Figure 1.--The Luftwaffe's successes brought great prestige. Notice the Luftwaffe insignias this little boy is wearing in the traditional family Christms portrait. NAZI armies by the summer of 1942 were triumphant everywhere, reaching the Volga and at the gates of Suez in Egypt. Most Germans still believed that Hitler was about to deliver another great victory. By Christmas 1942 the situation was very different. The Afrika Korps was smashed at El Alemaine and the Allies had landed in North Africa. The Red Army had surrounded the 6th Army at Stalingrd. By Christmas, that most Germn of all holidays, it was increasingly clear tha the 6th Army was doomed. We are guessing that this boy's father was a Luftwaffe officer. Whether hewas with Luftflotte 4 in the East, we do not know.

NAZI Germany began World War II with the most powerful airforce in the world. Much of Germasny's early success can be atributed in part to its air superority. The NAZI's first failure, however, came in the Battle of Britain, a Luftwaffe operation. This affected Göring's prestige with the Führer. Lufwaffe Commander Field Marshall Goering, after the Red Army surprise offensive, promissed Hitler that the 6th Army cut off in Stalingrad could be supplied by air. This appears to have been bluster and not based on any real assessment. He wanted to regain loss prestiuge. He had no idea, however, of the 6th Army's requirements or the Luftwaffe's cargo lift capability. To make matters worse for the Luftwaffe, the Allies at the same time struck in North Africa. Hitler decided to maintain the Afrika Korps in Tunisia and the Luftwaffe would also have to supply it because so many of the Axis (mostly Italian) merchant cargo vessels were being sunk. The Luftwaffe would have had diffiulty accomplishing either goal. In the end they were unable to do either. Paulus estimated that the 6th Army would require 500 t of supplies a day. The Luftwaffe was able to deliver less than 100 t per day. The lack of supplies redered the 6th army increasingly less effective an inmobile as the siege went on. Goering's pledge to supply the 6th Army by air was a illusionary as his pledge that German cities would bever be bombed or that the RAF would be desimated. A HBC reader as a GI in Germany after the War met a youth named Hans who as a Hitler Youth boy flew a combat mission in the Luftwaffe Komet rocket plane. His brother was killed flying supplies into Stalingrad where the 300,000 men of the 6th Army were trapped.

The Luftwaffe

Hitler created the Luftwaffe in 1935 and assigned World War I ace abd NAZI stalwart Herman Göring the task of creating the new German air force in total violation of the Versailles Treaty. Göring gave the Luftwaffe a poweful political promoter, but he did not bring professionalism or strategic thinking. The Luftwaffe was largely built with army officers who transferred to the new service. The Luftwaffe showed this imprint. The Luftwaffe would be throughout the War a largely ground support force--in essence flying artillery. [Hayward] They very rapidly built a major fortce with modern aircraft types. NAZI Germany began World War II with the most powerful airforce in the world. Hitler was enamored by the Luftwaffe and soon realized its value in threatening opponents even befor the War began. This was clearly evident at Munich. Much of Germany's early success can be atributed in part to its air superority. The air of modernity and sucecess lent great prestige to the Luftwaffee.

Göring and Hitler

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring was Hitler's oldest and most important associate in creating the NAZI state. Goering had been an important fighter ace in World War I. He brought down 22 Allied planes. Göring after the death of the Red Baron Manfred von Richthofen was appointed to command the famed "Flying Circus. Göring after the War, because of his highly nationlistic politics, met Hitler and joined the fledgling NAZI Party (1922). He was involved with the Beer Hall Putch and like Hitler served a short prison sentence. While recovering from wounds he became addicted to morphine. Göring's social contacts were very helpful in making Hitler and the NAZI's respectable in Germany and to introduce Hitler to the industrialists that would help finance the Party! After Hitler was appointed Chancellor, he made Göring Minister of the Interior (police) for Prussia, the most important largest German State. Thus Hitler through this post controlled most of the police forces in Germany, including the Geheime Staats Polizei (GESTAPO). Thus Göring along with Himmler played key roles in establishing the NAZI police state. He also played a key role in the Night of the Long Knives which eliminated SA Commander Roehm, Göring primary rival in the NAZI hierarchy. As areward for his loyal support and success on building the Luftwaffe, Hitler ordained Goering as his successor (1939) and appointed him Reichsmarschall (1940). This was the peak of Göring's power and relationship with Hitler. Göring's Luftwaffe failed to prevent the BEF evacuation at Dunkirk. The NAZI's first major failure, however, came in the Battle of Britain, a Luftwaffe operation (1940). This affected Göring's prestige with the Führer. Göring for most of the Third Reich was the second most powerful man in Germany. It was no accident that Hitler turned to Göring to plan the Holocaust. But for Göring and the other NAZI princlings, power was largely based on their relarionship with the Führer.

