Figure 1.--. |
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The SIS organization was basically set before World War II began. SIS during the War was directed by Colonel Stewart Menzies. Menzies struck of a frienship with "Wild Bill" Donovan before he was appointed to head the American inteligence agency--the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). There was no centrally coordinate British intelligence operation during World War II. Very important operations were conducted outside of SIS (MI6). MI5 was responsible for domestic counter-intelligence operations. And they effectively rolled up the German operatives early in the War. They turned some of them and executed others. MI5 also ran the important "double-cross" system to confuse and mislead the Germans. The greatest Allied achievement was in misleading the the Germans about the location of the D-Day landings. As the landings were launched from England, this was primarily but not entirely a British achievement. The British obtained some valuable information frome tapeing high ranking German POWs.
One of the most important operations was the cryptanalytic effort taken on by the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). They were responsible for intercepting and decoding foreign communications (primarily German radio transmissions) at Bletchley Park. Here the Ultra program cravled the German Enigma mschines.
Another major effort was the RAF's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit which collected at considerable risk imagery intelligence. This was the beginning of The National Imagery Exploitation Centre (JARIV).
The SIS began with a massive failure--the Venlo incident. Venlo wa a Dutch town where the SIS much of the operation took place. The Netherlands was a neutral country. Abwehr agents posed as disident officers planning to depose Hitler. SIS agents met several times with the Awehr agents posing as conspirators. A German operation to abduct the SIS team had to be cancelled when Dutch police shoed up in Venlo. Later when the Dutch police were not present, the Germans succeeded in abducting two SIS agents. After Churchill became primeminister, Section D was
substantially expanded as the Special Operations Executive. By this time, the NAZIs had succeeded in occupying most of Western Europe. Churchill hoped to set Europe ablaze bu supporting and directing resistance activities. SOE operations were initially conceived as offensive in character. This proved possible in Yugoslavia, but were not feasible in the rest of Western Europe which was highly urbanized. In addition, the German resopnse to resistance attacks was to execute large numbers of civilian hostages. Thus the emphasis gradually shifted to intellihence gathering, especially as serious preparations began for the D-Day landings. The SOE operaions resulted in a split in the SIS. Most of the Service was fixed on more discrete operations. And the German response to the SOE operaions was to increase security operations made it more difficult for other SIS operatives.
The SIS still managed to carry out important operations in both occupied Europe as well as Asia (the Middle East and Far East). In Asia it operated as the Iterservice Liaison Department (ISLD).
British opperatives also provided valuable information about the German rocket program. Data on the German rocket program helped to significantly limits its impact. The Ressistance movements in occupied countries provided a great deal of valuable information. Here the French Resistance waz particulrly important in preparing for D-Day.
The SIS organization was basically set before World War II began.
There was no centrally coordinate British intelligence operation during World War II. Very important operations were conducted outside of SIS (MI6). MI5 was responsible for domestic counter-intelligence operations.
There was no centrally coordinate British intelligence operation during World War II. Very important operations were conducted outside of SIS (MI6).
The Britishb SIS during the War was directed by Colonel Stewart Menzies. Menzies struck of a frienship with "Wild Bill" Donovan before he was appointed to head the American inteligence agency--the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He and William Stephenson directing the British inteligence operation in New York played a key role in developin the American secret service.
The SIS began with a massive failure--the Venlo incident. Venlo wa a Dutch town where the SIS much of the operation took place. The Netherlands was a neutral country. Abwehr agents posed as disident officers planning to depose Hitler. SIS agents met several times with the Awehr agents posing as conspirators. A German operation to abduct the SIS team had to be cancelled when Dutch police shoed up in Venlo. Later when the Dutch police were not present, the Germans succeeded in abducting two SIS agents.
Arguably, the most important British intelligence operation of the War, was the effort to bring America into the War. The British lunched a major intelligence effort in America, oversween by Canadian , William Stephenson, The headuarters was in New York CiIty nd facilities across the border in Canada. After the fall of France, Britain was unable to match the power of NAZI Germany controlling the resources of occupied Europe. While the Battle of Britain staved off defeat, Britain could not even continue fighting without American resources. Thus bringing Ameica into the War was vital for Britains's survival. And as part of the British iperation, they helped to lay the foundation of the American secret service. The British operation was conducted with th full knowedge of Presidnt Roosevelt an FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover who was less supptive than the President.
