Figure 1.--The Giberts were the cornerstone of the Japanese outer island shield in the Central Pacific, the most easterly extent of Japanese expansion. The major atolls were Maken and Tarawa, but only Tarawa (Betio) was heavily fortified because of its airstrip. The U.S. Navy launched its Central Pacific campaign with assaults on Maken and Tarawa (Novejmer 1943). Maken unlike Tarawa was inhabited. Here we see the main island, Butaritari, in the Maken Atoll. The civilian population is being temporarily resettled. The press caption read, "Lighting Up: Holding his son, a Makin native is about to enjoy the luxury of an American cigarette as he grubs a light from one of his neighbors. This crowd about to be evacuated from the area by Americans." The photigraph was dated January 7, 1944. Source: U.S. Signal Corps.

The Gilbert Islands had been a British possession. There were 16 islands. Tarawa was the largest atol and Bacio was the largest island in the Tarawa Atol. The Japanese assaulted the Islands the day after Pearl Harbor (December 8, 1941) and quickly took the lightly defended islands. American raids on the Gilberts, especially a Marine assault by submarine caused the Japanese to fortify the islands, especially the largest atol--Tarawa. The American carrier victory at Midway forced the Japanese to change strategy. They could no longer rely on naval superority to defend their Pacific islands bases. They were hoping that the island defenses would be sufficient. Instead the Japanese began to heavily fortify the islands believing that the islands could be made impregnable. As the Gilberts were the cornerstone of their outer island defenses, the Japanese correctly assumed that the American blow would fall there. Special attention was given to fortify Tarawa because the airstrip there dominated the Gilberts. Defenses included naval artillery, sand covered concrete bunkers, 500 pillboxes, and concrete and barbed-wire beach defenses. The Japanese garrison consisted of a mixed force. There were 4,800 navy troops on the island, included 2,600 men of the Special Naval Landing Force, commonly referred to as Japanese Marines. The Japanese recognizing the importance of the islands also assigned highly skilled artillery trainers to the island. All this on a area smaller than Central Park in New York City. Tarawa did not have the largest garrison in the Pacific, but in relation to the area and fortficatins, it would be the hardest nut to crack until the Marines got to Iwo Jima. The Japanese Commander General Shibasaki boasted that a million Americans could not take Tarawa in a 100 years. Tarawa was the beginning of the American offensive in the Central Pacific. It was the first test of the evolving Japanese strategy of heavily fortifying island bases as a defensive shield. The 2nd Marine Division which had fought on Guadacanal was assigned the task. The Navy subjected the Japanese defenses to withering artillery and air craft strikes. The Imperial Japanese Navy stung by losses in the Coral Sea, Miday, and the Sollomons did not contest the landings. After the naval gunfire ceased, the Marines went ashore (November 20, 1943). The were horrified to find that thed Japanese defenses were largely in tact. The result was what the Marines refer to as 'Bloody Tarawa'. Virtually the entire Japanese garison fought to the death. Only 13 Japanese surrendered in addition to Korean slave laborors. The Marines took Tarawa, but the losses were shocking. About 1,000 Americans died. In terms of casualties per area it was the most expensive American operation of World War II. After Guadalcanal and Tarawa, the Japanese no longer thought that the Americans were too soft to fight. President Roosevelt had to decide whether or not to release the casualty information and films of the battle. He decided the American people had the right to know and did so. No other country released such graphic images of the War. After Tarawa the American people were undr no illusions as to what the Pacific War would mean in terms of casualties. The Navy learned valuable lessons for the island campaign to come. The Navy studied the Japanese defenses to determine why the naval gunfire had been so ineffective.

The Islands

The Gilbert Islands had been a British possession. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands were occupied as a British protectorate (1892). The British interested reflected expanding German naval and colonial activity. The protectoraate became a colony during World war II (1916). The two neighbiring island groups were adminitered as a single colony. The Gilberts consisted of 16 island atolls. Tarawa was the largest atoll and Batio was the largest island in the Tarawa Atoll. Makin Island was another important Gilbert atoll, roughly triangular in shape. Butaritari is the principal island, near the principal lagoon entrance. It is approximately 8 miles long and 1/2 mile wide. The island is covered by a coconut palms. Banaba Island (Ocean Island) was the headquarters of the British colony

Japanese Seizure (December 1941)

The British evacuated the Giberts. The Japanese the day after Pearl Harbor began assaulting the Islands (December 8, 1941) and quickly took the undefended islands. Makin atoll was occupied (December 10). The British had not fortified the island. The Japanese landings were uncontested. The Japanese converted the island into a seaplane base. This was of some strategic importance because it was the most easterly extent of Japanese expansion in the Pacific and thus the best window on American military activity. The Japanese controlled most of the islands to the west (Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas). Thus they had a substantial Central Pacific island barrier even after the substrantial losses at Midway (June 1942). The United States would have to deal with huge area of Japanese-held islands if it was to pursue the Pacific War.

