Figure 1.--The Red Army and Russian civilians had warmn winter clothing. The Wehrmacht did not. This snapshot was probably taken by a German soldier during the Winter of 1941-42. The Russian boy here may look ragged, but We doubt if the German soldier who took the photograph was dressed as warmly.

The sea of mud which engulfed the Wehrmacht was not overcome until the roads began to freeze. The cold weather, however, brought, a whole new set of problems for the Wehrmacht. The Winter of 1941-42 was one of the most severe in Russian history. The Wehrmacht was totally unprepared. Barbarossa was premissed on victory before the Winter set in. The German troops fought in light summer uniforms. There were no winter uniforms available for the troops when the weather turned cold. Nor was their equipment built for winter operations. The mud clogged roads caused by the Fall rains amnd then the early onset of Winter denied the Wehrmacht one of its key advantages--mobility. As the temperatures fell, German tanks could not even been started without first building a fire underneath to heat the engines. Part of the problem was the lubrucants used. Guns froze. The Russians on the otherhand were prepared for winter weather and had tactics and equipment for it. Russian resistance was stiffening by October-Decenber, but the cold winter weather which enveloped the Wehrmacht by late November had a devestating impact on fighting efficency and the operation of German equipment. The Wehrmact desperately rushed available supplies of warm clothing and winter lubricants to the front, but they proved inadequate and hard to deliver. The Wehrmacht was at the extreme limit of its supply routes and the winter weather proved to be an insurmountable problem.

Severe Winter

The sea of mud which engulfed the Wehrmacht (October) was not overcome until the roads began to freeze. A soldier writes, "A hard freeze came on November 7, which proved both an advantage and a disadvantage. We could move again, but we were freezing because we still do not have winter clothing." [Knappe, p. 226.] The cold weather brought, a whole new set of problems for the Wehrmacht. The Winter of 1941-42 proved to be was one of the most severe in Russian history.

Preparations

The Wehrmacht was totally unprepared for the arrival of the Russian winter, even a normal winter. And the winter of 1941-42 was not a normal winter. Barbarossa was premissed on victory before the Winter set in. Limitations in the German industrial and man-power reserves made it necessary to plan a short, successful campaign. Germany would be at a disadvantage in a lengthy war of attrition. Thus Barbarossa was basically the Germand hurling their full force at the Siviets in the hope of securing a decisive victory before winter set in. Planners who sought to make provision for winter clothing were criticized for negative thinking. This would havecrequired the diversion of resources. It is not that preparations for a winter campign were inadequate, there were absolutely no preparations for the winter. The German soldiers who began the campaign with light-weight clothing were wearing the same uniforms when fall arrived. Commanders who asked for winter gear in the fall were first ignored and then reprimanded. The German troops continued to fight in their light summer uniforms. Even as Winter approached, no effort was made to send winter gear forward. This seems almost unbelieveable. Germany is not a southern European country. Wunters can be quite severe in Germany. And there is no way commanders would not hve known that warm weather clothing would be needed by December if not earlier. Yet even in November there was no effort to provide the troops winter clothing. Report reached Propaganda Minister Goebbels who promoted a a national collection of winter clothing (August 1941). THe Wehrmacht leadership, however did not like the sound of this and rejected the campaign. [Bullock, p. 769.]

