Figure 1.--The United States begn building superb ground suppot aircraft during World War II, incredibly 3 years before the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) had a tactical air doctrine. Arguably the best close ground support plane of the War was the Republic P-47 Thunderboldt which was introduced (1941) before Pearl Harbor. The 8th Air Force in Britain first used it for escort duty despite the limited rangeeven with drop tanls. The USAAC at the onset of the war had very little interest in ground support despite having the ideal aircraft for it. The P-47 at first had a razorback look with the slide back canopy. It was only when it was redesigned with the bubble canopy seen here that the pilots had great ground and rear visibility. (The P-51 Mustangs received the same redesign.) Another change was changing the propeller to the larger Hamilton Standard prop that really chewed up the air giving the plane more lift capabilities meaning an even greater bomb/rocket load. The P-47 thus had excellent visibility and above all, a massive engine that gave it the lift capability to carry an enormous load of the ordinance needed to support infantry and armor. This began with the P-47D-5 (summer 1943). This redesigned magnificent ground support plan began arrivng in Britain just as America began the D-Day buildup. It was a beast, weighing over 12,550 lb., far more than any single-engine fighter ever developed. Here we have a fully loaded P-47, we think the P-47N in the last year of the War with both rockets and bombs. The P-47 also could carry napalm. The rockets proved to be a highly effectve ground support weapon and could be more acurately aimed than the bombs. No other ground support plane could match the P-47s load capacity.

The Luftwaffe began the War in Poland as a highly effective, short range tactical air force. They had worked out the all imprtant matter of air ground communications. The British at the time did not even have an advanced all-metal fighter, let alone a tactical doctrine. The RAF saw strategic bombing as the most effective use of air power. The same was true of the Arm�e de l'Air Fran�aise and they played a terrible price with a humiliating defeat (May-June 1940). The U.S. Army Air Corps (USAC), despite being a part of the Army was even more committed to strategic bombing. The USAC was dominate by the Bomber Boys (Armold, Eaker, and Spaatz). The result was that the United States entered the war with what would become the world's largest air force and several advanced fighters, but no tactical (ground support) doctrine or intention of developing one. In fact, the USAC commanders not only were committed to winning the War through strategic bombing, but were opposed to disapating the bombing campaign by devoting resources to tactical operations. The Bomber Boys fervently believed that the best support the USAC could provide to American ground forces was to destroy German war industries producing military equipment. Fortunately for U.S. ground forces, the United States had the industrial capacity to produce both bombers and fighters. Thus when the United States arrived in North Africa as part of Operation Torch (November 1942), it had the aircraft needed for tactical operations, but incredably no tactical doctrine or pilots trained in tactical operations. The USAC was using the fighters for roles like escort and patrol duties. It did not escape the Torch Commander, Gen. Eisenhower, and other American ground commanders that the Americans mauled at Kaserine (February 1943), had no air cover despite an overwealming American superiority in air assetts. Slowly commanders like Gen. Joe Cannon in Italy began to develop a tactical doctrine (1943). But Italy was a backwater and the war would be won or lost in France during 1944. It would be in France and Belgium that American tactical docrtine would be first deployed and come of age to play a decisive role in the War. USAC Gen. Ira Eaker based on Gen. Pete Quesada's work with fighters in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, brought him to England to command the new 9th Air Forces's Fighter Command (IX TAC). Gen. Eisenhower demanded tactical support for the Normandy landings. The 9th Air Force's Fighter Command would be responsible for tactical operations over the American Normandy beaches. This was done over the protests of the British and American Bomber Boys who wanted to continue strateguc operations seep into the Reich. Thus Quesada in only 4 months had to not only find and build facilities, train the air groups that had begun to arrive from America in strength, but also to develop an American tactical air doctrine from the ground up. [Hughes] We know of no American commander in any service except perhaps for Adm. Nimitz who accomplished more in four short months than Quesada. The Bombers Boys had two decades to develop strategic air doctrine, but Quesada and the talented staff he cobbeled together had only 4 months to create tactical air doctrine and train skeptical, inexperienced pilots. It would be IX TAC that after D-Day would would be at the center of the most dazzling display of air power in history. The American GIs that stormed through NAZI-occupied Europe has mostly inferior wepons than the Germans, but had airborn tactical support that more than compensated.

The Luftwaffe

The Luftwaffe began the War in Poland as a highly effective, short range tactical air force. They had worked out the all imprtant matter of air ground communications.

