Figure 1.--The United States began building superb ground support aircraft during World War II, incredibly 3 years before the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) had a tactical air doctrine. Arguably the best American close ground support plane of the War was the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt which was introduced (1941) before Pearl Harbor. The British Typhoon was equally capable. (The Germans and Soviets had nothing remotely comparable.) The 8th Air Force in Britain first used it for escort duty despite the limited range even with drop tanks. The USAAC at the onset of the war had very little interest in ground support despite having the ideal aircraft for it. The P-47 at first had a razorback look with the slide back canopy. It was only when it was redesigned with the bubble canopy seen here that the pilots had great ground and rear visibility. (The P-51 Mustangs received the same redesign.) Another change was changing the propeller to the larger Hamilton Standard prop that really chewed up the air giving the plane more lift capabilities meaning an even greater bomb/rocket load. The P-47 thus had excellent visibility and above all, a massive engine that gave it the lift capability to carry an enormous load of the ordinance needed to support infantry and armor. This began with the P-47D-5 (summer 1943). This redesigned magnificent ground support plan began arriving in Britain just as America began the D-Day buildup. It was a beast, weighing over 12,550 lb., far more than any single-engine fighter ever developed. Here we have a fully loaded P-47, we think the P-47N in the last year of the War with both rockets and bombs. The P-47 also could carry napalm. The rockets proved to be a highly effective ground support weapon and could be more accurately aimed than the bombs. No other ground support plane could match the P-47s load capacity, a vital applicability in measuring ground support..

"My front lines looked like the face of the moon. And at least 70 percent of my troops were out of action -- dead, wounded, crazed, or numb."

-- Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, Commander Berlin-Brandenburg 3rd Panzer Division after the launch of the Allie Operation Cobra, (July 24, 1944).

The Luftwaffe began the War in Poland as a highly effective, short range tactical air force. They had worked out the all important matter of air ground communications. The British at the time did not even have an advanced all-metal fighter, let alone a tactical doctrine. The RAF saw strategic bombing as the most effective use of air power. The same was true of the Armée de l'Air Française and they played a terrible price with a humiliating defeat (May-June 1940). The U.S. Army Air Corps (USAC), despite being a part of the Army was even more committed to strategic bombing. The USAC was dominate by the Bomber Boys (Armold, Eaker, and Spaatz). The result was that the United States entered the war with what would become the world's largest air force and several advanced fighters, but no tactical (ground support) doctrine or intention of developing one. In fact, the USAC commanders not only were committed to winning the War through strategic bombing, but were opposed to dissipating the bombing campaign by devoting resources to tactical operations. The Bomber Boys fervently believed that the best support the USAC could provide to American ground forces was to destroy German war industries producing military equipment. Fortunately for U.S. ground forces, the United States had the industrial capacity to produce both bombers and fighters. Thus when the United States arrived in North Africa as part of Operation Torch (November 1942), it had the aircraft needed for tactical operations, but incredibly no tactical doctrine or pilots trained in tactical operations. The USAC was using the fighters for roles like escort and patrol duties. It did not escape the Torch Commander, Gen. Eisenhower, and other American ground commanders that the Americans mauled at Kaserine (February 1943), had no air cover despite an overwhelming American superiority in air assets. Slowly commanders like Gen. Joe Cannon in Italy began to develop a tactical doctrine (1943). But Italy was a backwater and the war would be won or lost in France during 1944. It would be in France and Belgium that American tactical doctrine would be first deployed and come of age to play a decisive role in the War. USAC Gen. Ira Eaker based on Gen. Pete Quesada's work with fighters in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, brought him to England to command the new 9th Air Forceps's Fighter Command (IX TAC). Gen. Eisenhower demanded tactical support for the Normandy landings. The 9th Air Force's Fighter Command would be responsible for tactical operations over the American Normandy beaches. This was done over the protests of the British and American Bomber Boys who wanted to continue strategic operations seep into the Reich. Thus Quesada in only 4 months had to not only find and build facilities, train the air groups that had begun to arrive from America in strength, but also to develop an American tactical air doctrine from the ground up. [Hughes] We know of no American commander in any service except perhaps for Adm. Nimitz who accomplished more in four short months than Quesada. The Bombers Boys had two decades to develop strategic air doctrine, but Quesada and the talented staff he cobbled together had only 4 months to create tactical air doctrine and train skeptical, inexperienced pilots. It would be IX TAC that after D-Day would would be at the center of the most dazzling display of air power in history. The American GIs that stormed through NAZI-occupied Europe has mostly inferior weapons than the Germans, but had airborne tactical support that more than compensated.

