** war and social upheaval: World War II drive into Germany








World War II: Western Allies Drive into Germany (April 1945)


Figure 1.--Here we see 25 German boys captured by the Americans. They are being interviewed by Brig. Gen. Merrill Ross of the 26th Artillery Division, near Kronach, Germany. The uniforms and age suggested that they had been inducted into the Volksturm. Notice how the uniforms do not fit. The photograph was taken April 14, 1945. U.S. Army photograph.

Once accross the Rhine there were no longer any major geographic barriers to the Western Allies. The destruction of the German petrochemical plants and Allied air superorityb meant that the remaining German units were largely imobilized. This was exploited by highly mobile American armoured divisions which rapidly moved into the German hearland, surrounding and reducing any pockets of resistance encountered. Montgomery's units in the north drove towaed the major German ports: Bremen, Hamburg, and Luebeck. The Ninth Army moved toward Muenster and Magdeburg. Within weeks the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland was surround and huge numbers of Germans soldiers surrendered in the Ruhr pocket. The Ninth and First Army executed a giant pinzer movement which encircled the Ruhr--Germany's industrial heart (April 1). Caught in the Ruhr pocket was the German ?? Army. This was the Wehrmach's last significant force in the west. More than 325,000 German soldiers surrendered. The American First Army then moved further east toward Kassel and Leipzig. Patton's Third Army took Frankfurt and then drove east toward Eisenach and Erfurt. The Third Army then took the shatered city of Dresden and then turned south toward Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Sixth Army Group moved into nto Bavaria, taking Munich and Salzburg. The Allies were concerned that the NAZIs would dry to establish a redoubt in the difficult terraine of the Alps of southern Germany and Austria. The Allies did, not, however, moved toward Berlin. This is a matter of ongoing historical debate. Some say that Stalin hoodwinked Eisenhower. The British concerned with the political connotations were interested in striking at Berlin. Montgomery envisuioned a race accross northern Germmany to Berlin. [Chalfont, p. 271] Eisenhower rejected the drive to Berlin. Eisenhower explained later that he saw it as a waist of Allied manpowe to make a potentially costly drive toward Berlin to take ground that was later to be turn over to the Soviets. (The occupation zones had alreadt been determined by political leaders.) German commanders, however, were later to day that they were anxious to surrender to the Americans and could not understand why the Americans did not come. Instead Eisenhower focused on engaging the remaining remnants of the Wehrmacht not positioned around Berlin.

No Geographic Barriers

Once accross the Rhine there were no longer any major geographic barriers to the Western Allies. Not only were there no geographic barriers, but the German Autonahns meant that the Allied mobilized units could rapidly fan out throughout Germany. (At the time no other country had a similar highway system.) The destruction of the German petrochemical plants and Allied air superorityb meant that the remaining German units were largely imobilized. This was exploited by highly mobile American armoured divisions which rapidly moved into the German hearland, surrounding and reducing any pockets of resistance encountered.

Boy Soldiers

German manpower resources were exhausted. The Volksturm was created by the NAZIs to defend the Reich. Surrender was not an option as a result of the Holocaust and NAZI attrocities in the East. The Soviets were bent on revenge and the Western Allies were demanding unconditional surrender. Hitler realized that surrender mean exposure of his crimes and almost certain execution. Boys as young as 16 were inducted into the Volksturm. But as in the photograph here, even younger boys fought in the futile defense of the Reich (figure 1). We can only wonder why younger boys joined. Partly this can be attributed to the effectiveness of NAZI propaganda and the sense of dutu these boys felt. Some of them were recruited from Hitler Youth groups and many boys were coerced by adult leaders. The idea of not deserting their friends was a powerrful tool used by some adult leaders.

Boys Cooperating with the Allies

Not all German boys were determined to fight in the defense of Germany. In fact some boys cooperated with the Allied soldiers. Here we do not mean the friendly relations that developed between American soldiers and German children during the occupation. Here we mean cooperation during the fishting as Allied armies crossed the border of the Reich. Here our preconceived concept is that msany young Germns were willing to either fight the Allies in the Volkssturm or at least fearfully watched the Allies roll through German once the Rhine River crossings were forced. We do not know how common it was for German boys to cooperate with the Allied soldiers or indeed what their motivation was.

