World War II: Italian Role in Barbarossa (1941)

World War II Ukraine
Figure 1.--Italian soldiers like the Germans liked to take photographs during the beginning phase of the Soviet campaign. The Germans told the Italians that it would be over in 8 weeks. This photo was taken in Vil'shanka by an Italian soldier sone after arriving in the Ukraine during the first phase of the Italian expedition in rhe Soviet Union. (1941).

Italian troops were not involved in the initial assault. Mussolini despite being kept in the dark immediately decided to send Itlaian forces to aid Hiter in the invassion of the Soviet Union. Mussolini without consulting with his commsanders ordered Italian units to join the attack. Few ever returned, but thecDuce was very enthusiastic about the undertaking Ciano writes, "The thing that is closest to the Duce's heart is the participation of one of our contingents, but from what Hitler writes it is clear that vhe woud gladly do without it." [Ciamo, June 22, p. 369.] The next day Count Ciano reports that the Germans are talking about 5 million POWs who will become slaves. He also indicates that We are sending an expeditionary force under the command of General Zingales, whih will operate on the borders between Rumania and sub-Carpathian Russia." [Ciano, June 23, p. 369.] This was at a time when the Italian Army in Libya had been badly mauled by the British Army in the Western Desert. After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign. Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) to participate in Barbarossa. The inintial units were reinforced with additional units including the Alpini Army Corps made up of three Alpini Divisions. Mussolini's primary concern was to deploy Italian forces in time to make a contribution before the Soviet Union collapsed. This would allow him to claim a share of the spoils. Hitler had denied Mussolini a share of the spoils in France because Mussolini only declared war after France had already been defeated. Hitler had even refused to reward the Italians with Tunusia. Mussolini at Verona reviewed the first motorized division moving for deployment (June 26, 1941). This was a unit consisting of 62,000 troops. They were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine. In a colorful ceremony on the morning of June 26 at Verona, Il Duce reviewed the The official communiqué proclaimed that the Italians "presented themselves in a superb manner, complete with men, arms and motor vehicles." Ciano was skeptical," At Verona, Mussolini reviewed the first division on its way to Russia. By telephone he defined it as perfect. Be that as it may, I am concerned about a direct comparison between our forces and the Germans. Not on account of the men, who are, or who may be, excellent, but on account of their equipment. I should not like to see us play once more the role of a poor relation." [Ciano, June 26, p. 370.] The spearhead of the hastily assembled troops passed through Vienna (July 13). A member of Italy's Embassy in Berlin noted that they were dirty, ill-equipped, and likely to make a bad impression. And they did. After the war, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel bitterly remembered yet another group as they were reviewed by Mussolini and Hitler in Galicia near the end of August 1941. He called them "a boundless disappointment" and asked, "How were half-soldiers like these supposed to stand up to the Russians, if they had collapsed even in face of the wretched peasant folk of Greece?" The Italian force became the 8th Army eventually totaled about 250,000 men. Little serious preparartion was made to fight in Russia or adequately equip the men being deploted there. Italian soldiers fought as second-class allies in support of Hitler's legions in the most savage campaign of all on the Eastern Front. The Russian winter proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a balmy Mediterranean climate.

Invasion (June 22, 1941)

The Germans struck with enormous force. And because of Stalin's refusal to prepare for a German attack and positioining of units, the Germans destroyed much of the Red Air Force and front-line Red Army units. Panzers were soon cutting wide swathes through the western Soviet Union. Italian troops were not involved in the initial assault. Mussolini despite being kept in the dark immediately decided to send Itlaian forces to aid Hiter in the invassion of the Soviet Union. Mussolini without consulting with his commsanders ordered Italian units to join the attack. Few ever returned, but thecDuce was very enthusiastic about the undertaking Ciano writes, "The thing that is closest to the Duce's heart is the participation of one of our contingents, but from what Hitler writes it is clear that he woud gladly do without it." [Ciamo, June 22, p. 369.] The next day Count Ciano reports that the Germans are talking about 5 million POWs who will become slaves.

Mussolini's Calculation

Mussolini's primary concern was to deploy Italian forces in time to make a contribution before the Soviet Union collapsed. This would allow him to claim a share of the spoils. Hitler had denied Mussolini a share of the spoils in France because Mussolini only declared war after France had already been defeated. Hitler had even refused to reward the Italians with Tunusia. One would have though after failing in Greece and Italy, Mussolini would have been wary about another military adventure. Perhaps he thought that in Russia the Germans would be doing most of the fighting. Here he had the example of the stunning German Blitzkrieg of Yugoslavia and Greece. The Germans defeated th eYugoslaves, Greeks, and British Expeditionary Force in only a few weeks and Italy obtained a substantial reward of Balkan territory, including areas like Dalmatia that it had long coveted. He presumably calculated that Hitler would again richly reward Italy for supporting another Blitzkrieg. He never recorded for history just why he was so enthusiastic about the Russian camoaign.