Midway (June 1942)

Admiral Yamamoto planned to destroy what was left of the american Pacific Fleet at Midway, namely the carriers that had urvived the Pearl Harbor attack. He planned a huge operatin and concentrated his massive fleet. It may well have suceeed had American code breakers not cracked JN-25, the Japanese naval code. The resulting decisive American carrier victory at Midway was the turning point of the Pacific War. The American carriers cut the heart out of the Imperial Fleet in a matter of minutes. It meant that the American Pacifi Fleet now had the capbility of going toe to toe with the Japanese to protect Pearl and Australia. This meant that the Pacific Fleet could buy time while American industry delivered new fleet units that woild make offensive operations possible. The Pavific Fleet did not at theime have the capability to immediately launch for a Central Pacific campaign. It became fully committed in the South Pacific, but gradul=llyresources becmee available for the Central Pacifuc. .

Maken Island Raid (August 1942)

The Second Marine Raider Battalion raided Butaritari, the main island in the Maken Atoll (August 1942). These Marine Raider battalions were a new type of unit born out of the need to take some inf of offensive operation against anaterially superior enemy. The idea had begun in Europe, championed by Primeninister winston Churchill. Faced by the NAZI war machine which overran Western Europe, Churchill conceived of the commandos which could at least deliver pin pricks and tie up German resources. The U.S. Army was interested and organized Rager force. The Raiders were the Marine version. , the Marine Corps Commandant ordered officers to England to study the British commando program. rganization and techniques. - The Maken Raid was arelatively small operation. The Marine were landed by submatine. The succesful operation was leavily publicized in the press at aime in which there was notv aot of good news. American raids on the Gilberts, especially a Marine assault by submarine caused the Japanese to fortify the islands, especially the largest atol--Tarawa.

Japanese Strategic Shift

The American carrier victory at Midway forced the Japanese to change strategy. They could no longer rely on naval superority to defend their Pacific islands bases. So they decided to use the islands as a defensive shield. The Ameican Maken Islnd raid showed that their island garrisons were vulnerable. They began to fortify the islands, hpoing that fortifications and strong garisons would be sufficient even without naval protection. So the Japanese began to dig in and heavily fortify the islands believing that the islands could be made impregnable. There were serious limitations to this effort. There were only so many soldiers that the Japanese ould garrion on small ilands. Thus therewas no way they could use theur large army to bolster their Central Pacific barrier. Most of the Japanese Army was bogged down in China. But even though island bastions could be strengthened, building up the garisons on a large numbers od Pacific islnds meant that they had to be supplied. This was a serious problem. While the Imperial Fleet was reay for War in 1941, the marus or merchant fleet was not. The Japanese merchant fleet was not. The merchant fleet was barely adequate in peace time. It was totally inadequate for the Paific War. Worse still, by 1943, the American submarine campaign by 1943 was beginning to sink the marus in large numbers. And there way to build more. Naval losses in the South Pacific and Midway meant that Japanese shipyards were fully commited to building navl vessels to replace the substantial losses and prepare the Imperial Fleet to confront the rapidly expanding Anerican Pacific Fleet. This meant that the merchant fleet did not have the capabilirt of supplying all the Pacific island garrisons. And this was before American naval power began to cut the garrions off from resupply. The Gilberts were the most easterly Japanese possession abd thus the cornerstone of their outer island defensesive shield. As the Gilberts were the cornerstone of their outer island defenses, the Japanese correctly assumed that with the expanding American power, the first blow would fall there. Fully occupied in the south Pacific, the Japanese were unsure when the Americans would strike andctended to estimate the speed and strength of the american buildup.

American Intentions

The battered U.S. Pacific Fleet after Pearl Harbor was at first in a life and death fight for survival with the Imperial Fleet. It had two primary tasks in 1942, first to protect the Hawaiian Islands and second to protect Australia. The naval victory at Midway (June 1942) meant that Pearl was safe and the fighting then shifted to the South Pacific. Even after Miday, American nacal resources were barely suffucent to hold the lines in the South Pacific as the Japanese attempted to cut the sea lnes to Australia. Gradully with the victories on and around Guadalcanal and the steady flow of new vessels and planes, the U.S. Navy finally had the capacity to launch what admiral Nimitz had wanted--a Central Pacific campaign.

Preparatory Landings (October 1942-June 1943)

The Japanese did not have the capcity to heavily defend all of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. And early in the war, the Japanese with its naval dominance did not give a lot of attention to fortifying its new island possesions. After the stunning American victory at Midway (June 1942), the United Sttes conducted some limited operations in the Central Pacific. The United States began seizing some of the undefended or lightly defended islands. American forces landed in Funafuti (October 2, 1942). The next step was Nanumea and Nukufetau (August 1943). The Americans constructed an airfield on each island and other bases. The atolls of Tuvalu served as an imortant staging base during the preparation for the Battles of Makin and Tarawa. And they provided useful air bases for land-based air support when the major contested landings began. One of the many differences between American and Japanese military operations which emerged at an early stage was the speed with which construction groups like the Seebees could build air strips and other infrastructure projects.

