Figure 1.--Here a German Panzer Mark IV with a short 75mm gun passes military transport trucks on a road. The Mark IV became the mainstay of the Wehrmacht and its shattering Blitzkrieg campaigns. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Soviets fielded the innovative T-34 tank and American entry into the War unleashed a torent of war material that German industry could not begin to match. Notice the camafloge folliage on the trucks. This photograph was taken in France after D-Day. It look like the 12th Wafen-SS Hitler Youth Panzer Division. The Wehrmacht was unable to unleash a Blitzkrieg campaign aginst the allied beachheads because of Allied air power. A country that has to camouflage its vehicles, especially the ranks, is a country no longer capable of Blitzkrieg and war winning offenses--despite the high-quality of their tanks.

The Prussian military was one of the most reprected in Europe. Prussia was not a great or rich country. What it had was a powerful, but not large aemy. It was said at the time that Prussia was an army with a country attached rather than a country with an army. And from an early stage the Prussians gave great attention to speed and mobility. And because the Prussians maintained a small, but throughly trained standing army, they were a valuable ally to have. At the time Europe was involved in a series of both religious and dynastic wars. Wars werev very frequent occassions. Speed and mobility were capabilities that the Great Elector himself had emphasized. What we called Bltzkrieg in World War II and now called comined arms or combined operations is simply a modern version of the Great Elector's tactics with industrial weaponry. The Prussian Army provided the core of the Imperial Germany Army formed after unificationm (1871). The German Schlieffen Plan developed by the Imperial German Army General Staff was a Blitzkrieg-style operation. Only the World war I Germany Army was not capable of executing it. There was no supportive air arm and the army moved at the speed of marching men and draft animals. The Germans had no tanks and only a handfull of trucks--all operating on wooden wheels. The end result was failure and eventually a disterous military defeat. Germany like the Prussia of old could only win if they struck hard and fast and defeated the enemy at the onset. Having failed with the Sclieffen Plan, the greter human and material resources of the Allies prevailed. Blitzkrieg means 'lightning war'. It was an innovative military technique applying modern weaponry to the well-established basic Prussian military doctrine. The Germam military brooded after their defeat in World War I and developed the tactics needed to win another war. And now the weapons existed to execute a Schlieffen Plan operation (ground support air craft, fast-moving tanks, and trucks). Several German commanders reached the same basic concept. The most notable was Heinz Guderian who stressed the importance of speed and the value of dive bombers and light (meaning speedy and maneuverable ) tanks. The concept was brillantly outlined in his book--Actung Panzer. The German General staff was more conservtive, but Hitler was impressed with Guderian concepts. Hitler was one of innumerable German soldiers who spent 4 years in the trenches of the Western Front and experienced the frustration of static warfare. Guderrians tactics and daring appealed to him. The result was the starteling German victory in France (June 1940). Hitler and OKW after the victory in France convinced themselves that it was German superiority and not tactics that brought victory. Hitler was convinced that the key factor was his military genius. It would take the British and Soviets a costly few years to learn Blizkrieg tactics, but once they did the masive human and material resources of the Allies would mean disater for the NAZIs and the German people. The Soviers Allies had not only the population to create massive armies, but with American industry mobilized, the industrial capacity to create the tools of Blizkrieg in quantities the whermacht could only dream of acquiring.

Prussian Traditions

Prussia was a rather poor principality in northetn Germany, but became important because of its well drilled army. An essential element of Prussiam military doctrine was speed, mobility, and responsiveness to commnd. [Citino] And when German was united under the Prussian monarchy,the Prussian tradition became the core of the new Imperial German Army. The Prussian military was one of the most reprected in Europe. Prussia was not a great or rich country. What it had was a powerful, but not large aemy. It was said at the time that Prussia was an army with a country attached rather than a country with an army. And from an early stage the Prussians gave great attention to speed and mobility. And because the Prussians maintained a small, but throughly trained standing army, they were a valuable ally to have. At the time Europe was involved in a series of both religious and dynastic wars. Wars werev very frequent occassions. Speed and mobility were capabilities that the Great Elector himself had emphasized. What we called Bltzkrieg in World War II and now called comined arms or combined operations is simply a modern version of the Great Elector's tactics with industrial weaponry. The Prussian Army provided the core of the Imperial Germany Army formed after unificationm (1871).

World War I

When Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered the German Army to attack France through Belgium, he had confidence that he was setting the strongest army of Europe in motion. And like the old Prussian Army, its tactical doctine was based on speed and mobility butressed by the industrial power of a unified Germany. The German Schlieffen Plan developed by the Imperial German Army General Staff was a Blitzkrieg-style operation. Only the World War I Germany Army was not capable of executing it. The German army was not motorized. The Germans had no tanks and only a handfull of trucks--all operating on wooden wheels. The army moved at the speed of marching men and draft animals. There was no supportive air arm. Neither did they have any advanced communications. Slowed by the gallant Belgian Army and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), the French Army stopped the Germans on the Marne. This set up a war of attrition which favired the Allies. The end result was failure and eventually a disterous military defeat. Allied material advantages and the entrance of the United States in the War resulted in a shattering defeat. Germany like the Prussia of old could only win if they struck hard and fast and defeated the enemy at the onset. Having failed with the Sclieffen Plan, the greter human and material resources of the Allies prevailed.

