*** World War II Japan military campaigns operations








World War II: Japanese Military Campaigns--Operations


Figure 1.--Japan began its aggression in China. While the Chinese military was not match for the Japanese, China was such a large country that Japan found it impossible to defeat. Just has Hitler got it in his head that he could defeat the British by attacking the Soviet Union. Tojo and his advisers got in in their heads that they could complete the conquest of China by attacking the United States. The initial result was the surprise carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. Here we see 'USS West Virginia' and 'USS Tennessee' burning. They were two of the American 'Big Five' battkeships. 'Tennesse' was back in service in just a few months (March 1942), but the more heavily damaged 'West Virginia' would not rejoin the fleet for over 2 years (July 1944), by which time it was a much more powerful ship.

World War II consisted of land, naval, and air operations. Japanese land operation were primarily in China, Burma India Theater (CBI), especially China. Here we are talking about the troop dispositions and not the importance of the operations. The problem for the Japanese is that even after 6-months of stunning successes, the American refused to ask for an armistice. This mean that Japan would have to fight the Pacific War with an army that was primarily deployed in China and only limited capabilities to transport it to the Pacific or even to adequately supply the units already deployed there. It is a little difficult to talk about the land operations in the Pacific war because so much of it was amphibious operations on relatively small islands. The Pacific War is best known for some of the greatest naval battles in history. The Imperial Army scored some major victories beginning with Pearl Harbor. And this was the case even after Midway. Unlike the Imperial Army, the Imperial Navy was well trained and had some excellent ships and weaponry. The Japanese gave as much as they received in the naval battles around Guadalcanal (August-September 1942). Radar was of great assistance to the depleted American fleet. But by 1943 the overwhelming American superiority in both ships and aircraft mean that the Imperial Navy could no longer go toe to toe with the Americans. The Japanese admirals generally avoided battle, hoping vainly that fortified island garrisons could repel American invasions (1943) Then the strategic importance of the Marianas and Philippines forced the Imperial Navy to battle and was destroyed in the process and ceased to be an important force. Often loss in the fleet actions, is the importance of the submarine campaign. There had been air operations in World War I, but they were still minor. This was not the case in the Asia-Pacific theater. Most of the island hopping invasions were designed to seize islands where air based could be built. The Japanese Zero surprised Allied commanders, but actually the American Wildcat out-classed the Zero in Pacific aerial combat. The Zero's effectiveness and range came at a cost, no defensive armament and self-sealing tanks. When a new generation of American aircraft reached the Pacific, the Zero was totally outclassed. This began to be seen in the Solomons (1943) and then starkly on display in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (1944). With the destruction of the Japanese carriers, attention turned to the Air Force bombers. B-29 Superfortress was a shock to the Japanese. They had assumed that American bombers did not have the range to reach the Home Islands. The fall of the Marianas which provided bases fir the B-29 was a game changer. There were efforts to bomb from China, but flying material and supplies over the hump was absurd. It would take some time, but the B-29 would turn Japan's wood and paper cities into mounds of glowing cinders even before the atomic bombs.

Land

The major land operations of the Japanese were conducted in China. The first land operations were the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931). These were fairly limited operarions because the Chinese did not opose the Japanese invasion. Chiang was well aware of the Japanese superiority and did not to engage the Japanese. the war wih China bgan 6 years later at the Marco Polo Bridge just north of Peiking. The Japanese ininiate a police action and punishing the Chinese, but did not mean to launch a full-scale war. Chiang was heavily criticised for not responding in Manchuria, damaging the reputstion of his Nationlist government. He this had no choice to respond. Thus the Japanese encursion set off the War. Fir the first year of the War, The Nationaslist when toe- to toes with ghe Jspsnese and sufferdc badly. hey put up a substantial defense of Shanghai. The losses were horendous. After that first year, Chiang retired into the interior where the Japanese had trouble getting at them. The Japanese seized Chinese ports. The Chinese interior had little infrastructure that would aid the Japanese who had very limited logisticak capability. So after huhe successes, the war in China settled down to a long, slow conflict without any resolution in site. The Japanese were frustrated and the cost of the war was affecting the economy. They were furtherfrusrsted by the increasing American pressure. The oil embasrgo was the final straw (Juky 1941). The war in China woukd go on for another 4 years. The CBI campaign that began with the invasiin of makaya (Decenber 1941, took Singapore and Burma (1942). Finally the Jaoanese atte,oted toninvade Induia (1944). The actions were not connected with the war in China where the great bulk of the Japanese Army was committed. The Pacific War involved a range od island invasions, in both the Siuth pacific and than the Central Pacific leading tio the libration if the Philippines. The problem for the Japanese was that their army throughout the war was still in China, making it difficult to fight the Pacific War.

