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German Diplomacy: Bilateral Relations--China (1921-41)

NAZI-Chinese relations
Figure 1.--The Germans conducted an effective military modernization program in China. After Japan invaded China (1937), Hitler had to chose between China and Japan. He ended the Geramn military mission, but maintained relations. Finally Hitler officially recognised Wang Jingwei's and his Japanese controlled puppet government in Nanking. The Germans expelled the KMT Chinse diplomats (July 1941). Here children of the Chinese diplomats arrive in America. The press caption read, "Arriving on the S.S. West Point: Johnny Sheng, 6 years old, and his sister Heallgi, 4 years old, son and daughter of Chinese attache in Berlin, going thru custom gate on-pier, as the custom guard stamps the bag." The photograph was archived August 7, 1941. Two major developments also occurred in August 1941. First the United States emargoed oil shipments to Japan as a result of Japnese seizure of southern French Indo-China. Second President Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter. The President then ordered the U.S. Navy to laubch an undeclared naval war against Germany in the North Atlantic. "

German diplomacy was of course primaeily focused on Europe. Germany did, however, have diplomatic relations with the few independent Asian countries. The focus at first was not on Japan which had joined the Allies in World War I and unlike China engaged in actual combat operations. German foreign policy during the Weimar era was to break out of the diplomatic isolation resulting from defeat in World War I. Germany's initial Asian partner was China. A separate German-Chinese Peace Treaty was concluded (1921). This was an extension of the Rapallo Treaty (1922), cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union as a result of Marxist dogma saw America, Britain, and France as mortal enenies and thus were willing to help Germany evade the restrictive provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The same was true of China and the Kuomintang (KMT). China afterrrhe collapse of the Manchu Imperial Dynasty (1911) and World War I (1912-18) was divied by warlordism and civil war as well as suffering from foreign intrusions. The KMT was in the process of unifying China and ending the foreign concessions for Treaty Ports which meant primarily actions against Britain and France. And the KMT was at first allied with the Communists. The KMT was seen in the 1920s as a revolutionary movement akin to the Communists. But as Germany no longer had colonies, cooperation berwee the two countries was possible. And there was interest among German industrialists. German-educated Chu Chia-hua (朱家驊) began arranging Sino-German contacts. The Chinese KMT focus was increaingly on an aggresive Japan which energed as the greatest threat. The KMT was as a result interested in industrial and military modrnization. A bloody civil war broke out between the KMT and the Communists (1927). The KMT Northern Expedition nominally unified China (1928). The Chinese urgency for modernising its military and industry and Germany's need for raw materials amf overseas industry made for a close relationship. A German military mission played an important role in modernizing the Chinese military. It was not on a par of the Japanese, but the impact of the German mission helped create an army that the Jaoanese could not overwhelm. The Battle for Shanghai which boke out after Japam seized Manchuria showed a Chinese Army stunned the Japanese (1931) It performed well and the German military cooperation relationship was one reason why. Chiang Wei-kuo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's adopted son, received military training in Germany. After Japan invaded China (1937), Hitler had to make a choice. An alliance with Japan was not possibke as long as Gernany was aiding the KMT. Hitler chose Japan because it posed more of a creditavle threat to the Soviet Union. This ended significant Sino-German military ooperation. The German effort, however, had been significant. And while the Japanese won battles, they were unable to defeat China. The KNT withdrew into the interior where the Japanese had troubke getting to them. Eventually the Japanese decided they would have to defeat the United States to end the war in China. Hitler continued to maintain low-level relations with the KMT. Germany signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy (September 1940). The final srraw for Chiang was Hitler officially recognised Wang Jingwei's and his Japanese controlled puppet government in Nanking (July 1941). Two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, China which was altaesy at war with Japan formally declared war on Germany (December 9, 1941).

Diplomatic Isolation

German diplomacy was of course primarily focused on Europe and the United Strates. Germany did, however, have diplomatic relations with the few independent Asian countries. The focus at first was not on Japan which had joined the Allies in World War I and unlike China engaged in actual combat operations. And the Japnese had seized German colonies, mostly islands in the Central Pacific. The islands werelargely unknown at the time, but would become majoor Pacific War nattkle grounds. German foreign policy during the Weimar era was to break out of the diplomatic isolation imposed by the Allies after the defeat in World War I.

Chinese-German Peace Treaty

Germany's initial Asian partner was China. China had not played a significant role in World War I. China had declared war on Germany. and Chinese labor brigades were employed by the Allies on the Western Front. Rge Chinese had niot, nhowever, conducted cimbat operations. A separate German-Chinese Peace Treaty was concluded (1921).

