|
"We have all been briought up from the cradle to consider Leonidas' fight at Thermopylae as the highest form of scruifice for one's people .... It is well known that a nation which has not fought out sucvh a freful struggle tight to the last has never risen afain as a nation."
-- Waffen SS officer
One very difficult question to answer is why with their armies smashed and the cities turned into pils of rubble did the Germans continue to fight? One historian phrases the question succinctly, "How and why was Hitler's Germany able to fight on to the bitter end? Was no other conclussion to the terrible conflict possible? And if not, why not? 'The real puzzle, it has been aptly remarked, 'is why people who wanted to survive fought and killed so desperately and so ferociously to the last moments of the war.'" [Kershaw] Even to the end, Hitler's acolyltes were killing Jews and those deemed disloyal. The Germans continued fighting to virtual annialation and terrible suffering. Compare this with the Dutch, Belgians, and French who surrendered very quickly even though they still had the means to resist and relatively little damage was inflicted on their cities. First, one of the most common reasons suggested for the tenacous German resistance was the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. Goebells suggested this was an important factor as did many Whermach commanders after the War. Even Churchill had doubts about demanding unconditional surrender. The same historian writes, "Of course, in the First World War there had been no Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender' .... This was often seized upon in the early post-war years particularly by German generals, as the sole and adequate explanation for Germany;s prolonged fight, since, it was claimed , the demand for 'unconditional surrender' ruled out any alternative." [Kershaw] This was of course a convenient out for the generals who so energetically conducted Hirler's war and participated in horrendous war crimes. The simple matter is that unconditional surrender was not all that much od an alernative to the once person who was in a position to negotiate an end to the War. Given the enormity of his crimes, Hitler realized that negotiating an end to the War or transfering power to a care-taker government to end the War would mean his arrest and trial for war crimes. Thus for Hitler there was no real advantage to end the War. He prolonged his existence by continuing the War. The cost to Germany was inmaterial as belived that the Germans had failed him in historical mission. There are a range of other matters that probably expalain both military and civilian resistance. Second, probably the most important was the savagery of the War in the East and fear of the Soviet reprisals. That proably to much of the Wehrmacht made continued resiatance more paletable than surrender. There is no doubt that Red army soldiers had revenge on their mind. Third, Hitler's mesianic leadership with Goebbels propaganda and early achievements had made a connection with the German people. All to many Germans, and not just die-hard NAZIs, saw their fate inextricably liked to that of the Führer. And this spell was not broken until he shot himself in his Brlin bunker. Fourth, many Germans were all to aware of the horrendous crimes that had been committed in Germany's name, often crimes in which they had participated. And they expected a terrible retribution at the hands of the victors. Fifth, the NAZI police state was efficent enough that even the Wehrmacht was unable to seize power. Sixth, patriotism was another powerful factor. Germany was being attcked from all sides by the Soviets and Allies. Many Germans so no alternative, but to fight to protect their Fatherland even Germans who did not haEighth, vw a connection with Hitler. Seventh, Goebbels propaganda proved very effective. Some still believed, especially young people. There was still hope for secret weapons. Actually there were secret weapons, only they were not really war winning weapons. Some like jet engines if introduced early enough might have had an impact. The probelm for the Germans was both Hitler;'s interference and that many of their secret weapons (like balistic ad criuse missles) were futuristic but not capable of inflencing the War. The one secret weapon they had, poison gas, Hitler decided not to use. These are all factors as to why the Grmans fought on, but as to the relative impotance, it is difficult to assess.