Britain: The Royal Air Force

The British at the time did not even have an advanced all-metal fighter, let alone a tactical doctrine. The RAF saw strategic bombing as the most effective use of air power. The terrible defeat suffered by the British Expedition Force (BEF) in France and Belgium (May 1940) forced the RAF to develop a tactical support system, but it took some time. A British reader describes the evolution of this system. ACM Tedder became A O C-in-C Middle East (June 1941). Tedder organised the RAF's No.204 Group into a separate Air Headquarters, Western Desert and grouped its fighter, light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons into wings with increased transport for mobility while removing unnecessary equipment and personnel. This streamlining effectively created the RAF's first tactical air force, soon to be known as the Desert Air Force, which came under the command of AVM Coningham (July 1941). Attention was given to the machinery for requesting, allocating and providing air support, and a system similar to that being developed at home in Britain came into operation (October 1941). A joint RAF/Army staffed Air Support Control (ASC) headquarters was established at each army corps and each armored division, linked to the forward units by a 'tentacle' equipped with two way wireless telegraphy. An RAF team was also allocated to each brigade, known as a Forward Air Support Link (FASL) and equipped with two way radio-telephony for the control of supporting aircraft and the reception of reconnaissance broadcasts. Support requests from the brigades were evaluated at the ASC and, if accepted, contact was made with the RAF units at the airfields through a Rear Air Support Link (RASL). A fusion occurred of the air support system developed in Britain with that created in North Africa (1942) , when a UK trained Tentacle (No.2 AASC) arrived to gain operational experience. No.2 AASC was employed during the Gazala battle, and when called upon proved that air support response time, from army request to aircraft over target, could be reduced to 30 minutes or less. As a result of a combination of theory, experimentation and training in Britain and practical experience in North Africa, a British air support system had been created (late-1942). This system remained essentially the same throughout the war. It was refined and control of vital components changed. For example the vital Tentacles, that linked the Army and RAF had (by 1944), become the responsibility of the Royal Corps of Signals and were renamed Air Support Signals Units (ASSUS). They enabled Army formations down to brigade level to request air support via the combined RAF/Army control center and they were standardized to allow their deployment to Corps, Division or Brigade headquarters. They were also attached to RAF headquarters at Wing and Group Control Centers. 【Rusling】

France: Armée de l'Air Française (AAF)

The same was true of the French Armée de l'Air Française (AAF). To make matter worse, the AAF was dispersed all over the country to ensure that it could not be destroyed in a powerful Luftwaffe strike. This dispersal, however, meant that he AAF could not be concentrated to quickly oppose the German offensive in the Ardennes. And they played a terrible price with a humiliating defeat (May-June 1940). Although French forces were evacuated along with the British at Dunkirk, the British would regroup across the Channel, the French declined to do so. It should be stressed that the disaster was not because the AAF pilots were incapable or the aircraft obsolete, it was he command decisions of the French generals that led to he disaster. Of considerable importance, the Germans did not use the substantial French aviation industry to any extent during the occupation. Of all the occupied countries, France had the capability of substantially adding to German armaments production, but the Germans made little effort to take advantage of this opportunity. One factor was French passive resistance, but another factor was that the Germans were just not all that interested. The Germans thought they had won the War in 1940 and by the time they realized that they had not largely in large because of arms production (1942), victory had slipped beyond their grasp. Hitler appointed Albert Speer Armaments Minister (1842). Speer made some effort to use French industry, but with little success.

Germany: The Luftwaffe

The Luftwaffe began the War in Poland as a highly effective, short range tactical air force. They had worked out the all-important matter of air ground communications. No other air force had done his, including the Soviet Red Air Force which was also largely a tactical ground support air force. This was a vital component of Blitzkrieg. The tanks perhaps get more of the credit, but aircraft were absolutely indispensable. The Germans even had radios installed in their tanks before the War. Luftwaffe Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Walther Wever (1887-1936), like most air commanders, supported strategic bombing and the development of long-range heavy bombers. His death in 1936 sealed the fate of Luftwaffe strategic bombing. This was especially the case when Luftwaffe Chief Herman Göring. himself a fighter ace, realized that Hitler was most impressed with statistics on the number of aircraft being produced, not the type. Another issue was industrial capacity. It took far more resources to build heavy bombers than small fighters. Only late in the War did Hitler became fixated on bombing. He insisted that the Me-262 should be used as a bomber even after he was told, we think by Galand, that even a child could see that the 262 was a fighter.