The Luftwaffee in Russia (1941-42)

The Luftwaffe had played a major role in Germany's victories: Poland (1939), Norway (1940), France (1940), and Yugoslavia/Greece (1941). The Luftwaffe also played a major role in Barbarossa, largely destroyong the huge Red Air Force in the first week of the campaign (JUne 1941). The Luftwaffe played an important role in the Wehrmacht's success in the opening campaign of Barbarossa. [Hayward] The massive forces involved and the enormous distances, however, mean that the Luftwaffe did not have the same decisive impact in the East as they had had on the Western Offensive which defeated France. The Luftwaffe just was not a large enough force. And worse still, the expanding British strategic bombing campaign by 1942 was forcing the Luftwaffe to deploy significant resources to defend German ci=ties, making it impossible to concentrate the full force of the Luftwaffe in Russia.

Luftflotte 4

General Wolfram von Richthofen began 1942 as commander of Flieger Korps VIII. He was given command of Luftflotte 4 (July 1942). This made him the senior air commander in Operation Blue. Richthofen i of couse the most pretigious name in the history of German military aviation. His cousins, Lothar and Manfred von Richthofen, both became flying aces and they encouraged him to join the Luftstreitkräfte (German Imperial Air Service). He did just that, and joined Manfred's Geschwader (Wing), Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1)--he famous Flyin Circus. Manfred, known as the Red Baron, was the mot fame fightr ce of all time. He was the highest scoring ace of World War I scoring 80 victories. On Wolfram's first mission with his famous cousin (April 21, 1918), Manfred was killed by an nfantry man in a incredibly lucky shot. Wolfram continued flying after Göring assmedcommand. He went on to claim eight aerial victories before the armistice (November 1918). Richthofen like Göring was an arrogant man, but unlike Göring, he was an exceptionally competent commander. He has been described as the Luftwaffe's best field commander. [Hayward] We are notsure how much say Richtofen had in the major air decisions concerning Stalingrad. Or if he just was responsibl for carrying out orders issued by Hitler and Göring and Hitler.

Reducing Stalingrad to Ruble (August-November)

As the German Panzers approached the suburbs of Stalingrad (August 23), Luftflotte 4 commenced to bomb the city. The Luftwaffe was a finally honed tatical airforce, playing a key role in the German cictories in the West and then with Barvarossa in the East. The Germans has begun the War in Poland with close air support. It took the Allies over 3 years to adopt a similar tactical doctrine. Confronted with this vast Soviet indistrial city, the Germans deided to reduceit o rubble. We are not sure who gave this order or to what extent the most effective role of the Luftwaffe was actually assessed by German commanders. What we do know at this time is what the Germans did. They proceeded to reduce the city to rubble. Luftflotte 4 constantly pounded the city for 2 days and nights. The Luftwaff did not hav a strategic bombing force. They used their medium bombers, elements of KG 27, KG 51, KG 55, KG 76, and I/KG 100. [Bergstrom, p. 72.] Luftflotte 4 flew some 1,600 sorties and dropped 1,000 tons of bombs on the city essentilly destrong it (Aigust 23). Only three aircraft were lost. The destrction resulted not only fom the bombs, but from the fores tht boke out all over the city. The headquarters of the city's air defences were bombed, adversely affecting the air defenses. Alhough the ity wleft a vast ple of rubble, some of the larger factories while damaged incredibly continued to function. Worker militias defended their factories. fighting. The Germans continued bomb the city block-by-block for another 5 days. The Soviets cliam that fighter defences of 8 VA and 102 IAD PVO shot down 90 German planes and that anti-aircraft unts shot down another 30 German planes. The Red Air Force in the Stalingrad area lost over 200 aircraft (August 23–31). Some limited replacemnts arrived, but beginning in setember the burden od air defense fell to the 1077th Anti-Aircraft (AA) Regiment. Stalin had refused to evacuate civiians. This may have beensue to the importance of the city's industrarial output. Historians also cite his belief thatthe soldiers would fight more resolutely with civilians in the city. Whatever the reason, the city's civiians paid a heavy price. It is estimated that some 90,000 civilians were killed in the bombing amid the rubble. [Prikazchikova] The question becomes what was the impact of the bombing. Wars are not won by killing civilians or destroying buildings. As far as we can tell, the Luftwaffe commanders just assumed that leveling the city would elp the ground units take the city. The rubble created impeded the mobility of the Germn panzers. It also create infanite firing positions for the Russian infantry defending the city. The Wehrmacht's strength was its mobility. The Red army;'s strength was the tenacious resistance of the individual soldier. Turning the city into a sea of rubble played into the Soviet strength. Over te entire campaign before the Soviet encirclemnt, Luflotte 4 flew 70,000 sorties dropping more than a million bombs. After the first few days, many of the bombs dropped onlt stirred up the rubble. The Sovietssoon realized that it was to their advantage to position themselves as closeas possible to the German lines, making it difficult for the Luftwaffe to bomb tem out of fear of hitting their own men.

