Japan with little encouragement joined the Allies in World War I. The country played only a minor role in the War, but gained German possessions in the Central Pacific which they proceeded to turn into fortified bases. Japanese diplomats at both Versailles (1919) and the Washington Naval Conference (1921) failed to achieve goals and this angered nationalist elements, especially in the Army. The Depression and resulting protectionist trade policies in America and Europe adversely affected the Japanese economy. The Japanese military increasingly advocated action to secure markets and raw materials. This process began with the Japanese Army seized Manchiera and set up the puppet state of Manchuko (1931). This brought international condemnation and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. An Army revolt in Tokyo failed, but left the Army essentially in control of the Japanese Government (1936). The Japanese signed the Anti-Comentern Pact to protect their position in Manchuko (1936). Japan invaded China proper (1937). Many historians date this as the beginning of World War II. After the NAZI victories in Europe, Japan moved into French Indo China (1940). Japan formally joined the Axis (1941). The United States objected to Japanese expanonist policies and moved the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor and ininitated embargoes of strastegic materials. The Army had been the main force pushing for war, the Navy realizing they would have to fight the American and British fleets were less enthusiastic. Once the decession was made, however, the Navy dutifully prepared for war. Hitler as Soviet resistance stiffened expected Japan to join his anti-Bolshevik struggle. Instead the Japanese struck south with a devestating carrier attack at Pearl Harbor (1941). This brought America into the war and initiated a war of unprecedented savegery. The Japanese Army treated both POWs and civilians with unprecedented cruelty. As Japanese naval commander Yamamoto predicted, spearheaded by a powerful carrier force, Japan in 6 months swept over Southeast Asian and the central Pacific with largely ineffective opposition. The decisive American naval vicvtory at Miday (1942) significantly weakened the Imperial Navy. This provided America's vast industrial strength to build the naval forces needed to seize the Pacific island bases to bring the war to Japan. America then laubched a desestating strategic bombing campaign culminating in the dropping of the atomic bombs (1945). Most countries that played important roles in World War II have come to terms with the War. Japan is the principal country today which keeps the truth of the War from their school children.
Looking back as a historian, it is almost incomprehensible that Japan decided to wage war against the United States. War with Britain and the Netherlands is more understandable. Britain in 1941 looked like if not a defeated nation, at least a severely weakened one. The Netherlands was occupied by Axis ally NAZI Germany. America is a very different matter. The United States was not at war. It had not been weakened by the War. And Japan had no commitment that the Germany would join them if they attacked America. War with America seems like an extrodinarily wreckless decession for a country already mired down in a war with China and that had experienced a sharp defeat in a short war with the Soviets. Why would Japan have decided on war with America, a country with a larger population and a much larger industrial and scientific base. The road to war began early in the history of modern Japan. Wars with China (1895), Russia (1904-05), and Germany (1914-18) proved both short and profitable, enabling Japan to build a small empire. The risring influence of the military brought to power men of limited outlook who saw military action as a legitimate use of sate power. They were backward looking men who saw the European empires of the 19th century as to what Japan should seek to establish. And they were men who were strongly influenced by the historic image of the Samurai and Bushido which convinced them that Japanese racial superiority and martial spirit could prevail over the material supperority of America. Despite the power of American induistry, tgey saw Americans as a weak, decadent people who would not fight. Most of the Japanese militarists who made this judgement on which the very life of Japan would hang, knew no Americans and had little or no experience with Ameica.
The Japanese faced a quandry. They had achieved sucess after success in China, but still the war dragged on. The war in China put substantial demands on the Japanese economy. To make matters worse, their primary source of resources to conduct the war in China as the United States. This was especially true of petroleum. Japan would have to end the war in China or find alternative supplies of natural resources. German successes in Europe opened up the prospects of seizing the resource rich British, Dutch, and French colonies in Southeast Asia. But situated between the Home Island and those resources were the American Phillipine Islands and the implied threat threat of the Pacific Fleet which President Roosevelt had moved forward to Pearl Harbor. One of the not yet fully inderstood questions of World War II is why the Japanese did nor strike north at the Siviets after the Germans had destroyed much of the Red Army. Once the Japanese had decided on war with America. Their focus became the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese strategic concept was to smash the Pacific Fleet and seize a huge empire with the resources it needed and then fortify it so that it would be enormously costly for the Americans to retake. The resources from the empire which the Japanese called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were to be used to support the Japanese military. The Japanese with little knowledge of America were convinved that America would never make the sacrifices needed to retake the Japanese conquests. This strategic concept was fataly flawed. First, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a starteling military success, but a strategic blunder of incalcuable proportions. The attack turned a biterly divided America into a unified, mortal enemy. Second, the Japanese strategy had no provision for attacking the industrial base of the United States, an industrial base far exceeding the industrial capacity of Japan. This industrial base allowed American to build a military force that Japan could not possibly match. Third, the Japanese were unprepared for the American submarine campaign, a campaign which by 1943 was beginning to deny Japanese industry the resources from their newly won empire. The Japanese found their army bogged down in unwinnable campaigns in China and Burma and morooned on isolated Pacific islands that they could no longer supply or even defend. Nor could the resources of their empire be brought back to the factories on the Home Island. Japan at the time of its surrender in 1945 was approaching starvation.
A military historian assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Japan would be hard put to understand why the country would have ever launched a war against the United States. The further imponderable is that unlike their Axis partners where the decesion for war was made by the whims of an all-powerful dictator, the Japanese actually carefully studied the issue and the decision for war wa made a consesus of the country's militay leadership. The only factor that makes the decision for war somewhat understandable is that they were under the impression that the Germans had defeated the Soviet Red Army and the Soviet was about to collapse. Overall, the Jaanese, however, were next to Italy, the weakest of the major World War II beligerants.
The Japanese has some real strengths. Japan was an industrial power, in fact the only industrial power in Asia. This gave them the ability to wage war in China, a much more populous country. Japan was better prepared for war having devoted a substantial part of its national income to build a powerful navy. Especially important was the First Air Fleet. This gave them the opportunity to win a short war with the United States which was not prepared. It had a technical capability to produce two important weapons, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero and the Long Lance Torpedo. The Japanese leadership had a compliant population and a lthe fiercely devoted, determined military which supported the leadership at all levels without question. There were some competent military leaders, most prominently Adm. Yamamoto and Gen. Yamashita. And they had a powerful Axis ally--NAZI Germany.
Many of Japan's strengths had offsetting weaknesses. While Japan was the only industrial power in Asia, its industrial caability was a fraction of that of the other belgerants and pailed in comarison to the huge industrial base. This meant that while Japan might win a short war, it has little chance of winning a long, drawn out war of attrition. This was especially the case of a naval war which relied heavily on industrial power. The limited industrial also mean that the Japanese soldier fought the War with the worse weaponry of any power. Japan also had only a fraction of the technological capability of America and Britain. The Japanese might have done well if the War was fought with the same weapons that Japan and America brought to the table in December 1941. But it was not. The Japanese lagely did fight the War with the same weapons, but America did not. America with its massive industrial and technoloigical capability not only could replace losses, but could introduce many advancd weaons that the Japanese could not match. A compliant population not asking questions was an advantage as long as Japanese leaders made correct decisions. But of course the decisions they made were disasterous. Overall, Japan had perhaps the most incompetent military leadership of all the major belligerants. The most respected commander was Adm. Yamaoto. His Pearl Harbor plan worked well against the unprepared Americans. Yet it was the same Yamaoto who planned perhaps the most incoherent naval battle plan in history--Midway. Japanese Army commanders exhibited little tactical subtelty. They were prone to ordering Banzai attacks that proved suicidal against a modern military force. In major battles, Japanese casualties exceed American casualties by a ratio of 10 to 1. The large Japanese Army proved of little use in fighting anaval war and air war. And their German ally which they believed had defeated the Red Army proved to have failed disasterously. Japan's wood and paper cities were particularly vulnerable to stragegic bombing. But of all Japan's weaknesses, the most important was the almost total lack of critcal natral resorces. And it was not just a matter that there was very little on the Home Islands, but having to import food, metals, oil, and other material made them vulnerable to a marime interdiction campaign. Japan focused on naval war ships. Its maru fleet (merchant marine) was barely adequate in peace time, but was grossly inadequate for war. And this was before theamerican submarine force began to systemartically destroy the marus.
