Figure 1.--

The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was a major factor in the decline of Japan as a major air power. The First Air Fleet began its campaign with the carrier attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). It was the primary, but not only instrument by whuch the Japanese establish naval doninance in the Western Pacific. Japan began the War with a cadre of extensively trained pilots. They were some of the finest pilots of the War and with the superb A6M Zero provided air superiority for Japanese operations in the South Pacific and Southeast Asian for more than a year. Their training program was, however, seriously flawed. While the trainingbprogram produced superb pilots, it did not produce large numbers of them. The very intensive training program was no practical for waging an extended war against a major power. The Japanese produced enough meticulously trained pilots to fully man four of their six mainline carriers (Akagi, Hiryū, Kaga, and Soryu). The plots of the newer Shōkaku and Zuikaku were well trained, but less experienced. The Japanese had limits on how many carriers they could build because of their limited industrial base. There were, however, no limits on the number of pilots they could train. For apprently reasons of economy, they did not train significantly more pilots than demanded by their carriers. They began the War with little margin for error as regards their pilot reserves. For the first 6 moths of the War, it looked like the trained pilot force would do fine. They lost only 29 pilots at Pear Harbor and for 6 months that ws their most serious loss. The Japanese lost very few pilots. This began to change, first in the Coral Sea (May 1942) and the more decisively at Midway (June 1942). The Japanese not only lost four mainline carroers at Midway, but large numbets of their best trained pilots. Japanese naval aviation never recovered. Japan never organized a training program to create large numbers of skilled new pilots. The American pilot training program did not produce the masterful aviators with which Japan began the Pacific War, but it produced competent airmen in large numbers. In addition, pilots were expected to fly until they were killed. Particularly skilled pilots were thus gradually lost and with them their invaluable skills. Thus was the case for Army pilots as well, but was especially the case for carrier pilots because of the skills meeded to take off and land on moving carrier decks. The United States would bring back paticularly skilled pilots to help train new pilots. One estimate sugests that The Japanese Army and Navy had lost about 10,000 pilots by the end of 1943, and for much of that period, they enjoyed the advantage of fghting obsolete American aircraft. American Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, chief air commader in the Pacific at the time, reported to Washington, “Japan’s originally highly trained crews were superb but they are dead.” Japan by 1943 was not only facing improved American plane types, but the replacement pilots flying the ageing Zeros were often poorly trained and unprepared to deal with the increasingly skilled American pilots and their more powerful new aircraft. The result would disater for Japanese naval aviation--be the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot and the destruction of Japanese naval aviation (June 1944).

First Air Fleet

he First Air Fleet began its campaign with the carrier attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). It was the primary, but not only instrument by whuch the Japanese establish naval doninance in the Western Pacific. Until this time, the battle ship was widely seem as the capital naval ship. With its battle ships destroyed or sunk, the U.S. Navy had to structure it operations arounf carriers which quickly becamee ccepted as the capital ship. The success of the Pearl Harbor atack also convimced doubting Japanese admirals of the wisdom of Adm. Yamamoto's tactics. While the United States dis not lose its carriers at Pearl. It did not have the capability of taking on the First Air Fleet. The United States had not perfected conined ioerations as was clearly demonstated in the Coral Sea and evn at Mkdway. It aircraft were less dcapable tghan he Japanse aircraft and in some cases obsolete. And its pilot were not as well traimed or as experienced as ythe Japanese.

Japanese Pilots

Japan began the War with a cadre of extensively trained pilots. They were some of the finest pilots of the War and with the superb A6M Zero provided air superiority for Japanese operations in the South Pacific and Southeast Asian for more than a year. The combination of superb pilots and superior aircraft was lethal and is amajor part of the Japanese success in securing their goal of carving out the Southern Resource Zone in a massively successful offensive during the first 6 months of the War.