Oil

Air war doctrines had not been well refined at the time World War II began. Many thought poison gas would be used. Others thought that civilan populations could be cowed by bombing cities, thus quickly winning wars. Modern historians argue that target selection was faulty. Most historians argue that the Allies should have targeted petroleum sites earlier in the War. The capability of hitting Ploesti and the synfuel plants in the Reich , however, isoften overestimted. Germany did not have a strategic bombing force. British (Iraq/Iran) and American oil fields were beyound the reach of the Luftwaffe. Operation Blue, however, briefly brought the Luftwaffe within the range of the principal Soviet oil fields--Baku. One historian argues that large-scale raids on Baku during the summer of 1942 could have severely impaired the Soviet war effort. Luftwaffe raids on refineries at Grozny were effective. [Hayward] Instead Hitler chose to reduce Stalingrd to rubble, an action that may have actually assisted the Red Army.

NAZI Reverses (October-November 1942)

NAZI armies by the summer of 1942 were triumphant everywhere, reaching the Volga at Stalingrad and at the gates of Suez in Egypt. Most Germans who because of Goebels proppganda were not fully aware of the dimensions of the losses suffered durng the Red Army 1941-42 Winter Offensive. They still believed that Hitler was about to deliver a great victory. Hitler had great hopes. In addition to the military victories, his cherished dream of destroying the Jews had begun in earnest with industrial scale gasings in the NAZI death camps. Then the NAZI dream began to unravel. By Christmas 1942 the situation was very different. The Afrika Korps was smashed at El Alemaine (October) and the Allies had landed in North Africa (November). The most serious blow of all came would come at Stalingrad where Zukov was preparing a massive Red Army offensive to surrounded the Germany 6th Army which had driven the Red army back toanarrow perimter long the Volga. .

Soviet Winter Offensive (November 19, 1942)

The Torch landings in North Africa has surprised OKW. But aweek later they would be shocked to their very foundation. Zukov during October husbanded his resources, only commiting the minimal amount of men to Stalingrad to prevent a total German victory and to continue bleeding them. He begun assembling about 1 million men, artillery, and tanks north and south of Stalingrad. The Soviets finally struck in mid-November. This time Marshall Zukov had engineered a massive encircling operation, clear evidence that the Russians had learned the basics of modern mecganized warfare that the Germans had introduced. Zukov struck the weak Romanian armies north and south of the city. The offensive was launched on November 19 south of Stalingrad in a driving snow storm with a massive artillery barage, obliterating whole Romanian units. [Fest, p. 662.] Then Zukov on November 20 strikes northwest of Stalingrad into the Don Valley Ismas again obliterating whole Romanian units. German units had been committed to the battle in Stalingrad and the flanks had been protected only by the Romanians. The two wings of the Russian forced joined 3 days later, surrounding the 6th Army and units of the 4th Panzer Army in Stalingrad.

Breakout

Zukov's offensive came as a great shock to Hitler and the High Command. They thought ther Russians in Stalingrad were near collapse and the Red Atrmy was a defeated force, incapable of a major offensive. The initial Soviet offensive fell on the Romanians nort and south of Stlingrad (November 19). The German 6th Army in Stalingrad although worn down was still a powerful, highly mobile force. Paulis and the High Command rapidly readied plans to break out. The Red Army ring around Stalingrad was a first relatively weak. It all probability major segments of the 6th Army could have successfully broken out. It was at this time that Göring pledged to supply the 6th Army by air. Hitler's mind set was to never retreat or give up territory. He thus jumped at Göring's offer. He ordered Paulis and the High Command to cancel plans for the Sixth Army to break out. Paulis was ordered to hold his position until releaved. Paulis was shocked. He had been an enthusiastic NAZI, one of the reasons that he was appointed 6th Army commander. Hitler who had quarled with Jodl over the dividing foirces in the summer offensive told Jodl that after the German victory at Stalin grad, he would be replaced with Paulis.

