Early European Air Campaigns (1939-40)

Luftwaffe campaigns
Figure 1.--The Czechs in 1938 were prepared to fight even after the Btitish and French deserted them. The one thing that terrified Czech leaders was the Luftwaffe and the impossibility of defending Czech cities. The Luftwaffe demonstrated in Poland during 1939 what Hitler had threatened in Czechoslovakia. Many Polish cities were struck by the Luftwaffe, but the most intense bombing was focused on Warsaw. Resvisionists historians accuse the British of beginning the bombing of cities, forgetting what the Germans did in Poland from the opening of the War. The press caption here described the photograph as the "First unsensored photographs of the bombing of Warsaw." The photograph was taken by Julien Bryan with Wide World. He was the only foreign photo journalist who remained in Warsaw during the German seige. He stayed in the abandoned American Consulate. He left Warsaw (September 21). This is one of the photographs he snuggled out to America, His caption read, "The canary in the cage was the only possession of this boy saved from the ruins pf his homehere. Ten people were killed by a bomb at this place in the center of Warsaw near the Danzig Station." The photograph was published in American newspapers October 7, 1939, after the Germans had occupied Warsaw.

The Luftwaffe played an important role in all of the early German campaigns. The German concept of war was Blitzkrieg. This involved concentrating conat power at critical points of the battlefield. The Luftwaffe was a key element in Blitzkrieg because it provided powerful support to fast moving ground forces in a way that artillery could not. It was also used to disrupt enemy movement toward the critical points. This permitted the rapid breaching of enemy linrs and breakout out to cut off and destroy enemy strong points. At the onset of the inasion of Poland, the Luftwaffe conducted massive air raids on Polish cities (September 1939). Wieluń became the first city destroyed by bombing in World War II. The initial directives issued to the Luftwaffe pilots were to destroy the Polish air force to prevent it from supporting Polish ground forces or attacking targets in the Reich. [Speidel, p. 18.] The Poles had only a small air force, but had dispersed much of it. The Luftwaffe was highly sucessful in dusrupting Polish mobilization and troop movements. The Luftwaffe also played an important role in the campaigns against Denmark and Norway, the Luftwaffwe role in Norway was decisive. Again the Luftwaffe played key roles in the Western offensive against the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. The offensive as in all German campaigns was led off by raids intended to criple the oposing air force. Here they were largely sucessful, giving the Germans command of the air during the critical fighting which led to Dunkirk and the fall of France. The Dutch airforce was largely destoyed on the first day and the Nelgian airforce crippled. The French and British were unprepared for the force of the attack. The French unliked the Germans had not massed their air force to counter the German attack. A factor here may have been to make a knockout blow impossible, but it meant that a substantial portion of the French air force was out of the battle as the issue was being decided. The British held back much of the RAF to protect Britain itself. The primary use of Luftwaffe in these campaigns was tatical and within the rules of War, but from the very beginning in Poland, the Luftwaffe engaged in bombing cities, including terror attacks which were clear violations of the established standards of warfare.

Blitzkrieg

The German Wehrmacht unveiled Blitzkrieg, its new battle docrine in Poland at the onset of the War. The Luftwaffe played an important role in all of the early German campaigns. The German concept of war was Blitzkrieg. This involved speed, combined forces operations, and concentrating combat power at critical points of the battlefield-- Schwerpunk. The Luftwaffe was a key element in Blitzkrieg because it provided powerful support to fast moving ground forces in a way that artillery could not. It was also used to disrupt enemy movement toward the critical points. This permitted the rapid breaching of enemy lines and breakout out to cut off and destroy enemy strong points. The Allies at the onset of the War had aircraft that were roughly comparable to the Germans. The difference was the Luftwaffe's focus on tactical air and the degree to which air operations were wovn into ground support. Innovations like forward air controllers and communications with advancing ground units were innovtions that the Allies did not fully master until 1944.

Poland (September 1939)