Problems

Several problems surfaced for the Wehrmacht as the weather turned cold. The most obvious is that the troops were not oufitted for the cold weather. The Russia winter is severe even for people properly outfitted. There were no winter uniforms available for the troops at the front when the weather turned cold. It was not that winter uniforms did not exist, it was that they were in warehouses in the Reich rather than at the front. The Germans had planned on a quick summer campaign. Thus planning for winter fighting was not part of Barbarossa. As the fighting moved further ad further east, the supply lines becane overstreached. Priority was given to arms and anunitiion. The winter uniforms remained in warehouses in the Reich. Another prioblem was the eqioment. Nor was their equipment built for winter operations. Nor wre there logistical preparations to ship winter clothing and equipment rapidly to the front. The mud clogged roads caused by the Fall rains and then the early onset of Winter denied the Wehrmacht one of its key advantages--mobility. All accounts of Barbarossa describe the mobility of the Wehrmacht as a primary factor in its victories at the onset of Barbarossa and the Red Army's inability to react effectively. [Clark] Part of the problem was the lubrucants used. Guns froze. The Russians on the otherhand were prepared for winter weather and had tactics and equipment for it. As the temperatures fell, German tanks could not even been started without first building a fire underneath to heat the engines. An additional problem was the animals. Both the Germans and Soviets relied on horses as draft animals. The German horses, however, proved to be unable to withstand the rigors of the Russian wibnter. Russian resistance was stiffening by October-December, but the cold winter weather which enveloped the Wehrmacht by late November had a devestating impact on fighting efficency and the operation of German equipment.

The Soviets

The Russians of course also suffered in the cold. It was not any warmer on the eastern side of the front line. The Russians had, however, winter uniforms and equipment that could be operated in cold weather. They had also lived and trained in winter conditions. In addition the Soviets until early December were on the defensive, in many cases able to utilize prepared defensive positions which offered cover from both the Germans and the elements. It was the Germans who had to brave the elments and advance.

Desperate Efforts (December 1941- March 1942)

The Wehrmact as Operation Typhoon to take Moscow ground to a hault in the snow and ice, desperately rushed available supplies of warm clothing and winter lubricants to the front, but they proved inadequate and hard to deliver. The Wehrmacht was at the extreme limit of its supply routes and the winter weather proved to be an insurmountable problem. The Sovoet offenive further complicated the logistical problem. It was not that the Germans did not have stocks winter clothing. There were piles of winter clothing in warehouses in the Reich. And the Germans had several million captive Jews in ghettoes that could have been set to work producung more. Instead the SS began killing operations in the Lodz ghetto where the Jews were producing a range of products to support the war effort. The problem with the warm clithing is that arms and amunition was given priority in a failing effort to seize Moscow and destroy the Red army. The Germans did not have the logictical capabilikty to move both arms and clothing as needed by the troops. Despite the fact that the availability of winter clothing was not the pronem. Goebbels decided to launch a collection of winter clothing as pat of the annual Winter Relief effort. Goebbels issued an appeal in which he explained,"At home everybody has a roof over his head and a bed to sleep in. The nutrition is admittedly limited, but compared with that of all other European nations it is still sufficient. At home one is still in a position to get such relaxation as newspapers, theatres, concerts, visits to movies, radio-the relaxation which the population needs pressingly in consideration of the strain it bears during its process of work. Almost all this does not hold good for our soldiers on the Eastern Front. That cannot be changed. But in one thing the hinterland can help. It can give to its sons and fathers protection against the wrath of the wintry climate. As long as a single object of Winter clothing remains in the fatherland, it must go to the front. I know that also in the homeland the individual can spare such equipment only with great difficulty. He is not in a position to replace it. But a thousand times more urgently do our soldiers need such equipment, which they cannot replace either." [Goebbels] What he did not explain was why the great war leader, Adolf Hitler, had the German Army drive deep into Russia wihout warm clothing in near Arctic conditions. Of course you could not say this aloud, but surely it must have crossed the minds of many. Also not explained was the extent of the Red Army offensive before Moscow and the fact that the Germans were retreating on all fronts. The Hitler Youth children participated in the collections. It was successful in the sence that large amounts of winter clothing was collected. It was not, however, rushed to the front. The German logistical network did not have that capability and the success of the Red Army offensive made it even more diificult. Many units did not get warm clothing untiul the approach of Spring the following year.

