Figure 1.--Most of the damage connected with the liberation of the Philippines occurred in Manila which was basically destroyed after the regade Japanese there chose to fight to the death. The damage on the rest of the islsnd was much more limited, although as we can see here there was damage where ever the Japanese chose to fight. For the most part they just fought delaying actions as they withdrew northeast into the rugged moutainous spine of Luzon. Here we see Filipino children in the aftermath of the Luzon battle playing with the detritus of war. Their parents have re-purposed an aircraft drop tank in war-torn surroundings. American air support which by this point of the War had been refined to an art was a major factor in combat oprations. Drop tanks extended the range of American fighters and as the name suggests, were dropped all over Luzon.

Leyte was just the preview and designed to support the liberation of Luzon. Luzon was the heart of the Philippines and the liberation of Luzon meant the liberation of the Philippines. It was on Luzon that the Japanese defeated the Americans in 1942. It was Luzon that MacArtthur was talking about when he said, "I shall return." Luzon is the fourth most populated island in the world and had over hlf the total Filipino ppopultiomn. The U.S. Sixth Army commaned by General Krueger finally reached the main island of Luzon with massive landings at Lingayen Gulf along the northwestern coast of Luzon (January 9, 1945--S Day). The series of American landings at Luzon consisted of seven proposed landings and other operations were designated MIKE. Each MIKE plan was numbered, but most were not executed because of the sucess of MIKE I--the Lingayen landings. Lingayen Gulf was where the Japanese had invaded 4 years earlier. Manila in the south was the real prize, but Lingayen Gulf offered the best beaches for a large amphibious operation. It is why both the Japanese and Americans chose Lingayen Gulf. The weather was perfect for the Americans, good visibility and light seas. The pre-assault bombardment began (0700) followed by the initial landings (0800). Yamashita concentrated his forces on Luzon and conducted a skillfull defense, but without air support and the armor and artillery support of the Americans or the prepared defenses the Marines encountered on small islands could not stop them. He faced the same problem that MacArthur had faced against the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. He had a substantial force on the island, but his men were out-gunned by the Americans who also had extensive air support. The major landings were conducted at Lingayen Gulf. It took over a week to establish the beachhead, then the drive south to Manila began. Kruger made full use of the mobility his tanks and trucks as well as amphibious forces provided. Yamashita began withdrawing his forces east into the rugged Cordillera Mountains comprising the interior of Luzon. Japanese diehsrds in Manila, however, refused his orf=ders to withdraw from the capital. Macarthur wanted a rapid push south to Manila. Kruger was worried about an attck on his flank as he moved south. The drive south was supported by subsequent Mike 6 landings north of Batan and southwest of Manila. Within a month they had retaken Clark Field and reached the outskirts of Manila. Here the rpd pace of the drive south ended. The Japanese in the city, however, were prepred to fight to the death and take as mny Filipinos with them as possible.

Lingayen Gulf Beachhead: Operation MIKE I (January 9)

I Corps landed on the eastern part of Lingayen Gulf's southern end near San Fabian. Linguayen Gulf was avbout hakfway down the western coast of Li=uzon. XIV Corps landed west off the Dugupan River. The initial American landings were largely unopposed. The 43rd Division encountered six dug in Japanese batalions. [Rottman, p. 304.] Landings at Lingayen Gulf continued for more than a week. Nearly 175,000 men along a 20-mile beachhead. There were few developed airfields in the bridgehead area which limited air cover. I Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Innis P. Swift, protected the beachhead's flanks. XIV Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold prepared the drive south. The initial objective was Clark Field and then on to Manila. I Corps was to hold its position on the flamks until Manila had been liberated. Then it was to move north and east to the road junctions leading from the beachead into the mountains of northern Luzon. At an early stage MacArthur and Kruger quarled about the pre-invasion plans. Sicth Army Commander, General Krueger wanted the I Corps to secure the roads out of the beachhead east into the mountains before XIV Corps moved south. He was concerned that I Corps was encountering on the beachhead's eastern flank, while the XIV Corps was reporting little resistance the south. Krueger was concerned about a southern drive to Manila before his eastern flank was secured. MacArthur was stronly committed to a rapid advance south. He thought a Japanese attack on the beachead unlikely. He ordered Kruher to proceed south as planned. Neither MacArthur or Kruger were aware that Yamashita had massed his forces in the mountains east of the beachead. Yamashita had, however, commited Shobu Group to a defensive campaign.

