Figure 1.--Barbarossa which led off the apocalyptic war in the East was the largest military strugglev in human history. Studying the campaign it is almost incoceivable that the Germans would plan it without any consideration of weather. The dllest German school boy knew it gets cold in Russia during the winter. And the German Army had spent 4 years in Russia during World War I and this included officers tasked with invading the Soviet Union. But Hitler insisted on a plan that would deliver victory in a short summer campaign. Fortunately for history, while he could bend the generals to his will, he could could not commnd the weather. The Soviets on the other hand were preopared to fight the Germans in the snow and cold. Here Moscow school boys train for winter operations. The press caption read, "These Soviet school children in Moscow, as in many other Soviet cities, spent their recent winter holidays in mass war games under the directionof Red Army offices. The two youngsters above are on 'post' duty in Sokolniky Park, Moscow." The photograph was dated February 28, 1941.

As Hitler and the generals argued about the focus of Bsrbarossa, orders begsn to go out to individuals German units being moved east to the Soviet frontier. Barbarossa abnd gthe orders being issued were based on a number of assumptions about the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and the Soviet people. Whilke the generals assigned gto lead the Wehrmacht east were extrordinarily competent in military science, theirvmnoralk compas had klong dince been lost with their willingness to serve Hitler and the NAZIs. This in the end would doom their finely honed army. Because with Hitler and the NAZIs came a series of deeply flawed assumptions that would doom the entire enterprise. Not all the German generals were ardent NAZIs. Some were. Others were German nationalists who sinmply supported the NAZIs because of their devotion to military might and labish bappripriations for the military. The genberals had made a deal with Hitler in 1934. He supressed the SA. They cionfirmed him in power. Now they were stuck with him in what would be a life and death struggle in the East.

Red Army Equipment

The Germans blievd that Red Army military equipment reflecting Soviet techniology in general was grossly inferior. NAZI racial docrine was at the heart of this assumption. The NAZIs got it into their head that race superiority meant that their weaponry was superior. This oproved to be a grave error. The British demonstrated only a year after the War began that this would not the case, but Hiutler did not take note. The Red Army had a lot of obsolete arms, especially tanks and planes, but the newer versions being delivered was high quality. And much of the Soviet weaponry performed better than Germans weapons under battlefield condiutions.

Luftwaffe Readiness

The Germans believed that the damage sustained by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain had not been significant. In fact given the emense expanses of the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe was more important in the East than the West. Fortunately for the Soviets, Luftwaffe Chief Göring had neither the knowledge or the inclination (knowing it would mean a dispute with Hitler) to point this out. Unlike the Heer, The Luftwaffe had barely managed to replace he losses over Britain. And ould thus be unable to provide the level of support priovided in the western campaigns.

Red Army Soldier

The Germans believed that the Red Army soldier was because of Slabvic racial inferiority would not be a match for the German soldier. Hitler believed the German soldier was superior to all other countries and could overcome enemy numerical and material superiority. He saw this as especially true in the Slavic East. To Hitler's horror the 'backward' Soviets proved him very wrong. Although not as well led as the German counterparts, the Red Army soldier proved a very tough and resiliant adversary.

German Will

Hitler knew he would be fightuing against countries with larger populations and larger industrial bases. He believed that German fighting spirit could overcome eneny numerical and material superiority. The term Hitler often used was 'will'. Leni Riefenstahl promoted the idea in the classic propaganda film, 'Triumph of the will'. Hitler thought this more important than military professionalism. In the East it was numerical superiority, but the Soviet Union had a substantial industrial base and would be aided by Americam Arsenal of Democracy through Lend Lease. German Will would be broken on the anvil of Soviet will and the Russisn Winter.

Judeo-Bolshevism

Hitler constantly used the term Judeo-Bolshevism, advancing ghe idea that Cimminism was a Jewish implant. Jews were involved with the Bolsheviks, but were hardly the Bolsheviks major source of support. Hitler was covinced, however, that the substantial Jewish population of the Soviet Union had fundamentally weakened the country which already suffered from Slavic racial inferiority. This proved to be one more NAZI fantasy. Jews as they proved in America were a major contributor to Soviet society.

Western Disposition of the Red Army

German planners assumed that the Red Army could be destroyed in the western perifery of the Soviet Union. Here Stalin was Hitler's best assett. He moved substantial forces from well prepared defenses into the western territories seized from Poland, the Baltics, and Romania. The Wehrmacht generals believed tht there was a logistical ability capable of supporting an advance 300 kilometers into the Soviet Union. [Tooze, p. 453.] Hitler was not convinced that this was a real constraint and in any case was convinced that this would be enough. The ehrmacht suceeded in badyly damaging gthe Red rmy, but failed to destroy it.

Soviet Infrastructure

The Barbarossa planners did not believe that the poorly developed Soviet infrastructur would not be a problem. The Germans ignored the primitive infrastructure of the Soviet Union and did not fully ppreciate understand how the improved roads of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France had played a key role in the German victoy. The great advantage of the Wehrmacht was mobility, but primitive infrastructure limited mobility putting the Wehrmscht and Red Army on an increasingly even footing as the Grrmans moved east.

Weather

The Germans did not believe that weather would not be a factor. The Barbarossa plan counted on a quick summer victory. The planners were not allowed to consider weather as a factor. To do so would have slowed the all important summer advance. There was no providsion in Barbarossa for the impact of the Autumn rains or the winter snows and frigid temperatures. This is astonishing to historians studying Barbarossa. The superior mobility of the Wehrmsct was its major strength. But both of these weather events would severely restrict mobility.

Soviet Industry

The Germns believed that the Soviet Union as Russia in World War I did not have an adequate industrial base to fight a war with Germany. This belief was another major factor pushing Hitler to invade. While he underestimred Soviet industry, he knew it was expanding and more develped than Tsarist industry in World War I. Thus he saw any delay in attacking the Sioviets would be to their dvantage.

America Entry into the War

Hitler thought it was only a matter of time before America would declare war and join Britain. Here he was probanly correct, although until Pearl Harbor it was not as emminent as he may have anticipated. The United States had already begun to rearm. Hitler blived ght it was critical to defeat the Soviet Union and secure the resources of the East before America entered the War. Here he was probably correct.

Industrial Mobility

The Germans did not even conceive that Soviets could pack their factories up and transport them east beyond the Urals. Such a thing had never been done before. Armies had retreated in msny wars before, but never before had an ndustrial nation moved its industry out of the hnds ofan invading army. And the Germans had no way iof preventing it. The Luftwaffe did not have the strength or range to do it. And because it was so unexpected, there was not even a plan to do so. Soviet indudtry was located ijn he west, but not in the newly acquired areas of eastern Poland and the Baltics. As a result, despite the rapid Germsan adavnce, there was time to get a substantial part of Soviet industrial equioment on trains for transport east along with the workers.

Sources

Glantz, David. Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk Vols. I and II (Helion & Company: 2010).

Higgins, Trumbull. Hitler and Russia: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937–1943 (Macmillan Publishing: 1966)..

Hitler, Adolf. 'Führer Directive 21,' (Devember 18, 1940)

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf (1925).

Megargee, Geoffrey. Inside Hitler's High Command (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

Seaton, Albert (1982). The German Army, 1933–1945 (New York: Meridian, 1982).

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breking of the Nazi Economy (Penguin: New York, 2006), 800p.

Created: 10:15 AM 5/14/2018
Last updated: 10:16 AM 5/14/2018