|
The Battle of Britain can be divided into four major, but overlapping and not always easily destinguishable phases. The critical stage, was the second one in which the Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the organization and forward air bases of the RAF. If accomplished an invasion might have become feasible, although Hitler still hoped the British could be forced to make peace. This was the most critical phase for the RAF. British industry was producing substantial numbers of fighter aircraft, especially the all-metal Spitfires, but the Luftwaffe still had an edge in trained pilots. If Britain was to be defeated, this was the critical time. The failure of the Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF at this time mean that a vengeful and determined enemy was left in the West with important technological and industril resources that would prove to be the launching board for a stratehic bombing campaign that would dwarf the Blitz and destroy German cities. Britain would also be the necessary launching board for the ground assault on Hitler's Fortress Europe.
After the French capitulation (June 16) and the signing of a armistice (June 18), the Luftwaffe moved quickly to established bases along the French coast. This requird a major logistical effort. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarina, and Wehrmacht to prepare for an invasion of Britain (July 2). The Luftwaffe's task was to establish air superiority over Britain's Channel coast. The Luftwaffe wih a series of successful campaigns was confident of victory. The Luftwaffe began launching preliminary strikes in what has come to be called the Battle of Britain. The first attacks were on coastal shipping and probing attacks on Channel. The Aldershot barracks, an important Army grrison along the coast, was hit (July 6). July 10 is the date normally used for the beginning of the Battle of Britain. It marked the beginning of the Kanalkampf. While the Luftwaffe was moving into French air bases. Operations in the Channel were the easiest to initiate. Coastal shipping and ports were the major target, but the primary Luftwaffe objective was to draw out the RAF fighters to battle. The Luftwaffe launched attacks on the Chain Home Radar Net. These proved to be difficult targets and not fully understanding the importance, did not persist in attacking the radar stations. Although Air Chief Dowding was crticised, he correctly was determined to husband Fighter Command resources. Dockyards at South Wales were also hit by a force of 70 bombers (July 10). From a very early point Hellfire Corner emerged as a focal point of the Battle--this was the area between Dover and Folkstone including the White Cliffs of Dover--where the Battle of Britain stands today. Dover had been the most important berthing point for Operation Dynamo--the Dunkirk Evacuation. The Straits of Dover were located there, the narowest pont of the Channel. Thus much of the Kanalkampf swirled around Dover and Folkstone. The Lufwaffe attacked ships in Dover Harbor (July 20). Dover was again heavily bombed (July 29). Other Channel ports were hit. Chain Home Stations atood atop the Dover Cliffs. Hitler unveiled plans for a cross-channel invasion code nammed Operation Sea Lion (July 16). It was scheduled to begin with massive air assaults on August 5 followed by the German force crossing the Channel under a protective Lutwaffe shield.
The Luftwaffe, seeing that the FAF had not taken their bait, began the Battle of Britain began in ernest on August 9. Masive Luftwaffe raids were scheduled to begin earlier, but had to be cancelled because of bad weather. The Germans launched 300 aircraft. Among the targets were radar stations. There were additional attcks on radar stations during the next two days, but as the Luftwaffe could see no clear results, thus the radar stationswere not made a priority as the air offensive unfolded. The plan was to destoy the RAF with a overpowering attack on Adler Tag (Eagle Day). The Fighter Command air fields protecting the Channel coast where the Germans were to land were located in Kent. This meant that many attacking
Lufwaffe formations flew over the same Hell Fire Corner where many of the Kanakkamof battles were fought. The major attack came on August 13, Eagle Day. Massive Luftwaffe raids envolving nearly 1,500 planes targetted British airfields and aircraft factories. The Germans came in successive waves. The RAF thanks to the radar network was not destroyed on the ground as the Luftwaffe had expected, rather they were airborn and shot down 45 Luftwaffe planes. The Luftwaffe on the next day could only launch 500 planes because of poor weather and the RAF shot down 70 of them. The Lutwaffe despite losses kept coming. The Luftwaffe on August 17, however, had to scale back the attacking forces somewhat by withdrawing the Stukas which were slow an vulnerable to attack. The same night the Bomber Command responded with night raids on northern German cities. The British each night reponded with night raids on German cities, although only a few bombers were involved. The next day August 19 there were no Luftwaffe attacks. Goering ordered changes in the Luftwaffe tactics. Because of bomber losses, the fighter escorts were ordered to closely acciompany the bombers which robbed them of their fighting power. Goring also ordered a ration of 3 fighters to every bomber which mean that the bomber raids were limited because of an inadequate number of escorts. The Luftwaffe, however, launched a massive attack on August 23 on air craft factories and oil depots. A huge raid on August 30 focused on the RAF airfields. The steadily unfolding Luftwaffe campaign substantially damaged RAF forward bases in Kent and had seriously weakened the fighter units stationed there. The Luftwaffe, albeit at considerable cost, was seriously weakening the RAF. Fighter Command was having increasing difficulty maintaining its forward air bases in Kent and its ability to maintain air superority over the Channel coast. Althought the campaign was proving far more costly than the Luftwaffe had expected, their strategy was working. In desperation the FAF commited its foreign squadrons who for the first time flying effective aircraft performed brilliantly and with fierce, often suicidal determination. The Polish Kosciuszko Squadron flying Hirricanes downed twice as many Luftwaffe planes as any other RAF unit. [Olson and Cloud] They were soon the darlings of London society and the British press. Despite the heoism of the RAF pilots, the weight of the Luftwaffe was gradually destroying the effecivness of the RAF forward bases which would be those needed to oppose a cross-channel invasion. At the end of August the issue was still in doubt.