Göring's Pledge

Lufwaffe Commander Field Marshall Goering, after the Red Army surprise offensive, promissed Hitler that the 6th Army cut off in Stalingrad could be supplied by air. This appears to have been bluster and not based on any real assessment. He wanted to regain loss prestiuge. He had no idea, however, of the 6th Army's requirements or the Luftwaffe's cargo lift capability. The Luftwaffe had actually saved some surrounded units earlier. But they had been much smaller units. Göring made the pledge to supply the 6th Army and then turned the task of actually doing it to Luftwaffe commander Wolfram von Richthofen, a competent officer, but given an impossible task. [Hayward]

Hitler's Decession on North Africa

To make matters worse for the Luftwaffe, the Allies at the same time struck in North Africa. Hitler decided to maintain the Afrika Korps in Tunisia and the Luftwaffe would also have to supply it because so many of the Axis (mostly Italian) merchant cargo vessels were being sunk.

The 6th Army's Situation

There was no panic among the Germans. For many it was simply inconceivable that the 6th Army could be destroyed by the Russiams who had proven so inept in the early phase of Operation Blue. Paulus reported, however, that the 6th Army had only 6 days of food. There were similar limited supplies of fuel, ammunition, clothing and other materiel. German troops in Stalingrad began calling their position "Der Kessel" - The Kettle. Paulus estimated that the 6th Army would require 500 t of supplies a day and that was the bare minimum required to sustain the 6th Army in static position.

Luftwaffe Planes

The principal Luftwaffe transport plane was the Junkers Ju-52 trimotor. Von Richthofen estimated that Luftflotte 4 would need 250 Ju-52s and fly four round trips to Stalingrad daily. Luftflotte 4 didn't that many Ju-52s and many of the Ju-52s available were not fully operational. Many needed maintenance. Luftflotte 4 also did not have sufficent pilots to fly so many trips. The Luftwaffe inventory of Ju-52s had been significantly reduced during the Crete Operastion (May 1941). About 100 Ju-52s were lost there. Hitler demanded that Goering and Jeschonnek move every available airplane throughout the NAZI empire to Russia. Von Richthofen managed to assessmble 150 operational Ju-52s. To supplement these planes, he attempted to use He-111 bombers. The 4 engine Focke-Wulf Condor was withdrawn from maritime patrols in the North Atlantic. It was an effective partol vessel, but it was not C-47. It was totally unsuited as a cargo plane. A training squadron working with the new He-117, a four-engine bomber was transferred, but all kinds of problems were encountered with the still not fully operational plane.

The Air Lift

Failure

The Luftwaffe was given the task of supplying both the forces in Tunisia and the 6th Army in SDtalingrad. It would have had diffiulty accomplishing either goal. In the end they were unable to do either. The Luftwaffe was able to deliver less than 100 t per day, only 20 oercent of what was needed. The lack of supplies redered the 6th army increasingly less effective an inmobile as the siege went on. Goering's pledge to supply the 6th Army by air was a illusionary as his pledge that German cities would bever be bombed or that the RAF would be desimated. Göring whose reputation had been tarnished was now no longer a key player in the NAZI hierarchy. The loss of the 6th Army was in fact primarily Hiltler's fault. He refused to listen to commanders who advised him to lmit his objectives and not split his forces. Of course Göring made matters worse, but it was Hitler's flawed strategy that doomed the 6th Army. Hilter was very adept at finding scapegoats for his incompetence. After Stalingrad, Hitler lost all faith in Göring and made him the primary scapegoat for the Stalingrad disaster. Interestingly, another airlift woul be aajor Siviet defeat in the Cold war. It islikely that the failure of the German airlift at salingrad condition Stalin to discount the possibility that the AAmeriva led Berlin Air lift wouldsuceed.

Reader Comment

A HBC reader as a GI in Germany after the War met a youth named Hans who as a Hitler Youth boy flew a combat mission in the Luftwaffe Komet rocket plane. His brother was killed flying supplies into Stalingrad where the 300,000 men of the 6th Army were trapped.

Sources

Bergstrom, Christer. Stalingrad: The Air Battle 1942 Through January 1943.

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1973), 844p.

Hayward, Joel S. A Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943 (Modern War Studies).

Prikazchikova, Tatyana. Senior research fellow at the Stalingrad Memorial. She places the death toll in the first few dys of the bombing at 93,000 people..

Created: 12:46 AM 12/12/2005
Last updated: 7:02 AM 5/8/2016