At the onset of the German invasion of Poland, the Luftwaffe conducted massive air raids on Polish cities (September 1939). Wieluń became the first city destroyed by bombing in World War II. The initial directives issued to the Luftwaffe pilots were to destroy the Polish air force to prevent it from supporting Polish ground forces or attacking targets in the Reich. [Speidel, p. 18.] The Poles had only a small air force, but had dispersed much of it. The Luftwaffe was highly sucessful in dusrupting Polish mobilization and troop movements. Poland had a mall air force. It was much smaller than the Luftwaffe and he plsanes were inferior to the modern German planes. The Poles awarte tha a German attack was imiment had moved their planes from the major air bases to small camouflaged airfields. As a result, when the Germans struck on the first day of the invasion Only some trainers and auxiliary aircraft were destroyed by the Luftwaffe. This was something that the Dutch, French, Yugoslasvs and Soviets failed to achieve when the Germans struck. The Polish Air force as a result fought the Luftwaffe in to the second week of the invasion. The Polish pilots with their small force and largely obselete planes was unable to offer much support to the Polish Army or protect Polish cities. They did manage to bloody the Luftwaffe. [Zalonga, p. 50.] The Luftwaffe lost 285 aircraft during the campaign. The Poles claimed 134 air victories. An additionl 279 aircraft were damaged. The Poles lost 333 aircraft. [Overy, p. 28.] A number of Polish pilots managed to get to France anf then Britain and were effective in the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe bombed the railway station at Kolo killing 111 refugees (September 2). This of course can be seen as an attempt to disrupt Polish transportation. The Allied strategic bombing campaign would eventually target the German transportation network. It should be noted, however, that Germany initiated this aspect of the air war. Bombing railway stations and instalations is more important than in may sound. Railway stations and other rail centers are located in cities, often the center of cities. There is no way that railway stations can be surgically bombed using World War II technology. An attack on a railway station is thus almost by definition an attack on a city. The Luftwaffe staged a terror bombing raid on Krzemieniec, killing dozens (September 12).

Initial Allied Bombing Campaign (1939-41)

The initial British bombing raids in 1939 dropped leaflets. The British were reluctant to actually bomb German cities, in part fearing reprisal raids from the Luftwaffe. I have little information on the French at this time. There was not significant bombing campign, except for Luftwaffe operations in Poland (September-October 1940), until the Battle of Britain. After the fall of France (June 1940), German cities were no longer as vulnerable to FAF attacks. Bomber Command had only small numbers of heavy bombers and they were slow, poorly defended, and had a limited load capacity. Throughout the Battle of Britain, small numbers of British bombers hit German targets in night time raids. The rids were wholly ineffectual in a military sence. Hitting a military target at night with 1940s technology, especially 1940 technology was very difficult. Sometimes the raiders did not even hit the intended city. Some of the raids were also very costly in air crews and planes. The raids did have an in important psychological impact. British raids on Berlin so enraged Hitler that he ordered a change in Luftwaffe tactics in the Battle of Britain, which may have well resulted in a favorable turn in the battle in favor of the British

Finland (November 1939-March 1940)

The Soviet Union launched the Winter War by invading Finlnd. The Soviet Red Air Force deployed about 800 planes to participate in the invasion of Finland. This included fighters (60 percent), bombers (30 percent), and reconisance and utility (10 percent) planes. The Red Air Force outclassed the small Finnish air force was superior in the number and performance of their aircradt. Quite a number of the Soviet pilots had some combat experience in the conflict with Japan on the Mongolian-Siberian border (July 1939). The Red Air Force did not, however, play a major role in the outcome Winter War. A factor here was the weather, but even more important was the Red Air Force's combat doctrine. They were prone to attack cities and did inflict considerable damage on civilians, but not on Finnish combat units. The Soviets attavked rail lines which did impair the day time monility and supply of combat units. The Finnsc report losing 243 locomotives and some 2 000 carriages either destroyed or damaged, a ubstantial loss for a small country. The Soviet's mass superority in ground forces, however is what won the war. The Red Air Force did not have the ability to effectively hit specific targets in Finnish cities. Soviet air raids killed nearly 900 Finnish civilians. Soviet fighters and anti aircraft gunners reported 534 confirmed kills the actual number was probably substantially higher. (Soviet statistics are made up and thu of no historical value.) Red Air Force pilots shot down 35 Finnish planes. Give the size and performance advantages, this was an abimsal performance. It is unclear to what extent Red Air Force commanders realistivally assessed their performance. In the Soviet Union, military commanders did not report failure as it could mean arrest and execution. As a result, no significant reforms were instituted to prepare the Red Air Firce with its life and death struggle with the Luftwaffe.

Studie Nord: Denmark and Norway (April 1940)

The Luftwaffe also played an important role in the German campaigns against Denmark and Norway, the Luftwaffwe role in Norway was decisive. Denmark did not have an army of any consequence. Thus with a land border, the Germans were able to cooupy the country within hours with virtually no resitance. Norway was different. The Germans had no land border and the Royal Navy was a superior force. The Allies should have neen able to save Norway, but the Norwegian reliance on its neutral status proved to be their undoing. The Luftwaffe was ble to essyanlish air bases in Norway. Air oprtatiins were given less emphasis by the Britoish and French. This the Germans were ble to estanblish air superority over the batlfild. This proved to be the critical difference in the campaign.