Major American Invasion (November 1943)

Finally as the South Pacific campaign was achieving increasing success and American industry delivered more and more resources, a major American campin became possible. Dritical herewas the arrival of the new Essex class carriers. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Adm. Nimitz to begin planning operations to seize the Ellice and Gilbert Islands (July 20, 1943). Success in the South Pacific had forced the Imperial Fleet to withdraw fom the South Pacific and to a large part the Central Pvific. This and weakening of the Japanese base at Rabaul meant atleast at first, the Central Pacific campaign would not, unlike Guadalcanal involve major fleet engagements. It would be assaults on Japan's island bastions. And the first of these assults would come in the Gilberts. The American invasion fleet, Task Force 52, sailed from Pearl for the Gilberts (November 10, 1943). TF 52 had 35,000 troops, 120,000 tons of supplies, and 6,000 vehicles. TF 52 had two forces for the two targets, Maken and Tarawa. Rear Admiral Richmond Turner commanded the northern Maken force. Rear Admiral Harry Hill, Turner's deputy commanded the southern Tarawa force. The Navy and Marines named the effort Operation Galvanic. Thi included General Holland Smith's Marines who landed on Tarawa. The Army effort focused on Maken was Operation Kourbash.

Maken Island: Operation Kourbash (November13-23)

The Japanese prepared for an American invasion, but not nearky to the extent on Tarawa. Makin was left in the hnds of Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Seizo Ishikawa and a garrison of less thn 800 and that included 276 laborers and 100 aviation ground crew. There were no ships or even planes. The principal defense was along the coast of th main island of Butaritari, 8-inch coastal defense artillery. Thee were also three 37-mm anti-tank gun positions, 10 machine gun emplacements, and 85 rifle pits protecting the beaches from amphibious assaults. Inlnd there ware two land barriers crossing the island to slow the American drive. The island western tank barrier was 12-13 feet wide and 15 feet deep, supported by one anti-tank gun shielded by concrete. This was supported by six machine gun positions, and 50 rifle pits. The eastern barrier was 14 feet wide and 6 feet deep, protected by barb wire, gun emplacements, and rifle pits. The thought behind these limited efforts was was to hold off the attackers until reinforcements could reach the island. This of course was absurd given the fact that the Imperial Fllet had withdrawn from the central Pacific. It was more based on defending from noter raid rather than a major invasion by a substantial amphibious force.

Tarawa: Operation Galvanic (November 20-23

The Japanese gave special attention to fortify Tarawa because the airstrip there dominated the Gilberts. Defenses included naval artillery, sand covered concrete bunkers, 500 pillboxes, and concrete and barbed-wire beach defenses. The Japanese garrison consisted of a mixed force. There were 4,800 navy troops on the island, included 2,600 men of the Special Naval Landing Force, commonly referred to as Japanese Marines. The Japanese recognizing the importance of the islands also assigned highly skilled artillery trainers to the island. All this on a area smaller than Central Park in New York City. Tarawa did not have the largest garrison in the Pcific, but in relation to the area and fortficatins, it would be the hardest nit to crack until the Marines got to Iwo Jima. The Japanese Commander General Shibasaki boasted that a million Americans could not take Tarawa in a 100 years. Tarawa was the beginning of the American offensive in the Central Pacific. It was the first test of the evolving Japanese strategy of heavily fortifying island bases as a defensive shield. The 2nd Marine Division which had fought on Guadacanal was assigned the task. The Navy subjected the Japanese defenses to withering artillery and air craft strikes. The Imperial Japanese Navy stung by losses in the Coral Sea, Miday, and the Sollomons did not contest the landings. After the naval gunfire ceased, the Marines went ashore (November 20, 1943). The were horrified to find that the Japanese defenses were largely in tact. The result was what the Marines refer to as 'Bloody Tarawa'. Virtually the entire Japanese garison fought to the death. Only 13 Japanese surrendered in addition to Korean slave laborors. The Marines took Tarawa, but the losses were shocking. About 1,000 Americans died. In terms of casualties per area it was the most expensive American operation of World War II. After Guadalcanal and Tarawa, the Japanese no longer thought that the Americans were too soft to fight. President Roosevelt had to decide whether or not to release the casualty information and films of the battle. He decided the American people had the right to know and did so. No other country released such graphic images of the War. After Tarawa the American people were undr no illusions as to what the Pacific War would mean in terms of casualties. The Navy learned valuable lessons for the island campaign to come. The Navy studied the Japanese defenses to determine why the naval gunfire had been so ineffective.

Created: 4:00 AM 3/18/2016
Last updated: 4:00 AM 3/18/2016