One of the most common reasons suggested for the tenacous German resistance was the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. This was announced at the Casablanca Conference (January 1943). It was President Roosevelt's idea. Goebells suggested this was an important factor as did many Whermach commanders after the War. Even Churchill had doubts about demanding unconditional surrender. The same historian writes, "Of course, in the First World War there had been no Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender' .... This was often seized upon in the early post-war years particularly by German generals, as the sole and adequate explanation for Germany;s prolonged fight, since, it was claimed , the demand for 'unconditional surrender' ruled out any alternative." [Kershaw] This was of course a convenient out for the generals who so energetically conducted Hitler's war and participated in horrendous war crimes. It coveniently removed responsibility from them. The simple matter is that unconditional surrender was not all that much od an alernative to the once person who was in a position to negotiate an end to the War. Given the enormity of his crimes, Hitler realized that negotiating an end to the War or transfering power to a care-taker government to end the War would mean his arrest and trial for war crimes. Thus for Hitler there was no real advantage to end the War. He prolonged his existence by continuing the War. The cost to Germany was inmaterial as belived that the Germans had failed him in historical mission. There are a range of other matters that probably expalain both military and civilian resistance.
Probably the most important was the savagery of the War in the East and fear of the Soviet reprisals. Hitler had told his generals that the War in the East would be fought unlike any other war. The Soviets were to be given no quarter. It was to be a war of anialation. A series of standing orders were issued by Hitler and OKW. And plans to kill, deport, and enslave the population were drawnup by Himmler's SS--Generalplan Ost. The Soviet treatment pf Polish POWS, such as the mass graves of Polih officers found in the Katyn Forest was well know to the Gerjmans. That proably to much of the Wehrmacht made continued resiatance more paletable than surrender. There is no doubt that many Red Army soldiers had revenge on their mind. And many Wehrmacht soldiers wee well aware how they had treated Soviet POWs and how the Soviets treated German POWS.
Hitler's mesianic leadership with Goebbels propaganda and early achievements had made a connection with the German people. All to many Germans, and not just die-hard NAZIs, saw their fate inextricably liked to that of the Führer. And this spell was not broken until he shot himself in his Berlin bunker. A very difficult question to answer is what the German people saw in Adolf Hitler. But it is undeniable that large numbers of Germans became mesmerized by the man. And this was not jyst young boys and girls. We see eldely people adulating him as well. And perhaps even more amazing, many (but certainly a declining portion) grizzeled veterns of Germany's long war continued to put theur faith in him long after any realistic possibility of victory had long past.
Many Germans were all to aware of the horrendous crimes that had been committed in Germany's name throughout Europe, but especially in the East. Both POWs and civilians were killed and in large numbers. The killing in the East was not carried out in isolated death camps behind barbed wire but in the full view of both military personnel and civilians. The Holocaust id of course the best knowm, but only a part of wide spread killing. These killings began at a time that the Germans believed that they were winning the War and thus the crimes could be hidden, as the Soviets were able to do. These were crimes in which large numbers of Germans had participated in eith directly or indirectky. And they expected a terrible retribution at the hands of the victors. Those with 'blood on their hands' were thus motivated to fight to the end. Here paradoxially some even high-raking individuals believed that they would not be procecuted, this included Dönitz, Göring, Jodl, Keitel, and others.
The NAZI police state was efficent enough to cow the civilan population into submission. A substantial, but hard to quantify portion of the population still supported the NAZIs and those tht did not had learned to keep theior mouths shut., After the Bomb Plot failed (July 1944), the NAZIs decided to not only go after the plotters, but to settle old scores. The Gestapo began arresting many anti-NAZI Germas, including members of the Weimar SPD which had been the main political opposition to the NAZIS in their rise to power. These were men who had played no part in the Bomb Plot, but were know to dislike Hitler ahnd the NAZIs. The only group that was capable of seizing power was the Whermcht, and after the disedent element in the Whermacht failed, there was no possiibility of replacing Hitler and ending the War as had occurred at the end of World war I.
Patriotism was another powerful factor. Germany was being attcked from all sides by the Soviets and Allies. Many Germans so no alternative, but to fight to protect their Fatherland even Germans who did not havw a connection with Hitler.
Goebbels propaganda proved very effective. He was undeniably a very effective propagandist. Propaganda is most effecive, however, if there is an elemet of truth involved. And with their country collapsing all around them, even very effective propgabnda will fall flat. Even true believers began asking questions, at least to themselves. Goebbels as aresult increasingly focused on fear of the Soviets to inspire resistance to the end. Some still believed, however, especially the young people.