Japan fought World War II with two services, the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy. The Imperial Army was the dominant servioce. There of course was a third unit, the Air Force, but like the United States it was part of the Imperial Army and the Navy had its own separate air service. The strongest support for Pacific War came from the Imperial Army which was determined to complete its subjacation of China. It was the Army that led the militarization of Japanese society, assainating any political leader who questioned the military. Curiously this was after failing to win the War in China which was being fought at enormous cost. Not only had the Army failed to complete its victory in China, but the Army was decisevely defeated by the Red Army in a sharp engagement on the Mongolian Border (July 1939). Fighting the poorly armed Chinese was one thing. Fighting a well armed, modern army was a different matter.
One might have though with that Japanese commanders would have realized that there equipment was deficent in fighting a well-armed foe. Incredibly, the Japanese militarists decided that they could go to war with the United States and Britain. The militarists apparently concluded that the Deutsche Wehrmcht after launching Barabrossa (June 1941) would smash the Red Army and the United States would have to concentrate its efforts in Europe. They also did not believe that the Americans had the warrior spirit neede to fight a war. The Whermcht not only failed to destroy the Red Army, but suffered devestating losses in a Red Army Winter Offensive before Moscow. The most technologically advanced service was the Imperial Navy. And they would have to bear the brunt of the Pacific War. They had a magnificent fleet and well trained sailors and aviators. And it was with the First Air Fleet that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor Laubching the Pacific War. It was a brilliant executed attack and one of the gretest blunders in miitary history. The Japanese air forces proved highly effective at the beginning of the War, both because of advanced air craft and superbly trained air crews. The Imperial Army achieved some stunning successes early in the War, but as American industry began to restore the military balance, weaknesses in Army tactical doctrine and weaponry led to one failure after another in the Pacific despite the fanatical commitment of the individual soldier. Asthe Allies began tofield well trained and equipped forces, the Japanese string of victories ended. Even when the Japanese had a substantial superority in forces, they filed to retake Guadalcanal, in large part because of astonishly amateurih tactics. Army doctrine soon degenerated into how to kill as many Americans as possible in hopeless defenses of one Pacific island after another.
A militaristic party rose to dominate the Japanese government during the early era of his reign. His complicity with the milatarists is a not well researched subject. Not every authority agrees with the widespread belief that Hirohito had no hand in Japan's conduct in World War II. Far from it. One example is Imperial Conspiracy written by David Bergamini (1971) who found that Hirohito was behind all the major decisions in the war, but that his role was covered up, and that General MacArthur knew, but went along with the whitewash for pragmatic reasons. Loyal Japanese officials and military commanders, unwilling to see the Emperor soiled by association with crimes committed in his name, saw their honorable duty as taking the punishment. What ever Hirihito's role, the militarists during his reign pursued expansionism, war with China (1937-45), and military alliance with the Axis powers (1940). The alliance led to Japan's participation in World War II and its attack on the United States in 1941. Toward the end of the war Hirohito sought peace, and in August 1945 he broadcast the unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allies.
The Japanese militarists having successfully taken on China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05) and participating in Wiorld War I believed that in possession of a powerful fleet they could now enter World War II to solidify their position in China andexpand their empire with the Southern Resource Zone. Rather than join the NAZI war with the Soviet Union, the Japanese instead struck south with a devestating carrier attack at Pearl Harbor (1941). A Japanese carrier taskforce composed of six carriers on December 7, 1941, executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It was a brilliant tactical victory for Japan, but perhaps the greatest mistake in modern military history as it brought a suddenly united America with its vast industrial capacity into the War. The Japanese launched 360 aircraft which in 2 hours struck Peal Harbor just as the American sailors were waking up on a sleepy Sunday morning. The strike sunk or heavily damaged six of the eight American battleships, thrre cruisrs, three destroyers, and most of the Army Air Corps planes on the island. America was at war.
The Japanese led by Admiral Yamaoto were the first to begin to grasp the full potential of naval aviation, although the big-gun bttleship devotees still had enormous influence. And even Yamaoto did not fully understand how obsolete the battleships had become. Admiral Nagumo demonstrated the power of carrier-based aircraft at Pearl Harbor. And this was cpmpounded by their sweep across the Pacific (1942). Yamamoto was correct in his assessment of the importance of the carrier. He also warned the Imperial Givernment that he could guarantee naval dominance only for 6 months, an amazingly accurate assessment. Japanese leaders had no concept of how quickly America could build new carriers and update their aircraft. In the end, the Pacific War was won by the carriers, but it would be the American carriers. The primary target of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor were the three carriers of the Pacific fleet Enterprose, Lexington, and Saratoga). By mere chance, none were at Pearl. Admiral Nimitz who after the strike was ordered to Pearl was given command of the Fleet. He had to develop a strategy to hold off the Japanese with those three carriers while America built a powerful new fleet. Had the Pacific Fleet's battleshis not been devetated, there are probably would have been a majpr fleet action in which the U.S. Navy would have suffred far greater damage. Without the battleships, however, Nimitz was forced to build a naval strategy around carriers, the major surviving force. The United States began an emense effort to build a vast naval armada. Priority was given to 40 new carriers-many of which were the Essex class fast carriers. These enorous fighting ships were over 800 feet long and totaled 27,000 tons. These carriers, however, would not begin to arrive until 1943. Until then, Nimitz would have to hold off Yamamoto and the Forst ir Fleet with a few carriers, obsolete aircraft, and a devestated Pacific Fleet.
The attack on Pear Harbor This brought America into the war and initiated a war of unprecedented savegery. The Japanese Army treated both POWs and civilians with unprecedented cruelty. Most accounts of World War II find that the Pacific War was fouught more savagely than the European War, especially the fighting between the Germans and Western Allies. The differences can be exagerated. Tere were German attrcities in the West (Oradour-surGlane and Malmedy). Both the Germans and Allies carried out air raids on cvilian populations. There are, however, reasons to conclude that the fighting in the pacific Gheater reached a level of savergy not normally experienced in the Western Front of the European War. A range of explanations have been offered to explain the savagery of the conflict. Race certainly was a factor. The overwealmin factor, however, appears to be the Japanese martial code (Bushido) and the assumtion as in the case of the NAZIs that the War was won and Japan would never have to answer for the attrocities committed. In fct Japan has a nation has never come to terms with the attricities committed by the Imperial army in its name.
Japanese American children were severly affected by the war. Those living in Pacific coast states were move into concentragtion camps. Although not separated from their patents, Japanese Americans in Pacific coast states were interned in concentration or relocation camps as they were called. Italian and German families were also interned, but only aliens or those whose parents have been involved or suspected of involvement in subversive activites. The Japanese were treated differently in part because of Pearl Harbor, but racial factors were a signoificant factor. President Roosevelt in February 1942 signed the order "evacuating" Japanese, most of whom were Japanese citizens, from the West Coast. Like the Germans, American authorities developed euphenisms for what was done to the Japanese. The order only affected the West Coast, not the Japanese on Hawaii. About 127,000 Japanese Americans were interned. It was one of the most grevious violations of the civil rights of American citizens in United States history. While the internment of Japanese Americans was a terrible injustice, depriving them of their property in many instances and their freedom for several years, the camps were quite different than the the NAZI and Japanese concentration camps. The internees were given adequate food and the children attended local schools. Japanese Americans formed Boy Scout troops such as at the Gila River Relocation Center, Arizona, during 1943.
