Figure 1.--the only Allied plane with the low-altitude speed to be effective against the wave of V-1s was the FAF Hawker Tempest. Here a RAF Spitfire has interceoted a German V-1 south of London. The RAF pilot is attempting to tip over the wing of the V-1 by disrupting thev air flow so it falls harmlessly in a rural area before reaching London.

The V-1 unlike the other Wunderwaffen was a real threat to the Allies. Fortunately the raid on Peenemünde delayed development and production. . The British were able to deal with the V-1 offensive when it came in a number of ways. First, one of the major achievements of the Allied Strateefic Bombing campaign was delaying the V-1 and V-2 programs. The RAF raid on Peenemünde (August 1943) delayed the programs several months, in fact nearly a year -- most notably until after D-Day. Second, was another round of evacuations (June-September 1944) Many of the children evacuated in 1939-40 had returned home by 1944. As a result of the V-1s, the children were sent back to safety in the countryside again. The advance of Allied armies in France overran the V-1 sites. It was at this time that the V-2 attacks began. Third, the Allies began searching for the tell-tale ramps alomg the Channel coast and attack them by air. The Germans were able to develop launch methods with less elaborate favilities. They could not fire the numbers they had hoped to, but they were able to begin the campaign while they still held positions along the Channel. With the massing of Allied forces in the Channel ports, the V-1s could have had a real impact. Fortunately, the Gernmans could not launch the V-1 offensive until after D-Day and mostly aimed at London. Hitler had not learned that knocking down British homes had little impact on the Allied war effort. Fourth, inaccurate news reports mislead the German targetting. The V-1s had a primitive trgetting system. It was basec on how long it would take to hit a site. British news reports carried false reports. Thus ment that the Germans had troublr hitting densely populated areas. Fifth, the RAF intensified fighter patrols. The V-1s because of their relatively slow speed were y vulnerable to fighter aircraft. Fighters shot down about 2,000. This was a dangerous undertaking, however, because the size of the war head endangered persuing fighters. The fighters to get off a good shot had to get near to the V-1 and the resulting explosion could destroy the fighter. Some pilots tried to pull up along the V-1s and use their wings to flip it over. This was also a very risky maneuver. Sixth, anti-aircraft guns were rushed to the Channel coast. Anti-aircraft batteries knocked down a similar number. Seventh, barrage baloons brought down about 300. Eighth, the most effective counter measure proved to be the advance of the Allied armies after the breakout from Normandy. The Allies moved up the French coast, reaching Belgium (September 1944), the NAZIs lost the last V-1 sites within range of London, but the V-2s were still in range.

Delaying the Program

First, one of the major achievements of the Allied Strateefic Bombing campaign was delaying the V-1 and V-2 programs. The RAF raid on Peenemünde (August 1943) delayed the programs several months, in fact nearly a year. Not only were facilities at Peenemünde destroyed and staff killed, but the Germans had to go underground which hmoered priduction. As a result, The Germans could not launch the V-1 and V-2 offensive until after D-Day. This meant the missles could not interfere with D-Day invasion and once on the ground in France, the Allies could begin overunning the launch sites. In addition to the V-1 and V-2, other prduction sites went indergriound. This protected them from direct hits, but it also had a range of negative consequences, most importantly placing a greater strain on an already over streched transport network. And the transport network was not underground so it could be attacked. .

Renewed Evacuations

Second, was another round of evacuations (June-September 1944) Many of the children evacuated in 1939-40 had returned home by 1944. As a result of the V-1s, the children were sent back to safety in the country side again. The advance of Allied armies in France overran the V-1 sites. It was at this time that the V-2 attacks began.

Destroying Launch Sites

Third, the Allies began searching for the tell-tale ramps alomg the Channel coast and attack them by air. The Germans were able to develop launch methods with less elaborate favilities. They could not fire the numbers they had hoped to, but they were able to begin the campaign while they still held positions along the Channel. With the massing of Allied forces in the Channel ports, the V-1s could have had a real impact. Fortunately the Germans ciould not launch the V-1 offensive until after D-Day and mostly aimed at London. Hitler had not learned that knicking down British homes had littkle impact on the war effort.

Targeters Mislead

Fourth, inaccurate news reports mislead the German targetting. The V-1s had a primitive trgetting system. It was basec on how long it would take to hit a site. British news reports carried false reports. Thus ment that the Germans had troublr hitting densely populated areas.

Fighter Patrols

Fifth, the RAF intensified fighter patrols. The V-1s because of their relatively slow speed were y vulnerable to fighter aircraft. Fighters shot down about 2,000. This was a dangerous undertaking, however, because the size of the war head endangered persuing fighters. The fighters to get off a good shot had to get near to the V-1 and the resulting explosion could destroy the fighter. Some pilots tried to pull up along the V-1s and use their wings to flip it over. This was also a very risky maneuver.

Anti-Aircraft Guns

Sixth, anti-aircraft guns were rushed to the Channel coast. Anti-aircraft batteries knocked down a similar number. Here the British were aided in placing the guns because they knew the target was orimarily London. Hitler since 1940 was fixated in destroying London. Allied raids on Berlin only intensuifuied this fixation.

Barage Baloons

Seventh, barrage baloons brought down about 300.

D-Day

Eighth, the most effective counter measure proved to be the advance of the Allied armies after D-Day. The breakout from Normand (late-July) mean the end if the V-1. The V-1 Bizz bombs were a short range weapon, but only if fired from the Channel coast. The v-1 opperatiinal range was about 160 miles. The Allies moved up the French coast and liberatred most of France, reaching Belgium (September 1944). This mean that the NAZIs lost not only the Channel coast, but most of France. The last V-1 sites within range of London were gone. The V-2 missles, however, were within range and about to be unleashed. This would be part of the reason Gen. Eisenhower approved Field Marshall Montgomery's Market Garden plan. The V-2s with mobil platfiorms could be launched from Belgium and the Netherlands. .

Created: 6:49 AM 6/12/2023
Last updated: 6:49 AM 6/12/2023