Many Germans after the fall of France, including Hitler and many in OKW, essentially thought the War was won. And this was only confirmed by the great victories of Barbarossa. Actually if the Whermacht had suceeded in desrtrying the Red Army, which they almost did, they would have been correct. Even after Stalingrad (January 1943), while hope of victory was fading, few thought that it was possible. There is agood record of feelings in the Whermacht from recordings secretly made of POW concersations. Historians who study these conversations report, "Aside from some hopeless optimists, who still talked about Germany invading England in summer, 1943, most of the soldiers simply considered total defeat impossible. German euphoria at early Blitzkrieg successes and conviction in their own innate superiority blocked acknowledgement of the course the war was actually taking. Expectations and reality were diverging even more from one another, creating cognitive dissonance." [Neitzel and Welzer, p. 198.]
Despite what we now know about Hitler's military leadership, there was widespread faith in the Führr amont many German civilians and the Whermacht. This wa largely because all he was seen as achieving before the War and the early campaigns of the War, especiall the fall of France. He certainly seem unfallable at the time, even across the Channel in Britain. Many who had once doubted were now convinced. And once individuals give their loyalty and adulation to a leaser and are invested in him, it is difficult to change their minds. After the War begn to go bad for the Germans, we know from the transcripts of POW conversations that there was a widespread belief that "German 'leadership' would put things right". [Neitzel and Welzer, p. 198.] The situation by 1944 was unretreavable for Germany. The War was lost, the only question was how much more suffering would be involved in ending the War. Even after the Normandy landings has succedded (June 1944), many still had faith in the Führer. One officr who was finally captured after holding out in the Normandy coastal bastion of Ouistreham was recorded telling a comrad, " saying, "It is presumed that our leadership could never be so careless, or supposing our Führer was not convinced--that's to say, if the prospect of still winning the war by some means did not exist--than it is known that he would be honest enough to say: 'Here people, condemn me!' If he was not still convinced of having something up his sleeve which would still prove the deciding factor in the war, he would put a bullet through his head, in order not to experience what could no longer be carried out rather than plunge his people into an abyss." [Gundlach]
There was still hope for secret weapons. Recordings made of POWs show that even the Wehermacht took Goebbels threats about secret weapons seriously. It is not entirely clear just wgat Giebbels was talking about, if the threats were just bluster or if he understood hust what weapons were being developed. Actually there were secret weapons, only they were not really war-winning weapons. Some like jet engines if introduced early enough might have had an impact. The probelm for the Germans was both Hitler's interference and that many of their secret weapons (like balistic ad criuse missles) were futuristic but not capable of inflencing the War. The one secret weapon they had, poison gas, Hitler decided not to use. A reader writes, "I would not consider poison gas as a secret weapon. Right from the start of the war the British began to issue gas masks to civilians. I would say that the British knew that the Germans had it but did not know if or when the Germans would use it." That is true, but the Germans developed chemical weapons that the Allies did not have and were far more deadly than what the Allies had--Tauban and Sarin. The British knew that the Germans had poison gas, but were unaware as to just how deadly they were. At the time that the Germans surrendered, a new generation of Luftwaffe jets were beginning to come off undergroujnd assembly lines that would have given the Allies a lot of trouble. They also developed improved U-boats. The Type 21 was particularly advanced, but Germany by the end of the War had no way to build them in any numbers. Unlike jet aircrft and missles, they could not be built in underground factories.
World War II like World War I was primarily fought in other countries and not the Reich itself. Of course this tome the bombing that the Germans had begun was brought home to Germany, but that was not the same as foreign boots on the ground in modern parlance. For most of the War, Germans could see large areas of deafted and/or occupied countries on the map. Thus the true enormity of the disaster did not come home to the ordinary German until the last few months of the War when the Soviets and Allies began entering the Reich. Is at this time that the bombing campaign intensifies abd the food supplies begin to break down. . The Red Army enter East Prussia (late-1944) and at the same time the Western allies reached the Siegfried Line. It was not until 1945, however, that the Soviets and Allies began entering major Germn cities.
