Figure 1.--.

"In the early years of the bomber war, when in seemed that the campaign might actually be abandoned, that the great immorality open to us was to lose the war against Hitler's Germany, to have abandoned the only means open to us for direct attack would have been a long step in that direction."

The air war in the West wound down in 1941. The Luftwaffe launhed some heavy raids on Britiain before shiting east to prepare for Barbarossa. With the attack on the Soviet Union, Luftwaffe bombers were primarily deployed in the East and to a much lesser extent in the Mediterranean. Hitler focused on the Soviet Union and ordered all projects shelved that could not be made operational in 12months. The British conducted raids durng 1941, but they were done with small numbers of planes and with negligble results. More importantly the RAF was pouring enormous resources in Bomber Command and building an increasingly important bomber force. The British during 1942 increased the number of long range four engine bo,bers from 41 to 539. They also were training increasing numbers of air crews. America, although not yet in the War, expanded its commitment to air forces. The United States had develped a long-range startehic bomber in the 1930s--the B-17. Congressional resistance had limited actual construction. The fall of France had changed many minds in Congress concerning military appropriations. President Roosevelt in 1941 ordered Air Chief Hap Arnold to build a strategic bomber force of 5,000 planes. The United States also commenced an enormous pilot and air crew training program.

Luftwaffe Attacks on Britain

The German begn bombiong Polish cities on the first dy of the War (September 1, 1940). The British were the victims to the world's first sustained strategic bombing campaign. It failed when the RAF mafe it too dangeroys to bomb during the day, but raid contuinued at might for seberal months. The air war in the West wound down in 1941. The Luftwaffe launhed some heavy raids on Britiain before shiting east to prepare for Barbarossa.

Barbarossa (June 22, 1941)

With the attack on the Soviet Union, Luftwaffe bombers were primarily deployed in the East and to a much lesser extent in the Mediterranean. First units were shifted south to support the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece (April). The great bulk of the Luftwaffe was ddployed east to support the massive attack on the Soviet Union (June). The Luftwaffe performed septaculsarly, destroying the sunstantial Red Air Force and supporting the Pasmzers as they sliced through Soviet defenses. The Luftwaffe was, howver, not the decisive force that it had proven in the West. Barbarossa was such a massive undertaling over an enormous area, tht the Luftwaffe was too limited a force to have a decisive impact. In the West the Luftwaffe could be concentrated to force the issue at a few critical locations. In the east this was not possible.

German Military Development Projects

Hitler focused on the Soviet Union and ordered all projects shelved that could not be made operational in 12months. At this stage of the War, Hitler believed that the War was already won. He was less concerned about British and Soviet threats than the potential German civilian reaction to shortages of food and consumer goods. Here he had in mind the collapse of the home front during the final year of World War I. One of those projects was the work on jet aircraft which at the time was well in advance of the British work. There was no work at all in America. A scietific commission assured the Army Air Corps that jet propulsion was not feasible.

British Raids

The British conducted numerous nightime raids on Germany durng 1941, but they were done with small numbers of planes and with negligble results. The British thought the raids were effective. One assessment suggested that production in the Ruhr fell 20 percent. The British gradually realized that they were having no real impact on the German war industry. German sources report that the impact was basically nill, not even reaching 1 percent. 【Rumpf, p. 46.】 The Luftwaffe began working on the problem of engaging British bombers at night. While the damage being dome was minimal, it did attract NAZI attention and the Germans were bdginning to devote considerable resources on air defense.

