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World War II -- island territories Ceylon Sri Lanka
World War II Indian Ocean Island Territories: Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
Figure 1.--This report from Ceylon was released jyst after the Japanese seized the Andaman Islands and as Adm. Nagumo's First Air Fleet was entering the Indian Ocean. The caption read, "Mothers of Ceyloin: Long skirted Celonese mothers with their youngsters pictured in the native quarter of Colombo, the capital of Ceylon. With the seizure of the Andaman Islands by the Japanese, 800 miles away, the famous tea-growing British Crown Colony, only 50 miles from Indi's mainland, now stands in the pathj of the invaders. In eneny possession Ceylon would provide the necessary base for invasion of southern India." The photograph was dated March 25, 1942.
The British Crown Colony of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in sharp contrast to India after the outbreak of World War II pledged its support to Britain. Sir Don Baron Jayatilaka assured the British of its continued support. British confidence in Ceylon was, however, shaken by the Cocos Island mutiny (May 1942). Ceylon's principal importance during World War II besides its strtegic location was a source of raw materails for the British. With the loss of Malaya, Ceylon was the only remaining source of natural rubber. There were also imortant graphite mines. An efficient rationing was instituted and the Ceylonese were comparatively well fed than the Indians. Ceylon provided strategically placed Royal Navy bases. Japanese possession of Ceylon would have cut off Australia from Britain and well as the British forces defending India from the Japanese. After the fall of Singapore the Royal Navy's East Indies Station was moved to Colombo and then to Trincomalee. One of these least noted naval campaigns of World War II was the Indian Ocean engaements during early-1942. Admiral Nagumo with the First Air Fleet entered the Indian Ocean with a force of five carriers and four fast battleships as well as accompanying cruisers and destroyers (March 26, 1942). Three days earlier the Japanese had seized the Andaman Islands to control the waters around Rangoon (March 23). The Japanese paln was to supply the army in Burma by sea. This was the most powerful naval formations to enter the Indian Ocean. The purpose appears to have been to support Imperial Army operations in Burma and escort a convoy to Rangoon which the Japanese Army had seized (March 8). Nagumo's force than struck the British naval base in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) where the Royal Navy had been building up a substantial naval force. Incredibly this was a larger carrier force than Admiral Yamamotyo would deploy 2-months later against Midway. The force succeeded in sinking the British light carrier HMS Hermes, two cruisers, and smaller ships. The Royal Navy was astonished with the power of the Japanese carrier force. At this stage of the War, the Japanese carrier aircraft were far superior to British carrier aircraft. The Royal Navy was still using bi-planes. After the engagement the Royal Navy retired from the eastern Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean might be condidered a backwater of the War, but it was through Indian Ocean convoys that the British forces in the Western Desert (Egypt) as well as Royal Navy forces in the eastern Mediterranean were being supplied at the time. It is unclear what the value of Nagumo's campaign was. Driving the Royal Navy out of the eastern Indian Ocean to secure the appraoches to Rangoon was a failure. The American military victory at Midway (June 1942) meant that the Japanese would never again be able to commit an important force to the Indian Ocean, meaning that Ceylon would never again be threatened. At the time the only creditable threat to Japan was the badly mauled American Pacific fleet and its four priceless carriers. Any reasonable assessment of the military situation would suggest that Japan should have focused on bringing the U.S. Pacific fleet to battle so as to get at those carriers. It is unclear just what the purpose of this powerful force was. It was far beyond what was needed to escort a convoy to Rangoon. We suspect it was the Japanese samarai spirit--a lust for a naval battle with the British. They could have seized Ceylon, but this would take ground forces. They also could have attacked British facilities in India. While Nagumo had some success against the Royal Navy force, the Royal Air Force from bases in Ceylon downed or damaged some Japanese planes. Nagumo had dispersed the British nsval forces--but they were never a threat. The American Pacific fleet carriers were -- a very real threat. The British had somewhat reduced the combat effectiveness of the First Air Fleet. More importantly, the American carriers were given two precious months to prepare for the inevitanle showdown with the Japanese.
