*** World War II : France Vichy American diplomacy
World War II: Vichy France--American Diplomacy
Figure 1.--Here we see American Ambassador Adm. William Leahy brought out of retirement and appointed by President Roosevelt (December 1940). The Amnassador is visiting Toulon, a Mediterannean port in the Vichy unoccupied zone on April 9, 1941. Notice the French response to an American visit--click on the image for a clearer view. Pétain was still veery popular at the time, but clearly it was America that the French people were looking toward. Leahy at first hoped that the United States could work with with Pétain and Vichy. We are not sure who the Vichy Army officer is. By the time he returned to the States he realised that this was ann illusion (May 1942). He would be appointed to head the Joint Chiefs, a rare individual that the President, the Navy, and the Army trusted. He finished the War as one of the American five star military commanders.
The United States after the fall of France and German occupation decided to grant Vichy full diplomatic recognition as the legitimate government of France. President Roosevelt brought Admiral William D. Leahy out of retirement to seve as ambassador (December 1940). The choice of Leahy was an indication of how important the President at the time attached to relations with Vichy. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted to deaw Vichy to the American side as nuch as possible while under German control. They wanted to convince Pétain and the Vichy men to resist military collaboration with NAZI Germany. This was a tough assigment. France was traumitized by the German victory. And the Germans seem unstopable in 1940-41. Many Vichy men decided to throw in their lot with the Germans. Adm. Leahy worked dilgently and at first concluded that he could work with Marshal Pétain. Leahy attempted to convince Pétain and otherr Vichy officials to resist German war demands. There were several issues such as the French fleet, air bases in French-mandated Syria. moving war supplies through French North Africa, and other issues. The American policy was to insist that Vichy take no action not explicitly required by the 1940 armistice that could adversely affect the Allied war efforts. And this was before Pearl Harbor and America entering the War. DeGualle of course objected to this effort. And the effort was contriversial becuse Vichy was seen by many as pro-NAZI. And this was before the level of Vichy cooperation with the NAZI Holocaust was not yet widely known. Neither the President or Leahy liked DeGualle. [Mayers, p. 160.] Adm. Leahy returned to Amnerica after the death of his wife (May 1942). By this time he realized that the Vichy men would not work with the Allies. And the United States did not replace him. The United States formaly ended relations with Vichy after the Torch landings in French North Africa (November 1942). It is at this time that the Germans occupied all of France. The Americans had hoped that Vichy would cooperate with the Allied lamdings in North Africa. It did not occur. And Gen. Eisenhower's decision to work with Vichy men like Adm. Darlan woild blow up in his face.
America Recognizes Vichy (? 1940)
The United States after the fall of France and German occupation (June 1940) decided to grant Vichy full diplomatic recognition as the legitimate government of France. It was the only NAZI occupied country the United Stares recognized. The Presidebnt calculated that he might be avle to lure Vichy away from ther NAZI camp, not fully understnding the nature of either Vichy or the NAZIs. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted to deaw Vichy to the American side as nuch as possible while under German control. And tghere were two important cards still in Vichy hasnds--the Frebch Fleet and the French Empire. They wanted to convince Pétain and the Vichy men to resist military collaboration with NAZI Germany. This was a tough assigment. France was traumitized by the German victory. And the Germans seem unstopable in 1940-41. Many Vichy men decided to throw in their lot with the Germans. The American policy was to insist that Vichy take no action not explicitly required by the 1940 armistice that could adversely affect the Allied war efforts. And this was before Pearl Harbor and America entering the War.
Anbassador Leahy (December 1940)
President Roosevelt brought Admiral William D. Leahy out of retirement to seve as ambassador (December 1940). The choice of Leahy was an indication of how important the President at the time attached to relations with Vichy. Adm. Leahy worked dilgently and at first concluded that he could work with Marshal Pétain. Leahy attempted to convince Pétain and otherr Vichy officials to resist German war demands. There were several issues such as the French fleet, air bases in French-mandated Syria, moving war supplies through French North Africa, and other issues. DeGualle of course objected to this effort. And the effort was contriversial becuse Vichy was seen by many as pro-NAZI. And this was before the level of Vichy cooperation with the NAZI Holocaust was not yet widely known. Neither the President or Leahy liked DeGualle. [Mayers, p. 160.] Adm. Leahy returned to Amnerica after the death of his wife (May 1942). Ny this time he realized that the Vichy men would not work with the Allies. And the United States did not bother to replace him.
Murphy-Wegand Agreement (February 1941)
After the fall of France, President Roosevelt took an interest in French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) as a possinble way of resisting the NAZIs. Secretary odf State Cordell Hull promoted the idea as did chargé d'affaires Robert Murphy in Paris. This was more than a year before Prome-Minister Churchill would potopose the invasion of North Africa to him. Murphy was sent to North Africa and Dakar to assess the situation there. The trip led to Murphy-Weygand Agreement. This was an economic agreement with the Vichy Government. French authorities in North Africa were shipping food to Germany as requirfed in the French German 1940 Armistice. This led to food and other shortages in the North African colonies. The United Stastes offered food assistance. The Britishwere apauled ast the idea, but could not derail it. They insisted tha food and other deliveries be nonitored to ensure the Germans fid nit get thir hznnds in it. Twelve American vice consuls were sent to North Africa to moniktor dustribution. (The twelve men became known as the Twelve Apostles.) Little actusally came of the agreement. A mere ten cargo ships and three oil tankers reached North Africa. Oil was a special problem as there were no refineries in Nortth Africa and the Germans had no interest in semding oil to North Africa. Although signed, there were real problems with implemtiung the agreement. There was interagency bickering within the Roosevelt Administration. And the British had a very different view of Vichy. While the himanitarian effort failed. It probanly laid a fouindation in Rossevelt's mind that would lead to Operation Torch--the AZllied invasion of North Africa. The Twelve Appostles collected arange of valuable intelligence. One source suggests that the military made little use of it. [Litsky] The effort did play a role in the developing American inteligenve system. Two of the Twelve Apostles (Stafford Ereid and David King would work in the Office of Strategic Services.
President Roosevelt readily agreed when Prime-[[Minister Churchill proposed Opersation Torch. He over ruled his military commanders, including General Marshal, who had doubts. This was a rare presidential interference in military matters. The United States formaly ended relations with Vichy after the Anglo-American Torch landings in French North Africa (November 1942). It is at this time that the Germans occupied all of France, moving ingo the Vichy unoccupied zone. The Americans had hoped that Vichy would cooperate with the Allied lamdings in North Africa. It did not occur. And Gen. Eisenhower's decision to work with Vichy men like Adm. Darlan would blow up in his face.
Sources
Litsky, Elliott Burton. "Murphy-Wegand Agreement: The United States and French North Africa (1940-42)," ETD Collection (Fordham University: 1986).
Mayers, David. FDR's Ambassadors and the Diplomacy of Crisis: From the Rise of Hitler to the End of World War II (Cambridge U.P.: 2012).