New Directive (July 1941)

The Defense Committee over time changed its Directives to Bomber Command. After the fall of France (June 1940), bomber Command was the only military force striking directly at the Reich. With Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941), Bomber Command was no longer the only force actively engaged with attacks on the Continent. Five moths later, Hitler declared War on the United States, fundamentally changing the balance of power. But even before that the Defense Committee in part to support the Soviets issued new Directives to Bombers Command. The existing Directives had prioritized oil and naval targets. New directives fundamentally changed targeting. The new Directive was "dislocating the German transportation system and ... destroying the morale of the civil populations a whole and of the industrial workers in particular." 【Webster and Frankland, Vol. IV, pp. 135-40.】 Critics charge that this was a euphemism for killing civilians. Not quite, but not far from it. The British made the mistake both before and during the War of thinking that support for Hitler and the NAZIs were brittle. Lord Trenchard before the war had expressed his opinion that the Germans would crack before the British in any bombing campaign. 【Webster and Frankland, Vol. IV, p. 195.】 Trenchard and the many other Brit's who held this opinion were wrong. It was not. It is true that German will cracked first, but this was only because the level of Allied bombing was so much heavier than German bombing. German civilians would support the NAZIs just as resolutely if not more so than the British people supported their government during the Blitz. The Defense Committee was coming to the conclusion that attacks on specific targets were largely ineffective and that only the bombs falling on cities were doing real damage. Now Bomber Command did not have the planes with the effective range and payload to execute such orders in 1941. But modification to existing aircraft and the the new planes needed were now off the drawing board and being built. And would begin reaching actual squadrons (February 1942). At the same time that the new Avro Lancaster began reaching Bomber Command squadrons, so did a determined and single-minded commander--Sir Arthur Harris. And the British Government bcause of NAZI actions considered itself morally freed from its initial commitment to only bomb military targets and not whole cities. And if the Blitz and other German actions was not bad enough, Prime Minister Churchill was receiving reports of a bestiality beyond human comprehension. Bletchely Park was delivering the Prime-Minister a steady stream of decrypts from intercepted Einsatzgruppen reports informing Himmler of the the Jews being murdered with number tallies detailing the grisly results, separated into the numbers of men, women, and children.

Butts Report (August 1941)

Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser, ordeed aysematic analysis of the results of the bombing (June0-July 1941). The result as the Butt Repoert. D.M. Butt was an member of the Ear Cabiner Secretariat. Hus staff examined 630pohoigraphs taken by Bomber Command aicraft of night operations. The concklussion was gthat of the 630 bombers who reported bombing the assifned targets, only a third gotbwithin 5b miles of the target. The proportion was higher against the closer targets in France, but droped to one-tenmth against the haze shriuded Ruht. Success was slightly higher on moon-lit nights, but much lower when bombing on moonless nights --only one fifteenth. 【Webster and Frankland, Vol. IV, pp. 205-13.】 The results shocked the Air Ministry and Prime-Minister Churchill. Clearly Bomber Command was not having any impact on Grrman war prodyction. But not fully understood, the bombing has unsettled Hitlerand he ordered substanyil trsoutces be assigned to deal with the bombing. And this was just what Bomber Command was ordered to accomplish, force the Germans to divert resources from the efforts to destroy the Red Army.

Bomber Command Expansion

More importantly the RAF was pouring enormous resources in Bomber Command and building an increasingly important bomber force. The British during 1942 increased the number of long range four engine bombers from 41 to 539. They also were training increasing numbers of air crews.

American Air Forces

America, although not yet in the War, expanded its commitment to air forces. The United States had develped a long-range startehic bomber in the 1930s--the B-17. Congressional resistance had limited actual construction. The fall of France had changed many minds in Congress concerning military appropriations. President Roosevelt in 1941 ordered Air Chief Hap Arnold to build a strategic bomber force of 5,000 planes. The United States also commenced an enormous pilot and air crew training program. With the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7) remaining fiscal constraints on the Air Forces evaporated.

Sources

Rumpf, Hans. Edward Fitzgerald, trans. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1962), 256p.

Franklamd, Charles and Noble Frankland. The Strategic Air Offensive against Grmany (HMSO: 1961).

Created: 5:23 AM 8/25/2005
Last updated: 5:41 AM 6/11/2020