MI5 was responsible for domestic counter-intelligence operations. The Germans had before the out-break of the War placed a few agents in Britain as well as recruited British symphstizers. It was not a major effort as the Abwehr had other priorities. There were a small number of German spies and saboteurs that the Germans had inserted or recruited among the many foreigners in Britain, including refugees from the NAZIs. A few more were hasity inserted during the War. at the sme time the SS began compiling lists of Brits for special treatment. The operations were run by MI-5's Twenty Committee chaired by John Cecil Masterman. MI-5 after the outbreak of the War quickly rounded up the German agents it what was called the Double Cross System. The British MI-5 very quickly rounded up the German agents early in the War. We do not have details on how the British questioned the German agents. Perhaps some of our readers will know something about this. We would guess that they were not treated like POWs with all the rights guaranteed by the Geneva Convention. We do know there were a number of executions which was acceptable under internsaional law. The Brtish used he Tower of London during both World Wars for executions. Captured German spies were shot there. German Corporal Josef Jakobs was shot for espionage (August 15, 1941). MI-5 appears to have apprehended all of the German agents placed during the War, possibly with the exception of one who committed suiside, although they did not know this until after the War. The Twenty Committee was named after the Roman numerals "XX". The Double Cross System was also called the XX System. It was MI-5s primary World War II anti-espionage and deception operation. Double Cross involved more than just finding the German agents. Threatened with execution, MI-5 managed to turn several of the agents who were useful in transmitting disinformation to the Abwehr. The initial MI-5 objective policy of MI5 during the war was initially to use the system for counter-espionage, tracking down foreign spies. Only as the War developed did MI-5 realize the possibility for deception. This was primarily after the British with American aid had begun to launch offensive operations. MI5 ran the "Double-cross" system to confuse and mislead the Germans. It was the most effective double operation of its kind during the War. One of the most imprtant double-cross operatives was a Barcelona chicken farmr who walked in off the street. Juan Pujol was safe from the War in Spain, but decided to do what he could to opose the NAZIs. He had no training in espionage, but proved remarly able to tell lies and convince experienced inteligence agent. The Germans came to see him as one of their most valuable agents. The British at first did not take him seriously and then did not trust him. His code name was Garbo and he played a key role in comvincing the Germans tht there as a million man army in Kent preoparing to invade at the Pas de Calais. And as part of that deception he comvinced the Germans that he ran a network of spies in Britain. [Talty] This was all part of the greatest Allied deception of the War, misleading the the Germans about the location of the D-Day landings. As the landings were launched from England, this was primarily, but not entirely a British achievement. Garbo was part of this and amazingly he managed to sustain the deception even after the Allies landed in Normandy (June 1944). As result, powerful German armored divisions remained north of the Seine while the decisive battle for Normandy unfolded.
The British obtained some valuable information from a a MI-19 operation recording and transcribing high ranking German POWs. The first insuights were about Luftwaffe directiinal beams because many of the first German POWs were luftwaffecrews brought down in the Battle of Britain. Confirmation of German missle work was one of the most important insights. They also learned the extent to which the Wehrmacht was complicit with the Holocaust. MI-19 was a lesser-known division of the British War Office's Directorate of Military Intelligence, part of the War Office. In World War II it was responsible for obtaining information from enemy prisoners of war. MI-19 was initilly founded as MI9a, a sub-section of MI9 (December 1940). After a year it became an independent organisation, although maintaing a close association (December 1941).
MI-19 operated a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centres (CSDIC) at Beaconsfield, Wilton Park and Latimer as some overseas sites. {Hoare] The most fascinating operation was over a period of 5 years, more than 10,000 POWs were recorded at the three especially designed and equipped 'eavesdropping' POW camps: Latimer House and Wilton Park (both in Buckinghamshire) and Trent Park in North London. German generals were held here. They were confined under pleaant conditions. Actual interogation came up with little, but the generals were put at ease by the pleant surroundings and talked freely among each other. State of the art micraphones were located in the mansion and on the gronds and managed to pick up revealing personal conversations. Useful information was also obtained from lower raking POWs. Hidden away in basements and attics were the listeners and recording machines. The Germand had nothing like this. The tapes could have been useful in the Nurremberg trials, but the British did not want to reveal their inteligence methods. The recordings are, however, now being studied by historians. The transcripts are an important addition to the historical record because unlike memoirs, this is how the German soldiers talked among themselvs without thinking about what they said would be viewed by others, even other Germans. Tensions developed, but not between the Germans and British, but between the NAZIified officers and the more traditional officers, some of whom regarded the NAZIs with contempt. MI-19 also operated an interrogation center in Kensington Palace Gardens, London. It was commanded by Lt. Col. Alexander Scotland and became known as the 'London Cage'. [Scotland]
The most important cryptanalytic effort and arguably the greatest secret of the War taken on by the British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). They were responsible for intercepting and decoding foreign communications. They had achievd important advances cracking Garman codes during World War I. Thanks to an American code breakr, the Germans knew that their codes had been cracked. As the concept of Blitzkreig began to spread within German military circles, they realized that they would need a secure, but easy to operate method of command communication. The result was the Enigma Maxhine first dveloped for the German Rail System. The British and French were able to make no headway in cracking the Enigma that they were intercepting in large numbers, some began to believe that it could not be cracked. And Wehrmacht radio communication was the major intelligence objective of the War. Unknown to both the Gemans and the Allies, the Poles cracked it before the War. The Germans just before the War introduced security complications thar froze the Poles out. The Poles relized that with greater resources that they could break back into Enigma. Days before the German invasion (September 1939), the Poles presented the British and French with operational Enigma machines and materials they had used to crack it. As a result, within only a few months, GC&CS had begun cracking Enigma traffic. Soon after becoming primeministe, Churchill began sharing Ultra with the still neutral United States. The Unined States at the time had cracked the Japnese Purple Machine and was working on the Imperial Navy's JN-25. The Americans brought immense resources to the Ultra effort so that the Allies were reading messages before the Germans. The decoded messages played a major ole in many importnt orld War II campaigns, including crucial ones like the Battle of the Atlantic, D-Day, Midway, and the Amrerican Pacific submarine campaign.