German Western Offensive (May 1940)

Again the Luftwaffe played key roles in the German Western offensive against the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. The offensive as in all German campaigns was led off by raids intended to criple the oposing air force. Here they were largely sucessful, giving the Germans command of the air during the critical fighting which led to Dunkirk and the fall of France. The Dutch airforce was largely destoyed on the first day and the Belgian airforce crippled. The French and British were unprepared for the force of the attack. The French unliked the Germans had not massed their air force to counter the German attack. A factor here may have been to make a knockout blow impossible, but it meant that a substantial portion of the French air force was out of the battle as the issue was being decided. The British held back much of the RAF to protect Britain itself. After Dunkirk the RAF continued flying missions over France, but flying from distant British bases made the RAF effort ineffectual. The RAF units that had been posted to France were badly mauled. The RAF had depoyed 261 fighters and in only 10 days, 75 had been shot down in aerial combat or destroyed on the ground. An additional 120 could not be brought back to Britain because they were damaged or fuel was not available. [Gilbert, p. 319.] Overall the RAF lost 1,000 planes in France. Fortunately, most of the pilots could be brought back. The losses in France were a quarter of the FAF's front-line fighter strength. The French pleaded for more, but Churchill, who had just replaced Chamberlain as prime minister, had to refuse knowing that the RAF now would be needed to protect Britain itself.

International Law

The primary use of Luftwaffe in these campaigns was tatical and within the rules of war, but from the very beginning in Poland, the Luftwaffe engaged in bombing cities, including terror attacks. Here the principal target was Warsaw. The Luftwaffe and subsequently artillerly bombarded Warsaw remorsely. This was a clear violations of the established standards of warfare. From the beginning, Hitler dew a destinction between war in the East and West. The aur war in the West was conducted differently with more restraint. Here there were racial factors involved as well as a desire to avoid a lengthy war wih Britain so he could focus on the East. This changed with the Battle of Britain.

Battle of Britain (July-September 1940)

The German initiated their long awaited western campaign in May 1940. Paris fell June 14 and France capitulated June 22. The Luftwaffe quickly established bases in France and by July 10 launched preliminary strikes in what has come to be called the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe while better trained and outnumbering the RAF was ill prepared for the campaign. They did not appreciate the critical importance of the British home chain radar network. They also had no straegic bomber fleet. The air offensive was to be conducted with two engine bombers that proved highly effective in short range tactical operations, but were not well suited for kinger-range strategic bombing. The Battle of Brirain began in ernest on August 13 with Luftwaffe raids on British airfields and aircraft factories. Hitler had assumed that the Luftwaffe could force the British to capitualte. This isresumably why he stopped the panzers before Dunkirk. Unlike his strategy against the Poles, Dutch, and Belgians, there were no German terror bombing of London and other British cities. The Luftwaffe im its August campaign seriously weakened the RAF and Fighter Command was having increasing difficulty maintaining its forward air bases in Kent. Then off-course German bombers accidentally bomb London on August 23-24. RAF Bomber Command on August 25-26 mounted a small reprisal raid against Berlin. Hitler is furious and orders an immediate change in Luftwaffe tactics. Rather than completing its offensive against the RAF infrastructure, Hitler ordered a "blitz" on British cities which began in earnest on September 7. The Luftwaffe wreaked havoc on civilians in London and major English cities. An estimated 42,000 civilians were killed. Thousands of civilians were killed. Edward R. Murrow broadcasting from London ("London calling ...") described Britain's valiant resistance to rapt American radio audiences, greatly affecting American attitides toward the Hitler and the NAZIs. White British cities burned, the RAF was given a respite, allowing its forward air bases to recover from the damage done in August. As a result the RAF was able to mount increasingly costly attacks on the German bomber fleets. The Lutwaffe eventually is forced to shift to nightime raids. Night bombing made it impossible to hit actually military and industrail targets, only cities could be targetted. The Luftwaffe eventually ended the major offensive against the British as the German military in 1941 began preparing for Opperation Barbarosa, Hitler's long awaited dream of invading the Soviet Union which at the time was a virtual German ally.

Sources

Gilbert, Martin. A History of the Twentieth Century Vol. 2 1933-54 (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1998), 1050p.

Overy, Richard J. The Air War: 1939-1945 (London, Europa Publications, 1980).

Speidel, Wilhelm (1956). The Luftwaffe in the Polish Campaign of 1939 (Montgomery, Alabama: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1956).

Zalonga, Steven J., Ramiro Bujeiro, and Howard Gerrard. Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg (Osprey Publishing, 2002).






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Created: 12:31 AM 3/3/2010
Last updated: 7:05 PM 2/22/2017