With the American fleet imobilized at Pear Harbor, the Japanese were able to sweep through the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. Guam was quickly taken. Resistance at Wake sland suprised the Japanese, but after the initial assault was repulsed, a second assault took the island. MacArthur's defense of the Philippines was compromised when most of his planes were destroyed on the fround at Clarke Field. General MacArthur commanded the most important American military force west of Pearl. His handlong of the defense of the Philippines wasdisapponting at best, bordering on incompetence. He failed to strike back at the Japanese in the hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor by bombing Jpanese bases in Formosa. He also allowed much of the available aircraft to be destroyed on the ground. [Schom] The horror of the Batan Death March created an impage of the Japanese military in the American mind that fueled a hatred for the Japanese. [Schom] Hong Kong quickly fell. The Japanese also seized the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). Allied naval forces fought a series of engagements to stop the Japanese, but could not match the powerful Japanese naval forces. Animitz and Halsey tried to distract the Japanese with hit an run carrier raids. The Japanese moved south from IndoChina, seizing Malayia and then the bastion at Singapore. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are lost in the defense of Singapore. Then they moved west through Thailand and defeating the British in Burma. Within a few months the Japanese had carved out the huge empire with enormous resources that they had long coveted. The Japnese then targeted New Guinea in preparation for a move south to Australia. All that remained to stop them were four American carriers.
The Japanese in the territories territories during the early phase of its imperial expansion (Taiwan 1894 and Korea 1909) were subjected to a Japanization policy. These countries were not so much occupied as sujected to a fundamental reordering of culture. Some attention was given to education, but instruction was in the Japasnese language. This apparenly was also the plan in Manchuria (Manchukuo), but included colonization by immigrant families. The territories seized in the Pacific War were military occupations. It is unclear what Japan's long-term plans for the new Empire were. Occupation policies depended in part on the political orientation of the population. The Japanese were especiallu severe with the Westerners they found in the occupied territories and the Chinese. There were Chinese comminities in many large cities in the Burma, Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand. The Civilians from Allied countries, which happenedto be the colonial powes, were interned in near genocidal conditions. The Japanese also did not trust the Chinese. Singapore had alargely ethnic Chinese population. The most deadly action was the Sook Ching Massacre. While there were differences among the many mostly European countries occupied, the Japanese pursued some consistent policies. First all considerations were secondary to the war effort, including the welfare of the occupied people. And as the Japasnese did not bring food for their soldiers with them, this would result in mass starvastion in the Dutch-East Indies and Indo-China and serious local food shortages throughout the occupied areas. In fact, isolated Japanese garrisons throughout the Pacific began to starve. Second, Japanese civilian occupation authorities had no control overthe military. Third, every occupied area had to be self-sufficent, including food. Occupied areas were not allowed to import food, includung territiries that berfore the War were dependent on imports. Fourth, there was no rule of law. When food shortages developed because of Japanese mismanagement, the Japanese Army was freeto go out into the countrtyside and seizefood from the peasantry. Fifth, the Japanese pursued the propaganda narative of Asia for the Asians. This appealed to some of the nationalists in the European colonies. It was less persusive in the Philippines where the United States was in the process of independence and the Fiipinos already had home rule and Democratic elections. It is unclear to what extent the Japanese would have permitted autonomy after the War. And meaningful independence seems out of the question. Even autonomy is something the Japanese did not allow anywhere in their existing empire, including Japan itself. The military had seized control of the Government. It defies logic to think that the military would have permitted independence when they denied it to their own people. There is absolutely no doubt that the Japanese would have retained control over critical natural resources, especially oil.
Specially trained American aviators in B-25s took off from the carrier Wasp to strike Japan. It was the first blow to the Japanese home islands. The raid was led by Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle. The physical damage was inconsequential, but the psychological impact was immense. Most of the Amrican aviators crash landed in China and were helped to reach saftey by Chinese Nationalist guerillas. The Japanese reprisals were savage. A estimated 0.5-0.7 million Chinese civilians were murdered. The Japanese Navy was so embarassed th hey rushed forward plns to bring the desimated American Pacific Fleet to battle at Midway Island.
Allied intelligence in breaking the Japanese codes had a substantial impact on the Pacific War, especially at the Coral Sea (1942) and Midway (1942). As the initaitive shifted to the Americans, learning of Japanese intentions became less important. The code breakers did develop information that lead to an air strike which succeeded in killing Admiral Yamamoto (1943). The Americans never launched a major military deception campaign in the Pacific, in sharp contrast to the operations in Europe. One historian explains that the American assessment. The Americans believed that the Japanese Empire was "... too incompetent to understand what was being told them, and stood to low in the estimation of the decessionmakers for it to have done much good if they had." [Holt] The Americans did carryout one important deception effort--Operation Bluebird. This was designed to convince the Japanese that southern China and Formosa (Taiwan) were to be invaded rather than Okinawa.
We do not yet have much information on the Japanese home front during World war II. Japan was the most industrialized country in Asia, but the country's industrial capacity was a fraction of that of America and Britain. And the country had to import raw material, including vital resources like petroleum. Nor was the country self-production in food production. The Militarists who made the decession for War calculated that Japan could seize the resources it needed in a quick war and that the Americans and Eutropeans would not be willing to wage a costly war to recover the lost territory. That was essentially the gamble made at Pearl Harbor. That gamble was lost at Midway. Not only did Japan suffer that disastrous defeat, but it suffered it at a time that the Imperial Navy was still dominant in the Pacific and before American industrial production had decisively shifted the ballance of forces. We do not know a great deal about the Japanese home front. The Japanese militarists absolutely controlled the press in Japan. Only news of Japanese victories were allowed in the press and for the first 6 moths there were plenty of those. When Japanese defeats began to occur, they were strictly prohibited in the press. When the sailors and surviving air men returned from Midway (June 1942) they were held incomunicano least news of the disastrous defeat leaked out. Even Army commanders were not fully informed.) We are not sure when the Japanese people began to realize that their country was losing the War. In fact Japan lost very little territory until 1944. And the fighting was very distant from Japan. The militarists believed that the NAZIs in Europe would occupy America's military and thus Japan's smaller industrial output would be suffient for a shirt war. Japan mobilized the country's industrial capacity. Women and children were ordered to work in factories as well as on farms. Japanese industry, however, proved totally incapable of matching America production in quantity or quality. The Japanese did succeed in seizing vital natural resources in Oceania and Southeast Asia, including oil and rubber (1942). Unfortunately for the Japanese the U.S. Navy was successfully waging a sunmarine campaign that made it impossible to ship these resources to Japanse factories (1943). Worse still the Americans took the Marianas which brought Japanese industry within the range of the new American B-39n bombers.
The losses of the tiny attols and islands in the central Pacific, however, brought the Japanese Home Islands within reach of the new American B-29 bombers. The strategic bombing of Japan was a disaster that could not be hidden by control of the press. These raids must have come as a huge shock and may well have been the first infication to the Japanese people that the War had turned into a national disaster. The first raids were of marginal effectiveness, but by 1945 the U.S. Arny Air Firce was burning the heart out of one Japanese city after another--including Tokyo. There was also a poor harvest which combined with the destruction of the Japanese merchant marine meant that there were growing food shortages. Rationing reduced rice and other food purchases to 1,500 calories--subsistence levels. But as the war continued into 1945 even that amount was often not available. Thestategic bombing camopaign hadby mid-1945 destroyed Japan's transportation system. Had Japan not surrendered (August 1945), Japanese civilians would have starved in large numbers during the Winter of 1945-46.