Nero Decree (March 19)

The Allies seized the Remagen Bridge (March 7) and pored in a lodgement on the east bank og the Rhine. Allied units prepared other assaults on the Rhine. The failure of the Rhine barrier must have ended any lingerig doubts Hitler had about the outcome of the War. The Siviet seizure of Silesia confirmed this. He issued his decree "Demolitions on Reich Territory" (March 19). It came to be known as the Nero Decree (Nero Befehl) because Emperor Nero was blamed for the fire destroying much of Rome. The German people had put their confidence in Hitler and loyally stood by the Third Reich through 5 years of unrelenting war. Their reward was the Nero Decree, orders to totally destroy the German econommy. Every thing needed by a midern nation was to be destroyed. Hitler throughout the War was quick to take credit for any German success. He was, however, never willing to accept resonsibility for any failure. In his mind at the end of the War, the German people had failed him, he actusly stated that the German people had "proved themselves unworthy of me." He ordered the destruction of any factory, public works, or other facility that the Allies might find of value. The Decree read in part. "It is a mistake to think that transport and communication facilities, industrial establishments and supply depots, which have not been destroyed, or have only been temporarily put out of action, can be used again for our own ends when the lost territory has been recovered. The enemy will leave us nothing but scorched earth when he withdraws, without paying the slightest regard to the population. I therefore order: 1. All military transport and communication facilities, industrial establishments and supply depots, as well as anything else of value within Reich territory, which could in any way be used by the enemy immediately or within the foreseeable future for the prosecution of the war, will be destroyed." I am not sure the action was taken to punish the German people as is often aledged, but it certainly was issued without any concern for their plight. Hitler actually felt of himself as Germany and with his death Germany would cease to exist. The German people were simply immaterial to him. He gave the order to Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, who later wrote that it was then that I realized he had been serving a madman. Hitler found it difficult to execute the order as even committed NAZIs were not all that anxious to blow up what little remained after the Allied bombing. Speer for his part showed remarkable courage in trying to prevent the order from being carried out.

Invading Allied Force

The Allied forces commanded by General Eisenhower. crossing the Rhine were the most powerful and well equipped in the history of warfare, including highly mobile forcesd with imcreasingly potent tanks and backed by a formidable air force. The Allies were organized into into three powerful army groups. The norther group was Fiekd Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group. It consisted of the First Canadian Army (Crerar) in the extreme north, the British Second Army (Dempsey) in the center and the U.S. Ninth Army (Simpson) to the south. It had a front fron the North Sea south to just north of Cologne. The central sector was the 12th Army Group commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley. It had a front from Cologne to Mainz. Bradley had two American armies. The U.S. First Army (Hodges) im the north and the U.S. Third Army (Patton) in the south. The southern sector was the 6th Army Group commanded by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. He commanded two armies. The U.S. Seventh Army (Patch) in the north and the French First Army (de Tassigny) in the south. The French were no longer a small Free French force, but they rapidly reconsttitured a major force and werec armed with U.S. rquioment,

The Ruhr Pocket (April 1-21)

