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Germany World War II -- declaration of war on America
Hitler's Declaration of War on America (December 11, 1941)
Figure 1.--Here is Hitler speaking at Berlin's Kroll-Oper as he declares war on America (December 11, 1941). Americas was the only country on which he he officially declared war. The Kroll Opera House is where the Reichstag met after the Reichstag building burned down (1933). The insanity of declaring war on America is highhlighted that the fact that the Red Army, which he had thought was on its last legs, had just launmced its winter offensive before Moscow in force, meaning that the Whermacht had failed at its primary task of destroying the Red Army which was in the process of severely danaghing the Ostheer.
Hitler appears to have been more aware of the dangers posed by the United States than the Japanese Army clique that dominated the Imperial Government. He also seems more aware than his own inner circle, but of course they often parroited what they thoughtbhe he wanted to hear rather than express their real opinions. Professional military men and industrialists had much more relaistic opinions, but Hitler did not go to them for advise. The exact nature of his assessment is not precisely known. While he speaks highly of America in Mein Kampf, he appears to have convinced himself in his second book that the 'mongeilization' of America had sapped its once formidable energies. Even so, he also speaks about America's industrial might. "The size of the internal merican marketand its wealth of buying power and akso raw materials guarantee the American automobile industry internal sales figures that alone premit production methods tht would simply be impossible in Europe. The result of that is the enormous export capacity of the American automobile market. At issue is the general motorization of the world--a matter of immense significance. [Hitler. p. 107.] Hitler's attitudes toward America may have been influenced by book provided him by War Minister Blomberg in the late-1930s. He reportedly told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotove in Berlin (November 12, 1940), "The United States will not be a threat to us in dcades -- not in 1945 but at the earliest in 1970 or 1980." An incredible miscalculation, but it may have been more takling points to affect Molotov's thinking than his real assessment. His policies, however, until the declaration of war suggest a healthy regard for the potential strength of the United states. His attempted to avoid conflict with the United States, even when President Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to engage U-boats in the North Atlantic. The eternally optimistic Goebbels wrote in his diary, " An American newspaper [sic], The Reader's Digest, with a circulation of 5,800,000, has published a sensational article which asserts that the United States in the last analysis is unable to undertake anything against the armed forces of the Axis. America's war was a hopeless undertaking and could only result in bleeding the nation white. At least one voice in the wilderness! It remains to be seen, however, whether this viewpoint will make headway." [Goebbels, p. 35.] It is unclear where Goebbels got this information as there is no known article in the Reader's Digest that made this assertion. Goebbels' confidence seem to be based on the difficulty America would have in transporting an army to a location where it could attack Axis forces. Within months he would be proved wrong. American offenses would begin in the Pacific at Guadalcanal (August 1942) and North Africa (November 1942). This was the first in a series of misjudgements Goebbels would make about America. G�ring seems to have been unaware of America's potential. He assured the German people that the Americans "only know how to make razor blades". This of course came from the head of the Luftwaffe tasked with defending German cities. Germany's production of airplanes was dwarfed by that of the United States. And result would be that German cities were to be reduced to rubble. Such nonsense did not come from from the competent military commanders that would be tasked with fighting the United States.
Hitler
Hitler's concept of America, however, is not precisely known an clearly changed over time. Some have argued that Hitler and the NAZIs seriously underestimated the potential power of the United States. G�ring is known to have said that all the Americans know is how to make razor blades. Some historians argue that Hitler himself had a similar simplistic understanding of America. [Remnak]
Hitler appears to have been more aware of the dangers posed by the United States than the Japanese Army clique that dominated the Imperial Government. He also seems more aware than his own inner circle, but of course they often parroited what they thoughtbhe he wanted to hear rather than express their real opinions. Professional military men and industrialists had much more relaistic opinions, but Hitler did not go to them for advise. The exact nature of his assessment is not precisely known.
Hitler did not discuss America to any great extent in Mein Kampf. What he did have to say was relatively complimentary.
He was impressed with the industrial and technological advances. He also approved of the way which America had
solved the Native American problem and the Jim Crow system to isolate and restrict black Americans. He enviously
discussed America's continental power base, the kind of continental dominance he desired for Germany.
