Figure 1.--The Marianas was different than the previous islands invaded. Here they encountered Japanese civilians. This photograph was published in American newspapers on July 4, 1944. The caption read, "Jap women, children rounded up on Saipan: Japanese women and children whose husbands and fathers are opposing American troops on Saipan Island in the Marianas are guarded after being rounded upfor removal to a compound where they are now comfortably quartered. Source: U.S. Army Signal Corps. It is unclear why the wire service did not mention that the Japanese Army was incourging civilans to commit suicide rather than be captured and many dud so,

There were four principal Marianas Islands. Each of them would serve as air bases from which the United States could commence the strastegic bombing of the Home Islands. American Marines in 1943 demonstrated that even heavily foortfied garrisons could not repel invasions without air and naval support. Thus the Imperial Fleet intervened for the first time since the Solomons (1942). America carrier strikes destroyed the aircraft on the islands before a Japane carrier force arrived to repel the invasion. The American carrier aurcraf not only repelled the Japsne fleet, but decimated the attacking plnrs. After this, each island could be invaded in separate opeations. The isolated garisons had no way of supporting each other and after the Japanese carriers were defeated, had no hope of support or supply deliveries. Each if the four islands were different. Not only was tge terraine different, but for the first time the United States encountered Japanese civilians, especially on Saipan. Saipan and Tinian were close together. Guam was a former American possession, far to the south. Admiral Nimitz decided to forego an invasion of Rota as the other islands provided adequate sites for the needed airfields. The Japanese garrison there was left to languish.

Saipan (June 15-July 8, 1944)

American planners debated how to attack The Marianas. The initial plan was to take periferal island and then attack Saipan. Admiral Nimitz vetoed this approach and decided to go right for Saipan. The Americans decided to bypass Rota. Tinian was a smaller island 5-miles southwest of Saipan and thus combined in the Saipan invaion. The American invasion force was enormous. It was an armada of 535 ships with 127,570 U. S. military personnel. About two-thirds were Marines (2nd and 4th Divisions). Seven American battleships and 11 destroyers shelled Saipan and Tinian for 2 days prior to the landings. On the second day the initial force was joined by 8 more battleships, 6 heavy cruisers and 5 light cruisers. Saipan and Tinian were ringed by an incredible naval force which conducted one of the most intensive shellings of the War. Without planes and ships, the Rota garrison had no ability to threaten the American assault on on Saipan and Tininan. The main American invasion force went ashore on a 4 mile streach of beach at Chalan Kanoa. Despite the 2-day naval barage, Japanese shore defenses were still largely intact. The Japanese destroyed 28 American tanks the first day. The Japanese had crefully prepared for the invasion. They had placed colored flags in the lagoon to indicate the areas in which howitzers in positions beyound Mt. Fina Susu has been ranged. The artillery fire proved deadly on the Second Marine Division which suffered 2,000 casualties. Fighting continued for 24 days

Rota

The Spanish when they forced the Chamorros on the laarger Marianas islands o Guam, failed to do so on Rota because most managed to from the Spanish in the hills to avoid capture capture. As a result, the Chamorros on Rota are the least mixed of any on the Marianas. Rota was occupied by Japanese forces and heavily garisoned. It was located half way between Saipan in the north and Guam in the south. became an important link in their air routes from Japan to the south Pacific. They built a single air strip on the highest elevation of the island. After the American air strikes, however, Rota was cut off and had no way of attacking the Americans. It became one of many islands on which Japanese garrisons were left isolated. It showed a major weakness in the Japanese war effort. Not know where the Americans would stroke they had to garrison large numbers of islands and were unable to concentrate their forces. Without planes and ships, the Rota garrison had no ability to threaten the American assault on on Saipan and Tininan. Nimitz decided an invasion was unecessary. The Japanse having lost control of the sea had no way of meanihgfully resupplying Rota. Wghen the Jaopanese surrendered, the garison was close to starvation. Bypassed by the United States, Rota came out of the war with little physical damage.

Tinian (July 24- )

The small island of Tinian is only 8 km southeast of Saipan across an ocean channel. The Japanese operated Tuinian as a sugar plantation. There were also Japanese civilans on Tinian, but far less than on Saipan. While lightly populated, the Japanese heavily garrisoned Tinian. Once the Marines had largely secured Saipan, they struck at the smaller Japanese garrison on Tinian (July 24). Two Marine divisions assaulted Tinian under the command of Lt. Gen. Harry F. Schmidt. The Marines were assigned the infantry missions. Supporting Army units provided artillery and engineer support. The Marines feinted an invasion at San Jose Village beach located in the center of Tinian. The landing craft approached Tinian from the north, drawing the attention of the Japanese. The landing craft at the rear of the invasion force then peeled off and executed a surprise real landing at a beach located to the northwest. The Army 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion stood by offshore, ready to support the Maines if needed. As the Marines pushed inland, the Army 1341st Engineer Battalion took over the beachead sending landing personnel and supplies forward and transporting casualties to waiting hospital ships. The Marines at first encountered light Japanese resistance. By the end of the day, they had a beachhead 2 miles wide and 1 mile deep. The Japanese used the same tactics employed on Saipan. They launched massive night time attacks. The Americans could not employ their firepower or callin air support at night. Even so, the Japanese were unable to dislodge the Marines, but lost more than 1,200 men in the process. The rolling terrain allowed the Marines to employ sarmor and they advanced rapidly, seizing the the first airfield and Mount Lasso (July 26). A typpoon ended tge rapid advance (July 29).

Guam (July 20- )

Guam was the southern-most and largest islands of Marianas, about 150 miles south of Saipan. Most of the Chomoros inn the Marianas lived on Guam. After the destruction of Japanese air forces, the Japanese garrison Guam could no support the beleagered garrison on Saipan. Major General Roy Geiger of the III Amphibious Corps wasc given command of the the Guam invasion force. The invasion was schedulred for June 1944, but had to be postponed becuause of the protracted Japanese resistance on Saipan. Geiger used the delay for an extended preparatory bombardment. He was also able to obtain better intelligence on Japanese deployment. Naval air strikes began (July 5) and continud unabated until (July 21). Carrier airstrikes hit Guam daily followed by intense naval gunfire. The landings began (July 20). Theisland was surrounded by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf which presented a chllenge for an amphibious landing force. The first objective was the exposed Orote peninsula on the western side of Guam. An airfield was located here. The 3rd Marine Division landed near Agana to the north and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed near Agat to the south. The Japanese were prepared and despite the pre-invasion shelling, Japanese artillery sank 20 LVTs. The marines fought their away ahote on both beaches. They were, however, 7 miles a part and linking up proved a difficult undertaking. The 77th Infantry Division had a difficult time crossing the reef without amphibious landing craft.

Sources

Kinoaki Matsuo. The Three Power Alliance And The United States Japanese War. Matsuo's book explained how Japan could win a Pacific war with the United States. He was an intelligence officer who served as a liaison between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Admiralty. He argued that the "... the United States will be obliged to exercise prudence and self-restraint toward Japan at least until 1945." He believed that it would take this long for America to build up amidabe military force.

Created: 5:15 AM 12/26/2010
Last updated: 5:15 AM 12/26/2010