German-Japanese Axis Meeting: Berlin (March 1941)

Figure 1.--Here we see Hitler with Japanese Foreign Mimister Yōsuke Matsuoka after their meeting. Matsuoka is best known for his defiant speech at the League of Nations after Japan invaded Manchuria (1931). He was a strong advocate for both the Strike Nirth Faction and Japan joining the Axis. He visuted Germany 2 months before Barbarossa, but was kept in the dark by the Germans. He also did not tell the Germnans that their planned offensive in the Pacigic icluded an attack on the United States. The Axis was very different than the Anglo-American alliance, lacking in basic trust and common goals. The Japanes officer in the back ground is Baron Hiroshi Ōshima (大島 浩 Ō). He was a competent, diligent diplomat and advocate fo german-Japanese cooperation. He vtried to convince his Goverment to join the campaign against the oviet Union. He earned the trust of Hitler, Himmler, other high level NAZIs, and Whermacht officers. He sent detailed cables back to Tokyo. As a result, not inlywas the Japanese Government well informed, but so were the Unites Staes and Britain because the United States had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code. Baron Oshima thus unwittingly became the best Allied agent in the Reich.

Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka (松岡 洋右) visited Germany to discuss Axis Alliance issues (March 1941). The Germans were at the time completing plans for Barbarossa. Hitler issued Führer Order 24 on cooperation with Japan which eaised many of the issues which were discussed with matsuoka. Matsuoka met with NAZI Foreign Miniter, Joachim von Ribbentrop (March 29). There was also a meeting with Hitler. Hier had ordered Ribbentrop and others not to divulge the plans for Barbarossa. The invasion was to be kept a secret from their Axis ally. [Cecil, p. 114.] The major reason seems to have been the need for secrecy. The Japanese could have made Barbarossa a two front war. Hitler at the time did not believe he needed Jaoanese help to defeat the Red Army as he saw only a short summer camapign. Hitler's other Axis ally, Mussolini, was also not told. Ribbentrop focused on the British and attempted convince Matsuoka to urge his government in enter the war with Britain. He suggested an attack on Singapore, pointing out that the Royal Navy committed in the North Atlantic did not have the force to wage a Paciic War. Incedably the Germans about to launch the largest military camapign in history aagainst a laege, heavily armed army were talking about Singapore when Japan could have played an important role. Matsuoka was not such more honest reported that preparations to seize Singapore were under way. [IWG, vol. 3, pp. 379-80.] What he did not mention is that in any ich camapaign, war with the United States could not be avoided. The Japanese had already conclude with one look at the map, that they would have to fight the United States. The American Commonwealth of the Philippines wa stride the sea lanes between the Home Islands and the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ)(British and Dutch colonies). Hitler still wanted to mavoid bringing the United States into the war, but as Matsuoaka was not open with him, the conquences of a Japanese offend\sibe in the pacific did not come up; What all of this shows in contrast to the Anglo-American alliance is the level of mistrust and varied goals of the Axis members. . Japan had been negotiating a Neutrality Pact with the Soviets. Hitler expressed no reservations. Given that he was about to attack the Soviet Union, he had no cernns about such an agreement. And at this stage he saw Barbarossa as a short summer campaign in which Japanese help was not needed. And German objections might have caused Soviet suspions, especially as the prepatation for Barbarossa had been impossible to hide. On his way back to Japan through the Soviet Union, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow to sign the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty (April 1941). Agter Hitker launched Barbaross, Stalin camme to the conclusion that Matsuoka knew about Barbarossa and was part of the subterfuge. Japan honored the Treaty during the War. But coming as it did just before Barbarossa, the Soviets in declaring War on Japan (August 1945), cited it as an act of treachery.

Sources

Cecil, Robert. Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941.

Interagency Working Group (IWG). The Trial of the Major War Criminals (U.S. National Archives).

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Created: 11:31 PM 7/12/2019
Last updated: 11:31 PM 7/12/2019