Figure 1.--After Okinawa, an important American objective was to destroy the remaining Japanese air power. The P-51s escorting the B-29s were allowed to come down to the deck and seek out targets of opportunity. Japanese airfields were a primary target and were soon littered with wrecked aircraft caught on the ground. The Japanese boy here in the immedite aftermath of the War is sitting atop the external drop tank slung under the wing of a wrecked Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien "Tony" at an airfield on Honshu. This was the premier Japanese fighter of the War, although the Japanese had trouble perfecting it after it first appeared (1942). The Japanese managede to hide some 12,000 aircraft in caves, abandoned mines, and railway tunnels where they could not be hit by American air raids. They and the available pilots could not take on American aircraft, but they were caoable of massive Kamkikazee attacks. American intelligence viewing the wreckage of Japanese planes on airfields had no idea of the dimensions of the Kamikazee force being prepared in secret to oppose the Allied invasion fleet being assembled.

The Japanese secret airforce is much more than an trivial historical footnote. An appreciation of the existence of the force is important in fully understand the ending of the War. Japan is often described as a defeated country in 1945. This represents a failure to reasonably appreciate the strategic situation. Japan even after the fall of Okinawa still had a sizeable airforce. American intelligence at the time did not fully appreciate the strength of the Japanese air force. Japan is a very mountanous country. After it became clear that the Americans planned to initiate a strategic bombing campaign, the Japanese military began to move its aircraft production facilities into caves, abandoned mines, and railwat tunnels where they could not be hit by American bombers. Using these facilities Japan managed to amass a secret airforce of 12,000 combat planes that were to be used against an AZmerican invasion fleet. American intelligence had no idea of the dimensions of the force being prepared to oppose the landings. Not only was a large force being prepared, but the Japanese aided by NAZI technology were building planes that were mre advanced than anything in the American arsenal. Some of these planes include the Japanese Army's Kario (Fire Draggon) which was based on the Luftwaffe ME-262 jet fighter. The Japanese used plans for the jet engine to be used for the Henkel He-162 Volksyager (People's Fighter). It was a simplified engine that was quicker and easier to mass produce. The Japanese version was the NE-20. It was ot just a copy, but an improved version. The Japanese avy also developed a jet fighter, the Kika (Mandrin Orange Blosom). The Navy began flying an operatioinal version (August 7, 1945). The Japanese also produced a fighter to target the B-29 bombers that were desestating Japanese cities. The plane was the Suswi and was an improved version of the Luftwaffe ME-163 Komet. The Japanese Navy began operational flights (July 1945). There was also the Oka rocket suiside bomber. It was of limited use in Okinawa because it had to be brought into range by slow mombers, but might have proven effective in the defense of the Home Islands. The Japanese also developed the R2Y (Beautiful Cloud) jet bomber. A prototype was flown (April 1945), but with propellar engines as the engines were not yet ready. Many of these aircraft were very complicated and thus a challenge for the Japanese to produce in numbers. They were not ready in August 1945. Some of them, however, would have been available by Spring 1946 when the American invasion was schheduled. Combined with the hug number of conventional aircraft that had been built, the American invasion could have been a very costly undertaking.

Strategic Situation

The Japanese secret airforce is much more than an trivial historical footnote. An appreciation of the existence of the force is important in fully understand the ending of the War. Japan is often described as a defeated country in 1945. This represents a failure to reasonably appreciate the strategic situation. Japan was defeated in a conventional sense. Japanese military stratehists accepted that they could not win the War. There strategy from an early stage had become to make the War so costly that the United States would not presevere in the conflict. We have noted comments, for example, that the Japanese Air Force was defeated by 1945. This is simply not true. It is true that America would prevail in any engagement. It is also true that the Japanese Air Force even in 1945 could inflict very sizeable losses through Kamakazzee tactics on American forces. Japan suffered huge losses. Nearly all of the more than 100,000 man army garrison fought to the death. Yet from the Japanese perspective, the defense of Okinawa was a success. Sizeanle losses had been inflicted on the invading forces and the Kamikazees had inflicted significant losses on the naval flotilla which the Navy kept a closely garded secret. The obvious inference was that an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands would suffer exponentially greater losses.

Japanese Potential

Japan even after the fall of Okinawa still had a sizeable airforce. There was a very large force of conventional aircraft. Okinawa showed that even though the standard Japanese planes could no longer compete with American aircraft in single aircraft engagements, mass attacks could inflicvt grevios losses on an invading naval force. In addotion the Japanese were developing with NAZI technology, advanced aircraft types. There is every reason to expect that an Allied naval invasion would have resulted in very sizable Americam losses.

Kamikazees

Kamikaze means Divine Wind. It refers to the Mongol invasion of 1281. The Mongol Emperor of China was Kublan Kahn introduced to the West by Marco Polo. China at the time wa the most poweful country in the world Mongul armies had conquered China and then swept all opponents and pushed into the Middle East and Eastern Europe. When the Japanese Shogun refused to pay homage to the Mongol Emperor, Kubla Khan launced a massice invassion in 1281. The invasion fleet was made up of 4,200 ships and 142,000 men--larger than the D-Day invasion at Normandy. It was, however, destroyed by a typhoon which the Japanese came to call the divine wind. This became the foundation of a holy myth, buttressed in the next century by a Samari General Kusunoke who launched the hopeless battle of Minegawa at the order of theJapanese Emperor. As a result, his obedience and sacrifice came to be lionized in Japan and a holy natianal myth was built around him. His life was seen as the basis for the Kamikaze campaign. And inded the letters, diaries, and poemsof the Kamikaze pilots wre filled with references to him. Interestingly, the Kamikaze was not conceived by the Japanese General Staff. Rather it was a tactic demanded by junior officers who saw that they could not match the rising power of American air and naval power. Only reluctantly did the Generl Staff adopt the tactic. Junior naval officers wrote to the General Staff in thei own bolld demanding hat Kamakazi units and operations be employed. Admiral Onishi, anaval aviator, wa the driving force behind the Kamikaze pilot attacks. Kamakazi attacks had resulted from individual acts of Japanese pilots. After the loss of the Philippines, however, it was adopt as a major defense policy. It was central to the Japanese plan to defend Okinawa.

