Figure 1.--This Signal Corps photograph from the Philippines shows two U.S. soldiers holding up a handmade sign to a group of Filipino children, one of which one is holding a baby in her arms. The sign can be read with a magnifying glass and says "GREETINGS MERRY CHRISTMAS and HAPPY NEW YEAR" written in cursive. It is not stated that the photograph was taken on Mindoro, but the date and hat style suggests it was Mindoro. Source Singnal Corps phitop SWAP 44 20158.

Mindoro is an island that is often omitted in World War II histories, in part because invasion casualties were limited. The island was located west of Leyte and south of Luzon, the American's prime target. The island symbolized the Japanese problem once they lost control of the sea lanes. Most of their Army was in China. Without control of the sea, shifting forces to the Pacific was difficult. The Japanese did it, but in several cases experienced serious losses to American air and naval patrols. Another serious problem that once an island was garisoned, it had to be supplied. Many of the islands, especially the small islands and even New Guinea, while self-sufficent in food production did not produce a surplus. And when Japanese garison's began seizing food, it adversely affected food production. As a result many Japanese garisons began to starve. The Japanese used their submarines in a futile effort to supply the garisons, severly affecting their offensive punch. With control of the sea, the United States could 'island hop', it could simply leave the Japanese garrisons to wither on the vine. The Japanese could not garrison all the islands. Often here were undefended islands with as much strategic value as a defended island. Mindoro was one of those islands. The Americans began the libertion of the Philippines by invading Leyte (October 1944). The primary purpose was to obtain air fields needed to support the upcoming Luzon landings at Lingayen Gulf. Fom the beginning, Luzon and Manila were the primary American tagets. It soon becme apparent, however, that the airfields planned on Leyte could not be built as quickly as anticipated. And the existing Japanese airfields neded to be improved to meet Air Force needs. Most of the areas on Leyte thiught to be deal for airfield and road development, especially those in the southern Leyte Valley, proved too wet to for the use of heavy equipment and rapid construction. Thus Mindoro became a part of the drive on Luzon. Sites there offered more suitable terraine for airfield construction. And it was closer to Linguyan Gulf making it better for fighter operations. The U.S. Sixth Army under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger was responsible for the Mindoro operation. Krueger assigned Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff and his 24th Infantry Division supported by the 19th Infantry and the separate 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George M. Jones to take the island. These forces invaded (December 13). And because there was such a small Japanese garison, Woodruff deemed the Island secure within 3 days. Yamashita had made such a sustained stand in Leyte that he had used up about half of his combat strength. He could now not defend Luzon, let alone Mindoro. The only significant Japanese oposition encountered was Kamikaze and Navy ships. Filipino guerrillas who already controlled areas assisted the American landing force. In addition to providing needed air bases, Mindoro also served as the advanced base for U.S. ground forces on Luzon.

Location

Mindoro is an island that is often omitted in World War II histories, in part because invasion casualties were limited. The island was located west of Leyte and south of Luzon, the American's prime target.

Japanese Situation

The island symbolized the Japanese problem once they lost control of the sea lanes. Most of their Army was in China. Without control of the sea, shifting forces to the Pacific was difficult. The Japanese did it, but in several cases experienced serious losses to American air and naval patrols. Another serious problem that once an island was garisoned, it had to be supplied. Many of the islands, especially the small islands and even New Guinea, while self-sufficent in food production did not produce a surplus. And when Japanese garison's began seizing food, it adversely affected food production. As a result many Japanese garisons began to starve. The Japanese used their submarines in a futile effort to supply the garisons, severly affecting their offensive punch. With control of the sea, the United States could 'island hop', it could simply leave the Japanese garrisons to wither on the vine. The Japanese could not garrison all the islands. Often here were undefended islands with as much strategic value as a defended island. Mindoro was one of those islands.

Leyte (October 1944)

The Americans began the libertion of the Philippines by invading Leyte (October 1944). The primary purpose was to obtain air fields needed to support the upcoming Luzon landings at Lingayen Gulf. Fom the beginning, Luzon and Manila were the primary American tagets. It soon becme apparent, however, that the airfields planned on Leyte could not be built as quickly as anticipated. And the existing Japanese airfields neded to be improved to meet Air Force needs. Most of the areas on Leyte thiught to be deal for airfield and road development, especially those in the southern Leyte Valley, proved too wet to for the use of heavy equipment and rapid construction.

Importance

Mindoro was no iriginally a priority for the American invasion planning. But because of the problems encountered in Leyte this chnged. Thus Mindoro became a part of the drive on Luzon. Sites there offered more suitable terraine for airfield construction. And it was closer to Linguyan Gulf making it better for fighter operations. The U.S. Sixth Army under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger was responsible for the Mindoro operation.

Invasion (December 1944)

Krueger assigned Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff and his 24th Infantry Division supported by the 19th Infantry and the separate 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George M. Jones to take the island. These forces invaded (December 13). And because there was such a small Japanese garison, Woodruff deemed the Island secure within 3 days. Yamashita had made such a sustained stand in Leyte that he had used up about half of his combat strength. He could now not defend Luzon, let alone Mindoro. The only significant Japanese oposition encountered was Kamikazes and Navy ships. Filipino guerrillas who already controlled areas assisted the American landing force. In addition to providing needed air bases, Mindoro also served as the advanced base for U.S. ground forces on Luzon.

Luzon (January 1945)

Southern Philippines (March 1945)

After the fighting on Leyte and Luzon, General Robert Eichelberger commanding the U.S. 8th Army was ordered to land on the large southern island of Mindanao (March 10, 1945). This began the liberation of the southern Philippines, including Panay, Cebu, Negros and Bohol. These operations were not trongly opposed. Yamahita had drawn down forces in the south to defend Leyte and make his stanbd on Luzon. There were as a result, no pitched battles are major organized resistance on Mindanao and the other southern islands. Eichelberger pressed the campaign agressively would unhinge the Japanese both physically and psychologically. He believed that success would be detrtmined by beachhead performance and the ability of the invading units to maintain the momentum of their initial attack. This would Japanese reactions. In fact, the weak Japanese doirces in the south had little capbility to resist the Americans. The area, however, was vast with countless small islands. The major islnds were quickly seized. The red=fusal of the vJaobese to xurrebder, hoiweverr, mdeant that protracted mopping up operations were necessary. The mopping up was conducted by small American units and Filipino guerrillas. Gen. Eichelberger announced the end of organized Japanese resistance. Small Japanese units continued to resit, especilly on Mindanao. Here the impenetrable terrain of the large island's unexplored jungle expanses. Only asfter the Emperor's sdurrender did 22,000 Japanese soldiers emerged from the jungle. That essentiasly completed the liberastion of the Philippinrs. Some 10,000 Japanese troops were killed on Mindanao. There were aslso 7,000 were wounded. Another 8,000 men succumbed to starvation and disease. Unlike most armies. The Japanese routinely suffered more men killed than wounded. The number who diued fffrom didease and starvation reflects the Jaosbnese Army's policy of deploying forces without anby capobility to supply them. They were expected to live off the land. Early Japanese victories involved seizing the supllies of poor prepared colonial forces.

Created: 9:43 PM 6/16/2021
Last updated: 9:44 PM 6/16/2021