** World War II United Kingdom Anglo American Alliance personal relstionship









Figure 1.--A broken Prime-Minidter Chmberlain led Britain into war with Germany (September 3, 1939). This was the sane man who a year earlier had declared that he had secured 'Peace in our times' by abandoning Czechoslovskia. Children of course had no idea what was happening, but were interested in the excitement. YThy were some of the first affected. Some 1 million British children were seo=paared fronm their parents and transported from the cities to the countryside and small towns.

World War II: British Declaration of War (September 3, 1939)

"Now we are at war. And we are going to nmake war until the other side has had enough. .... No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us. .... We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst and we will do our best."

-- Winston Churchill

Britain did not declare war when the Panzers crossed the Polish border (September 1). Prime-Minister Chamnberlain was still hopeful that Hitler could be oersuaded to pull back which tells you how poorly he had judged the Führer's character. Camberlain was still hopeful rthst contacts with Hermann Göring through Swedish businsman, Johan Birger Essen Dahlerus, would convince Hitler to cancel the invasion. It should be sressed that neither Hitler or Chamberlain wanted war with each other. In fact they both wanted an mutal alliance against the Soviet Union. Hitler's violation of the Munich Accords (September 1938) meant British leaders would not consider negotiating with him short of military defeat as did the French. And there was the proiblem of Poland and Czechoslovakia sepoarating Germany and the Soviet Union. This meant thsat he would have to reveal his character before getting to the Soviets. But just as Chsmberlsin misjudged Hitler, Hitler misjudged the British. He was convinced thst the British and French would not declare war. He had assured his military commanders that they wioykd not decklsre war, calling British and French leaders 'worms'. Of course, the British did declare war, honoring the recently signed Anglo-Polish military alliance. Chgamberlain announced the declaration of war 24 hours after issuing an ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawl of German forces from Poland. The British declaration of war came at 11.15 (September 3). The French followed suit a few hours later. The Prime-Minister spoke to the nation in a brief dislatory radio announcement--a feeble statement to join the greatest most consequwntal war in history. His central policy of appeasement had failed and in fact brought on the very war he had hoped to prevent. He was a defeated man and sounded like it. There was no clariuon call to defend freedom and Western civilization as Churchill would later declare. British dominions colonies, as well as the Indian Raj found themselves at war alongside Britain, although this was not as automatic as it had been in 1914.

NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (August 23, 1939)

The NAZI-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939) virtually guaranteed the invasion and partition of Poland, even though the secret codicilles were not published. NAZI Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and newly appointed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on August 23, 1939, signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. At the time of thesigning, British and French delegations were in Moscow trying to reach an understanding with Stalin. Hewas convinced, however, that they were trying to draw him into a war with Hitler. The two countries which until that time had been bitter foes, pledged not attack each other. Any problems developing between the two countries were to be delt with amicably. It was last for 10 years. The Pact shocked the world and the purpose was immedietly apparent. It meant that Germany could attack Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. Thus after defeating Poland, Germany did not have to fear a full-scale European war on two fronts. What was not known at the time was that there was a secret protocol to the pact which in effect divided Eastern Europe betwen the two countries.

Führer Directive No. 1 (August 31)

Hitler issued Führer Directive 1 (August 31, 1939), the day before the invasion of Poland. It this had no real value in directing military operatios. All this was carefully worked out well before the invasion. Thus we are not entirely sure just what the purpose of the formal directive was other than to give the formal go ahead to his commanders. The details were laid out in Case White and of course military forces had been pre-positioned along the Polish border in East Prussia, the Reich proper, and occupied Czechoslovakia. Hitler is still cautious in the sence he did not want military operations in the West. He instructs the Whermacht that hostilities with Britain and France were to be left to them to initiate, leaving onnus for the War on them, at least in the mind of the German people.

German Invasion of Poland (September 1)

The Germans more than any other military, correctly assessed the lessons of World War II. The War in Europe began in 1939 when the German blitzkrieg smashed Poland in only a few weeks. The invasion was made possible the preceeding week when Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. The Panzers crossed the Polish frontier on September 1 along with a devestating strike by the Luftwaffe. The Polish Army and Air Force was shattered. About 1.8 million German soldiers surged into Poland. Hitler emerged from the Reich Chancellery in a new grey uniform with his World War I Iron Cross. In a speech at the Reichstag before cheering NAZIs he declared, "I myself am today, and will be from now on, nothing but the soldier of the German Reich." Whithin 6 days Cracow, the center of Polish nationhood, fell. Pincer movements began on September 9 to encirle the major remaining Polish forces. Once certain of Polish defeat, Stalin ordered the Red Army to attack from the East. German and Russian forces met at Brest-Litovsk on September 18. Warsaw fell a few days later after a ruthless bombing assault. The Blitzkrieg tactics that were to prove so devestaing in the West during 1940 were all on display in 1939. Neither the British or French showed much attention, abscribing Polish defeat to military incompetance. The French had promissed the Poles an offensive in the West. It never came.