Rapallo Process

An opening with China was an extension of the Rapallo Treaty (1922), cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union as a result of Marxist dogma saw America, Britain, and France as mortal enenies and thus were willing to help Germany evade the restrictive provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

Relations with the KMT

The samr German attitide toward the Bolsheviks was also true of China and the Kuomintang (KMT). China afterrrhe collapse of the Manchu Imperial Dynasty (1911) and World War I (1912-18) was divied by warlordism and civil war as well as suffering from foreign intrusions. The KMT was in the process of unifying China and ending the foreign concessions for Treaty Ports which meant primarily actions against Britain and France. And the KMT was at first allied with the Communists. The KMT was seen in the 1920s as a revolutionary movement akin to the Communists. But as Germany no longer had colonies, cooperation berwee the two countries was possible. And there was interest among German industrialists. German-educated Chu Chia-hua (朱家驊) began arranging Sino-German commercial contacts.

Japanese Factor

The Meiji Restotation provided a foundation for a modern military (1870s). This was demonstated in the First Sino Japanese War (1894-95). Next was a struggle to control Manchuria and Korea. During World War I, the Japanese made clrar their much larger desugns on China--the Twenty One Demands (1915). The Chinese focus after World War I was increaingly on an aggresuve Japan which energed as the greatest foreign threat. The KMT was as a result interested in industrial and military modrnization. The Germans at the time continued to see China as more of a threat to the Allies than Japan. And German businessmen saw commercial opportunities in China compared to the basically closed Japanese economy.

Initial German Interest in Chinan (1926)

The first Chinese-German military contacts flowed from commercial iniatives and were not at first a reflection of official German Governent policy. Chu Chia-hua who was working in the commercial sphere invited Max Bauer, a World War I general staff officer, to survey investment possibilities in China (1926). When Bauer arrived in Guangzhou, Chiang offered him a post as an addviser because of his military expertise. And he recruited 46 other German officers to advise and train Nationalist forces. This was a private effort paid for by Chiang and the KMT. It was not a German Government iniative. Bauer helped devised the strategy that enabled the KMT to win the 1929 campaigns against the warlords. 【Young】 The Weimar Goverment was intent ok keepin the relationship commercial. Bauer had returned to Germany to recruit a permanent advisory mission, but failed in part because the German Government had little confidence in him and saw pursuing a military mision as counter-productive. (Bauer had been involved in the Kapp Putch involving the Freikorps after the War.) The Weimar Government had vasilated on relations with China. The Weimar government had basically pursued a policy of neutrality. They discouraged the Reichswehr from any direct involvement with the Chinese Government.

Civil War (1927)

A bloody civil war broke out in China between the KMT and the Communists (1927). The KMT Northern Expedition nominally unified China (1928). The Communists were an important part of the KMT coalition. They had a strong following among workers in many cities. Chiang who did not trust the Communists, fell out with them. The KMT and the Communist split was the beginning of the Civil War. Ching launched a military campaign against the CCP (1927). One of the CCP members who managed to escape was Mao Zedong. The Communists were in the 1920s a largely urban movement. Mao for example while of peasant orgins, became a Communist because he worked in a library where he read Marxist books. To escape the KMT campaign against the CCP, the Communists abandoned their urban base and fled to the countryside. Chiang with German military advisors tried to cut them off and destroy them. Chiang's goal was to "eliminate the cancer of Communism." He almost complete this, but the Communuists broke out from the KNT military encirclement (1934). The Communists were almost completely defeated. Suronded by KMT forces, Mao led the Long March and established the Communists in northwestern China. They began with about 100,000 people. After a year and 6,000 miles they were down to 6,000-8,000 people.

Japnese Seizure of Manchuria (1931)

The Japanese seized resource rich Manchuria (1931). It was done by the Kwantung Army without direction from the Imperial Government. Buy the Government did not dare resist the agression. And the KMT did not dare resist the powerful Japanese either. It was a major loss. Manchuria was one of the most developed areas in China, containung half of the Chinese rail system. While it was a great success for the Japanese, it changed the KMT mind set. The KMT wasa revolutionary force with an anti-Western mindset. Seising the European Treaty Ports was a major goal. Suddenly Chiang understood t that it was no longer the Europeand, but the Japanese that was the real problem. Chiang began mending his relations with the Europeans. And the countyry most willing to offer assustance was the new NAZI Government (1933). There was also great sympathy in the United States necause of the American missionary movement in China. And Pearl Buck's novels began to appear only widened that sympathy (1930). America was deeply isolationist at the time, but ironically the one country for which thare was widespread sympathy was surrusingly China. The United States was not about to offer military assistance at the time (early-1930s). The League of Nations cindemned the Jaopabnese, but gthere were no serious consequences. The NAZIs were, hiwever, willing gto aid China. There was an internatiinasl reaction, most notably in the United States. `American opposition to Japanese agression grew steadily despite the country's isolationst sentiment and it would be American support for China not Britain that would result in America's entry into World War II.

