** World War II -- Allied Ultra and Magic Warnings to Stalin on Barbarossa








Allied Ultra and Magic Intelligence Warnings to Stalin on Barbarossa (December 1940-June 1941)


Figure 1.--

The Ultra system was too new to be of assistance to the Allies in the Norwegian (April 1940) and Western campaigns(May 1940). Barbarossa was different. Both the British and Americans learned what the Germans were preparing to do. We are not sure just when the Bletchley crytptologists concluded what the Germans were preparing and informed Primeminister Churchill. One source suggests the British had some inkling of Hitler's intentions even during the Battle of Britain (August 1940). Wehrmacht planners had a basic plan for Barbarossa (December 1940). And the troop deployments west began soon after that. As Ultra was fully operationsl by that point and given the dimensions of the opertations, Bletchly Park would have learned early in 1941. This information must be known and discussed in the many books on Bletchley Park and Ultra, but we have not yet found it. We know that Bletchley Park decoded F�hrer Dirctive 21 (Operation Barbarossa) (December 1940). And that Wehrmacht decrypts must have shown a massive deployment east whoich cold have been for only one purpose. The British were leaking information on the German buldup to the Soviets for weeks before Hitler launched Barbarossa. The British forwarded information indicrectly through agents in Switzerland and Eastern Europe in an effort to desguise the work at Bletchley Park and the Ultra secret. Both the British and Americans warned Stalin without revealing their sources. Churchill sent a personal telegram to Stalin (June 11). Direct contacts through the British Embassy in Moscow are mired in controversy, in part because British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps did not want to pass on the warnings. [Gorodetsky, p. 979.] The Americans also learned of the invasion and warned Stalin. Sam Woods at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin began to collect information about German intentions in the East (late-July 1940). The reports were discounted in Washington. Later Purple decrypts of mesages between Tokyo and Japanese Embassy in Berlin confirmed Woods' work. President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Government be informed. Under-Secretary of state Sumner Wells personlly notified Soviet Ambassador Umansky in washington (March 20). The state Department cabeled Anbassador Laurence Steinhartin Moscow. When the translation reached Stlin, he wrote 'Provication!' on it. Steinhart conveyed subsequent warnings to Soviet officials. [Murphy, p. 146.] Stalin was getting similar warnings from his own iteligence sources and reports of German troop dispositioins. He chose to ignore all these warnings. [Lewin] Stalin was convinced that the British and Americans were trying to draw him into the War and until the actual attack could not believe that Hitler would attack him. The German attack, as a result, was an enormous strategic, tactical, and operational success. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. German formations drove deep into the Soviet Union and destroyed or captured a sunstantial part of the Red Army. Stalin was shocked and descened ito a near-catatonic state at his dachau. He refused to emerge and speak to the Soviet people for 2 weeks. The country was virtually leaderless during this critical period. Ultra could have helped the Soviets prepare for the German attack. But as a result of Stlin's paranoia, this warning which could have had had a major impact on the War was lost. The Allies subsequently proivided the Soviets Ultra intelligence, but without devulging the source. Given the accuracy and timliness of the inteligence provuided, the Sovirts must have realized at some point that the Allies had cracked Enigma. Soviet inteligence sources believed that the Americans had broken the Japanese diplmatic codes months before Pearl Harbor. It is interesting to note tht while the Allies attemppted to warn the Soviets, the Soviets who had intelligence tht the Japanese were prepating to strike in the Pacific, made no effort at warning either the Americans and British. And Soviet diplomts un learned that the Americans had cracked the Japanese Purple Code, alerted Japan's German allies.

Ultra and Magic Systems

The Ultra system was too new to be of assistance to the Allies in the Norwegian (April 1940) and Western campaigns(May 1940). Barbarossa was different. Both the British and Americans learned what the Germans were preparing to do.

German Planning for Barbarossa

Wehrmacht planners had a basic plan for Barbarossa (December 1940). And the troop deployments west began soon after that.

