Figure 1.--To support the Ameican 10th Air Force in China, with the Burma Road cut, supplies had to be f;own in over the Hump. One of the major items required was aviation fuel. The fuel was flown in using barrels. As a result, there were huge quantities of these empty barrels around the air bases. Here Chinese Boy Scouts are putting them to use. The caption for this 1945 wire service read, "Man size jobfor Boy Scouts--In China: Hee, in China, well trained Boy Scouts construct a pontoon bridge from old gassoline barrels. They have been carryig a man-sized burden of war work on their little shoulders. Ther Chinese Boy Scouts have acted as air raid sinalers, cared for wounded shoulders, raised war funds, aided refugees and served on the war fronts." The photo was dated January 25, 1945.

After seizing Singapore, Japaese forced rapidly overran the British in Burma despite American air support and Nationalist Chinese divisions under Gerneral Stillwell. This severed the Burma Road, Nationalist China's last suppy route to the Allies. This left the poorly equipped armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek totally cut off from outside support. It was important for the Allies to keep Chiang and China in the War because the bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed there. And President Roosevelt believed that China could play a major role in the war. It was not possible to supply the vast quantity if equiomnt the Chinese Army needed by air. The air lift capacity could not begin to meet the needs of the Chinese Army. Not only did the United States not have enough planes and crews to do his, but the route over the eastern Himalayas was extrenmely dangerous. The route became jknown as the Hump. Many planese were lost flying the route. [Diebold] The Allies began supply runs to China from India over the forbidding Himalayan Mountains (April 1942). Among the dangers were the unknown reception of the flyers by people like the Lolo tribesemen. The pilots referred to these runs as flying "The Hump". The flights because of the Himalayas were dangerous. They were 530-mile flights. The flights were conducted as part of the 10th Air Force operations. Nearly 1,000 men and 600 Air Transport Command (ATC) planes were lost during the CBI operations over the Hump. The China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) lost an additional 38 planes and 88 airmen. The air deliveries were primarily focused on building up and supplying the American 10th Air Force. The crews and planes could fly into China. But then they needed to be supplied with fuel, amunition, bombs, spare parts and other materiel. The United States hoped to initiate the strategic bombing campaign against Japan from Chinese airfields. Once the Allies gained the iniative on the ground along the Indian-Burmese border, they began building a road from Ledo, a rail head in India, to connect with the Old Burma Road. The Allied offensive into Burma succeeded in reopening the Burma road. A land route significantly increased the supplies that could be delivered to the Narionalist Chinese and made possible supplies to the Chinese Army as well as the 10th Air Force.

Flying Tigers (1941-42)

President Roosevelt after hearing from Claire Chennault, who Madame Chiang Kai-Shek had hired him to train Chinese pilots, decided to help China build a modern air force. He signed an executive order 1940 which permitted U.S. military personnel to resign so that they could participate in a covert operation to support China (May 1940). This is significant because it was was the first direct American military action to impede Axis aggression. It was taken in the atmospshere of the fall of France and the president deciding to run for a third term. Subsequent Japanese actions beginning with the occupation of northern French Indo-China only confirmed the President's decision to aid China. And the Magic intelligence from the cracking of the Japanese Diplomatic (Purple code) made it clear that the Japanese public protestratoins of a desire for peace were a diplomate charade (September 1940). President Roosevelt approved the transfer of Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighters to China. They would be included in the Lend Lease Program (1941). The planes were originally slated for the British RAF which was just beginning to brace for the Battle of Britain. America woud eventually produce a phenomenal number of aircraft. At this time, howevr, production was still limited and the U.S. Army Air Corps struggling to obtain needed new aircraft. The President also secretly approved the formation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG) to fly the P-40s. These were the first modern fighters ever deployed in China. The AVG's main task was to protect the Burma Road so that supplied could continue to reach China. The all-volunteer AVG became known as Chennault's Flying Tigers. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (December 1941) before the AVG could go into action. It thus no longer had to be a covert operation. Although very small, provide the Chinese a creditable air capability for the first time. Initially part of the AVG was deployed on both ends of the Burma Road. The Japanese invasion of Burma forced the Burma contingent to redeploy to China. It also cut off supplies over the Burma Road. The AVG continued to operate with supplies flown in from India over the Himilayas. The P-40s flown by the AVG were on paper no match for the fast, manuerable Japanese Zeros, but they were more robust and had armor protecting the pilots. Chennault developed battle tactics that enabled the Tigers to deal with the Zeros, but their major goal was to intercept the Japanese bombers hammering Chunking. The Army Air Corps and U.S. Navy did not take the AVG seriously and did not adapt Chenault's tactics until losses in the Pacific forced them to adjust tactics. Eventually the AVG was formed into the U.S. 14th Air Force. Some of the Tigers joined up, but most did not because of the way the AAC was treating Chennault. Others left China. Many of the new crews honored the AVG by also painting the shark's mouth image and referring to themselves as the Flying Tigers.