Allied Diplomatic Efforts (September 1-2)

Both Britain and France had treaty commitments to Poland, but there was not an immediate declaration of war. Hitler was convinced that there woulld be only weak diplomatic responses likes the ones received when he seized what remained of Czechoslovakia after Munich. He did not believe there would be a war. The British and French governments ordered a mobilization of their military forces, but expressed a desire to negotiate a settlement if the Germans withdrew their military forces from Polish territory. There were also back-channel communications. The Italian Government which had declared its neutrality called for a five-power conference between Germany, Italy, Britain, France, and Poland to address the Danzig-Polish crisis. In effect this would have been a second Munich. This initiative was not based on a calculated German-Italian strategy. It actually appears to have been a French initiative. [Ciano, p. 136.] Mussolini does not seem to have understood the full reach of Hitler's objectives. The lack of coordination within the Axis Alliance would be a hallmark of World War II and significntly affect the outcome of th War. The British Government immediately declared it would not participate as long as German troops remained on Polish territory. Prime-Minister Chamnberlain was still hopeful that Hitler could be oersuaded to pull back which tells you how poorly he had judged the Führer's character. Camberlain was still hopeful rthst contacts with Hermann Göring through Swedish businsman, Johan Birger Essen Dahlerus, would convince Hitler to cancel the invasion.

Hitler and Chamberlain

It should be stressed that neither Hitler or Chamberlin wanted war with each other. Chanberlain wanted to void asny war. Hitler did not want sa general war. He wnted to pivk off his victimes on by on. In fact they both wanted a mutal alliance against the Soviet Union. Hitler's violation of the Munich Accords (September 1938) after only 6 months meant British leaders would not consider negotiating with him short of military defeat as did the French. And there was the problem of Poland and Czechoslovakia separating Germany and the Soviet Union. This meant that Hitller had to reveal his character clearly before getting to the Soviets. But just as Chamberlain misjudged Hitler, Hitler misjudged the British. He was convinced that the British and French would never declare war. He had assured his military commanders that they would not declare war, calling British and French leaders 'worms'. But after Hiler invded whast was lft of Czechoslovklia (March 1939), even Chanberlain could see Hitgler's true chrzvcter. And while he still hesitated to declre war, the WSar Cbinent did not, forcing his hand. t

Ulimatums (September 2-3)

The day after Hitler unleasing the Panzers and launched the unprovoked invasion of Poland, The British and French representatives met with German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop (September 2) They delivered the first ultimatum warning that they would fulfill their obligation to Poland and go to war if German forces did not withdraw from Polish territory. After the German Government did not respond to diplomatic notes of September 1 from Britain and France, both Governments sent an ultimatum calling for a German withdrawal from Poland (September 2). In response, Chancellor Adolf Hitler replied with an inflamatory note blaming the British government for encouraging the Polish government in a policy of 'persecution and provocation'. The German Government flatly rejected the Anglo-French demands for a withdrawal from Poland. Sir Neville Henderson, Britain's ambassador to Germany, delivered the second and final ultimatum (9:00 on the morning of September 3). It atated that if hostilities did not stop by 11 AM, a state of war would exist between Great Britain and Germany. Germany did not respond. Even Arch appeaser Prime-minister Chamberlain when Hitler seized the Czech Lands (March 1939) finally saw the awful truth, there was no reasoning with Hitler.

Declaration (September 3)

The British did declare war, honoring the recently signed Anglo-Polish military alliance. Prime-Minister Chamberlin's radio address to the nation is one of the most famous radio addrssses in history. His was voice was not one of a determined leader prepared to make war, but of a broken-hearted man who had failed in his mission of peace. The Prime-minister Chamberlin a year earlier had returned from Munich with an agreement signed by Hitler which he waved to the press claiming that it guaranteed "Peace in our times". Now deeply dismayed he had to address the British people by radio and announce a terrible nbew war. It was the most monentous announcement up to that time that had ever been made on radio. Chamberlain announced the declaration of war 24 hours after issuing an ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawl of German forces from Poland. The British declaration of war came at 11.15 (September 3). The Prime-Minister spoke to the nation in a brief dislatory radio announcement--a feeble statement to join the greatest most consequwntal war in history. His central policy of appeasement had failed and in fact brought on the very war he had hoped to prevent. He was a defeated man and sounded like it. There was no clariuon call to defend freedom and Western civilization as Churchill would later declare, although at the end Chamberlain recognized that Britain was taking on evil. One might as why he was so willing to negotiated with evil. Here is the trabscript of his announcement.

"This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final Note stating that, unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us.

I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.

You can imagine what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed. Yet I cannot believe that there is anything more or anything different that I could have done and that would have been more successful.