Learning About Barbarossa


Bletchley Park

We are not sure just when the Bletchley crytptologists concluded what the Germans were preparing and informed Primeminister Churchill. One source suggests the British had some inkling of Hitler's intentions even during the Battle of Britain (August 1940). Ultra was fully operationsl by that point that the Wehrmacht began deployments east. and given the dimensions of the opertations, Bletchly Park would have learned early in 1941. This information must be known and discussed in the many books on Bletchley Park and Ultra, but we have not yet found it. We know that Bletchley Park decoded F�hrer Dirctive 21 (Operation Barbarossa) (December 1940), but we are not yet sure when that was done. Wehrmacht decrypts must have shown a massive deployment east which could have been for only one purpose. We are not sure just when the Bletchlkey code brekers cooncluded that the Germans were preparing an invasion. It seems to have been some gime in early-1941.

Washington


Allied Efforts to Warn Stalin

Both the British and Americans warned Stalin without revealing their sources.

British efforts

The British went to great lengths to warn the Soviet Union about Barbarossa, even risking the greatest secret of the War--Ultra. No country in Soviet history went to such extodinary lengths to save the countruy. Churchill from the very early days of becoming primeminister attempted to keep channels open to Stalin even before planning began on Barbarossa and the immediate target was Britain. Churchill expressed a hope for friendly relation (june 24, 1949). Soviet Ambassador M. Maisky informed Foreign Minister Molotov that Curchill and the British were going to continue the fight even without France (June 22). Maisky met with Churchill who reinteted the commitment to fight and mentioned Hitler's hatred of the Soviet Union (July 3). Maisky brushed yhe warnng aside, telling him, "You can be sure that the USSR can take care of itselfat any time and in any circumstances." [Yakovlev, pp. 76-81.] We know fron the Venona decrypts that Soviet military intelligence in Britain was primarily focused on the effectveness of the German bombing and the impact on civilian morale. [Yakovlev, pp. 45-47.] Any real cooperation at this time was complicated by the fact that Stalin was an ally of Hitler and there were aange of complications ovr the Soviet seizure of the Baltic Republics. As soon as the British had solid information about Barbarossa from Ultra , they began forwarding more detailed information to the Soviets. Foreign Minister Eden informed Maisky that the Germans were moving troops into Bulgaria and had taken over the airfields (February 13, 1941). British policy became to convince the Soviets that German moves into the Balkans and Middle East was aanger to both countries. British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps met with Deputy Foreign Miister (Commisar for Foreign Affairs) Andrei Vyshinsky of rumors that the Germans were prepating an invasion. Apparently the Foreign Office instructed him to do so based on Ultra decrypts. Cripps assumed the instructions were the result of Hitler's canceltion of Operation Sea Lion. Cripps passed on a letter from Churchill (April 3). Churchill wrote, "I have at my disposal sufficent information from a reliable agent [a desguised reference to Ultra] that when the Germans considered Yugoslavia caught up in their net, that is, after March 20, they began transferrinv three of their five tank divisions from Romania to southern Poland. As soon as they learned of the Serbian revolution, that transfer was revoked. Your Excellency will easily understandthe meaning of these facts." Direct contacts through the British Embassy in Moscow are mired in sime controversy, in part because British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps did not want to pass on the warnings. [Gorodetsky, p. 979.] While Ultra was the major Bfitish source of informstion, it was not the only source. Vice-F�hrer Rudolf Hess flew to cotland in an effort to make peace with Britain and prevent a two front war (May 10). Chutrchill ordered that the Soviets beinformed of his debriefing. Eden informed Maisky precise details [again from Ultra] abot German troop concentrations on the Soviet Ukranin border. Maisky reported thus to Molotov (June 3). Churchill by this time was convinced an attack was iminent and instructed Eden to offer support from British air forces in the Middle East. Churchill sent a personal telegram to Stalin (June 11). Eden again warned Maisky offering to send a military mission to brief the Soviets in Grman tactics (June 13). Maisky informed Moscow of the warning and British offer. Sir Alexander Cadogan acting under instructions from Eden gave Maisky a detailed briefing of information obtain through Ultra but rot revealing the source (June 16). The British estimated 115 German divisions were massed on the Soviet borderand this did not include the Romnian divisions. Cadogan provided details concerning the units moving into Poland, Moldavia, northern Bukovina, Norway and Finland. By this time the Soviets knew about Ultra and had obtained some decrypts. To what extent they had compared the raw decrypts to the desguised British summaries, we do not know. Finally, Ambassador Cripps who was in London met with Maisky who forwarded an account of the dicussions to Moscow (June 21). Cripps insisted that a German attack was imimnent and reinterated Eden's offer of military assistance. The next day of course the Germans struck.