Four Battles

The Japanese first used Kamikazes were first used in the Philippines. This did not come down by the High Command, but appears to have been demanded by junior officers and pilots. At this point with the loss of their fleet in the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the inability of their airforce to keep up with the new advance American aircraft, the Japanese began to see the Kamikaze as their most effetive weapon. After the loss of the Marianas and Philippines, the Japanese understood that they had lost the war. And bleeding the Americans as the only strategy left to the Japanese to avoid surrendera and occupation. Once the South and Central Pacific campaigns converged at the Philippines, the invasion options narrowed and the choices became increasingly obvious. Any basic look at the map drew both American and Japanese planners to the same locations. Two Pacific battlles followed the Phillipines and prepartions began for the invasion of the Home Islands -- Olympic (Kyushu) an Coronet (Honshu ).

Iwo Jima

Iwo Jima was an isolated vocanic islet betweem the Marianas and the Home Islands. It was of no real importance untill the Americans seized the Marianas and began building air bases there for their new long range B-29 Superforts. Iwo became an important radar post for the Japanese air defense system, although the Japanese aircraft had troublreaching the aldittudes the B-29s were flying at. Nore importantly the Americans wanted it as an emergency field for B-29s damaged or experiecing engine problems. And it also was a potential base for P-51 escorts. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi created an island fortress to be a killing field for Marines. They did succeed in killing 6,800 but also resulted in the obliteration of the 18,000 man Japanese garrison. The ratioin here because of Kuribayashi was actually more favoravle for the Japoanese than most Pacifc island battles. The Kamikazes did not come into play on Iwo. There was no place to hide aircrafty on the island an American air raids had destroyed the aircraft there before the invasion force approached.

Okinawa

The Japanese had no doubts that Okinawa would be the next American target. To invade the Home Islands the Americans needed air coverage. And Okinawa had air bases that could provide land based air coverage of the Kyushu invasion beaches. Land based air support was important because a land base could not be sunk by a Kamikaze like a carrier. The Japane plan was to tie the American down in a land battle fought in the mounenous south. Gen. Ushijima Mitsura oversaw the construction of three fortified belts with hidden gun positiin and pill boxes. The Japanese did not defend the invasion beaches supported by naval gungire, but rather fought it out in the mountains where naval gunfire could not be effictely used. The resulting battle required a massive supply operation and naval ships to protect it. We have noted a wide range of numbers concerning the number of Kamikaze air craft on Okinawa, Anf this is cimplicared by the fact that many of the Kamikaze assaults came from Kyhshu. The American struck the air strips, but much of thie force was hidden, both on Okinawa nd Kyhshu. and then hurled at the American fleet. The result was the greatest losses sustained by the Pacific Fleet in the entire war. Some 360 ships were hit and about 10,000 sailors were killed or injured. Presiden Truman was horrified od the casualties and worried about an Okinawa repeated up the length of the Japanese Home Islands.

Kyhshu

American intelligence at the time did not fully appreciate the strength of the Japanese air force that had survived thec repeated American raids. Japan is a very mountanous country. After it became clear that the Americans planned to initiate a strategic bombing campaign, the Japanese military began to move its aircraft production facilities into caves, abandoned mines, and railway tunnels where they could not be hit by American fighters and bombers. Using these fcilities Japan managed to amass a secret airforce of some 12,000 combat planes that were to be used against the American invasion fleet. Some 5,000 of these planes were on Kyjshu even after the Okinawa campaign. [Weinberg, p, 877.] American intelligence had no idea of the dimensions of the force being prepared to oppose the landings.

Honshu

Advanced Aircraft

Not only was a large force being prepared, but the Japanese aided by NAZI technology were building planes that were mre advanced than anything in the American arsenal. Some of these planes include the Japanese Army's Kario (Fire Draggon) which was based on the Luftwaffe ME-262 jet fighter. The Japanese used plans for the jet engine to be used for the Henkel He-162 Volksyager (People's Fighter). It was a simplified engine that was quicker and easier to mass produce. The Japanese version was the NE-20. It was ot just a copy, but an improved version. The Japanese avy also developed a jet fighter, the Kika (Mandrin Orange Blosom). The Navy began flying an operatioinal version (August 7, 1945). The Japanese also produced a fighter to target the B-29 bombers that were vesestating Japanese cities. The plane was the Suswi and was an improved version of the Luftwaffe ME-163 Komet. The Japanese Navy began operational flights (July 1945). There was also the Oka rocket suiside bomber. It was of limited use in Okinawa because it had to be brought into range by slow mombers, but might have proven effective in the defense of the Home Islands. TheJapanese also developed the R2Y (Beautiful Cloud) jet bomber. A prototype was flown (April 1945), but with propellar engines as the engines were not yet ready. Many of these aircraft were very complicated and thus a challenge for the Japanese to produce in numbers.

Japanese Potential

These advanced aircraft types were not ready in August 1945. Some of them, however, would have been available by Spring 1946 when the American invasion was schheduled. Combined with the huge number of conventional aircraft that had been built, the American invasion could have been a very costly undertaking.

Sources

Holmes. Underwater Victory

NA

RG 457

SRH-103.

Ugaki, Matome. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945

Weinberg, Gerhard L. World at Arms.

Created: January 18, 2003
Last updated: 11:26 PM 6/8/2019