Off-course German bombers accidentally bombed London on August 23-24. RAF Bomber Command on August 25-26 directed a small reprisal raid against Berlin. Hitler growing inpatient with the air battle and troubled by the losses of planes and crews was furious. A string believer in terror tactics, he was outraged that such attacks should be used against Germany. He called the British "night gangsters" and ordered an immediate change in Luftwaffe tactics. Rather than completing its offensive against the RAF infrastructure, Hitler ordered a "Blitz" on British cities which began in earnest on September 7. Goering was disturbed because the RAF resistance was making him look bad in frnt of Hitler. He had promissed an swift victory to his F�hrer. For the new phase of the battle he had brought his personal train to Pas-de-Calais to take charge from his Luftwaffe commanders. [Gilbert, p. 339.] (Goering was a fighter ace in World War I and Hitler had made him the Commander of the Luftwaffe. He had none of the training or technical capabilities of the highly professional Luftwaffe command.) The attack on September 7 included 300 bombers and 600 escorts. The target was the London docks, but the surronding residential area waslso heavily hit. The followup day a smaller attack on September 8 hit electrical power plants and railway stations. The 200 attackers were swarmed over by FAF fighters and 88 were shot down, devestating total. The attacks on London rather than the forward air fields in Kent and along the coast brought the Luftwaffe bombers in range of Lee Malory and 12 Group's big wing. This was a shock to Luftwaffe pilots who had been told that RAF Fighter Command had been reduced to less than 200 fighters. The Luftwaffe, however, kept coming. So did Bomber Command continue raids over Berlin. One report indicted that Goebbel's garden took a direct hit. [Gilbert, p. 340.] It was the London Blitz that is best rememberes with the image of fires around St. Pauls Cathedral, but the Luftwaffe targetted cities throughout Britain: Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Southampton, Swansea, and others. The Luftwaffe continued large scale raids. There were, for example 230 bombers and 700 fighters launched on September 15 and 56 were shot down. In general RAF losses were about half of the Luftwaffe losses and many of the RAF pilots bailed out unharmed while the shot down German pilots were lost to the Luftwaffe. The Blitz ws the most intense aerial bombing campaign seen to that time, far worst than the bombing of Republican cities in Spain, Rotterdam, or the Japanese bomving of Chinese cities. The change in tactics, however. proved to be a disastrous mistake. Hitler's oft repeated penchant for mindless violence was to cost the Luftwaffe dearly. (Strangely, Hitler's judgement during his rise to power and in the early military campaigns was to result in great victories. Beginning with stopping the Panzers before Dunkirk and this decission as well as countless other future decissions, Hitler's war directives were to seriously compromise the NAZI war effort.) The Luftwaffe's attacks wreaked havoc on civilians in London and major English cities, but the British did not crack. An estimated 42,000 civilians were killed. American newsman Edward R. Murrow broadcasting from London ("London calling ...") described Britain's valiant resistance to rapt American radio audiences, greatly affecting American attitides toward the Hitler and the NAZIs. With the Blitz, Fighter Command finally committed foreign squadrons (Candian, Czech, and Polish) that they had been unsure about. They were susosed to communicate in Enhlish in the air, but in the heat of battle that proved impossible. They proved to be some of the most gallant pilots in the FAF. While British cities burned, the RAF was given a respite, allowing its forward air bases to recover from the damage done in August. As a result the RAF was able to mount increasingly costly attacks on the German bomber fleets. The German offensive finally had to be broken off on September 16 because of mounting losses and deteriorating weather. The Luftwaffe had a achieved none of Hitler's goals. [Fest, p. 639.]
