Figure 1.--Hitler after the fall of France (June 1940) thiught he had won the War, so did many in other countries. Churchill was, however, no Chamberlain and refused Hitler's peace iniative knowing Hitler's assurances were meaningless. When Churchill refused to surrender, Hitler unleashed Göring's Luftwaffe. When this photograph was released (August 21, 1940) at the heighth of the Battle of Britain, Hitler and Göring still believed the British were going to be smashed. The German children here were the entertaiment for a polite diplomatic tea in Berlin while the bombs were falling on England. The press caption on the back reads, "Deutsche Jugend Spiel und Tanz umfasste das Programa, das unläse??? des vom Reichssportführer für das Diplomatische Korps gegebene Tees im Haus des Deutschen Sports zur Vorführung kam. U.B.z. die Kindergruppe Ohne (alter 3 bis 9 Jahre " zeigt aus dem Abschnitt 'Was dem Kande uutzt'" Kleinkinder spielen." That translates as something like, "German youth play and dance included the program, the unläse ??? of the tea given by the Reich Sport Leader for the Diplomatic Corps came to the House of German Sports. U.B.z. the children group without (age 3 to 9 years) shows toddlers from the section 'What the Candle Uses'." A month later with Britain still resisting, Hitler initiated some major diplmatic moves.

Hitler assured his military and intimates as he prepared with Stalin to launch the invasion of Poland that the Allies (British and French) would never fight. There would be no repeat of the World War I two front war. He was wrong, but only half wrong. The Allies after Germany invaded Poland (September 1939), declared war, They refused, however, to come out from bhind the protrection of the Maginot Line to aid Poland. They even declined to bomb Germany, largely becuse the French were concerned that the Luftwaffe would bomb France. The initial German diplomatic effort was to convince the Allies to rescind the declaration of War. This was useless given how Hitler had showed after Munch that his word had no value. Thus diplomacy languished as it was clear that the issue would be resolved on the battlefield in a showdown on the World War I Western Front. Both the Allies and Hitler realized this. Hitler quickly realized that he would not be able to dupe the Btritish again. So his inclination was to used his military might displyed in Poland to threaten and cajole other countries. This was on display when Hitler staged a military victory parade through the streets of a destroyed Warsaw and told the press and diplomats that he could ravage any capital in Europe just as he did Warsaw (October 5). It had some impact. It undercut Allies diplomacy in the Balkans. It was a factor with the strength of the iosolationists in America who wanted no part of another war with Germany. He accepted Soviet aggressions in the East even against Finland and against Romania which threatened the critically important Ploesti oil fields. This changed with his momentous victories in the West and the fall of France (May-June 1940). Hitler's Panzers were stopped at the Channel so he went on a diplomatic peace offensive, trying to convince Britain to make peace. Churchill was having none of it. And a combination of the Royal Air Force and American Lend Lease meant that there would be no British Vichy. So German diplomacy shifted to support what from the very beginning was his primary goal. This involved several diplomatic efforts which went on until Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). It would be the last important German diplmatic effort, after this Germany's fate was entirely in the hands of Hitler the war lord and the success or failure of the Wehrmacht. The German diplomtic effort was quite active and involved, continuing some policies and inititing new ones. He achievd considerable success, but there were failures. First, signing up allies for Barbarossa. Second, convining the Soviets that German military movements were not threatening and obtaining large quantities of critical material from them. Third, working with Germany's primary ally--Italy. Fourth, expanding the Axis, especially by obtaining Japanese adhesion. Fifth, keeping America out of the War. Sixth, securing the Wehrmacht's southern flank (the Balkans). Seventh, pursing prepation for the Holocaust in occupied countries. Eighth, working with neutral countries to obtain raw materials and military support. Ninth, attempting to garner influence and spy rings in Latin America.

Pre-War Assurancs (August 1939)

Hitler assured his military and intimates as he prepared with Stalin to launch the invasion of Poland that the Allies (British and French) would never fight. It was an assessment based on Prime-Minister Chaberlain's Appeasement Policy and especilly his performance at Munich performance at Munich. Hitler thus believed that there would be no repeat of the World War I two front war. He was wrong, but only half wrong. The Allies after Germany invaded Poland (September 1939), declared war, They refused, however, to come out from behind the protection of the Maginot Line to aid Poland. They even declined to bomb Germany, largely becuse the French were concerned that the Luftwaffe would bomb France.

Phony War (September 1939-May 1940)

The initial German diplomatic effort was to convince the Allies to rescind the declaration of War. This was useless given how Hitler had showed after Munch that his word had no value. Thus diplomacy languished as it was clear that the issue would be resolved on the battlefield in a showdown on the World War I Western Front. Both the Allies and Hitler realized this. Hitler quickly realized that he would not be able to dupe the Btritish again. So his inclination was to used his military might displyed in Poland to threaten and cajole other countries. This was on display when Hitler staged a military victory parade through the streets of a destroyed Warsaw and told the press and diplomats that he could ravage any capital in Europe just as he did Warsaw (October 5). It had some impact. It undercut Allies diplomacy in the Balkans. It was a factor with the strength of the iosolationists in America who wanted no part of another war with Germany. He accepted Soviet aggressions in the East even against Finland and against Romania which threatened the critically important Ploesti oil fields.

Fall of France (June 1940)

NAZI diplomacy changed with his momentous victories in the West and fall of France (May-June 1940). Hitler's Panzers were stopped at the Channel so Hitler went on a diplomatic peace offensive, trying to convince Britain to make peace. Some historians believe that his unexpcted restraint with France was tonvince the Bitish of his sincerity. Churchill was having none of it. And a combination of the Royal Air Force and American Lend Lease meant that there would be no British Vichy.

Diplomatic Shift (October 1940)

With th Luftwaff's failure over Britain, NAZI diplomacy shifted to support what from the very beginning was Hitler's primary goal--the conquest of the East. This involved several diplomatic efforts which went on until Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa--the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). It would be the last important German diplomatic effort, after this Germany's and Europe's fate was entirely in the hands of Hitler the war lord and the success or failure of the Wehrmacht. The German diplomtic effort was quite active and involved, continuing some policies and inititing new ones. He achievd considerable success, but there were failures. First, signing up allies for Barbarossa. Second, convining the Soviets that German military movements were not threatening and obtaining large quantities of critical material from them. Third, working with Germany's primary ally--Italy. Fourth, expanding the Axis, especially by obtaining Japanese adhesion. Fifth, keeping America out of the War. Sixth, securing the Wehrmacht's southern flank (the Balkans). Seventh, pursing prepation for the Holocaust in occupied countries. Eighth, working with neutral countries to obtain raw materials and military support. Ninth, changing the policy on Germans outside the Reich. Tenth, continued efforts to garner influence and spy rings in Latin America.

Created: 5:38 AM 3/17/2018
Last updated: 5:39 AM 3/17/2018