Inter-War Era: Birth of Blitzkrieg

Blitzkrieg means 'lightning war'. It was an innovative military technique applying modern weaponry to the well-established basic Prussian military doctrine. The Germam military brooded after their defeat in World War I, Military commanders analized their defeat and developed a new battle doctrine needed to win another war. And now the weapons existed to execute a Schlieffen Plan operation (ground support air craft, rapid fire weapons, fast-moving tanks, and trucks). They fused together the old Prussian doctrine of speed and mobility with modern weaponry offering intense fire power. Several German commanders reached the same basic concept. The most notable was Heinz Guderian who stressed the importance of speed and the value of dive bombers and light (meaning speedy and maneuverable ) tanks. The concept was brillantly outlined in his book--Actung Panzer. The result was Blitzkrieg, coined by a German military planner, but not popular within the key Wehrnachr ifficers, It was popularized by western journalists. Blitzkrieg is essentilly the tactical doctine of modern combined arms warfare, fusing together mechanize warfare with tank at the tip of the speer supported by high performnce air craft providing close air support. Important here were reconnaisance (recon) forces. [Edwards] It is no accident that it was the Germans who conceived of Blitzkrieg. It was esentially the long- established Prussiam military dictrine with rthe additioin of modern weapons. They were vitgal to find a fix enemny positions as well as to direct fire support. This is why field radios were a vital part of Germany iparions and included in tanks as well as aircraft. The idea was to use mobility to concentrate firepower and break through the fron and incircle fron line forces through vast pinzer movements. The Germans tested out soje of their new concepts in Spain (1936-39).

Bewegungskrieg

The term usually used by the major Heer practiciomers of Blitzkrieg and appearijg routinely in German militart jiurnals was 'Bewegungskrieg', variously translated as war of movement or maneuver / manoeuvre. As far as we can tell, the term Blitzkrieg was first coined in Germany. It appeared in 1935, in a German military periodical Deutsche Wehr (German War). [Frieser, p. 4.] It was never widely used, however, within the German military. Goebbels used it somewhat for propaganda purposes. Where it was primarily used was in the West. Western journalists as a result of the German camapign in Poland jumped on the term (1939). And then the British began referringbto the German bombing of London and other British cities as 'the Blitz'. It thus entered the English language. No one outside of Germany has ever heard od Bewegungskrieg, except for a tiny number of World War II historians andenthusiasts. Blitzkrieg in contrast is a commonly used term, even by people whi know littke about World War II. A noted expert on the German military explains why -- the term has Hollywood sex appeal. [Citino, video] This of course is the very reason it was embraced by Western journalosts early in the War.

Components

There were three key components to Blitzkrieg. First was motorization. This involved. The most obvious was the Panzers here. But we also see motorized troop transports and artillery carriers. And there were trucks to carry supplies. The purpose of the mobility was to actually exploit holes punched into he enemies front lines--the Schwerpunkt of battle. This was not a novel idea, but the the motorization of warfare have World ar II armies aped never before possessed by military commanders. And the German Wehrmacht used it with huge success in the first two years of the War. Second was tactical air. The Luftwaffe was a tactical air force. And Luftwaffe operations were tied to close ground support from the very beginning pf the war. And this level of tactical air was not fully achieved by the Allies until 1944. Third was improving communications between all levels of the military organization. We see improved communications between headquarters and combat units. Here a major stp was the Enigma machine. And we see improved communications between combat units. Radios in planes and tanks allowed commmuicatiins between headquarters nd forward units as well as among forward units. The Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a German innivation. Coordinating all of this was compljcate, requiring close cooperaion among servives. The German had this at the onset of the War in Polanf (1939) and perfected it for the Western campaiggn (1940). The Allies would not have it worked out until D-Day (1944).

Early German Victories

The Germans first introduced Blitzkrieg it with the invasion of Poland (September 1939). Their Sovet ally then invaded from the East. Some military analists dismissed the German victory, arguing that Poland was a small militarily weak country. But then after invading Denmark and Norway, the Germans turned on France. Many saw the French Army as the strongest in the world. OKW prepared an updated Schlieffen Plan to attack France. Jump off dates were delayed as plans were revised. The German General staff yook a conservtive approach, seking a limited advance. Hitler was unimpressed and noted a radical approach offered by Guderian. Hitler was one of innumerable German soldiers who spent 4 years in the trenches of the Western Front and experienced the frustration of static warfare. Guderrians tactics and daring appealed to him. The result was the starteling German victory in France (June 1940). The quick German victory shocked the world. In the space of less tha a year, Hitler and the NAZIs at limited military cost had seized most of western Europe. American diplomacy was seen as inconsequentil in comparison to the momentous German triumphs.