Hitler had much more to say about America in his second book which he decided not to publish. While he speaks highly of America in Mein Kampf, he appears to have convinced himself in his second book that the 'mongeilization' of America had sapped its once formidable energies. He concluded that race mixing and Jewish influences had eroded the strength of the United States. He saw the failure of America to overcome the Depression as a sign of weakness. He also postulated the theory that the growth of American power would threaten Britain, perhaps compelling her to seek an alliance with Germany.
Even so, he also speaks about America's industrial might. "The size of the internal American marketand its wealth of buying power and also raw materials guarantee the American automobile industry internal sales figures that alone premit production methods tht would simply be impossible in Europe. The result of that is the enormous export capacity of the American automobile market. At issue is the general motorization of the world--a matter of immense significance. [Hitler. p. 107.]
Hitler's attitudes toward America may have been influenced by book provided him by War Minister Blomberg in the late-1930s. Bloomberg provided Hutler some 400 books, pamplets, and monographs. They described a deeply divided America with a powefulmisolationist movement, virtually no war industries, and a miniscule 0.1 million-man army. (Eventually about 15 million Americans would be mobilized by the mikitary.) Hitler apprently read much of this material. [Ryback, pp. 169-72.] Curiously Blomberg is often sen as attemotung to restrain Hitler, perhaps he was just providing what he saw as the best availble informtion.
Hitler reportedly told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotove in Berlin (November 12, 1940), "The United States will not be a threat to us in dcades -- not in 1945 but at the earliest in 1970 or 1980." An incredible miscalculation, but it may have been more takling points to affect Molotov's thinking than his real assessment. His policies, however, until the declaration of war suggest a healthy regard for the potential strength of the United states. His attempted to avoid conflict with the United States, even when President Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to engage U-boats in the North Atlantic.
He probably believed much of this, but Hitler was also a practical thinker and understood that America posed a mortal danger to the NAZIs. As a result, he dealt with America cautiously despite the antagonistic policies of the Roosevelt Administration which steadily expanded assistance to the Allies despite a powerful Isolationist movement. Up to this time Hitler had avoided attacking the United States, even when
President Roosevelt launched what was in effect an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. Hitler appears to
have understood much better than the Japanese the potential danger that America posed.
Hitler Cronies
Hitler's chrinies had a gret deal to say aboutvAmerica although they had vry little actual knowledge.
Goebbels
The eternally optimistic Reich Propagnda Minister Jiseph Goebbels wrote in his diary, " An American newspaper [sic], The Reader's Digest, with a circulation of 5,800,000, has published a sensational article which asserts that the United States in the last analysis is unable to undertake anything against the armed forces of the Axis. America's war was a hopeless undertaking and could only result in bleeding the nation white. At least one voice in the wilderness! It remains to be seen, however, whether this viewpoint will make headway." [Goebbels, p. 35.] It is unclear where Goebbels got this information as there is no known article in the Reader's Digest that made this assertion. Goebbels' confidence seem to be based on the difficulty America would have in transporting an army to a location where it could attack Axis forces. Within months he would be proved wrong. American offenses would begin in the Pacific at Guadalcanal (August 1942) and North Africa (November 1942). This was the first in a series of misjudgements Goebbels would make about America. G�ring seems to have been unaware of America's potential. He assured the German people that the Americans "only know how to make razor blades". This of course came from the head of the Luftwaffe tasked with defending German cities. Germany's production of airplanes was dwarfed by that of the United States. And result would be that German cities were to be reduced to rubble. Such nonsense did not come from from the competent military commanders that would be tasked with fighting the United States.