The best intelligence information on Germany came from Germans who were horrified at the NAZI regime and what it was during in Germany's name. One of the most valuable source of information was the so-called Oslo report which provided British MI-6 extremely valuable information on German scientific wapons research. It has been described as the most serious breach of German scientific research security durung World War II. Nothing like it was obtained by the Germans on Allied weapons research. MI-6 was not responsible for generaing the Oslo Report, but it was responsible for assessingvand utilizing it.
The most fruitful British spy in NAZI Germany was Paul Rosbaud. He was throughout the War the best-placed British spy with access to both sciuentific and military information. It was
Rosbaud, code name was “The Griffin”, who first report on the V-1 buzz bomb and V-2 rocket programs.
He also provided early news of German consideration of an atomic weapon. And it was his reporting that evetually quited British fears of a NAZI atomic bomb. He reported that the German atomic program had made little real progress. [Kramish] Rosbaud is also notable for helping Jewish scientist Lise Mietner escape from the NAZIs when other colleagues had largely abandoned her. Rosbaud was considered so critical that the British did not share his reporting with the Americans until just befoire D-Day.
Another major effort was the RAF's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit which collected at considerable risk imagery intelligence. This was the beginning of The National Imagery Exploitation Centre (JARIV). Allied air superority achieved after Ameeican entered the War meant that the Allies knew a great deal obout the battlefied and the Germans often did not.
After Churchill became primeminister, Section D was substantially expanded as the Special Operations Executive. By this time, the NAZIs had succeeded in occupying most of Western Europe. Churchill hoped to 'set Europe ablaze' by supporting and directing resistance activities. SOE operations were initially conceived as offensive in character. This proved possible in Yugoslavia, but were not feasible in the rest of Western Europe which was highly urbanized. In addition, the German resopnse to resistance attacks was to execute large numbers of civilian hostages. Thus the emphasis gradually shifted to intellihence gathering, especially as serious preparations began for the D-Day landings. The SOE operaions resulted in a split in the SIS. Most of the Service was fixed on more discrete operations. And the German response to the SOE operaions was to increase security operations made it more difficult for other SIS operatives. The SIS still managed to carry out important operations in both occupied Europe as well as Asia (the Middle East and Far East). In Asia it operated as the Interservice Liaison Department (ISLD). Interestingly one of the top SOE leaders was Vera Atkins. She worked in the SIR= French section. [Stevenson]
British opperatives also provided valuable information about the German rocket program. The Germans began working on rockets after World War I. At the time, the Treaty of Versailles prohibited artillery, but made no mention of rockets or missles. Wehrmact administrator Walter Dorinberg found an enthusiastic young scientist to work on rockets--Walter Von Braun. When the NAZIs came to power, lavish defense spending allowed the work to expand at a scientific research station on the Baltic Sea--Peenemünde. Early in the War, Hitler reduced spending seeing the rocket program as to futuristic. When the War began to go bad, funding was increased. The Germans made considerable progress on the Waterfall Rocket (A-4). Hitler seized upon it as a way to strike back after the Luftwaffe lost air superiority and the Allies intensified the strategic bombing of Germany. It was one of the Vergeltung (Retribution) that Goebbels began reffeing to without any specufics. The British began receivibg reports of what the Germans were doing because the
Peenemünde researchers were firing their test missles into the Baltic. This meant that some of the missles wre observed and some even recovered. A Danish naval officer discovered the wreckage of one test on a small island between Germany and Sweden (August, 22, 1942). He took a photograph and detailed sketch to the British. The Crossbow Program was established to evaluate this and other intelligence reports along with photo reconissance. The British discovered that the research was being conducted at Peenemünde. British analysts were not sure at first just what the Germans were capable of building and what type of weapon was involved. Crossbow eventually compiled a good idea when both the V-1 and V-2 were dfinitively photographed. Primeminister Churchill ordered an air strike on Peenemünde to destroy the facikities and kill as many of the scientists as possible. Allied bombers struck the sight with considerable success (May 1943). The Germans relocated the production facilities to more secure locations. .