Italy

Japan

Soviet Union: Soviet Red Air Force (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily -- VVS)

The Red Air Force like the Luftwaffe was primarily a tactical ground support force. The vast bulk of the 157,000 aircraft produced by the Soviets were used in ground support operations. The Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik became the iconic Red Air Force plane of the War for its tank busting capabilities. Some 36,000 were produced. We have been unable so far to find details on Soviet tactical doctrine. It is notable, however, that one major weakness in the Soviet military was communications. The Soviets after the War like the Russians today disparage tte contribution of American Lend Lease, but one of the major American contributions was radio communication equipment. Few Red Air Force aircraft had radios before the War. And much of the radio equipment installed during the War was American Lend Lease equipment. Of course, effective tactical operations require communication with ground forces.

United States: U.S. Army Air Corps

The U.S. Army Air Corps (USAC), despite being a part of the Army was strongly committed to strategic bombing. The USAC was dominate by the Bomber Boys (Armold, Eaker, and Spaatz). The result was that the United States entered the war with what would become the world's largest air force and several advanced fighters, but no tactical (ground support) doctrine or real intention of developing one. In fact, the USAC commanders not only were committed to winning the War through strategic bombing, but were opposed to dissipating the bombing campaign by devoting resources to tactical operations. The USAC's expert on tactical aviation wa, Claire Chenault of Flying Tiger fame was incomprehensibly fostered off on the Chinese. The Bomber Boys fervently believed that the best support the USAC could provide to American ground forces was to destroy German war industries producing military equipment. Fortunately for U.S. ground forces, the United States had the industrial capacity to produce both bombers and fighters. Thus when the United States arrived in North Africa as part of Operation Torch (November 1942), it had the aircraft needed for tactical operations, but creditably no tactical doctrine or pilots trained in tactical operations. The USAC was using the fighters for roles like escort and patrol duties. It did not escape the Torch Commander, Gen. Eisenhower, and other American ground commanders that the Americans mauled at Kaserine (February 1943), had no air cover despite an overwhelming American superiority in air asserts. Slowly commanders like Gen. Joe Cannon in Italy began to develop a tactical doctrine (1943). But Italy was a backwater and the war would be won or lost in France during 1944. It would be in France and Belgium that American tactical doctrine would be first deployed and come of age to play a decisive role in the War. USAC Gen. Ira Eaker based on Gen. Pete Quesada's work with lighters in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, brought him to England to command the new 9th Air Forces's Fighter Command (IX TAC). Gen. Eisenhower demanded tactical support for the Normandy landings. The 9th Air Force's Fighter Command would be responsible for tactical operations over the American Normandy beaches. This was done over the protests of the British and American Bomber Boys who wanted to continue strategic operations deep into the Reich. Thus Quesada in only 4 months had to not only find and build facilities, train the air groups that had begun to arrive from America in strength, but also to develop an American tactical air doctrine from the ground up. 【Hughes】 We know of no American commander in any service except perhaps for Adm. Nimitz who accomplished more in four short months than Quesada. The Bombers Boys had two decades to develop strategic air doctrine, but Quesada and the talented staff he cobbled together had only 4 months to create tactical air doctrine and train skeptical, inexperienced pilots. It would be IX TAC that after D-Day would would be at the center of the most dazzling display of air power in history. The American GIs that stormed through NAZI-occupied Europe has mostly inferior weapons than the Germans, but had airborne tactical support that more than compensated. And although the U.S. Army Air Corps focused on strategic bombing, by the time a tactical doctrine was formulated, the superb P-47 Thunderbolt with its huge ordinance carrying capacity became available. The Air Force would largely phase out the P-47 before h end of the War in favor of the P-51 Mustang. The P-51 has a smaller ordnance carrying capacity, but was much cheaper to build. The longer range was not he issue, because at this phase of the War, the Allies were approaching the borders of the Reich

Sources

Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (The Free Press: New York, 1995), 380p.

Russling, Steven. Personal communications (November 14, 2019).

Created: 1:26 AM 6/17/2016
Spell checked: 7:40 PM 1/25/2025