The Deutcshe Wehrmacht is surely one of the most effective militaries in human history. Two outstanding factors were 1) professionalism of the officer and non-commisioned officer corps and 2) the ideological preparation even before the men entered the military. The Whermacht was a highly professional military force. It had its weaknesses, but they knew what they were doing. They virtually invented modern warfare--Blitzkrieg. Ans even after the early vicyories were past, it was remained an effective fiorce even wihout air cover, outnumbered, and with dwindling resources. The ideological ardor of the Wffen-SS helped stiffen the Whermacht. The proffesional comptence of the officer corps was a major factor in the continued resistance as well as the individual soldier's continued will to resist. This was especiall true in the East where surrendering to the Soviets was seen as tantamouth to death and there was a a great desire to protect the German people frpm 'Bolshvik ravages'. But even in the West, until the Allies crossed the Rhine (March 1945), resisrance was stiff. Here the effectiveness, especially the ideological indocrinantion, provided by the Hitler Youth (HJ)mprogram can not over estimated. As Hitler wrote at an early point, "He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future!" [Hitler] Many of the soldiers most willing to continue fighting were the younger men coming up frpm the HJ.
The German victories in the early phase of the War can be explained by their superior weapons and tactical doctrine. Less understable is the dogged German defense in the later years of the War. The Germans invaded many small countries, but aftr they invaded the Soviet Union the Germans always faced superior numbers of increasingly well-supplied adversaries. The Germans by 1943, faced staggering numbers of opponents who were well armmed and with much larger populations, greater industrial ouput, and access to nthe raw materials that HGermany lacked. During the War, the only defeat the Germans suffered at the hands of a numerically weaker adversary was the Battle of Britain. As mentioned above, superior weaponry and even more imoprtant tactical doctrine was the rinary reason fir thge German victories. Another part was the fighting spirit of the German soldier. The War was lost for Germany once it became a War of attrition agter the Red Army counbter offensive before Moscow (Secember 1941). Germany obce it failed to destri the Red Army in Barbarossa with its more limited resourceswas not going to win a wae with a coalition of the Societ Uniin, British Empiremabd tge United States. It was the spirit and comptence of the German military that enabled Germany to continue the War. German veterans complain that in American movies that the Germans are commonly portrayed as stupid. The Germams military, as compared to their commande, were never stupid. They were highly competent and professional. The Germans were outnumbered and over powered, not defeated through superior battlefield tactics. The strategic decisins that brought defeat were imposed by the political leadership--the German FührerAdolf Hitler. The German soldier continued figting even against staggering odds. One rason was that after 1942 they wee fighting to protect Germany. Many believed in the NAZI cause. Many also realized what Germany had done in the occupied countries and fully expected the Allies to do the same when they reached the borders of the Reich. Another factor ws the bond developed in the Wehrmacht and Wafen-SS, Luftwaffe, and Kiegsmarine among individual soldiers, airmen, and sailors. Given the odds, the Germen servicemen knew that their only chance of surviving was to depend on their Komrads. There was a community esprit de corps that was more typical of elite formations in the Allied armies. This was a spirit that had been enculcated in the Hitler Youth. Most German soldiers under 28 had been Hitler Youth boys. German soldiers were convince they had a duty to Germany and each other. This in itself ws not unique, but the strength of the bond was the a key factor in the abilitiy of Hitler and the NAZIs to continue a dogged resisance in 1944 and early 1945. They fought more for each other than their Führer. The Wehrmacht offuicee corps is a special matter to comider.
Gundlact, Cpt. Special Report Army (SRM) 526 (June 9, 1944). National Archives, Kew Gardens London (TNA), WO 208/4138. Quoted in Neitzel and Welzer, p. 202.
Kershaw, Ian. The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germant, 1944-1945 (2011).
Hitler, Adolf. Speech at the Reichsparteitag, 1935.
Neitzel, Sönke and Harald Welzer. Soldten on Fighting, Killing, and Dying: The Secret World War II Trnscriots of German POWs (Knopf: New York, 2012). 437p.
Navigate the CIH World war II Section:
[Return to Main German World War II page]
[Return to Main World War II industry and science page]
[Return to Main World War II atomic bomb page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to the Main World War II page]