Data on the German rocket program helped to significantly limits its impact. The Ressistance movements in occupied countries provided a great deal of valuable information. Here the French Resistance waz particulrly important in helping locate the V-2 launch sites.
The Allies had targeted Sicily as the next step even before the Germans surrendered in Tunisia (May 1943). The Sicily landings were code named Operation Husky. It would be the third second amphibious assault against Axis-held territory. The first at Dieppe proved a costly failure (April 1942). The landings in Vichy North Africa had proven poorly organized in many ways. Assaulting a well-defended position by sea is a difficult and potentially hazadeous undertaling, especially if the enenmy has anticipated the attack. The Germans had suffered some costly defeats in 1942, but was still an effective fighting force. The Americans had conducted several amphibious assaults in the Pacific against the Japanese, but was still working out the methods involved. The Allies were thus anxious to confuse the Germans as to the next axtion so they would not concentrate available resources in Sicily. The British conceived Operation Barclay to confuse the Germans. The best know part of Barclay was Operation Mincemeat. Mincemeat was designed to convince OKW that the Allies planning to invade Greece and Sardinia instead of Sicily. The Twenty Committee was given the operational assignment. To do this the British planted forged "top secret" documents on a corpse desguised as a military corrier. A British sunmarine placed him in the water where it was thought he would wash up on a beach in Punta Umbría in Spain. Spain at the time had not still not entered the War, but was sympathetic to the Germans. [Cooper] The militay documents found on the corpse were passed on to the Abwehr which after careful study concluded that they were genuine. The Allies did not learn until after the War that there deception had worked. But OKW had indeed diverted increasingly scarce resources to both Sardinia and Greece. This was imopoerant because as it turned out, the initial American landings on Sicily did not go well.
MI-5 was extodinarily successful against the Germans and throughout the War the Germans were the main focus. Largely unknown at the time was the degree to which Soviet intelligence services both the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the World War II manifestation of the Soviet secret police, and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Soviet military intelligenc, suceeded in penetrating MI-5. As after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviets became obstensibly allies, the penetration did not impair the World War II effort against the Axis. It would subsequently have substantial impact on the Cold War. MI-5 primarily continued methods developed during World War I era. They proved successful against the Abwehr which akso had a World War I mindset. The Soviet Union was able to develop a range of new methods, largely because there were Communists and left-wing idealogues in Britain and other countries that were willing go work with Soviet intelligence against tgheir own country. MI-5 continued to believe that the threats would come from agents using observation and bribery as gheir principal tools. And thrir main focus was on foreign agents, not sympzthetic British subjects. They were concerned about agitation within labor unions and the armed services. The NKVD had , however, developed a range of sophiticated methods. It began to recruit agents from within the British nobility, tatgeting young idealistic university stidents who had been exposed to Marxist thought and who had no idea of the police state reality of the Soviet Union. Fascism had very little cappeal in British universities. MI-5 basically assumed that the nobility or upper-crust was a virtual guarantee of a person's political reliability. The Soviets gurned several young men while they were students and brfore they had any real value. It was largely, but not entirely an investment in thecfuture. The Soviets were especially successful at Cambridge University. Agter graduation they pursued and were given positions within Government. And this included in the case of Kim Philby, MI-5 itself. They were thus able to provide Soviet intelligence a wide range of valuable information. Other important Soviet agent were Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. They became known as the Cambridge Five. The most immediate reward to the Sovirts was turning British atomic scientists working with the Manhattan Project.
Cooper, Duff. The Man Who Never Was (1953).
Hoare, Oliver. Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies - The Official History of MI5's Wartime Interrogation Centre (London: Public Record Office, 2000).
Kramish, Arnold. The Griffin: Paul Rosbaud and the Nazi Atomic Bomb That Never Was (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, Massachusettes, 1986).
Scotland, A.P. The London Cage (London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1957).
Stevenson, William. Spymistress: The True Story of the Greatest Femle Secret Agent of World War II
Talty, Stephan. Agent Garbo: The Brilliant, Eccentric Secret Agentwho Triked Hitler & Saved D-Day (2012).
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