The Royal Air Force

The British at the time did not even have an advanced all-metal fighter, let alone a tactical doctrine. The RAF saw strategic bombing as the most effective use of air power. The terrible defeat suffered by the British Expeditiinary Force (BEF) in France and Belgium (May 1940) forced the RAF to develop a tactical support system, but it took some time. A British reader describes the evolution of this system. ACM Tedder became A O C-in-C Middle East (June 1941). Tedder organised the RAF�s No.204 Group into a separate �Air Headquarters, Western Desert� and grouped its fighter, light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons into wings with increased transport for mobility while removing unnecessary equipment and personnel. This streamlining effectively created the RAF�s first tactical air force, soon to be known as the Desert Air Force, which came under the command of AVM Coningham (July 1941). Attention was given to the machinery for requesting, allocating and providing air support, and a system similar to that being developed at home in Britain came into operation (October 1941). A joint RAF/Army staffed Air Support Control (ASC) headquarters was established at each army corps and each armoured division, linked to the forward units by a �tentacle� equipped with two way wireless telegraphy. An RAF team was also allocated to each brigade, known as a �Forward Air Support Link� (FASL) and equipped with two way radio-telephony for the control of supporting aircraft and the reception of reconnaissance broadcasts. Support requests from the brigades were evaluated at the ASC and, if accepted, contact was made with the RAF units at the airfields through a �Rear Air Support Link� (RASL). A fusion occurred of the air support system developed in Britain with that created in North Africa (1942) , when a UK trained Tentacle (No.2 AASC) arrived to gain operational experience. No.2 AASC was employed during the Gazala battle, and when called upon proved that air support response time, from army request to aircraft over target, could be reduced to 30 minutes or less. As a result of a combination of theory, experimentation and training in Britain and practical experience in North Africa, a British air support system had been created (late-1942). This system remained essentially the same throughout the war. It was refined and control of vital components changed. For example the vital Tentacles, that linked the Army and RAF had (by 1944), become the responsibility of the Royal Corps of Signals and were renamed Air Support Signals Units (ASSUS). They enabled Army formations down to brigade level to request air support via the combined RAF/Army control centre and they were standardised to allow their deployment to Corps, Division or Brigade headquarters. They were also attached to RAF headquarters at Wing and Group Control Centres. [Rusling]

Arm�e de l'Air Fran�aise

The same was true of the French and they played a terrible price with a humiliating defeat (May-June 1940).

U.S. Army Air Corps

The U.S. Army Air Corps (USAC), despite being a part of the Army was even more committed to strategic bombing. The USAC was dominate by the Bomber Boys (Armold, Eaker, and Spaatz). The result was that the United States entered the war with what would become the world's largest air force and several advanced fighters, but no tactical (ground support) doctrine or intention of developing one. In fact, the USAC commanders not only were committed to winning the War through strategic bombing, but were opposed to disapating the bombing campaign by devoting resources to tactical operations. The Bomber Boys fervently believed that the best support the USAC could provide to American ground forces was to destroy German war industries producing military equipment. Fortunately for U.S. ground forces, the United States had the industrial capacity to produce both bombers and fighters. Thus when the United States arrived in North Africa as part of Operation Torch (November 1942), it had the aircraft needed for tactical operations, but incredably no tactical doctrine or pilots trained in tactical operations. The USAC was using the fighters for roles like escort and patrol duties. It did not escape the Torch Commander, Gen. Eisenhower, and other American ground commanders that the Americans mauled at Kaserine (February 1943), had no air cover despite an overwealming American superiority in air assetts. Slowly commanders like Gen. Joe Cannon in Italy began to develop a tactical doctrine (1943). But Italy was a backwater and the war would be won or lost in France during 1944. It would be in France and Belgium that American tactical docrtine would be first deployed and come of age to play a decisive role in the War. USAC Gen. Ira Eaker based on Gen. Pete Quesada's work with fighters in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, brought him to England to command the new 9th Air Forces's Fighter Command (IX TAC). Gen. Eisenhower demanded tactical support for the Normandy landings. The 9th Air Force's Fighter Command would be responsible for tactical operations over the American Normandy beaches. This was done over the protests of the British and American Bomber Boys who wanted to continue strateguc operations seep into the Reich. Thus Quesada in only 4 months had to not only find and build facilities, train the air groups that had begun to arrive from America in strength, but also to develop an American tactical air doctrine from the ground up. [Hughes] We know of no American commander in any service except perhaps for Adm. Nimitz who accomplished more in four short months than Quesada. The Bombers Boys had two decades to develop strategic air doctrine, but Quesada and the talented staff he cobbeled together had only 4 months to create tactical air doctrine and train skeptical, inexperienced pilots. It would be IX TAC that after D-Day would would be at the center of the most dazzling display of air power in history. The American GIs that stormed through NAZI-occupied Europe has mostly inferior wepons than the Germans, but had airborn tactical support that more than compensated. And although the U.S. Army Air Corps focused on stategic bombing, by the time a tactical doctrin was formulated, the superb P-47 Thunderbolt with itys huge ordinance attying capavity bcame available.

Soviet Red Air Force (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily -- VVS)

The Red Air Force like the Luftwaffe was primarily a tactical ground support force. The vast bulk of the 157,000 aircraft produced by the Soviets werevused in ground support operations. The Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik became the iconic Red Air Force plane of the War for its tank busting capabilities. Some 36,000 were produced. We have been unable so far to find details on Soviet tactical doctrine.

Sources

Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (The Free Press: New York, 1995), 380p.

Russling, Steven. Personal communications (Novembr 14, 2019).

Created: 1:26 AM 6/17/2016
Last updated: 11:02 AM 11/14/2019