Japanese Conquest of Burma (January-May 1942)1942)

Burma was an scene of vicious fighting between Japan and the Allies. At the time of World War II, it was a British colony. The British hard-pressed in North Africa could not afford either the men or equipment to properly garison eiher Burma or Singapore. Japan after the fall of France (June 1940) demanded that French officials in Indochina permit them to occupy the colony. The French delayed the Japanese, but in the end were forced to acede to Japanese demands. The Japanese occupation took place in two stages, first north and then south Indochina. The Japanese had a number of goals in Indochina. The first was close the port of Haiphong which had been a major conduit of supplies to the Chinese Nationalists. Indochina also provided staging areas for planned invasions of of the Southern Resource Area (Burma, Malaya, Singaporte, Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines). For this reason this brought the Japanese into increasing conflict with the United States whose Pacific Fleet was the only force capable of effectively resisting Japan. From Indochina, Japan pressured Thialand to grant them free passage for an invasion of Burma. This was accomplished through both threats and offering a slice of Indochina. The Japanese invaded Burma through Thailand. The Japanese Atmy rapidly advanced against the poorly prepared British. The American Flying Tigers arrived just before the War, but was too small a force to blunt the Japanese offensive. The British surrender at Singapore (February 1942) and the American surrender in the Philippines (April 1942) allowed the Japanese to strengthen their drive through Burma. The major problem for the Japanese as they moved west was keeping their army supplied. The Japanese defeated both the British Army which included Indian units and the Chinese Army in India (CAI) commanded by an American general, Vinegar Joe Stilwell. The British position was also undermined by the organization of Burmese nationalist forces. The Allied forces had to make a forced retreat into India under terrible conditions. The Japanese not only succeeded in occupying Burma, but in doing so cut the Burma Road, the last remaining route to supplying the Chinese Nationalists. This left the poorly equipped armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek totally cut off from outside support.

The Hump (1942-45)

It was important for the Allies to keep Chiang and China in the War because the bulk of the Japanese Army was deployed there. And President Roosevelt believed that China could play a major role in the war. It was not possible to supply the vast quantity if equipmnt and supplies the Chinese Army needed by air. The air lift capacity could not begin to meet the needs of the Chinese Army. The AAC's focus before the War was on bombers. Other aircraft types like fighters and transports wee given little attention as well as other missions. The AAC was totally unorepared for a mamoouth air transport operation. Not only did the United States not have the plans or enough enough transport planes and crews to do his, but the route over the eastern Himalayas was extrenmely dangerous. The route became known as the Hump. Many planes were lost flying the route. [Diebold] The Allies began supply runs to China from India over the forbidding Himalayan Mountains (April 1942). Among the dangers were the unknown reception of the flyers by people like the Lolo tribesemen. The pilots referred to these runs as flying "The Hump". The flights because of the Himalayas were dangerous. They were 530-mile flights. The flights began as part of the AVG and then 10th Air Force operations, but there never was a centralized Hump command. Hump flights were conducted by all the different Americn CBKI air commands in the CBI to supply their operations or to support the overall effort. Yhe Air Transport Command (ATC) was especially importnt. Nearly 1,000 men and 600 ATC planes were lost during the CBI operations over the Hump. The China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) lost an additional 38 planes and 88 airmen.

American CBI Air Formations

American war planning from an early point centered on the use of air power. The impact of Hitler's new Luftwaffe had a powerful influence on American war planning. President Roosevelt response was to lay the groundwork for building a massive air force far beyond Germany's industrial capabilities and hugely greater than Japan's capabilities. This whole process began well before Pearl Harbor, but after Japan plunged America into the Pacific War this whole orocess went into over drive. American air firmations would span the globe and this included the CBI theater. The United States could supply the largely Cimmonwealth forces fighting n the area through Indian ports and the Indian rail system. China was different. The Japanese controlled all the Chinese ports. The United States operated the 10th, 14th, and 20th Air Firces in the CBI as well as several independent air commands. Supplying these units in India could be done fairly easily after Midway (June 1942), but getting the suplies to China was a dunting undertaking. After the Japanese closed the Burma Road (February 1942), the most formidable geographic barrier in the world stood between the Indian ports and the KMT armies fighting the War. This meant that it was impossible for America to supply and feed China like it did its other allies. Supplies could be delivered to China by air over the Hump, but only a small fraction of the quantity possible by sea and rail could be delivered by air. This meant that difficult priorities had to be established. So American aid to China almost by necesity focussed on the air war. The Hump became an inportant partof the CBI air campaign. Several American Air formation served in the CBI area. And it was ininitally these units from bases in China would bring the war to Japan through a strategic bombing campaign. At the onset of the Pacific War, the prospect of penetrating the Japanese island defense perimiter did not seem favorable.