I Corps

I Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. Innis P. Swift was assigned to cover the beachhead's noirtheasterrn flank. The iniutial plan was for I Corps to hold the flank while XIV Corps drive south to Clsrk Field and Manila. Only after reaching Manila was I Corps to push north and east to seize the vital road junctions leading from the coast into the oordillera in northern Luzon. And at first only I Corps sustained substntial resistance. Differences developed between Msc Arthur and Kruger about how to proceed Krueger hesitated to committing XIV Corps to a narrow thrust south directly toward Manila as long s his eastern flank was open to a possible Japanese attack.

XIV Corps: Central Plain (Mid-January)

American forces took about 10-day to consolidate the Lingsyen beachead and then begam moving south onto Luzon's central plain. XIV Corps' 37th and 40th Divisions moved in parallel columns southward onto the Central Plain. They unexpectedly encountered very low Japanese resistance. Inknown to the Americans, the Japanrse had withdrawn most of their forces from on the Central Plain. Rather they were greeted with cheering Filipinos in villge after village. The 37th Division tentatively to expad the beachead along a highway that ran from to San Carlos and then on to Bayambang. The 40th Division moved along Highway No. 13 about eight miles to the west. The created a front line for XIV Corps from Bayambang on the east flank to Aguilar on the west (January 12). The Agno or Pangasinan River was the first major geographhic barrier reached by the Americans. It is one of the largest river systems in the country and runs down friom Cordillera Mountains. The Americans expected a Japanese stand there. Again it was not defended. The Americans crossed the Agno, still not encountered any sinstntial Jpanese force. Advance patrols were mostly slowed by joyous Filipinos lined the roads and showing their appreciation. American commanders began to become supicuius that the Japnaese were laying a trap by allowing them to advance so rapidly, perhaps over extending their lines. XIV Corps thus became concerned about their exposed eastern flank. This was of concern before all of the American foirces had landed, escpecially as American intelligence had overestimarted the Japsnese force. In contrast, I Corps to the northeast encountered heavy resitance as it tried to move into the Cabaruan Hills. To secure their flank, XIV Corps seized Paniqui and Anao before moving further south. With both towns secured, XIV Corps resumed the drive south to Manila (Janury 19). By this time most of the American force had landed and the Americans were more cinfident. these nds by 19 January, the advance to Manila was resumed. (Plate No. 75)

XIV Corps: Clark Field (Late-January)

XIV Corps did not encounter significan resistance until it neared Clark Field (January 23). Before the War, the air units at Clark Field was seen as the most powerful American striking force in the Far East. It was the center of American air power in the Philippines. Actually it was not just one airfield, but a huge complex of 11 airfields. It was about half way between Lingusyen Gulf and Manila, sime 40 miles further south. The American aircraft had been destroyed on the ground hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. The bases was overrun by Japanese forces (early January 1942). The Japoanese made use of the facilities and turned it into a major nase for air operations. Japanese aircraft from Clark field participated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but wuth little success. By the time of the Linguyan landings American air strikes had destoyed almost all of the aircrafft there. Even so, the Japnese decided to defend it. The Kembu Group, the weakest of the three Japanese combat groups organized by Yamashita, was ordered to oppose the Americans. General Kruger committed the 40th Division to to take Clark Field. It was the fiurst major engagement of the Luzon campaign. The Japanese resisted the American advance for about a week. The facilities were damged, but the air strips were intact and were almost immedutely put to use by Americam air groups.