G�ring
We are not sure just what G�ring said to Hitler during the War. After the War he claimed that he arued striongly against war with America. Anbd when Hitler actually declared war, G�ring said that he was shicked. "I was astonished when Germany declared war on the United States. We should rather have accepted a certain amount of unpleasant incidents. It was clear to us that if Roosevelt were reelected, the U.S. would inevitably make war against us. This conviction was strongly held, especially with Hitler. After Pearl Harbor, although we were not bound under our treaty with Japan to come to its aid since Japan had been the aggressor, Hitler said we were in effect at war already, with ships having been sunk or fired upon, and must soothe the Japanese. For this reason, a step was taken which we always regretted. It was unnecessary for us to accept responsibility for striking the first blow. For the same reason, we had been the butt of propaganda in 1914, when we started to fight, although we knew that within 48 hours Russia would have attacked us. I believe Hitler was convinced that as a result of the Japanese attack, the main brunt of the United States force would be brought to bear on the Far East and would not constitute such a danger for Germany. Although he never expressed it in words, it was perhaps inexpressibly bitter to him that the main force of the United States was in fact turned against Europe." [G�ring]
Ribbentrop
Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribentrop probably had the leadt influence of all the top NAZIs. And his influenced was not helped after ssuring Hitler thnt Britain woukd not go to war over Poland. He cclimed in his menoirs tha he tried to convice Hitler not to declare war on America. There is much evidence to suggest that this was not the case. Ribbentrop was a toady usually interested in dertermining Hitler's opinion so he could repeat it. His counterpart in Axis ally Italy was Fot=reign Minisrer Count Gakeaxxo Ciano. Upon hearing of the Pearl Harbor attack, he telephoned Ribbentrop and found he was 'joyful'. He told his Japanese counterpart, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka that American munitions were 'junk'. and that Roosevelt's foreign policy was 'the biggest bluff in wirld history'. He told Japanese Ambassdor in Berlin thatvthe Reich was 'more than prepared to deal with any American intervention'. And he assured Vichy Admirl Darlan that America could nevr 'be able to wage war in Europe'. He spoke with confidence about Anmerica because he had lived there for 4 years as a young man. He later told a viditing Italian delegation. "I know them, I kmow thir country. country devoid of culture, devoid of misic -- above all, a country without soldiers, a people ho will never be able ti decide the war from the ir, When has a Jewifed nation like tht ever beciome race of fighters and flying aces?" [Bloch, p. 345.]
Professional Military Commandrs
Serious German military men were fully aware ofvthe potenial dangrs posed bybAmerica. Ernst Udet, one of the most competent Luftwaffe commandrs and chief of the procurement section of theAir Ministry tried to warn Hitler and G�ring about the dangers of an Anglo-American air offesive and that Germany could not mtch their production potntual. As a result of bing ignored, he shot himself (November 17, 1941). General Friedrich Fromm, director of theWhrmachtvcentral administrative began talking about the need to make peace (Nivember 194). General Georg Thomas, theWehrmacht quartrmaster was asopted defeatest opinions after thevfailure of Barbrosa (January 1942). Abwehr chief Admirl Wilhelm Canaris was also doubtful that the war in the East coukld be won,. Byvthis time he ws secrely plotting against Hitler, but thouht the war af=gainst the Soviers had to be fought.
Goverment Officials
Many infirmed German leaders well understood the potential power of the Unuted states. [Tooze, pp. 506-08.] +any did not, however, have access tinHitler orc ere willing vto tekln him things he cdid not want to hear. And Hitler was not particularly interested in their opinions on the mtter. Reich Armament Minister Fritz Todt told Hitler bluntly that the wr in the East coulf=d not br won (Novmber 1941). Many believe that this explins his death in an aur crash only 2 months later. Hitler's favorite albert Speer replaced him. Soeer was wisely more supportive of the War and in fact worked miricles of production. Economics Minister Walther Funk spoke at G�ring birthday party aboutvthe ;misfortune thatvhas broken ovr the ntion'.
Industrialists
Industrialist Watr 'Panzer' Rohlnd told Todt tht the war in the East could not be win,
Sources
Bloch, Michael. Ribbentrop (1992).
Goebbels, Jeseph. ed, Louis B. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: New York, 1948), 566p.
Göring, Herman. In Gilberto Villahermosa. World War II Magazine (September 2006). G�ring was interogated immeduiately after the War in Prisoner of War Camp No. 32 (July 25, 1945). Major Kenneth W. Hechler of the U.S. Army Europe�s Historical Division asked the questions. Captain Herbert R. Sensenig served as the translator.
Hitler, Adolf. ed. Weinberg. Second Book (1928). This was Hitler's second unpublished book.
Remnak
Ryback, Timmothy W. Hitker' Private Library (2009).
Tooze, WagescofDestruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2006).