Naval

It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into World War II. Had the Japanese not attacked, it is unclear just when America would have entered the War. The Japanese Imperial Fleet was a superbly trained force with modern, well designed vessels. Many naval experts at the time did not fully appreciate the effectivness of the Imperial Navy. The lack of radar, however, proved a huge disadvantage. Allied radar and many other technical advances were the result of close cooperation between American and British scientists anf joint development projects that began even before America entered the War. There was no comparable Axis technical cooperation or even coordination of military campaigns. The Kriegsmarine had very effective radar on its surface ships like Bismarck yet advanced German technology like radar, jet engines, and other equipment was not provided to the Japanese until very late in the War, too late to be of any effective use to the Japanese war effort. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. The Japanese were able to seize much of Southeast Asia, but the stunning American carrier victory at Midway, significantly reduced the strike capability of the Imperial Navy. This provided the time for American industrial capacity to reated a naval force with which Japan's limited industrial capacity could not cope. While the German submarine campaign in the North Atlantic failed, the American submarine campaign in thePacific proved spectacularly successful. The Japanese merchant marine was almost completely destroying, cutting the country's war industries off from supplies and bringing the country close to starvation. Amercan industrial strength enabled America to build a naval force capable of leap froging from island to island. The Navy by 1944 had seized islands from which the Japanese Home Island could be bombed. The Navy also enabled the Army to retake New Guinea and the Phillipines and by 1945 Okinawa. Navy and Army forces were preparing for a full-scale amphibious invasion of the Home Islands when two atomic bombs were dropped (August 1945) and Japan finally surrendered (September 1945).

Air

The Western Allies discounted Japanese aviation in the run up to the Asian-Pacific War. This proved to be a serious mistake. The Asia-Pacific air war began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931). From the beginning the Jaanese began bombing Chinese cities, including Sahnghai. There was little or no Chinese air opposition. Japanese air attacks on China began on a wider scsle when the Japanese invased China proper (1937). The small Chinese air force was quickly destroyed. Japan had total sir control. Unlike the Luftwaffe there was no close air support, but the Japanese woukd attack Chinese ground positions. And they extensively bombed Chinese cities. The attacks on cities werev terrorv raids with no actual targets in mind. The hinese had very little indutry tio bomb. The goal was to break the willmof thev Chinese people. America resonding to the humanitarian crisis began to help China build an air fiorce. What China needed was air defense fighters. Mafam Chinag was put in charge of the Chinese Air Fiorce and she hired Claire Chenault. The Army Air Corps was dominated by the Bo,mberr Boys and Chenault focus on fihters meant that he had little opportunity. The unopposed Japanese bombing of Chinese cities This continued until the Chenault's Flying Tigers reached China (December 1941). They provided the first air defense for Chunking and other Chinese cities. The Flying Tigers was converted to the 14th Air Fiorce, but oprations would be limited by the necsity of flying supplies in over the Hump. The Flying Tigers were folded un to the 14th Air Firce which began bombing Japnese inatalations in China. The Pacific War was lunched by the Japanese caaier attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). Initial Japanese air superiority would olay a major role in the 6-month offensive fillowing Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Zero was fast and nmanuerable with enormous range, but very vulnerable because of its light construction. The major Japanese advantage was the core of enensley skilled Joanese carrier aviators. The probkem for Japan was the small nummbrr of these avaitors and the failure to create an effectuive trainng program for larger numberrs. The focus on carrier battles ended with the Battle of the Philippines Sea (June 1944) and the disaterous Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The Japanese turned tomland-based Kamakaze attacks. But the war-winning air campaign would b the strategic bombing camopaign from the Marianas. The Japanese like the Germans began the War with thev belieft that they could bomb other countries, but no one could bomb them. It proved to be avery bad bet, .







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Created: 5:57 AM 12/3/2023
Last updated: 8:41 AM 12/26/2023