The great prize immediately east of the Rhine was the Ruhr--the ibdustrial heart of Germany. And herec was located about 430,000 German soldiers of Army Group B (Heeresgruppe B) which consisted of 21 divisions. This was the Wehrmach's last significant force in the west. While a substantial force, the Wehrmacht at this stage of the War was largely immobile. The Allies decided to avoid the heavily wooded Ruhr region in the center of their lines, apparently learning from the experience in the H�rtgen Forrest. After crossing the Rhine, the first Allied objective was the Ruhr. The Ruhr was the industrial hearland of Germany. The Ruhr had been heavily damaged by the strategic bombing campaign, but some factories were still functioning. Without the Ruhr, Germany could not wage war. After crossing the Rhine Allied forces rush to surroud the Ruhr. British and Canadian units crossed in the north and American units crossed in the south. Imeeduiately after crossingb the Rhine, the Allied forces drove eastward into the Reich, encountering only limited resistance. The U.S. First and Ninth Armies within days of crossing the Rhine executed a giant pincer moveement. The American First and Third Armies drove eastward south of the Ruhr. The First Army then shifted north through Giessen and Marburg to make contact at Paderborn and Lippstadt with the American northern pincer (April 1). Montgomery drove his British and Canadian forces east. Frech and American forces also headed east, but the 1st and 9th American Armies proceeded to reduce the Ruhr Pocket. The coordinated operations to take the Pocket section by section. They succeeded in dividing the Pocket into a western and easter section (April 12). The maller, eastern section surrendered (April 13). General Bayerlein unconditionally surrender the LIII Armee Korps (April 16). He called further fighting futile and would result in "useless bloodshed." The larger western section held out a few more days, but surrendered (April 18-21). The commander Field Marshall Walther Model did not believe German Field Marshall's surrendered. He shot himself in a forest south of Duisburg. More than 325,000 German soldiers surrendered in the Ruhr Pocket. The American First Army then moved further east toward Kassel and Leipzig. German POWs were confined in the Rheinwiesenlager. The task of caring for such a sizeable number of men proved daunting. There were some deaths from starvation and exposure.

Montgomery: 21st Army Group in the North (March-April 1945)

Montgomry's 21st Army Group as well as the Americans to the south closed up to the Rhine, the final geographic obsacle to victory (March 1945). Twenty-First Army Group at thetime was made up of the British Second Army commaded by General Miles C Dempsey, the First Canadian Army under General Harry Crerar, and the US Ninth Army, under General William Simpson. The Americas had been added to Montgomery command after the Germans launched the Bulge offensive and they had been separted from other U.S. formtions. The First Canadian Army launched Operation Veritable in difficult weather, driving from Nijmegen in the Netherlands east through the Reichswald Forest then southwards. The Canadians were to be he northern part of the Operation Grenade pincer movement with the US Ninth Army moving as the southern prong northwards towards D�sseldorf and Krefeld. The objective was to clear the west bank of the Rhine north of Cologne. The Americans prog was slowed when the Germans destroyed the Roer dams and flooded the American route of advance. The Canadians pushed forard on their own, engaging and mauling the poorly armed German reserves deployed to defend the Cologne Plain. With the Rhineland secured, the Allies aided by the Remagen Bridge taken by theAmericans, the Allies plunged accross the Rhine. Montgomery executed Operation Plunder (March 13), a massive set-piece battle including a major air drop. Plunder was typical of Montgomery's Clossal Cracks approach. The British 2nd Army and the US 9th Army were able to cross the Rhine at various places north of the Ruhr. German resistance now without a geographic barrier quickly fell apart. Montgomery used the First Canadian Army to liberate the Dutch north of the Rhine who wre strving. The Canadiand wheeled left at entered the etherlands. The British 2nd Army occupied much of north-west Germany. The U.S. 9th Army moved south and formed the northern arm of the envelopment of German forces in the Ruhr Pocket. Eisenhower had planned to use the Montgomery's 21st Army Group as the major force driving into Germany. Eisenhower was still thinking zbout Berlin. Montgomery was generally cautious, in part to keep casualties to a minimum. But like Market Garden he began to ask Eisenhower t suport a drive to Berlin. His relations with Eisenhower and the Amercass were icey and plumted further when he gave apress interview and claimed respnsibility for the Bulge victory. After the battle for the Ruhr shaped up, however, he decided to make Bradley's 21st Atmy Group the focus of the Western offensive. After the Ruhr Pocket was reduced, Eisenhower reassigned the U.S. Ninth Army to Bradley's 12th Army Group (April 4). This essentially made Montgomery's drive to Berlin impossible (April 4). Montgomery was deeply disappointed. So were Bradley and Patton who Eienhowered ordered south, to cut off any German moves to estanlishan Alpine retreat. Montgomery's Tewenty-First Army Group rove towaed the major German ports: Bremen, Hamburg, and Luebeck, cuttig off the Red Army from the Jutland Peninsula (Denmark). Montgomery accepted the unconditional surrender of the German forces in the Netherlands, in north west Germany and Denmark (May 4). American historians have sharpy criticized Montgomery's performance, especilly in Normandy and the Nethrlands for his caution and bothched Marker Garden campaign. Montgomery has, however, his advocates. One historian stresses his caution was neceitated by the need to limit British casialties. [Hart] Itis not at all clearthat Montgomery's caution managed to limit caialties more than the tactics of the more aggessive American commanders.

