dowding who commanded Fighter Command. The two men could not have been more different. Dowding was taciturn and reserved, Göring was outgoing and flamboyant, probablt the most popular and vissible of all the NAZI leaders. He had been a World War I fighter, but with no idea how to administer or command an air force or willingness to do the hard work involved. He appointing incompetent cronies like Ernest Udet and reklied in them to do the sctual wiork. Dowding in contrast chose and managed air group commanders who won the Battle of Britain. Britain was almost totally unprepared for war in every conceivable area. The one area that the Germans and Göring stubbled cross was air defense.

The two leading commanders in the Battle of Britain were German Luftwaffe commander Herman Göring and British Air Chief Marshall (ACM) Hugh Dowding who commanded Fighter Command. The two men could not have been more different. Dowding was taciturn and reserved, Göring was outgoing and flamboyant. More importantly, Dowding was a consummate professional. Göring was a World War I fighter ace with no idea how to administer or command an air force or willingness to do the hard work involved. He appointing incompetent cronies like Ernest Udet, another World War fighter pilot Udet and arguably one of the greatest incompetents of the War. Dowding in contrast chose and managed air group commanders who won the Battle of Britain. Britain was almost totally unprepared for war in every conceivable area. The one area gh Germans stubbled cross was air defense. This was largely due to two main factors. First, was the German World War I air raids. The British public did nogt fvor military spending. Air defense was a different matter. Second, the exhaustive and determined work of Dowduibg during the inter-War period, all in the face of the most miserly budget appropriatins imaginable. World War II battles varied. There were battles in which the outcome was basically foreordained. There were other battles in which the outcome could have gone either way and the battle was decided by the competence of the commanders. The Battle of Britain was one of the latter. The Grmans could have won the battle. It was not as lop-sided a battle as oiften portrayed, but the Germans had a good chance of prevailing. It was the leadership of Dowding and 11 Group commander New Zealander Air vice-marshal Keith Park that was and the incompetence of Göring that was decisive. The Germans did not have everything going for them, butv they had enough that victory was within their grasp. Churchill did not interfere he left it up to his commanders, ast least during the battle. Churchill even deferred to Dowding on the question of fighter squadrons promised to France. Göring again was just the opposite, cravenly seeking to maintain Hitler's favor, he overrode Luftwaffe commanders and appeased Hitler by turning to terror bombing, ending any chance of defeating the RAF. Even during the Battle of Britain, Göring spent much of his time swilling champagne and racing around France, to terrorize Jews and steal art work from them.

The RAF

The RAF in the Battle of Britain was in the hands of competent military commanders, albeit who disagreed as to tactics. Fighter Command was commanded by taciturn Scotsman Air Chief Marshall (ACM) Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding (1882-1970), the oldest commander involved and his rightly regarded as the architect of victory in the Battle of Britain. He had enraged Churchill when he resisted demands to commit more RAF fighter wings to France. He was, however, a visionary proponent of all-metal fighters, radar, and central operational control of Fighter Command. He was a major force in creating the Chain Home radar network. As the commander of Fughter Command, he would be the commandr overseeing the Battle of Britain. His principal tactic was to carefully husband RAF fighter strength. His major problem was a shortage of trained pilots. In this he was ably supported by New Zealander Air Vice-Marshall (AVM) Keith Park (1892-1975), commander of 11 Group over southeast England. Dowding also developed important policies rotating pilots and providing some time off--something Göring never did. He also attempted to give new pilots some operational duty away from 11 Group before committing them to battle. And he made needed changed fighter flying formations. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory (1892-1944), commander of 12 Group over the Midland argued for 'big wing' attacks on the Germans. The problem was that his Big Wing took time to form and the Germans when attacking 11 Groups airdromes in the Southeast could not be engaged. This changed, however, when the Luftwaffe turned toward London to launch the Blitz (September 7). Churchill did not intervened during the Battle, but after the Battle replaced Dowding and turned more to Leigh-Mallory. Fortunately for Britain, this did not occur until after the Battle of Britain was won.

Luftwaffe

The Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain was commanded by a politician with little real professional military training or competence. The Luftwaffe commander was Herman Göring for whom Hitler had created the unprecedented rank of Reich Marshall. Göring was one of the most powerful and popular men in Germany. He was the Prime Minister of Prussia and held important posts in the Gestapo and Hitler chose him to manage the German economy--the Four Year Plan. NAZI Germany might have survived his incompetent management of the Luftwaffe, but it could not survive his incompetent management of the economy. He was a noted fighter ace during World War I. He was appointed to replace Von Rictoffen when he was killed. Göring never rose above the level of an exceptional pilot, but Hitler put him in charge of the new Luftwaffe after the NAZI's seized power. He was not, however, a competent military planner, although he thought he understood modern air warfare. Like Hitler, he believed that terror bombing could subdue the British. After the fall of France he busied himself with stealing art work from terrorized Jews and museums. He would play a central role in the Holocaust. Unlike Dowding who spoke forthghrighto to Churchill, Göring never attempted to question Hitler. He knew how to curry favor with Hitler. He even accused his pilots of cowardice when they were unable to bring him the victory he needed to impress Hitler. He also ordered the fighter pilots to fly in close formation with the bombers, absolute tactical stupidity--and Göring was a fighter pilot. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring (1895-1960) commanded Luftflotte 2 during the Battle of Britain. He was convinced that air superiority could be won by attacking RAF forward fighter bases stations in southeaster Britain (primarily in Kent or 11 Group) which would give the escorting fighters the opportunity to destroy the RAF opposition which rose to defend them. He was both efficient and professional, but failed to understand the importance of the Chain Home system. He was ordered by Göring and Hitler to switch to attacks on cities, especially London, and industrial targets. Luftflotte 2 was then transferred to the Mediterranean (1941). Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle (1885 – 1953) Sperrle commanded Luftflotte 3 during the Battle of France. It was Luftflotte 3 that provided vital air support for the powerful armored thrust through southern Belgium and northern France that defeated the Allied armies. He remained in command during the the Battle of Britain and the night Blitz that followed it. Like Kesselring, he failed to assess the importance of the Chain Home System. Most of his squadrons were transferred east to support Operation Barbarossa (1941). His tiny force was overwhelmed by Allied air power supporting the D-Day invasion (1944). Hitler blamed Sperrle personally for the failure and in August he was transferred to the Reserve. The Luftwaffe was focused on the offensive and this had brought them victories in the earlier campaigns. It is only after the Battle of Britain that Luftwaffe commanders became interested in radar.






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Created: 4:50 AM 10/29/2022
Last updated: 4:50 AM 10/29/2022