Figure 1.--The Luftwaffe over Britain suffered significant casulties for the first time. The British at the time overstated the losses, but they were still substantial. The Germans in the main phase of the battle lost 1,562 planes (July-October 1940). More than half were fighters (ME-109s and 10s). The rest were various types of light and medium bombers (Junkers, Dorniers, Heinkels, and Henschels). Unlike the British, almost all of the Germans air crews were lost to the war effort, even if they survived being shot down. And they were more difficult to repance than the oplanes. Collecting shrapnel and piexes of Lufwffe planes became a great sport among British boys. Most had to content themselves with a few opieces of shrapne. This litle chap has an entire plane all to himself! I can just picture--'Look mum, what i found!
The Luftwaffe over Britain suffered significant casulties for the first time. TNe British at the time overstated the losses, but they were still substantial. The Germans in the main phase of the battle lost 1,562 planes (July-October 1940). [Weidenhofer] More than half were fighters (ME-109s and 10s). The rest were various types of light and medium bombers (Junkers, Dorniers, Heinkels, and Henschels). Unlike the British, almost all of the Germans air crews were lost to the war effort, even if they survived being shot down.
The number of British and German planes shot down were comparable, with about 1,087 British planes shot down. Many of the British air crews, mostly fighter pilots, were not lost to the war effort. Some authors suggest that Luftwaffe fighter and bomber strength declined by about 25 percent. Here we do not entirely understand the statistics ans wee note statistics suggesting that Luftwaffe stength by November was back up to pre-Battle of Brirain levels. The 25 percent figure is presumably losses compared to the force committed over Britain without dding in replacements. This is a very substantial figure for a force that would soon be committed to the invassion of the Soviet Union--Barbarossa.
Both the losses in the Western Offensive (May-June) and the losses over Britain (July- October l940) nust have affected the size of the force deployed for Barbarossa (June 1941). We have not yet found a hisorical assessment of the impact.
Construction and pilot training mnore than made up for the losses, but it meant that
that the Germans went into the Soviet Union with a smaller force than might have been possible. The Luftwaffe at the onset of their Western Offensive had 1,711 bombers (May 11, 1940). This had declined for the Battle of Britain to 1,380 bombers (June 29, 1940). [Murray, p. 80.] By the end of the Battle of Britain, the Germans had more than made up the losses over Britain and had 1,423 bombers (November 2, 1940). But at the time of Barbarossa an almost unchanged 1,511 bombers (June 21, 1941). [de Zeng, Stankey, and Creek, p. 10.]
We are not sure to what extent the Battle of Britain affected the Luftwaffe force structure available for Barbarossa s opposed to Hitler/OKW priorities. Surely the Germans at the time masters of Western and Central Europe could have more than made up the losses if they decided to do so. Here we do not yet have information on Barbarossa
preparations and priorities given to the Luftwaffe. G�ring failure both at Dunkirk and then the Battle of Britain must have affected Hitler's view on air power to some extent.
It seems incredible, however, that the Germans would have plunged into the Sovier Uniin with a smaller air component that that which they lost the Western Offensive. The German victory was achieved in large part by concentrating the Luftwaffe at the Schwerpunkt (critical point of the battle), crossing the Meuse. After that it was a straight shoot to the Channel. The Lufwaffe could not in the vastness of the East begin to play the same critical role that it had played in France. The size of the invading force for Barbarossa was much larger than the great Western Offensive, but the Luftwaffe was actually smaller.
The losses over Britain certainly did not affect the first week of Luftwaffe operations when they largely destroyed the Red Air Force. We are less sure, however, about the impact on the full campaign.
A reader writes, "What I know about this is much the same as what you wrote. If anything while the Germans were able to replace equipment as you mention, the air crew were for the most part lost for the war; either captured or dead. But the way that the Germans had a good control of the air over the Eastern Front in the first year of Barbarossa, I really do not think the losses during the Battle of Britain had much of an impact. It is during the next year that the those losses in experienced pilots might have made a difference in combating the reformed Red Air Force, mostly less experienced squadron leaders." Yes it is true that they replaced planes, but notice the word replace. The Heer and the armored force was much enlarged for Barbaross. The Luftwaffe because of the serious losses was not v enlarged meaning that the Ostheer gotn much nless air support thn theru bhad received in the West. And you are absolutely correct about the iar crews.
Sources
Murray, Willamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1935�1945. (Princeton, New Jersey: University Press of the Pacific, 2002).
Weidenhofer, M. "Kronika Bitvy o Britanii" (Navrat 1991).
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek. Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933�1945: A Reference Source Volume 1. (Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allen Publishing, 2007).