The first importantAllied effort o stop the Japanse sweep through the Pacific occurred in the Coral Sea. The Japanse vplanned to seize Port Moreseby, completing their conquest of New Guinea. Port Moresby would have also posed a threat to Australia itself. A Japanese naval task force en route to seize Port Moresby was intercepted by an American carrier force, alerted by code breakers. It was the first carrirer to carrier engagement in history. The Japanese succeeded in sinking Lexington and heavily damaging Yorktown. The Japanese lost a light carrier and another carrier was heavily damaged. Despite the American losses, theJapanese invasion force turned back, the first major Japanese reversal of the War.
The decisive American naval vicvtory at Miday (1942) significantly weakened the Imperial Navy. This provided America's vast industrial strength to build the naval forces needed to seize the Pacific island bases to bring the war to Japan. Admiral Yamamoto was convinced that the remaining American carriers could be brought to battle and destroyed at Midway. The Japanese plans were based on achieving an element of curprise and on the fact that two American carriers had been destoyed in the Coral Sea, in fact the Yorktown, although heavily damaged had not been sunk. American code breakers had alerted the Ameicans to the Jaspanese plans. Admiral Nimitz positioned Enterprise and Hornet, along with the hastily patched up Yorktown northwest of Midway to ambush he Japanese. The American carrier victory at Midway dealt a crippling blow to the Imperial Navy. The Americans sank four first-line Japnese carriers, killing most of the well-trained crews. While the Imperial Navy still held an advantage, it was no longer an overwealming one. Meanwhile American shipyards were turning out the new Essex clss carriers that would engage the weakened Imperial Navy in 1943.
The first America land offensive in the Pacific occurred on the virtually unknown island of Guadacanal in the Solomons. Allied coast watchers reported the Japanese were building an air strip on Guadacanal. From that base, the Japanese could threaten the sea lanes to Australia. A marine invasion force was rapidly assembled. It was a risky operation from the onset. Although dealt a serious blow at Midway, the Imperial Navy still dominatd the Pacific and outnumbered the American Pacfic fleet in virtually every class of warship--including carriers. Yamamoto, the bold naval commander who planned the Pear Harbor attack, turned tentative after Midway.
The United Sates after climbing up the Solomon chain and isolating Rabaul persued two separate offensives. American industry was by 1943 producig war material in such quantity that it could both supply the European theater and support twin offensives in the Pacific. First, MacArthur and the Army would continue to move west along the New Guinea Coast toward the Philippines. Second the Navy would open an entirely new offensibe in the Central Pacific. Carrier strikes had hit Japanese-held islands, but the new offensive would be amphibious landings to seize the islands. The first landing was at Tarawa in the Gilberts. Te casualties were horendous. The next was the Marshalls. These landings covered by the Big Blue Fleet steadily expanding in size and capability were unopposed by the Imperial Fleet. The strength and timing of these landings caught the Japanese off guard. They did not believe the United States capable of so many landings over such a wide area. They had hoped that heavily fortified islands could resist amphibious invasion. This proved to be an illusion.
While Midway and Guadacanal were the turning point of the Pacific War, it was in the Marinanas that Japan's fare was sealed. American carrier aircraft broke the power of Japanese naval aviation. The one power Japanese First Air Fleet never again staged a major carrier strike on American forces. Even more significant were the air bases affored by the Mariana Islands. These bases brought the Home Islands into range of the the new long-range B-29 bombers. The invasion of Saipn was one of the key confrontations of the Pacific War. Earlier Pacific Island invasions had made it clear that the Jpanes would not surrender no matter how great the forces availed against them. American planners concluded that if the Japanese would fight to the death on isolated Pacific islands, tht they would resist to the end in the defense of the Home Islands. The casualties of an invasion of the Home Islands could be orrendous. It was thus important to bring the Japanese Home Islands within the range of American bombers so that the Jpanese war making power could be smashed. Seizure of the Marianas would provide the bases from which America could begin the bombardment of the Home Islands. There was a Japanese civilian population on Saipan. Japanese authorities urged the civilians to kill their children and commit suiside. Many did. After the Americans secured the island, the Jpanese civilians were interned, but in realtively comfortable circumstances.
The American conquest of the Philippines was an event that was impossible to hide even by the Thought Police. Even the most obtuse subject of the Emperor could not fail to ask himself if the War was one glorious Japanese vicgory after another, how could the Americans take the Marisanas? The most obvious casualty of the loss of the Marianas was Primeminister Tojo. Army fanatics who assumed that any defeat was the result of incompetance threatened assaination. Tojo had never been a dictator and he resigned and withdrew into a quiet retirment until after the War American MPs arrested him. A new Goverment as formed (July 1944). The new Goverment included Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai who had argued against war before Pearl Harbor.
The Emperor was not, however, despite the appointment of Admiral Yonai intent on ending the War. Rather he adopted te policy of gyokusai--broken gem. The essence of this concept was a Japanese saying--"better to be a gem smashed to bits than a whole tile". Imperial General Headquater's documents at this time speak of "Gyokusai of the 100 million". The 100 million was an inflated reference to the entire Japanese population. [Thomas, p. 139.] Now that American had proven a potent military force, the militarists no longer believed that Japan could prevail on the battlefield. Most still did not believe that Japan could be forced to surrender. Rather the prevailing strategic thinking was to make every American offensive as costly as possible and simply outlast the Americans. The Emperor wondered why the Imperial Navy did not engage the Americans more forcefully in the Philippine Sea and demanded a major fleet action.
The Philippino people suffered greviously under Japanese occupation. This helped fuel an effective Resistance campaigns carried out by guerillas which had achieved control of substantial areas. The Japanese, gowever, controlled the population centers, especially on Leyte and Luzaon. The Navy preferred targetting Formosa (Taiwan), but MacArthur eventually prevailed with his insistence that America must retun to the Philippines. He considered his vow to return a pledge to the Philippinp people that had to be honored. Some how his vow, "I shall return." sems less approaptiate than "We shall return", but it was pure MacArthur and he convinced President Roosevelt. Reports from resistance fighters and American pilots revealed that the Japanese were not heavily defending large areas of the Islands. The inasion of Mindanao was considered unecessary and the decession was made to strike first further north at Leyte. It was in this engagement that the Kamakazis first appeared, although still in relatively small numbers. MacArthur President Sergio Osme˝a waded ashore with the invasion force at Leyte Gulf (October 20, 1944). The American Army forces advanced steadily. The Japanese resisted, but could not match American fire power. The most serious Japanese resistence occurred at sea. The resulting naval engaement following on Battle of the Philippones Sea is commonly referred to as the Battle of Leyte Gulf. It was the largest sea battle ever fought and resulted in the destruction of the Japanese fleet as an effective fighting force. This opened the way for the land campaign. Further landings occurred at Ormoc (December 7, 1944).
America then laubched a desestating strategic bombing campaign vulminating in the dropping of the atomic bombs (August 1945). The air war in the Pacific began as in the European theater with mastery of the skies by the Japanese. The Chinese air force was vityually non-existant. The Japanese conducted terror bombing raid, first on Shanghai and then on other Chinese cities. Japanese aircraft, especially the Mitusubishi Zero, were so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the Unitd States beginning with the attack on Pear Harbor. This continued throughout much of 1942 and only did the arrival of ne American aircraft in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers brought the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The initial raids were inclonclusive. General Curtis LeMay devised a trategy of fire bombing which caused massive destruction in Japanese citis crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. When Japan refused to surender after the Yalta Conference, President Truman ordered the use of tha Atomic Bomb in August 1945. The Japanese surendered in September.