Battle for Shanghai (1931-32)

The Battle for Shanghai which boke out after Japam seized Manchuria showed a Chinese Army stunned the Japanese (1931) It performed well.. While the Chinese Nationalist KMT Army did not intervene in Manchuria, the Chinese people were outraged at the Japanese. The Japanese were increasingly resented in China and the seizure of Manchuria was only confirmation of what the Chinese already widely suspected. There were demonstrations and protests throughout China. Anti-Japanese disturbances broke out in Shanghai. And there were attacks on Japanese citizens. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) used these attacks and other instances of resistance to justify a military action in Shanghai which was the financial center of China and because of its location at the mouth of the Yangtze River dominated a huge area of central China. Complicating the situation was the Chinese 19th Route Army deployed outside the city. This was essentially a war lord force which the Shanghai Municipal Council fered as much as the Japanese. The Japanese set off this powder keg by attacking the city in what they called the Shanghai Incident (January 1932). The Japanese who had been massing naval forces off Shanghai, bombed the city to quell the claimed disturbances (January 28). Thus the fighting is also called the January 28 Incident. It was the first use of carrier aircraft in an military engagement. It is important to note that this was before the major military mission launched by the NAZIs (1933).

German Commercial Arrangements(1934-37)

NAZI authorities helped organize the Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte (HAPRO) to combine all German comercial operations in China (January 1934) 【Kirby, p. 120.】 Two years lter, the two countries negotiated the Three-Year Plan (1936). This was conducted by the KMT National Resources Commission and the German HAPRO. There were various components, such as the monopolisation of all operations of tungsten and antimony--showing the NAZI interest in strateguic metals. This was vital for the Germans because once the Germans laumched thee War, the British with their Royal Navy would institute another navsl blockade. There was also the construction of the central steel and machine works in Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan. Other components included building power plants and chemical factories. There were serious cost overruns, but increases in tungsten prices help keep the commercial effort viable (1932-36.) 【Chu, p. 145.】 The NAZIs extended a 100-million Reichsmark line of credit to the KMT. The Three-Year Plan benefitted by the work of technocrats to the KMT state-owned industries that was not common. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria convinced many Chinese that a war with Japan was inevitabke. Chaing knew that his military was not ready for it, but pressure in Chian neant that the KMT coukd not accept another major seizure of Chinese territory. The KMT became a major purchaser of German arms and heavy industrial equioment. This was paid for through barter agreemebts by Chinese exports as part of a stockpile for war that Germany needed to build. 【Stratman, p. 32.】 China was an imprtant source for metals like antimony, tin, tungsten, and others. These were barter greements, important becayse neither the NAZIs or KMT had the hard currency to purchase what was needed. German trade during this period reached over 15 percent of China's foreign trade. China became the largest Asian market for German exports. 【Fischer, p. 7.】 This level of trade, however, lasted for a reltively short period. Japan invaded China, seizing land and territory (1937). Trade weith Germany and other countries plummeted as the Japanese seized one Chinese port aster another. .

NAZI Military Mission


Chiang Wei-kuo (1916-97)

Chiang Wei-kuo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's adopted son had a fascinating life, especially his early life. He was born in Japan while the KMT was exiled there. His father had an affair with a Japanese woman and beleving that this would ruin his and the boy's future in China, asked Chaing to adopt him. Wei studied economics at Soochow University. He and his brother, Chiang Ching-kuo, then studied at Moscow University. The KMT at the time was seen as a revolutionary political movement. And Stalin did not trust Mao, meaning the Chinese Communists were a rare foreign Communist Party that he could not control. Once in Moscow, the boys would be held as basically political prisoners by the NKVD on the orders of Stalin. When Chiang managed to get them back, he sent Wei to NAZI Germany for military training. He was commissioned as a Unteroffizier in the Wehrmacht. He commanded a panzer unit during the Austrian Anschluss (1938). He was then preparing to see action in the German invasion of Poland. By this time, however, German-Japanese cooperation was well established and he was recalled home to China (1939). He returned home through the United States during which time he gave lectures to U.S. Army groups on German Panzer (armored) tactics. Once back in China he partcipated both in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War. After the Communist victiory, he escaped with his father to Taiwan and played an imoportant role in the Nationalist Goverment.

Developing German-Japanese Relationship

German-Japanese relations began to develop based on a shared antipathy toward the Soviet Union. The logic an alliance was iunescapable. Both Germany and Japan had major issues with the Allies. but both saw the Soviet Union as their fundamental threat as well as offering a treasure trive of resources they both lacked. A joint assault from east and west seemed the answer to thor major issues. The first step toward an alliance was the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936). This of course meant that the Germans would have to reevaluate their relationship with the KMT and China. Japan would not formally join the Axis until 1940, but cooperation began in 1936.