Red Army Offensive (December 1941)

The German offensive was grounding to a hault even before Zuhkov launched the Red Army offensive. The Red Army offensive before Moscow was the first Allied offensive to regain territory lost to the NAZIs. Reports had been received of NAZI attrocities in occupied cpuntries, especially in the East. These had been impossible to confirm. There was some skepticism among the American public because World War I reports of German attroicities had been widely overstated. And the Russians had been invaded by the Germans in World war I and the Germans had behaved sternly, but not barbarically. As the Red Army advanced, however, the hideous, auful truth emerged. They found burned villages and butchered populations. In some cases the Germans killed civilians as reprisals to guerilla actiins. The Soviets, however, found whole villages destroyed ahnd the inhbitants shot for no apparent reason. The Wafen SS was not yetr a major factor. Many of these attrocities appear to have been committed by Wehrmacht units. We do not yet know just who was responsible or why the Whrmacht begaved so barbarically. I do not yet know if any historian had addressed this. The subject of killing Jews has been addressed in details, but the Red Army duscovered wide-spread attrocities aimed at non-Jewish civilians. Much of this seems to have done by retreating Germans, but we can not yet confirm this. As the war swung back and forth on the Eastern Front, Hitler and the NAZIs had what they wanted, a war of anialation. Neither side would give the other any quarter and German soldiers feared more than anything falling into Russian hands. While the Red Army was used to supress the occupied countries and there was widespread rape and looting, the Soviets never committed the attrocities rourinely committed by the Germans.

Importance

German accounts stress the Winter as the decisive factor in the campaign. Tere is not doubt that it was a key factor. But part of the German emphasis on the weather is that they did not want to admit that the vaunted Wehrmacht had been defeated by the Red Army. There is no doubt that the weather was a factor explaining why the Red Army which lost 2 million men in one 2 month period of Barbarossa was able to not only stand before Moscow, but launch a poweful offensive, [Clark] It was not the only factor, but it was certainly an important one. Soviet accounts tend to take the exact opposit approach, deemphasizung the weather to attribute the victory on the Red Army.

Responsibility

Zhukov commented on both the Fall mud and the Winter snows very simply, he said that the Wehnrmacht should have know about the weather. [Jukes, p. 121.] Of course he is correct. In military campaigns there are many elements that are difficult to assess. The Germans in military professional terms can perhaps be excused for not fully assessing Soviet strength and their ability to rapidly form and deploy new units as well as the capabilities of the Soviet armaments industy. All of this was difficult to assess. But of course the avarage school boy knows that it gets cold in Russia during the Winter. How could the Germans made such a castrophic blunder. The answer can only be traced back to the Reich Chancellery. Hitler never asked OKW if an invasion of the Soviet Union was feasible. He commnded them to prepare plans. Thus he did not want to hear about the pitfalls and dangers. He wanted a plan. And what OKW gave him cwas a plan premissed on defeating the Red Army in one massive campaign. Germany did not have the capabilities for awar od atttrition, thus success in the initial Barbarossa campign was essential. Hitler was gambling on that success and everthing was thrown into that gamble. Of course the most basic aspect of any military operation is contengency planning. But in this case the susposedly highly professionl Wehrmacht did not commit resources to such planning. Here the Führer was a factor. Contingency planning for Barabarossa not achieving its goals would have been looked on as a lack of commitment to the enterprise.

Reader Comments

A HBC reader reports, "Talking to Germans just after the war, they indicated it was the bitter cold that stopped them. They could not start their tanks or fire their weapons. They were not prepared for this type of Winter warfare. The NAZIs called for the German population to donate and send heavy clothing to their troops. Loads of Winter clothing were sent to the Eastern front. Very little, however, reahed thectroops in time. Many German soldiers froze to death during the fierce fighting before Moscow."

Sources

Bullock, A. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (HarperCollins, Glasgow, 1991).

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian German Conflict, 1941-45.

Goebbels, Josef. We believe this was part of a radio broadcast on December 19, 1941. The complete text was printed in the America media. "Goebbels' plea for clothing for troops on the Russian front & Hitler's proclamation," New York Times (December 20, 1941).

Jukes, Geoffrey. The Defense of Moscow (New York, Ballantine, 1970), 160p.

Knappe, S. Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949 (Dell Publishing, New York, 1993).

Created: 2:35 AM 5/10/2007
Last updated: 2:56 AM 9/13/2011