American Marines invaded the isolated volcanic island of Iwo Jima (February 1945). Iwo was 600 miles south of the Jpanese Home Islands. The U.S. Army Air Force after the seizure of the Marianas wanted a base for fighters to escort the B-29 bombers involved in the strategic bombing campaign. It would also prove a safe haven for damaged bombers unable to reach their bases in the Marianas. The Japanese early than the Americans saw the potential strategic importance of Iwo and began to heavily forified the island. As much of the defensive work took place underground, the invasion planners were not aware just how heavily fortified the island was. It look the Marins over a month to secure the island and they suffered 30 percent casualties. Virtually all of the 22,000 man Japanese garrison perished. The defenders refused to surrender even when the situation was clearly hopeless. The irony was that the suicidal resistence of the Japanese on Iwo and than again on Okinawa was a factor in Presiden't Truman's subsequent decision to use the atomic bomb. The flag-raising on Mount Serabachi and the enormous Marine losses has raised Iwo to legendary status in American military history. In recent years, several authors have question the military decesion to take Iwo, arguing that the results did not justify the extrodinarily high Marine Corps losses on the island. Of course sych assessments are possible today when historians have access to information not availble the Air Force, Naval, and Marine Corps planners making the decision to attack Iwo in 1945.
Emperor Hirohito was aghast at how the War had turned against Japan. The military had ganbled and lost. Military leaders had not been frank with the Emperor as to the dangers associated with attacking America. The Emperor consulted with all former primeministers. All couseled him that Japan has no alternative, but to continue the War. The only exception was Prince Fumimaro Konoe. He had been replaced by the military 2 months before Pearl Harboir because of his relatively moderate outlook. Prince Konoe not only feared the destruction that woulkd be visited on Japan if the war continued, but he feared Communism. He thought that a climatic final fight would lead to a Communist Revolution and the end of the Imperial line. He counciled making peace with the Americans. The Emperor after these consulastions decided that Japan would fight a final decisive battle, not to defeat the Americans, nut to bleed them to get better peace terms. This might prevent an invasion and occupation. That final battle would be Okinawa
The Emperor wanted yo be a final decisive battle. The invasion of Okinawa was the first American attack on Japanese territitory. Okinawa, in the Ryukyu Island chain was strategically located between Kyushu, the southernmost Japanese island and Taiwan (called Formosa by the Japanese). American strategists saw Okinawa as a necessary base from which an American invasion of the Japanese home islands could be staged. Okinawa had several air bases and the only two important harbors between Formosa and Kyushu. The American invasion was code named Operation Iceberg. The greatest naval force in histoy was assembled for the invasion. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's 5th fleet included more than 40 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 200 destroyers and hundreds of support ships. Over 182,000 troops participated in the invasion. The American invasion forced was surprised when the beach landings were unopposed. Okinawa was defendened by the 32nd Japanese Army and a garrison of about 110,000 men. The Japanes had drawn back from the onvssion beaches. The Japanese strategy was to bring as many ships as possible in close to the island to support the invasion. it was then that a major Kamakazi attack was unleased on the invasion fleet. The Japanese on April 6-7 employed the first massed formations of hundreds of kamikaze aircraft. The Japanese during the Okinawan campaign flew 1,465 kamikaze flights from Kyushu. They succeedd in sinking 30 American ships and damaged 164 others. Other ships were attacked nearer Kyushu and Formosa. The Army Air Corps had rejected a request to havily bomb these air fields as it was seen as a diversion from the strategic bombing campaign. One third of the invasion force was killed or wounded. Over half of the 16,000 Americans killed were sailors on the ships attacked by the Kamakazis. Virtually the entire Japanese garison died in the Okinawa campaign. Few Japanese soldiers surendered even after defeat was certain. Large number of civilans were also killed. The Jaoanese military reserved available food and supplies for its use and in many cases forced civilians to commit suicide. The American military saw Okinawa as a dress rehersal for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands and anticipated even fiercer resistance. The extent of the casualties was a major factor in the American decission to use the atomic bombs.
The last step in the war against Japan was the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Based upon Japanese resistance on one after another Pacific islands, American planners believed that Japan woukd never surrender and a climatic, bloody invasion would be needed. The planning called for first invading Kyushu--the most heavily populated island. Kyushu was chosen because it was the southern-most island. Here air power was the key because the range of air cover from newly seized Okinawa only reached Kyushu. It also mean that the Japanese could work out where the landings would occur. Gen. Marshal advocated an invasion and Adm. Nimitz supported him. Gen. MacArthur was assigbned to command the invasion and began the planning. His plan provided that once Kyushu was secured, than air bases there could cover more northerly landings close to Tokyo. American military planners forsaw 0.5 million American casulaties. This was based on the tenacious Japanese resistance in every Pacific campaign. The military fully expected, and had every reaon to do so, that the Japanese Army would resist to the death just had they had done on Okinawa. In addition, the Japanese had amassed large numbers of aircraft which could be used in Kamakazi attacks on any invasion fleet. Many Japanese today maintain that Japan was near defeat and ready to surrender. It is certain true that the military situation for Japan was hopeless and the population approaching starvation. This does not mean, however, that the Imperial Army was preparing to surrender. The Army had not surrendered in any other campaign where the outcome was hopeless. Ultra intercepts reported that the Japanese were strenthening their defenses in southern Kyushu. The Army High Command deployed three divisions there in June and that had been increased to 9 divisions by July. Reinforcenents were brought back from China and Manchuria. In addition, the Army had incouraged, even forced, civilians to commit suiside as on Siapan and Okinawa. Some observers are convinced that Japanese civilian casualties in any invasion of the Home Islands would have been the greatest civilian disaster of World War II. Millions of Japanese soldiers and civilians may have died if America had invaded Japan. Ultra intercepts revealed constant strengthening of forces on Kyushu which reached 13 divisions. Both Marshall and Nimitz began to have second thoughts. Planners began to consider alternatives like poison gas, atomic bombs, or changing the invasion site. MacArthur continued to insist on Kyushu.
The Japanese Army began forming the People's Volunteer Army. It was not that much of a volunteer force. Men and women from 13 to 60 years were expected to volunteer. Only the sick or pregnant were exempted from take up weapons to defend Japan. By this tome of the War guns were in short supply. So arming an entire country was out of question. Most were armed with sharpened bamboo spears. Straw dummies were erected so the civilian soldiers could practice stabbing the evil Americans.