Hitler's Assessment

Hitler and OKW after the victory in France convinced themselves that it was German superiority and not tactics that brought victory. Hitler was familar withbthevter, but disn't like it. In fact, he called the term Blitzkrieg 'A completely idiotic word'--ein ganz blödsinniges Wort". [Reynolds, p. 254.] Hevprobably thought it took him ourbof thevequation. He convinced himself that his 'brilliant' leadership was an important part of the stunning NAZI victories. And importantly, tactics did not fit into the National Socialist racial and cultural narative. Other countries could copy tactics. Race could not be copied. And attemoting to vopy National Socialism was an admission of NAZI superiority. And any rate National Socilist doctrine with out Aryan bkood was doomed to failure. Notably Himmler ordered that the SS units conducting Lebensborn program that attemoted to collect blonf and blue eyed children in occuoied countries like Poland would seek to destroy children were not selected because it could strengthen occupied countries in the future. And France, which at an early stage could have overyhrown Hitler, was now fully under his control. Hitler had achieved in days what the Kasiser had failed to do in 4 painful years. Germany was now completely in his grasp. Fortuntely for the world, Hitler's behvior changed. Hitler was convinced that the key factor was his military genius. He no longer listen to his highly professional military commanders. He convinced himself that he knew more than they knew.

German Weaknesses

The early German victories were stunning. They were realtively small scale battles close to the Reich, meaning fairly short logistical trains and small countries or poorly prepared countries. Despite all the headlines and propaganda. Germany was a poorly prepared country to launch a world war. The most ovious weakness was the lack of food to feed its people and raw materials needed by a war economy. But even if we just address the major Blitzkrieg components, the German Wehrmact was an imperfect military for Blitzkrieg. The first component of Blitzkrieg was motorization. Germany had a much smaller industrial capacity producing motor vehicles. It was a fraction of the American industry and when Britain and the Soviet Union was added in, Germany was at a severe disadvantage. The result was not only could German industry produce only a fraction of Soviet and Allied industry. But that was only part of the German problem. The German soldiers that drove East into the Soviet Union did so largely on foot because of shortages of trucks. The German Wehrmacht like 19th century armies were dependent on horsepower. That was the major way the Wehrmacht moved both artillery and supplies. Andcthe German infantry moved on foot justblike their Wirld War I brithern. not only was it slow, but it meant that the already weak logistical train was strained by the need to transport vast quantities of feed and hay. In additiin, the Germans has no domestic sources of a vital resourcee -- oil. This was a huge disadvantage for a military bent on motirization. As a result, Whermanch units were hanpered throuhout the War by fuel shortages. Wehrmachr planbers even began discussing denotieization of some Whermanct operations. It is norable that the need for oil was atvthe heart of Cse Blau--the German 1942 summer offensive south. It of course led to the Stalingrad offnsive. The second companent of Blitzkrieg was tactucal air. But again the Germans did not have the industrial capacity to match America and again British and Soviet aircrat production put Germany at a severe disadvantage. It was enormously successful (19939-41). TheAllied stratehic bombing camoaign forced the Germans to behin withdrawing the Luftwaffe from the East to protect German cities. As a result, the Heer had to fight the remainder of the War with little or no air support. German soldiers began complaining, "If the plane is black it is British, ift it is white it is American. if it isb't there ut is the Lufrwaffe." The third component of Blitzkrieg was communications. And here again American industry gave the Allies at a huge disadvantage. And it went beyond radios to other electronics gear such as radars. The ability of the Wehrmacht to achieve so much so little speaks to the imcopetence of Western political leaderes and the competenc of Wehrmacht commanders.

The Soviets and Allies

It was developed by the Germans and eventually adopted by those countries (America, Britain, and the Soviet Union) that were able to survive the German assaults and had the industrial capacity to build modern weapons. And it took the British, Soviets, and Americans time to absorb the tactical dotrine with which the Germans began the War. It would take the British and Soviets a costly few years to learn Blizkrieg tactics, but once they did the masive human and material resources of the Allies would mean disater for the NAZIs and the German people. The Soviets and the Allies had not only the population to create massive armies, but with American industry mobilized, the industrial capacity to create the tools of Blizkrieg in quantities the Wehrmacht could only dream of acquiring.

Sources

Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2005), 428p.

Citino, Robert. "The German Way of War," video presentation.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West [Blitzkrieg-legende: der westfeldzug 1940]. Trans. J. T. Greenwood. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

Reynolds, David. The Long Shadow:The Great War and the Twentieth Century (Second ed.). (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2014) 2n bd edition.

Created: 6:31 PM 1/1/2015
Last updated: 5:13 AM 8/2/2020