Bradley: 12th Army Group in the Center (March-April 1945)

The Americans crossed the Rhine at the same time asMongomery, but without the huge Plunder operation. The Germans were no longer mobile and unable to even defend the hugeRhibe obstacle. General Eisenhower shifted the main weight of the Allied drive to Bradley's 12th Arny Group. He strengthened Bradley by detached the American 9th Army from Montgomery who had commanded it since the Bulge. Eisenhower also inserted the new 15th Army. It was tasked with holding the western edge of the Ruhr Pocket along the Rhine while the Ninth and First Armies squeezed the remaining Germans. Following the German surrender in the Ruhr, the Fifteenth Army was to take over occupation duties while the Ninth, First, and Third Armies drove west into the heart of the Reich. Simpson's Ninth Army in the north committed the XIX and XIII Corps in a drive for the Elbe, toward Magdeburg, north of Leipzig. Simpson hoped he would be ordered to Berlin. Hodges' First Army in the center drove due east toward Leipzig and the Elbe River. Patton's Third Army was to drive east to Chemnitz, about 40 miles (64 km) southeast of Leipzig, but well short of the Elbe. The 3rd Army took Frankfurt and then drove east toward Eisenach and Erfurt. Patton paused to allow the rest of the 12th Army Group on his flanks to catch up (April 4). At this time near Merkers, the 90th Infantry Division found a sealed salt mine containing a large portion of the German national treasure. The trasure hoard included vast quantities of German paper currency, stacks of priceless paintings, piles of looted gold and silver jewelry and household objects, and an estimated $250 million worth of gold bars and coins of various nations. Included in all this was the gold filled teath of Jews mirdered in the death camps. The 4th Armored Division and elements of the 89th Infantry Division entered the small town of Ohrdruf, near Gotha. Here the found the first concentration camp to be encounterted by the western Allies. The Third Army reached the shatered city of Dresden in the east and then finally turned south toward Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Devers: 6th Army Group in the South (March-April 1945)

General Devers' 6th Army Group was ordered south through Bavaria and the Black Forest to Austria and the Alps. Montgmery and Bradley attracted more attention than Devers n the south, probably because there ws still great interest n Berlin. . This was to end any threat of a NAZI diehard redoubt in the Alps. The Sixth Army Group moved into into Bavaria, taking Munich and Salzburg.

Eisenhower Leaves Berlin to the Soviets

The Allies did not moved toward Berlin. This is a matter of ongoing historical debate. The full story may never be known. Some say that Stalin hoodwinked Eisenhower by convincing him that the Soviets had no interest in Berlin. In reality, Stalin despertely wanted the prize of taking Berlin and was pushing his commanders (Zukov and Koniev). One historian suggets that Stalin helped convince Eisenhower that he (Eisenhower) had no interest. We know that Eisenhower's commander like Montogoimery and Patton were chomping at the bit to have a go at Berlin. The British concerned with the political connotations were interested in striking at Berlin. Montgomery envisuioned a race accross northern Germmany to Berlin. [Chalfont, p. 271] Eisenhower rejected the drive to Berlin. Eisenhower explained later that he saw it as a waist of Allied manpowe to make a potentially costly drive toward Berlin to take ground that was later to be turn over to the Soviets. (The occupation zones had alreadt been determined by political leaders.) Eisenhower was also concerned about a NAZI redoubt in the south. German commanders were later to say that they were anxious to surrender to the Americans and could not understand why the Americans did not come. Instead Eisenhower focused on engaging the remaining remnants of the Wehrmacht not positioned around Berlin.

Sources

Beavers, Anthony. The Fall of Berlin 1945.

Chalfont, Alun. Montgomery of Alamein (Atheneum: New York, 1976), 365p.

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.

Hart, Stephen Ashley. Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (Stackpole Military History Series, 2007).






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Created: 3:10 AM 11/24/2004
Last updated: 9:19 AM 7/14/2014