The students and older were given construction tasks. They built bunkers close to home. Thy also erected pillboxes along the coast and helped string barbed wire around positions where the Aericans were going to land. They also carved out caves in the mountains hich coul be usd to store ammunition. There was instructions in guerrillas warfare. An account fom a student, Susumu Nagara, provides some details. He was a squad of 20. The others were more than 40 years old. They were armed with bamboo spears, but has one rifle among them. They rotated the rifle every day so each had their turn carrying it. It was never fired and most did not know how to do it. [Halloran]
Japan after the American invasion of Okinawa still had powerful forces in the field. They had substantial forces in Manchuria, China, Formosa (Taiwan), Indo-China (Vietnam), Malaya/Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). With so many strong, undefeated forces, many in the militry did not believe Japan should surrender. These forces, however, could not assist in the all-important defense of the Home Islands--unless brought home. And this was only possible with the forces in China and Manchuria. Japan's merchant (maru) fleet by 1945 had been largely destroyed and moving troops and supplies was only possible in the inland seas where American naval patrols coild only operate with difficulty--even submarines. The maru fleet had ben lrgely destroyed by American submarines, isolating Japan from its remaining empire and resources it needed to continue the War. The strategic bombing campaign had destroyed most Japanese cities and industry. Using fire-bombing tactics, the wood and paper structures thst housed the population had been reduced to ashes. And in the resulting conflagrationss, war industry factories were also destroyed. The once proud Japanese Navy has been almost completely destoyed. But now American surface vessels and carriers patrolled the waters south of Japan. And to complete the blockade of Japan, aerial mines had been dropped in all important ports. This meant that raw material and petroleum could no longer supply the few factories that had survived the bombing. It also meant that badly needed food could not reach Japan. And the Japanese had already been forced to strictly ration food to virtual starvation levels. Personal accounts reveal the joy that civilians had in finding a noodle or bean at the bottom of a soup bowl. Japan was a heavily industrialized nation and the mountenous terraine limited arable land. As result, Japan had to import large quantities of food. And to make matters worse, the 1945 harvest was expected to be a poor one. Along with destoying Japanese cities, the Americn bombardment was also destroying the transportation system, especially the rail system. This meant there would be no way of getting the 1945 harvest into the cities. The Government put school children and other civilians to work collecting acorns in a desperate attempt to utilize every possible food resources. The Japanese had at first attempted to intercept the B-29s with fighters, but with limited and consumed irreplaceable fuel reserves. So by June they stopped interception attempts. This was to conserve availble planes and fuel for a massive Kmikazee assault on the expected American invasion fleet. The American flyers began referring to their raids as 'milk runs'.
The Emperor and the Japanese military were determined to resist. The military conveived the strategy of Ketsugo (April 1945). This was part of the overall strategy of bleeding the Americans to force a negoytiated peace. Ketsugo meant self defense, As a national defense policy it meant preparing civilans to fight an American invasion. It was a refinement of Japan's Shosango victory plan which envisioned defending the home islands to the last man. The plan was to prepare the Japanese people psychologically to fight the Americans and die defending their homeland. THere was to be no surrender, even civilians were not to surrender. Some Japanese sources claim that Japan was defeated and ready to surrender. Such claims are starkly disproved by what happened to civilians on Okinawa. The military there actively prevented civilians from surrendering and incouraged civilians to kill themselves. Ketsugo went a step further. It involved training civilns to actively resist an American invasion. The plan included training children, boys as well as girls, to fight with improvised weapns. Soldiers were assigned to schools to train even primary-level children in the use of weapons like bamboo spears. I am not sure how widespread this effort was and how intensive the training. I have noted Japanese adults describing such traing they received in schools. Japanese officials warned that the Americans would kill men who surrendered instantly and rape women. Not only were Japanese soldiers not to surrender, but neither would civilians. Others Japanese sources have reported their was no serious training in their schools. A peace faction led by Foreign Minister Togo complained that Ketsugo would destroy the nation. General Anami retorted that those who can not fulfill their resonsibilities to the Emperor should commit hari-kiri. He was intent that the entire nation should resist the Americans to the death,
After nearly 3 months of savage battle, resistance finall collapsed on Okinawa (June 22). The same day the War Cabinent met. For the first time the Emperor took the lead in the discussions. He had gotten his final decisive battle--Okinawa. And the Japanese defense failed without any observable slacking of America's determination to persue the War. He pushed the Govvernent to persue a diplomatic option gto end the War without specifying specific offers to the Allies. Both factions spoke out, the emerging Peace Faction led by Foreign Minister Tojo and the War Faction led by General Anami. It was decided to ask the Soviet Union to mediatea end of the War. There was no reason to believe that the Soviets would do this.
The militarists had launched the war in China and then the Pacific War. They were reluctant to admit how seriously that had miscalculated. Nor were they anxious to begin serious peace negotiations. They strangely thought that they could ask the Soviet Union to mediate an acceptable end to the War. Even the militarists realized that Japan had lost the War and wanted to end it, but they still believed that the thought of enormous casualties could deter an American invasion. The militarists still thouht tht they could retain the Emperor, avoid an occupation, and place disarmament and any trials of war criminals in the hands of the Japanese military. The extent to which the militarists were out of contact with relality was the belief that they could use the Soviets to mediate.
The Foreign Ministry pressed Ambassador Sato to approach Soviets officials to ask them to mediate an end to the War. Japan had a neutrality treaty with the Soviets, signed just before the German Barbarossa invasion. Ambassador Sato He had a difficult time arranging appointments with Soviet officials. He informed the Foreign Ministry that it was unrealistic to obtain any concessions from the Allies other than the preservation of the Imperial Dynasty. Foreign Minister Tojo cabled back to infirm him that this was compleletly unacceptable (July 22).
The Potsdam Conference was held at Cecilienhof in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin. The Conference was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945. It was a conference of the Big Three (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The participants proved to be quite different than those at the other major World War II conferences, incliding Yalta held a few months earlier. Stalin still represented the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt had died after Yalta and was replaced by the new president--Harry Truman. Churchill was at the beginning session was replace as prime minister by Clement Attlee, who had replaced him after a general election. The Conference was held after the NAZI surrender (May 1945). The primary order of business was how to administer occupied Germany as well as the post-War order, peace treaties, and the huge problems created by the War. The primary importance concerning the Pacific War was that Stalin secretly pledged to enter the War by August 15. President Truman informed Stalin of the atmoic bomb. Because of Soviet espionahe, he already knew. The Conference issued a declaration demanding that Japan immediately surrender or face "prompt and utter destruction" (July 26). The Japanese did not respond. Some Japanese officials actually thought the Potsdam Declaration showed the success of their policy of bleeding the Americans. Although the Potsdam Declaration called for unconditional surrender, there was language providing for Japan eventually rejoining the community of nations. Also and perhaps more impotantly, the Soviet Union did not sign the Declaration.
The Japanese military situation by 1945 was perilous. Even the most ardent Imperial militarist had long since given up on winning the Pacific War. Japan's strategy was now only how total defent and occupation could be prevented. The strategy was to cause as many Allied (meaning mostly American) casualties as possible. They sought to bleed the Americans so severely that the United States would not dare invade the Japanese Home Islands. Incredably they still clung to illusion that the Americans were a weak-willed people that could not stomach losses. Many Japanese military commanders were still convinced that they could out last the Americans. [Thomas, p. 139.] Here the Japanese resistance at Iwo Jima and Okinawa along with the Kamikaze attacks had considerable success. There were heavy Amerucan losses, although only a fraction of the Japanese losses. The terrain of the Home Islands was similar to that of Okinawa--very mountenous. There was no doubt where the Americans would strike first -- it had to be the southern-most island of Kyushu where the landings could be covered by air bases on Okinawa. American intelligence assessments reported indications that the Japanese were heavily reinforcing Kyushu. Men and equipment were being brought back from China and Manchuria to stenthen the forces already on Kyushu. Much of these reinforcenents were moving through the port of Nagasaki. The Yellow Sea was one of the few places that Japanese marus could still move with some degree of safety--although that was beginning to change. President Truman began to see a series of Okinawa campaigns and huge casualties up and down the Japanese Home Islands from Kyushu to Tokyo. He requested for caualty estimates from General Marshal annd astronimical figures surfaced. The Japanese prepared the Shosango Vctory Plan for the defence of the Home Islands. Prime-minister Kantar˘ Suzuki took office (April 1945). The government expanded the Shosango plan with Ketsugo. Emperor Hirohito approved the plan. The idea was to defend the Home Islands to the last man, actually the last person. And this did not mean just soldiers, but civilans as well--including children. Ketsugo was to prepare the Japanese people psychologically to die as a nation in an effort to defend the Imperial Japan. School children, boys and girls, were to be taught to construct makeshift weapons such as sharpened bamboo poles. Soldiers were assigned to schools to show children how to do this. We are unclear at this time just to what extent the Japanese were actually implementing Ketsugo. A Japanese reader from Tokyo tells me that he was sent into the country and received no such training. Other reports indicate that children were receiving this training. One fact is certain, American planners did expect a suisidal and costly Japanese resistance and given what bhappened in Iwo and Okinawa, this is likely what would have occurred. The caualties resulting from the Japanese strategy and the liklihood of even more fierce resistance on the Home Islands is a factor that has to be taken into account in the assessment of the subsequent decession to use the atomic bombs bombs.