XI Corps: Operation MIKE 6 Part I (January 29)

MacArthur opened a second front in the drive on Manila. Even before XIV Corps began the drive south, the first part of Operation Mike 6 commenced (January 29). We also notice this referred to as MIKE VII. This was a second amphibious landing, albeit on a much smaller scale than at Lingayen Gulf. XI Corps commanded by Major General Charles P. Hall landed at San Antonio north of Subic Bay, 25 miles west of the Batan Peninsula. Some sources calling this the Zambales Landings referring to the name of the proivince. Filipimo guerills reported the Japanese were not present and there was no pre-invasion barage. The landings were unopposed. The Japanese held up the advance at Zigzag Pass for 2 weeks. MacArthur replaced the division commander. XI Corps joined the west flank of XIV Corps, cutting off the Japanese on the Batan Peninsula. Some were able to evacuate to Corregidor or the mainland by crossing Manila Bay. [Rottman, p. 304.] Tactical air strikes were instrumental in breaking through the Jspanese defenses (February 7). This enabled the ground forces to join the fight for Manila.

Rangers: Cabanatuan Raid (January 30)

The Japanese held 511 American and Allied POWs in Pangatian prison camp, near Cabanatuan. They were emaciated sick and near starvation. Worse still, the camp commander like other camp commabders had orders to kill them if the Americans were prepared to seize the camp. The POWs included soldiers, Marines, sailors, pilots, as well as civilians. They were mostly Americans but there were also a few from other Allied countries. Most were survivors of the Batan Death March (April 1942). MacArthur ordered Lt. Col. Henry A. Mucci commander of the 6th Ranger Battalion along with Alamo Scouts were ordered to rescue the POWs in a surprise attack behind Japanese lines.

11th Airborn: Operation MIKE VI 6 Part II (January 31)

The 11th Airborn coducted the second part of Mike 6, again staging an amphibious landing instead of jumping. They landed some 45 miles southwest of Manila (January 31--X-ray Day). This totally surprised the Japanese who were fixed on the American drive from the north. Two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division, under Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, landed unopposed. The paratroopers were able to seize a bridge near the beach before the bewildered Japanese could demolish it. This enabled the the paratroopers to begin the southern drive on Manila. The Divisions Third Regiment (511th Parachute), did jump to join the other two regiments. They were soon advancing north along a rare paved highway. Filipino civilians lined the highway cheering them on. The 11th Airborne Division was one of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army units which had been pushig up the New Guinea coast. The Division was initially to be used to contain Japanese troops throughout southwestern Luzon. MacArthur decided to use the Division to add to the drive on Manila. It proved to be an epic drive. The Japanese mounted a defense near Imus, only 5 miles south of Manila (February 3). An entenched force of about 50 Japanese held a position centered on an old stone building. A bombardment by the battalion's 75-mm. howitzers failed to dislodge them. T. Sgt. Robert C. Steel managed toget on the roof and poured in gasoline with a phosphorous grenade. The Japanese rushed out and were mowed down. Three miles further up the road towad Manila was the Las Pinas River bridge. A Japanese detaschment on the north bank of the river was ready to blow it. As a result of ppor communicationsm they were unaware of the fighting at Inus and were surprised wehen the Ameriucans appeared. . The paratroopers managed to secure the briudge before the Japanese demolished it. One battalion guarded the vital span while another continued the drive on Mania. The nest day as the Division approsached the southern out\sskirts of Manila, they were stopped at Paranaque River, this was part of the main Japanese defenses around Manila. A danaged bridge stopped them. And they were hit with artillery fire from Nichols Field. [U.S. Army, pp. 11-12.] One division did not have the strength to break through here. But it mean that the Japanese defenders could anticipate no support from Shimbu Group to the east. This left the Japanese in Manila completely cut off.

XIV Corps: Final Push to Manila (February 2)

Kruger ordered the 37th Division to continue the drive south toward Manila (February 2). MacArthur was not pleased with the pace of the drive. He drove up and down the American columns urging them to move faster and complaining to Kruger.

1st Calvalry: Flying Column (February 3)

MacArthur was focused on the drive on Manila. After the 1st Cavalry Division landed on Luzon to reinforce XIV Corps (January 26). MacArthur met with the division commander, Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, and told him "Go to Manila, go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila." Mudge formed a mechanized task force, a flying column, around the 1st Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. William C. Chase. It consisted of two motorized cavalry squadrons reinforced with armor and motorized artillery and support units. This operated as a 'lying column' which rushed toward Manila while the rest of the division followed more slowly, mopping up the rear areas. The 1st Brigade reached the northern ouskirts of Manila (February 3)

Created: 2:59 PM 12/6/2018
Last updated: 2:59 PM 12/6/2018