Burma Operations

The Japanese immediately after Pearl Harbor opened the CBI theater with first the invasion of Malaya and the seizure of Singapore and then launched the campaign in Burma. All this was accomplished in only a few months and against numerically superior Allied forces, mostly British and Chinese. A major factor in their success was air power. British air units were negligible and the newly arrived American AVG (Flying Tigers) were only a small force. The Japanese were well trained, had much larger air assets, and better aircraft. The Japanese accomplished important goals, seizing resource rich areas and cutting the Burma Road, Nationalist China's life line. About the same time the Japanese complete the conquest of Burma, the U.S. Navy victory at Midway (June 1942), significantly changed the naval balance in the Pacific. This meant the Japanese could not rely on maritime transport to supply their army in Burma, specially as the American submarine campaign began to sink substantial numbers of Japanese marus (transports). And with the American offensive in the Solomons (August 1942), the Japanese did not have the capacity to build substantial air units in Burma. At the same time, American aircraft began to reach India in quantity, even though the CBI was usually the lowest priority theater of the war. The American aircraft included modern types that outclassed the Japanese aircraft, basically the same aircraft with which they began the War. The balance of power in the air changed quickly. The Allies formed Air Command South-East Asia (November 1943) to control all Allied air forces in the theater, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse as Commander-in-Chief. Peirse's and his deputy, USAAF Major General George E. Stratemeyer, formed Eastern Air Command (EAC) to control Allied air operations in eastern India and Burma, with headquartered in Calcutta (1943). Japa nese efforts to invade India, the U Go offensive, floundered because of lack of logistical capability and air support. The Japanese victories in Malaya and Burma were largely due to success in seizing British supplies. In India, the Allies supplied surrounded garrisons by air (Kohima and Imphal). The Japanese attacking force literally starved in the Jungle (1944). Allied air forces supplied British Chindits and American Rangers behind Japanese lands and played an important role in driving the Japanese out of Burma (1944-45).

Strategic Bombing Campaign

The original American plan for the strategic bombing campaign was based on bombing Japan from bases in China. The Americans attached much more importance to China as a war partner than the British. This is one reason the American Volunteer Group (AVG) was sent Burma and China. After the Japanese seized Burma and cut the Burma Road, the primary American focus in the CBI was to reopen the Burma Road. This was one reason that the campaign to take Burma and reopen the Burma Road. As it was, most of the limited supplies flown over the Hump was for the Army Air Corps in China. There was just not the air lift capcity to supply the Nationalist Army. The strategic bombing campaign was launched by the 20th Air Force operating from China. It was named Operation Matterhorn under XX Bomber Command. In preparation tge Chinese began building new airfields for the bombers. Matterhorn was initially commanded by Hap Arnold. China was chosen because in early 1944 with the new airfields built by the Chinese, it had the only airfields within range of the Japanese Home Islands. There were, however, serious problems. The Chinese airfields were extremly difficult to supply. Bombs, fuel, and amunition had to be transported to India and flow over the Hump. In addition, the B-29s operating from China were operating on the outer limits of their range. They could only reach Japan if they carried extra fuel which lowered the bomb load. The first B-29 bombing raid was launched from Chengdu, about 1,500 miles from Japan (June 15, 1944). The results were disappointing. There were problems with the plains, but apoor understanding of wind patterns and the use of high-explosives rather than fire bombs limited effectiveness. The Japanese responded with the Ichi-Go offensive. The Chinese Army defending the airfiekds virtually mdelted away before the Japanese advance. They seized a large area of central China, including the area where the USAF planned to base B-29s to pursue the strastegic bombing campaign.

The Ledo Road

The Burma Road had been China's ;ast life line to the outsise world. Chaing had dispatched Nationalist forces to help the British defend Burma. They were commanded by newly arrived American General 'Viniger' Joe Stillwell. Some of these forces joined the desperte British retreat to India. It became mission of Stillwell and his largely Chinese force to re-open the Burma Road and until that was acomplished to supply the Nationlists as much as possible through an air-lift from India over the towering Himalayas -- The Hump. It was a daunting task for the aircraft available at the time (C-46s and C-47s). The American effort to renter Burma began with jungle operations of Merrill's Marauders after British General Orde Wingate had organized Chindit Brigades. The men involved in the CBI Theater fought in some of the most difficult terraine and environmental conutions of the War. And they were for the most part the lowest priority of the Allied war effort. Stillwell was able to train and supply his Chinese division, tuning thm into some of the most effective units in the Nationalist Army. Despite the terrible conditions, the British who were less convinced of the importanbce of China, were determined to take back Burma. The Americans were primarily determined to reopen the Burma Road to keep China in the War. China was also seen as providing bases for the planned air assault on the Japanese Home Islands. The British and Americans faced monsoon rains, mud, leeches, and heat as well as tropical conditions. Once the Allies gained the iniative on the ground along the Indian-Burmese border, they began building a road from Ledo, a rail head in India, to connect with the Old Burma Road. The Allied offensive into Burma succeeded in reopening the Burma road. A land route significantly increased the supplies that could be delivered to the Narionalist Chinese and made possible supplies to the Chinese Army as well as the 10th Air Force.

Sources

Diebold, William. Hell Is So Green: Search an Rescue Over the Hump (2011), 272p.

Created: 10:06 AM 5/25/2010
Last updated: 3:14 AM 7/6/2016