Italian Expeditionary Force (CSIR)

He also indicates that We are sending an expeditionary force under the command of General Zingales, whih will operate on the borders between Rumania and sub-Carpathian Russia." [Ciano, June 23, p. 369.] This was at a time when the Italian Army in Libya had been badly mauled by the British Army in the Western Desert. After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign. Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) to participate in Barbarossa. The CSIR was hastily organized. The inintial units were reinforced with additional units including the Alpini Army Corps made up of three Alpini Divisions.

Fanfare at Verona

Mussolini at Verona reviewed the first motorized division moving for deployment (June 26, 1941). This was a unit consisting of 62,000 troops. They were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine. In a colorful ceremony on the morning of June 26 at Verona, Il Duce reviewed the The official communiqué proclaimed that the Italians "presented themselves in a superb manner, complete with men, arms and motor vehicles." Ciano was skeptical," At Verona, Mussolini reviewed the first division on its way to Russia. By telephone he defined it as perfect. Be that as it may, I am concerned about a direct comparison between our forces and the Germans. Not on account of the men, who are, or who may be, excellent, but on account of their equipment. I should not like to see us play once more the role of a poor relation." [Ciano, June 26, p. 370.]

German Impressions

The spearhead of the hastily assembled troops passed through Vienna (July 13). A member of Italy's Embassy in Berlin noted that they were dirty, ill-equipped, and likely to make a bad impression. And they did. After the war, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel bitterly remembered yet another group as they were reviewed by Mussolini and Hitler in Galicia near the end of August 1941. He called them "a boundless disappointment" and asked, "How were half-soldiers like these supposed to stand up to the Russians, if they had collapsed even in face of the wretched peasant folk of Greece?"

Deployment

Little serious preparartion was made to fight in Russia or adequately equip the men being deploted there. Italian soldiers fought as second-class allies in support of Hitler's legions in the most savage campaign of all on the Eastern Front. The CSIR initially consisted of three divisions with about 60,000 men. The CSIR was assigned to the southern sector of the Eastern Front--the Ukraine. The CSIR was redesignated the Italian 8th Army (July 1941). The Germans and Romanians had already driven into Moldavia The Italian joined the drive into the Ukraine (summer 1941). They helped occupy the industrial basin of the Donetz. The CSIR participated in the envelopment and capture of over 100,000 Soviet soldiers at Pervomaisk (July 1941). The Italians then froce east with the Germans. The CSIR made a forced crossing of the Dnieper (September 12).

Defensive Stance

The CSIR took up defensive positions around Stalino, Gorlovka, and Rykovo in the eastern Ukraine. Having rapidly moved east, logistics became a serious problem. The distances involved and the primitive Soviet infrastructure made getting supplees to the CSIR extremnely difficult. Logistics were not a strong point of the Wehrmachr. And as in North Africa, the Germans took most of the supplies that came through. The CSIR soldiers suffered from lack of supplies during the Winter. There were hortages of nnot only military supplies, but also fuel, food, and warm clothing. The Russian winter proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a balmy Mediterranean climate. Then came the winter offensive.

Soviet Winter Offensive (December 1941)

The Soviet Red Army launched a major Winter Offensive before Moscow (Secember 10). Red Army units also struck at various other locations along the Eastern Frlnt, including the Ukraine. The CSIR has to fight a protracted defensive action. The CSIR fought battles at Ubescicce, Chazepetovka. The Soviets launched a major assault (December 25). The Italianms called it thed "Christmas Battle". The CSIR manage to stop the Soiviets and stabilize the Izjum front. The 81st Infantry Regiment of the "Torino" destinguished themselves at Novaja Orlovka.