The discussion of the end of the War is dominated by the American use of nuclear weapons. And the concentarion is on the resulting caualties--some 0.2-0.3 million people is you add on those who died in the days following the detonation as a result of injuries. Almost ignored in the fascination with the bomb is the food situation. Japan was Asia's only indutrialized country. This meant that food had to be imported to feed the growiung population of industrial workers in Gapan's rosing industrial cities. Even when before Japan began to industrialize, food was a problem. Japan is a very mountaneous country. Only about 10-15 percent of the labd area is suitable for agriculture, a very small proportion. The prortion in China, for example, is 50 percent. The need for food was one reason the Japanese began to expamd their empire after World War I. Finst in Manchuria (1931) anf then in China proper (1937). The problem for Japan was that war did not solve their problem, it actually worsened it. The invasion of China netted less food than expected. Much of the food gained was used to feed the massive army Japan committed in China. There were some food shipments to the Home Islands, but the War reduced food production both in China and Japan. The disruption of the War adversely affected Chinese production, but less often realized, it also reduced Japanese harvests. Here the major factor was the conscription of rural workers reducing the agricultural workforce. And the situation worsened with the onset of the Pacific War. Again food was one of the Japanese objectives in launching the Pacific War with the United States and seizing the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ) (December 1941). Japan despite spectacular gainsin the SRZ at the onset of the War, soon lost naval dominance beginning with the Battle of Midway (June 1942). Japan had a maru fleet adequate for paece time, but totallu inadequate for war. Anf the American subnarine campaign focused on the marus. As a result, despite seizing the abundant foof producing areas of the SRZ, Japan had no way of getting that food back to the Home Islands. The food situation steasily worsened during the War. This can be followed in detail. The Ministry of Education meaured the weight and height of schoolchildren annually. And comparing the data collected in urban and rural areas shows that the city children were shorter and weighed less than rural children. And the differences got steadily worse as the continued. and the problem was not just harvests and the cuttinhg ofv of imports, transportation problems developed. Fuel shortages made it increasingly difficult getting food from the countryside into the cities. Another problem was the fishing fleet. Japan relied on fush for much of its protein and as fuel became scarse and the Amerivans began sinking the fishing boats, the mahor source of protein disappeared. All of this spiral down hill as the American strategic bombing campaign began to achieve results (february 1945). By Summer 1945, the girls working in the indutrial plants report feeling luvky to find a noodle at the bottom of their souo bowls. The Japanese were on near starvation rations. And if the War would have continued beyond September, the Japanese would have begin to starve. The Emperor, the Cabinet, and the military leaders knew this. And yet they were prepared to continue the War, ignoring the castrophe that they were bringing on the Japanese people. The Americans when the occupation forces arrived were shocked at the food situation. Millions of Japanese survived the War because the Americans arrived when they did.
There was little Japanese reaction to the Allies Potsdam Declaration (July 26). Prime Minister Suzuki decided to essential ignore it. He did not believe that American action would be eminent. He knew that the United States was preparing an invasion, but knew it ws several months away, leaving time to negotiate for better conditions. Many officials cling on to the hope that the Soviets would mediate an end to the War, despite the fact that the Soviets had given them no reason to beliece that they would. The Soviers were actually assembling massive forces on the Manchurian norder for their own invasion. Somehow the Japanee do not seemed to have been awre of this. The Emperor also showed little urgency. He busied himself collecting the imperial regalia (the acred mirror, sword, and curved jewel). Neither he or the Army appear to have een the utter obliteration of Jpanese cities as sufficent reasom for surrender. Many put their faith in the defense preparations that would nake the invasion so costly that the Americans would finally decide on a negotiated peace.
The Soviet Union, 2 days after the first atomic bomb was dropped, entered the war against Japan (August 8). Stalin as promissed at Yalta and Potsdam declared war on Japan. At the time the Japanese were attempting to use the Soviets to mediate an end to the War. He moved the date up after the Hiroshima bombing because he wanted to be in the War before Japan surrendered. Soviet plans included the invasion of Manchukuo (Manchuria), Mengjiang, Korea, the southern portion of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and Hokkaido. All these operations except the invasion of Hokkaido were carried out. The Soviets struck in Manchuria and routed the Japanese forces there. The offensive was in sharp contrast to the campaigns the Americans conducted in the Pacific. The Soviets after declaring war immediately launched a massive invasion--the largest ground operation of the Pacific War. The Red Army rapidly swept over Manchuria. Japanese resistance crumpled. The Soviet invasion is not well covered in Western histories of the War. One question that arises is why the Soviets so quickly suceeded in Manchuria while the United States struggled in Okinawa. I think this is primarily because Okinawa was a small island where the Japanese could concentrate their forces in mountainous terraine. Manchuria was a huge area, much of it a flat plain, ideal for tank warfare. The Japanese could not defend it like they were able to do on Okinawa. Perhaps readers more familiar with the Soviet invasion will be able to tell us more. Soviet plans included the invasion of Manchukuo (Manchuria), Mengjiang, Korea, the southern portion of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and Hokkaido. All these operations except the invasion of Hokkaido were carried out. The Soviet invasion was code named Operation August Storm. The massive Soviet invasion swept aside Japanese resistance. The Japanese were surprised and destroyed any illusions among the military that Japan's still substantial army had the ability to resist Allied armies. Some authors believe that the success of the Soviets in Manchuria and the inability of the Japanese army to resist them, had more of an impact on the Japanese military than the two American atomic bombs. One factor that we are not yet sure about is why Japanese resistance in Manchuria colapsed so quickly and why the Japanese military commanders were willing to surrender to the Soviets, but unwilling to surrender to the Americans in Okinawa or the Philippines. The Japanese that surrendered to the Soviets spent years in the Gullag. They were used for years in construction projects in Siberia and Central Asia. [Solzhenitsyn, p. 84.] Only about half survived and ever returned to Japan.
The Hiroshima Bomb (August 6) and the Soviet invasion (August 8) moved the Japanese Government to action. The War Cabinent met again t 10:30 in the morning (August 9). Foreign Minister Togo suggested offering peace terms with only one condition--the preservation of the Emperor. General Anami demanded other conditions, including no occupation, allowing the military to disarm itself, and to try its war criminals. Anami assured the Emperor that the Americans had only one atomic bomb. While the meeting was going on, news arrived that a second bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki. The Full Cabinet met, but they were also divided. Only the Emperor could dcide the issue. The Emperor resisted gicing up his authority. Figures like Hironumi, a Shinto Fundametalist, imsisted that this was not a constitutiinal question, that the imperial line existed before the 1871 constitutiob and could not be separated from the country';s very existeance. The Emperor broke the deadlock, approving an offer to surrender as long as it did not prejudice the perogatives of the Throne. The Japanese offer reached Washington (August 10). President Truman and his advisors were divided. Stimson wanted to accept, both to use the Emperor to assure compliance with the surrender and to avoid Soviet participation in the occupation. Byrne's advised against the accepatance, fearing public oposition to retaining the Emperor. Truman decided to side steo the Japanese language and send the Japanese a message making it claer that the occupation authority woyld be in charge.