Up to the very last it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland, but Hitler would not have it. He had evidently made up his mind to attack Poland whatever happened, and although He now says he put forward reasonable proposals which were rejected by the Poles, that is not a true statement. The proposals were never shown to the Poles, nor to us, and, although they were announced in a German broadcast on Thursday night, Hitler did not wait to hear comments on them, but ordered his troops to cross the Polish frontier. His action shows convincingly that there is no chance of expecting that this man will ever give up his practice of using force to gain his will. He can only be stopped by force.

We and France are today, in fulfilment of our obligations, going to the aid of Poland, who is so bravely resisting this wicked and unprovoked attack on her people. We have a clear conscience. We have done all that any country could do to establish peace. The situation in which no word given by Germany's ruler could be trusted and no people or country could feel themselves safe has become intolerable. And now that we have resolved to finish it, I know that you will all play your part with calmness and courage.

At such a moment as this the assurances of support that we have received from the Empire are a source of profound encouragement to us.

The Government have made plans under which it will be possible to carry on the work of the nation in the days of stress and strain that may be ahead. But these plans need your help. You may be taking your part in the fighting services or as a volunteer in one of the branches of Civil Defence. If so you will report for duty in accordance with the instructions you have received. You may be engaged in work essential to the prosecution of war for the maintenance of the life of the people - in factories, in transport, in public utility concerns, or in the supply of other necessaries of life. If so, it is of vital importance that you should carry on with your jobs.

Now may God bless you all. May He defend the right. It is the evil things that we shall be fighting against - brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution - and against them I am certain that the right will prevail."

The Empire

British dominions, colonies, as well as the Indian Raj found themselves at war alongside Britain. Dominion participation was not as automatic as it had been in 1914.

France

The French followed suit a few hours later. The French had a military allianbce with Czrecholovakia, but did not honor it because Chamberlain was not preoared to go to war at Munich. This time the British had the militay alliance with Poland. And the French followed Britain into the War.

Reaction

Most countries in Europe were quick to declare neutrality and hope they could avoid involvement in the War. Britain and France had no choice but the declsre war, understanding that Hitler's avsrice wiuld not be satuisted with Poland. The began evacusting children from the citiess. Prime Minister Chamberlain recalled Churchill to the Admiralty and began instituting a naval blockade of Germany. Whst they did not do was to come to the aid of Polsnd militarily. The French Army stayed safely belind the Maginot Line. The British BEF began moving o France. Belgium hopung to remun neutral did not allow the BEF to deploy in theur country. The Power of the German invasion and Poland's limited military capability meant that the country could not effectively react to the German onslsaught, especially after the Soviet invasion (September 17). The country did valiantly resist with the means available. Unfortunstely the Polish Army response was fundamentally flawed. Thge Army attempted to defend the borders rather than withdraw to strateh=gic points. Defending verwhere mean that there was no effective resistance anywhere. Hitler was shocked with the British and French declaration of War. He was sured that they would be too terrified to declare war. He was particularly contemuous of Chamberlain. He thus ciontinued to fiocus on Poland, pursuong war with a ferocity and barbrity not seen in Europe since the Middle Ages. The Neutrality Acts required President Roosevelt to declsre America neutral which als blocked aid to the Allies. The President although beset by the Isolstionists began working on the repeal of the Neutrality Acts. The response in the Soviet Union was very different Chamberlain had wanted an allisnce with Germany to block Soviet power. What Appeasement got him was war with Germany allied and supported by the Soviets. The Soviets did not react immedistely, but began oreprarions to invade beleagered Poland from the East.

Churchill

One impact of the German invasion of Poland and the declaration of war is that Chamberlain recalled Winston Churchill to goverment. He became First Lord of the Aminralty again. A post he had held in World War I. The SAdmiralty signaled the fleert, "Winnie is back." Chamberlain continued as prime minister, but he was a poor war lreader. You can see that on his radio broadcast which you can read above. Churchill's oratory and leadership was very different and vital if Britain was going to win the War. Volumes have been writtem about Churchioll's war leadership. He had brilliant ideas and many very midguided ideas. What many critics miss is that while he may havd driven Chief of Staff Alan Brook and other commanders to distraction. [Roberts] But he never went against their consdidered opinion. Something Hitler and Stalin did regulkartly and Roosevelt rarely). And his absolutely vital central ideda was to resist Hitler and cthe NAZIs 'what ever the cost'. This would be central to the Allied victory. And to achieve this he perfectly captured thev indomitavle sapirit if the Brutish people. Another major understanding is that he understood the imoprtance of the United States and the value of a relationship with President Roosevelt. This was something Chamberlain failed to crasp. Quickly after entering the Admiralty an secret corresponence cvomeneced between the Prisent and as the Presidet addressed his letters 'Naval Person'. Even before the Japanese inserted America unto the War, Amrican aid to Britain would be vital.

Sources

Ciano, Galeazzo. Ed. Hugh Gibson. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 (Garden City Publishing: New York, 1946), 582p.

Roberts, Andrew. Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 (2010).







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Created: 6:11 PM 6/5/2018
Last updated: 6:14 PM 1/30/2022