8th Army /Italian Army in Russia--ARMIR (July 1942)

Mussolini after the Germans stabilized the front and achieved victorues in the Crime and at Karkov decided to expand Italian participation on the Eastern Front (July 1942). This was primarily expanding troop levels, not improving the supply sitution or the the equipment. The Italian force was increased to eventually something like 250,000 men. The was remamed the 8th Italian Army, sometimes reffered to as the Italian Army in Russia (Armata Italiana in Russia -- ARMIR). The ARMIR was part of the Wehrmacht's General Maximilian von Weichs' Army Group B in the south. . Italian General Italo Gariboldi was given command of the ARMIR. CSIR commander General Messe had opposed exoanding his command in Russia until it could be adeuately with heavy weapons. This led to his dismissal. Gariboldi was the Governor-General of Libya where he had wirked with the Germans. Italian sources after the War criticized him for being too submissive to the Germans. Mussolini to form his new army group committed seven new divisions to the Eastern Front. This brought the AR

Stalingrad (August 1942-Fbrury 1943)

The ARMIR played a role in the climatic battle of the Eastern Front -- Stalingrad. After being activted, ARMIR as part of the Wehrmcht's Case Blue moved east toward the west bank of the Don River (July 1942). The mobile riflemen (Bersaglieri) of the Prince Amedeo Duke of Aosta Fast Division managed to reduce the Soviet bridgehead at Serafimovič (August 1942). The Bersaglieri sucessfully defeatd a Soviet attack during the first defensive battle of the Don (August). [IMD] This was only possible, however, because German Panzers intervened. The Italians did not have any meaningful armpr of therr own. Hitler deided to modify Case Blue and made Stalingrad a major objective. As the German 6th Army drove into Stalingrd itself, the Germans deployed its lightly armed allies (Italin, Hungarian, and Romanian) on the flanks of the city to the north and south. The ARMIR was placed on the northern flank of the German 6th Army fighting its way toward the Volga in Stalingrad. The Soviets supplied General Vasily Chuikov's 62nd Army in Stalingrad just enough support to keep the Germans committed to fighting in the city. The ARMIR was positioned between the Hungarian and Romanian forces. The Italian front line stretched along the River Don for more than 250 km. They begn with the Hungarian 2nd Army in Kalmiskowa to the Romanian 3rd Army in Veshenskaja, a small town about 270 km northwest of Stalingrad. The Italian line anounted to only a weak screen. The Don was the principal defense. They did not dig trench lines or build a real effective positions and did not have heavy wepons. Heavy snow and severe winter temptures restrictd troop movements. This led the Italians and OKW to believe that any kind of Soviet offensive was unlikely. The Soviet blow when it came was Operation Uranus was a complete surprise (November 19). The Italians escaped the initial Soviet blow which focused on the Romanians closer to Stalingrad. Uranus was a double envelopment. The twin Soviet obliterated the Romanian 3rd Army and the Romanian 4th Army and joined up at Kalach only 4 four days after the initial assault. This surrounded and isolated the 6th Army. OKW had to make one of the most importnt decesions of the War. Gem. Paulis asked for permission to break out. The Soviet lines were still weak. .

Withdrawl

The Germans manged to withdraw from the Cucauses and stabilize the Front (February 1943). For a whle it looked like the Red Army might managed to destroy the entire southern wing of the Ostheer. The ARMIR had been routed and thoroughly demoralized. Mussolini withdrew what remained of the ARMIR. Less than 150,000 men had survive the Soviet onslaught and 34,000 of these men were wounded. The disaster in Russia long with the developing dusaster in North frica significantly affcted the popularity of Mussolini. The Italians were not deeply invested in the war from the beginning. Now most Italians simply wanted out. The Fascist cintrolled media had ttemoted to msk the disaster. But as the men began to return from Russia, the extent of the disaster soon beame widely known. Survivors and the Italian public began blaming Mussolini and the Fascists as well as the army leadership.

Asessment

Mussolini committed sme 250,000 men to the Eastern Front. About 30,000 Italians died in combat or other causes. Even more, some 54,000 men, would die in Soviet captivity. Only smll numbers of Italin POWs survived to return to Italy after the war. The ARMI survivors believed that both Muusolini and the Army commanders were incompetent, sending a poorly prepared, ill-equipped, and inadequately armed military force to the Eastern Front just to placate Hitler. And it was not just the lack of heavy weapons. Survivors complained that hand grenades were defective and tht rifles and machine guns often did not work in the cold wether, commonly freezing up in battle. And the Germans were accused of abndonung the Italian divisions. The charge was that timely withdrawl was delayed in an effort to sabe German units. after the Soviet breakthrough, in order to rescue their own troops. [Faldella]

Sources

Ciano, Galeazzo. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City Publishing Company: Garden City, 1945), 582p.

Faldella, Emilio. L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale (Cappelli: Bologna, 1959).

Italian Ministry of Defence (IMD). Stato Maggiore Esercito. Ufficio Storico. L’8° Armata Italiana nella seconda battaglia difensiva del Don (Roma: 1977)







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Created: 5:10 AM 4/14/2010
Last updated: 9:10 AM 5/20/2016