Japanese Training Program

Their training program was, however, seriously flawed. While the Japanese training program produced superb pilots, it did not produce large numbers of them. The very intensive training program was no practical for waging an extended war against a major power. The Japanese produced enough meticulously trained pilots to fully man four of their six mainline carriers (Akagi, Hiryū, Kaga, and Soryu). The plots of the newer Shōkaku and Zuikaku were well trained, but less experienced. The Japanese had limits on how many carriers they could build because of their limited industrial base. There were, however, no limits on the number of pilots they could train. For apprently reasons of economy, they did not train significantly more pilots than demanded by their carriers they had. They began the War with little margin for error as regards their pilot reserves. Japan never organized a training program to create large numbers of skilled new pilots. The American pilot training program did not produce the masterful aviators with which Japan began the Pacific War, but it produced competent airmen in large numbers.

Attrition

Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942)

Data on the Coral Sea Bttle varies somewhat by sources. Ship losses are straight forward, but the aorcraft and crew losses are more complicated. The United States list the carrierLexington in the Ciral Sea and almost lost Yorktown, but the loss of pilots was fairly small. Carrier aircrew deaths titaled 35 men: Yorktown - 14 and Lexington - 21. Most of the air crews and sailors were got safely offg Lexington> before it went down. Lexington acrually did not sink, but wss scuttled in case it might fall into Japanese hands. Japan onlu lost a light carrier, but Shōkaku was badly damages. Zuikaku was not badky damags, but its a air crews were desimated. The Japanese lost 127 carrier aircraft and most important 90 aircrews. This was three times the losses at Pearl Harbor. [Peattie, pp. 174–175 and Gill, p. 44.] Most battle assessments focus on the carriers and not the loss of air crews. This is very important. American training programs by this times of the War were in full swing. Japanese training programs were not yet significantly accelerated.

Battle of Midway (June 1942)

Midway was the turning point of the Pcific War. The Japanese not only lost four main-line carriers, but large numbers of aircraft and air crews. And in the horrendous surprie and chaos of the dive bomber attack thatleft three carries burning, manyvau=ir and ship crews were killed or injured in the explossions that wrecked all four carriers. The American dive bombers caught the Japanese carriers with their decks full of ordinand fuel as they rushed to prepare the planes for a strike on the Americans. And many went down with the ships. Many air crews were resccued, but perhaps a third of the magnificently trained pilots were lost--a devestating blow for a Navy that did not have many reserves trained or a training program that could rapidly turn out competent air crews.

Survivors

If the losses at Midwau were not bad enough, the Imperial Navy compounded the damage by what they dud with the survivors, quite a number of whom were injured as their ships went down. The Americans were not at the time able to assess this and for some time after the War, historians could only guess as to what happened. Japanese sources now have provided detailed assessments. A good source is Japanese Rear Admiral Toshitane Takata. He was at the end of the War, Vice Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau in the Navy Ministry. He was interogated by U.S. Navy Intelligence officers after the Japanese surrender. He discussed the Japanese efforts to reorganize their surviving Naval Air Force after the Battle of Midway and subsequent vattles, especially the Solomons Campaign, the disastrous Battle of the Philippine Sea nd the planning for the defense of the Phillipines. He provides insights on why the Japanese failed as well comments on the origin and course of the Pacific War.

Japanese Aces

Japanese pilots were expected to fly until they were killed. Particularly skilled pilots were thus gradually lost and with them their invaluable skills. Thus was the case for Army pilots as well, but was especially the case for carrier pilots because of the skills meeded to take off and land on moving carrier decks. The United States would bring back paticularly skilled pilots to help train new pilots.

Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (June 1944)

American Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, chief air commader in the Pacific at the time, reported to Washington, “Japan’s originally highly trained crews were superb but they are dead.” Japan by 1943 was not only facing improved American plane types, but the replacement pilots flying the ageing Zeros were often poorly trained and unprepared to deal with the increasingly skilled American pilots and their more powerful new aircraft. The result would disater for Japanese naval aviation--be the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot and the destruction of Japanese naval aviation (June 1944

Sources

Gill, G. Hermon. Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. Vo. II Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 2: Navy. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial: 1968).

Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (US Naval Institute Press.).

Created: 7:36 PM 6/28/2015
Last updated: 7:36 PM 6/28/2015