The Allies at in the Potsdam Declaration demanded that Japan surrender (July 27, 1945). , the Allied powers requested Japan to surrender. The Japanese military despite the fact that the Allied bombing had destroyed major cities, were determined to resist, hoping that the cost of invading Japan would deter the Allies. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9). The Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria (August 8). There is reason to believe that the Soviet declaratioin of war and rapid seizure of Manchuria was more important in forcing Japan to surrender than the atomic bombs. Emperor Hirohito finally decided to surrender unconditionally (August 14). The success of the Soviet Army convinced even Imperial Army officers and the Ministry of war that defeat was inevitable. Emperor Hirohito on August 14 decided to surrender unconditionally. Even after the atomic bombs and the debacle in Manchuria, there were hardliners that were opposed to surrender. A group calling themselves the Young Tigers seized the Imperial Palace grounds and tried to prevent the Emperor's surrender broadcast. The attempted coup almost succeded. On what has become called "Japan's Longest Day" the attempted coup, bombing raid blackout, intrigues, killings, and sepukus determined fate of millions of Japanese people. It iwas a complicated series of events involving both great heroism and treason by officers convinced that they were behaving honorably. The Commander of the Eastern Army, however, remained loyal to the Emperor, dooming the coup. [PWRS] The formal surrender was held underneath the guns of the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Not knowing just what the Japanese were planning, the American carriers were standing at sea off Japan.
The Japanese seized Manchuria, ut there was only limited fighting and minimal caualties (1931). Chiang and te Nationalists declined t contest the aggession. The Japnese launched the Second Sino-Japanese War by ivading China proper (1937). Here the ationalist fought and there were csaualties on bohsides. ftr heavy combat and the lost of the best Nationalist units, the nationalits began to withdraw into the interior. Fighting continued, but at a lower level. Casualties declined, but continued. More imporant fr the Japanese was the strain on the economy. After 4 years of fighting the casualties mounted, although only a fraction of Nationalit casualties let alone the enormouscivilian casualties in China. Japanese civilians were affected by the economic strain and family losses. Nut as th Chinese had no appecianle navy and aitforces there were no loss loss of life on the Home Islands. The Japanese attack on the Amrican Fleet at Pearl Harbor, as strange as it may sound. was intended to finally end the fighting in China (December 1941). Of course it did not. Casualies at first were limited as the Japanese swet over the Pacifc and Southeast Asia, tis began to change after Midway (June 1942). The loss of carries at Midway meant the the Imperial Navy could no longer provide Japanese soldiers the support they needed. And casualties behan to mount, especially after high performance aircraft and newships began to pir out of American factories and shipyards. The losses sustained only added to te steady stream of losses from China. Eve sothelevel oflosss should not be overestimated. Japanese garrisons might fight to the death on a Pacific island, but tere were aonly so many men that could be crammed on a Pacific island, even defeat in Burma did not involve masdive losses. There were substantial losses in te Philippines and Okinawa, but not cripplng losses. The strain of war had begn toaffect Japanese civilans from an early poit, primarilt due to food shaortages and the American submarine campaign meant that their cictoris in the Pacific and Souuthwast Asian would nt benefit civilians or aid te war economy. The loss of the Marianas meant that the United States could begin the strategic bombing campaign (June-July 1944). This meant that for the frst tkm, Japanese civlians faced not only shoratages, but death and structin from the skies. American bombers methodically reduced Japan's tember and paper cities to ashes even before dropping the two atomic bombs. Japanese miitary casualties totaled over 2.1 million men. Civilian casualties resulting from military ction, mostly the strategic bombing campaign totaled about 0.5 million people. Another 0.5 million viviliams may have perished from malnutiion and related diseases. Today in Japan discussn of the War giv great attentin to civilian casualties. There is vrtually no appreciation for how small civilian casualties were in comparison the civilians who ere killed by Jaanese soldies or who perishd n amines aaused by th Japanese in China, the acific, and Southeast Asia.
American troops landed in Japan immediately after the Imperial Government surrendered on September 3. The American occupation was completely unlike the Japanese occupation of the countries that it had conquered. Most Japanese were stunded by the final year of the War and the massdive destruction. There was also widespread hunger. Many Japanese had been led to expect a brutal American occupation. The United States oversaw an occupation with fundamentally changed the nature of Japanese society, rooting out Japanese militarism and fomenting the development of democratic political regimes and social structures. Women were enfranchized and labor unions allowed to organize.
We note an unidentified boy graduating in 1939. Japan had been at war in China for 2 years. While China was devestated by the Japanese onslaught, the Japanese people at home were not yet significantly affected as would be the case when Japan attacked the United States. A Japanese reader Fujioka Keisukeremembers his childhood during and after the War began with America.
Most countries that played important roles in World War II have come to terms with the War. Japan and the Soviet Union are the principal country today which keeps the truth of the War from their school children. What Japanese children are told about the War is a widely debated subject in Japan. Most Japanese children today believe that their country was a victim of the War and not the primary agressor nation. The atmomic boming of Hiroshima and Nagasaki receive wide coverage every year leading children to view theur country as a victim of the War. Few Japanese children have any ide of the enormity of Japanese war crimes. Important Japanese politicians, especially officials with nationalist sympathies in the Liberal Democratic Party, persist in perpetrating a number of myths and historical lies. This has caused considerable problems for Japan in countries they occupied during the War and wear war crimes were committed. One of the most persistent myths is that Japan was "tricked" in attacking the United States by a wiley American President. The truth of course is that the decision to go to war was made by a series of Japanese government after a lengthy study of the evolving military situation in Europe and Asia. The Japanese decided to hitch their star to the Germans and the decesion to attack the United States was made at a time when the NAZI Panzers were ranpaging through the Soviet Union and the Soviet collapse seemed inevitable. The defense of being "tricked" is unworghy of a great nation. It is the kind of defense used by petty criminals caught up in a sting opetation.
The Japan Defense Agency Historical Branch (BKS) is an impoerant source of information, but Westwern researchers have found them very difficult to work with. One researcher says that communications with BKS must be by letterv in the Japanese language. Responses may take 6 months, if they come at all. Another researcher says that a 6 month turn asround is an optimistic expectation. The problem with the BKS is that it is not governed by Western historical standards. The War is still a very subject in Japan and Japanese Government and military authorities are still internt on positioning Japan as a victim of the War rather than a perpetrator. As a result, most of the Government's military records have been destroyed. One source estimates 95 percent. Much of what has survived is in the BKS archive. And given the enormity of the War effort, even 5 percent is aAs a result, unlike the Western Allies and European Axis, the archives are extremely limited. Soviet archives are also extensive, but difficult to access. The principal Japanese source on the War is the Senshi Sosho, a detailed, multi-volume work. There are 102 massive volumes and it is by far the most detailed account of the Japanese war effort. Not addressed are the attrocitioes commited by the Japanese military during the War. A copy is archived in the Library of Congress. Unfortunately, it has never been translated in its entirity and thus requires Japanese-language capability to use. Only a few relatively small segments of some of the volumes have been traslayed. A very important additional source is war-time the Ultra/Magic decripts. And as in the West there are wr time accounts published by Japanese officials and military figures.
Halloran, Richard. "How Japan got ready for suicide," New Tork Times (August 5, 1985)
Pacific War Research Society (PWRS). Compiler Kazutoshi Hando. Japan's Longest Day.
Spector, Ronald H. At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century (Viking, 2001), 463p.
Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941-1945 (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2006), 414p.
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