American efforts

The Americans also learned of the invasion and warned Stalin. Sam Woods at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin began to collect information about German intentions in the East (late-July 1940). The reports were discounted in Washington. Later Purple decrypts of mesages between Tokyo and Japanese Embassy in Berlin confirmed Woods' work. President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Government be informed. Under-Secretary of state Sumner Wells personlly notified Soviet Ambassador Umansky in washington (March 20). The state Department cabeled Ambassador Laurence Steinhartin Moscow. When the translation reached Stlin, he wrote 'Provication!' on it. Steinhart conveyed subsequent warnings to Soviet officials. [Murphy, p. 146.] Stalin was getting similar warnings from his own iteligence sources and reports of German troop dispositioins.

Soviet Knowledge of Ultra and Magic

Given the accuracy and timliness of the inteligence provided, the Sovirts must have realized at some point that the Allies had cracked Enigma. Agents in Britain provide some actual Ultra decrypts to the Soviets. They could thus compare the Allied inteligence with the Ultra decrypts to determine if the Allies were providing accurate information. Soviet inteligence sources believed that the Americans had broken the Japanese diplmatic codes months before Pearl Harbor. The Soviet agent involved informed the Germans.

Other Soviet Sources

Stalin had many other warnings about Barbarossa. Both the NKVD and Soviet Military inteligence submitted detailed reports as did Soviet diplomats. Not only did Stalin ignore these warmings, but thoise preparing were in several cases reprimanded for submitting them. The individuls involved must have known that submitting reports which were not appreciated was a dangerous actions. Only their patriotism and devotion to duty caused them to prrsist.

Stalin's Reaction

Stalin chose to ignore all these warnings. [Lewin] Stalin was convinced that the British and Americans were trying to draw him into the War and until the actual attack could not believe that Hitler would attack him.

Result

The German attack, as a result, was an enormous strategic, tactical, and operational success. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. German formations drove deep into the Soviet Union and destroyed or captured a sunstantial part of the Red Army. Stalin was shocked and descened ito a near-catatonic state at his dachau. He refused to emerge and speak to the Soviet people for 2 weeks. The country was virtually leaderless during this critical period. Ultra could have helped the Soviets prepare for the German attack. But as a result of Stlin's paranoia, this warning which could have had had a major impact on the War was lost.

Fate of Soviet Agents


Subsequent Ultra Material

The Allies subsequently proivided the Soviets Ultra intelligence, but without devulging the source.

Soviet Sharing of Intelligence

It is interesting to note tht while the Allies attempted to warn the Soviets, the Soviets who had intelligence that the Japanese were prepating to strike in the Pacific, made no effort at warning either the Americans and British. And Soviet diplomts who learned that the Americans had cracked the Japanese Purple Code, alerted Japan's German allies. The Soviets did not, however, war the Germans tht the Britidh had cracked Enigma.

Sources

Gilbert, Martin. A History of the Twentieth Century Vol. 2 1933-54 (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1998), 1050p.

Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "Churchill's warnings to Stlin: A reappraisal," The Historical Journal (December 1986). Vol. 29, No. 4, pp 979-90.

Lewin, Ronald Ultra goes to War (Penguin: London, 1978 and 2001).

Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa (Yale Press: New Haven, 2005), 310p.

Yakovlev, Aleksandr, N. ed. 1941 god book 2 (Moscow , 1998).






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Created: 11:59 AM 4/24/2012
Last updated: 3:21 PM 2/9/2021