Gradually as Winter 1940-41 set in, the German attacks declined in intensity and frequency. The fourth phase of the Battle of Britain had lasted for several months. It had been conducted at night. The RAF's growing strength meant that it was too costly for the Luftwaffe to attempt day-light raids. The last major Luftwaffe raid was staged May 10, 1941. It was a final show of strength. Preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the NAZI invasion of the Soviet Union, were by May highly advanced. Much of the Wehrmacht had already been transferred east. The Luftwafe was also being shifted east for Barbarossa. The Luftwaffe was never again able to mount major raids against Britain with conventgional aircraft. Raids were very klimited in 1942-43. The Luftwaffe was unable to focus on Britain as it had in 1940-41. The staggering extent of operations on the Easter Front created staggering demands that the Luftwaffe could not meet. And there were demands from North Africa as well as increasing demands to protect German cities from Allied air raids. Allied air power made it increasingly costly for the Luftwaffe to attempt raids and possible to as target Luftwaffe bases in France. The British air campaign against Germany was given new life with the arrival of the Avro Lancanster--one of the great bombers of the War. In addition, the Americans began building their air forces in Britain in 1942. Because of the way the Blitz ended, neither the Axis or the Allies preceived the full impact of the NAZI defeat. And the newspaper headlines were soon full of reports on the titanic battles being waged in the East. Not all the children were evacuated from London and the other cities. Even the hard hit East End had children all throughout the Blitz. And as the raids subsided, parents began bringing the children home. The desire to reunite families became especially strong as Christmas 1941 approached.
The most tragic victims of the Bliz were the children that lost their parents. We believe that the largest numbers of these children were orphaned diring the noths that Hitler turned the Luftwaffe from RAF forward airfields in Kent to London and the industrial Midlands (September 1940). The attack on RAF airfields resulted in relative few civilian csualties. The Blitz was a very different matter. Because of high daytime losses, this quickly became nightime bombing. It continued for several months until the Spring when the Lugtwaffe wasmoved in force to the East to prepare for Barbarossa (April-May 1941). There were other raids, especially the V-1 and V-2 campaigns, but the kargest numbers of cibvilian casualties occurred during the Bliz. This was also whn many evcuated children lost their parents. We are not sure what the numbers involved were. We think that the children were well cared for in homes, but not a great deal of information is available. On how many orphans there were and how many were adopted. An internet searchbeings up primarily children sent to Australia. We are not sure what proportion of the war orphans were sent to Australia after the war. There of course is only right that abuses be reported. But is it really true that the overwealming experience of British war orphans was abuse and transport to abusive institurions in Austrlia? The sites energing from internet searches focus almost entirely on the abuses involved. Never made clear is the proprtion of the children that were abused. We are not sure how to assess this, but strikes us as just one more example of the modern tendency to put as negative a light on Britain and America as possible by journlists and others emerging from our modern universities.
Propaganda Minister Goebbels provides us a private view from Berlin on the aftermath of the Blitz. "Although England is fighting at present against trremendous obstacles it cannot be said that morale among the common people is low. The English people are used to hard blow, and to a certain extent the way they take it compels admiration. In times of crisis the British Government profits by the pigheadness of the British national character but someday, somehow, the pigheadness will end; namely, when the blows begin to be staggering and deadly." [Goebbels, February 20, 1942.] This comment is illustrative of Goebbels and Hitler's mindset. They had gabled and lost. If Barbarossa had suceeded, a new more sustained Blitz might have been possible. but it did not. The Wehrmacht had suffered staggering losses in the Soviet Union. Not only NAZI Germany been significantly weakened so it was no longer possible to win the War, but it now faced not only a war in the East against a powerful mortal eneny, but a renewed war in the West with the enormous resources of the United States added to the ballance. But what is on Goebbels mind? He is thinking of settling scores with the British, and finishing the Blitz.
Churchill, Winston. Their Finest Hour (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1949), 751p.
Davidson, Eugene. The Unmaking of Adolf Hitler (Univesity of Missouri: Columbia, 1996), 519p.
Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.
Gilbert, Martin. A History of the Twentieth Century Vol. 2 1933-54 (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1998), 1050p.
Goebbels, Josef. Louis P. Lochner, ed. The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: Garden City, 1948), 566p.
Olson, Lynne and Stanley Cloud. A Question of Honor: The Kosciuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II (Knopf, 2003).
Navigate the CIH World War II Section:
[Return to Main Battle of Britain page]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[POWs]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
[Return to CIH Home page]