Japanese Invasion of China (1937)

Japan invaded China (1937). As in Manchuria, it was an action initiated by the Kwantung Army and not by the Government in Tokyo. The Japanese were at fiorst startled with Chinese resistance. This was in large oart due to the work iof the NAZI military missiion, especially the stiff resuistance thaey encountered in Shanghai (1937). Unfiortunately the vest divisiions uin the KMT Army were destroyed in this first year. The fighting in China forced Hitler to make a choice. An alliance with Japan was not possible as long as Gernany was aiding the KMT. Hitler chose Japan, primarily because it posed more of a valuable ally in the ineviatable military conflict with the the Soviet Union. This ended significant Sino-German military ooperation, although the relationship was not formally terminated for some time. The incudent at the Marci Polo Brudge outside Bejing was not initiated as any plan to launch a major war. Here the German trained divisions which put up a real fight around Shanghai was major factor in turning the China Incuident into a major war--and one the Japanese Armny proved unable to fight to a conclusive victory. There were major Japanese victories and the occupation of large areas of China, but no conclusive victory. And the war dragged on at great economic cost. Expanding into China was susposed to be a profitable undertaking--not a costky one. As a result, the leading miltary minds in Tokyo decided that the only way to win the war in China was to go to war with the United States. This now seems patently absurd, but at the timne Gen. Tojo made this decsion, it looked like the Germans had defeated the Red Army. So Japan attacked Pearl Harbir at a tiume that most oif their Army was tied down in China and would remain thete even after launching the Pacific War.

Soviet Military Mission (1937)

Stalin appears to have been somwhat suspious of Mao and the Communists, in part becaise he could not control them like other Communist parties. Here it should be remembered that Communism was only one aspect of Stalin's policies. Another important factor was Russian national interests. And Imperial Japan was a threat to the Soviet Union just as it had been a threat to Tsarist Russia. The Japanese coveted the resources of the Soviet Far East. The Bolshevik Revolution only intensified Japanese hostility. The Japanese occupied Vladisvostock at the end of World War I and unlike the Americans were not anxious to leave after the war. Japan resumed its drive to expanbd its empire by seizing Manchuria and establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo (1931). This was followed by the invasion of China proper, seizing the important cities of Shanghai and Nanking (1937). These aggressions as well as joining the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936) raised concerns in Moscow. The Soviet Union responded by negotiating a treaty with the Nationalist Kuomintang government (1937). Stalin provided Soviet financial and military aid to the Nationalist Chinese. In particular 450 Soviet pilots and technicians and 225 Soviet aircraft werre sent to aid the Nationalist. The Soviet Union was thus the second country to assist the Nationalists militarily. Soviet support continued until the German invasion (June 1941) when all resources had to be focused on fending off the Wehrmacht invasion. The Soviets sought to use the Kuomintang to tie the Japanese Army down in China. Otherwise the Japanese might be used to attack north in an effort to seize Siberia. Soviet technicians worked on logistics. Soviet General Georgy Zhukov observed Chinese and Japanese operations. For some time the Strike North Faction was the dominant group in the Japanese military. Zhukov would eventually fight the Japanese (May-September 1939).

Impact

The German military mission had a significant imopact. And while the Japanese won battles, they were unable to defeat China. Upuntil 1937, the Allies (Britain and France) and the United States has provided no miklirary aid to China. As a irony of history, the country that had helped Chian prepare for a Japanese incaion was oprimarily Germamy--Japan's futyre Axus ally. The KMT withdrew into the interior where the Japanese had troubke getting to them. Eventually the Japanese decided they would have to defeat the United States to end the war in China.

Final Break (1941)

Hitler continued to maintain low-level relations with the KMT. Germany signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy (September 1940). The final straw for Chiang was Hitler officially recognised Wang Jingwei's and his Japanese controlled puppet government in Nanking (July 1941). China broke rekations with Germany. Here we see chikldren frim nthe closed Chinse embassy in China reaching the United States. Two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, China which was already at war with Japan formally declared war on Germany (December 9, 1941).

Sources

>

Chu Tzu-shuang. Kuomintang Industrial Policy (Chungking: 1943).

Fischer, Martin. Vierzig Jahre deutsche Chinapolitik (Hamburg: 1962).

Kirby, William. Germany and Republican China (Stanford University Press: 1984).

Liu, Frederick Fu (1956). A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949 (Princeton University Press: 1956).

Stratman, George John "Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941," "Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. Vol. 2450. (University of Montana: 1970).

Young, Arthur N. China'sNation building Effort, 19270-1937 (Syanford:L Hoover IUnstitution Press, 1971).






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Created: 8:12 PM 5/15/2020
Last updated: 11:23 PM 9/27/2020