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The French established a protectorate over Tunisia (1881). Although supported by the British, the action was protested by Italy which also had designs on Tunisua. The French colonial era had a modernizing influence on the country, but also also served to foment Tunisian nationalism. Nationalists founded the Young Tunisian Party (1907) which worked for Tunisian autonomy. Another group Destour ('constitution') demanded independence (1920). The Bey endorses Destour (1922), but the French make few concessions. With the rise of Mussolini in Italy, the French fortified the Libyan-Tunisian border. More assertive nationalists led by Habib Bourguiba break away from Destour and form Neo-Destour (1934). As in the other French colonies, the fall of France shocked Tunisian nationalists (June 1940). One of the reasons Italy entered the War was to gain Tunisia. Hitler refused, however, to countenance the transfer. The Franco-German Armistice recognized continued French control of its colonies. Vichy thus controlled Tunisia. The Allies invaded Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch under the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower (November 8, 1942). Landings in Tunisia were impossible because of Axis airfieds in Sardinia and Sicily. The plan was to dash east and seize the Tunisian ports, thus trapping the retreating Afrika Korps. Hitler immediately decided to resist the Allied offensive and ordered substantial forces rushed to Tunisia, even as the Soviets surround the 6th Arny at Stalingrad. German troops begun to arrive in Tunisia (November 9, 1942). This was possible because Vichy authorities in Tunisia cooperated with them. The initially small German force was heavily reinforced by air. Hitler poured planes, men, and tanks into Tunisia.
Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps occupied the Mareth Line (French fortifications near Libyan-Tunisian border. Rommel attacked U.S. forces moving east through the Tunisian dorsals (February 14, 1943). It was a baptism under fire for the fledling U.S. Army. The U.S. II Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. Rommel planned to drive through the Kasserine Pass, then move northwest seizing an Allied supply base at T�bessa and then drive to the coast and trap the Allied units in Tunisia. Poor coordination between Von Arnem in the north and Rommel in the south weakened the Axis position and Rommel's force was inadequate to exploit his victory at Kasserine. Eisenhower gave George S. Patton, who had commanded the landings in Morocco, command of II Corps. The Americans had a great deal to learn about modern war, but after Kasserine the learning curve was steep. Hitler's decession to contest the Tunisia delayed the Allied victory, but it also meant that he deployed substantial forces that he could not supply because of overwealming Allied naval and air supperority. Thus the final surrender was very costly. With the German surrender, over 275,000 prisoners of war were taken (May 13 1943).
The French established a protectorate over Tunisia (1881). Although supported by the British, the action was protested by Italy which also had designs on Tunisua. The French colonial era had a modernizing influence on the country, but also also served to foment Tunisian nationalism. Nationalists founded the Young Tunisian Party (1907) which worked for Tunisian autonomy. Another group Destour ('constitution') demanded independence (1920). The Bey endorsed Destour (1922), but the French make few concessions. With the rise of Mussolini in Italy, the French fortified the Libyan-Tunisian border. More assertive nationalists led by Habib Bourguiba break away from Destour and formed Neo-Destour (1934).
Hitler launched World War II with the invasion of Poland (September 1939). The Mediterranean was not at first an active theater. Italy although an Axix partner, did not at first enter the War. And the British and French fleets were more powerful than the Italian fleet. French naval bases dominmated the western Mediterranean and British bases the eastern Mediterranean. The small German U-boat fleet could not exert any significant effort in the Mediterranean.
The fall of France (June 1940) changed everything. With the French fleet out of the War and Italy entering the war, the British Mediterranean squadron was badly outgunned by the powerful Italian fleet. The Franco-German Armistice left Tunisia and the other French colonies in the French hands. French authorities in Tunisia supported the Vichy regime, which the Germans allowed to govern unoccupied southern France. As in the other French colonies, the fall of France shocked Tunisian nationalists (June 1940).
Some Tunisians were pleased with France's humiliating defeat. Few knew anything about the Germnans, but were impressed with their defeat of the French. Moncef Bey acceded to the Husaynid throne (July 1942). He adopted a nationalist stance, asserting Tunisian rights against the new Resident General appointed by Vichy. Moncef toured the country, dispensing with beylical protocol, establishing his image as a nationalist voice for Tunisians. He achieved considerable popularity. Moncef in a very brief period assumed the role of a nationalist opposition after the French had suppressed the Destour and Neo-Destour parties. [Perkins, pp. 105-06.]
One of the reasons Italy entered the War was to gain Tunisia. Hitler refused, however, to countenance the transfer. The Franco-German Armistice recognized continued French control of its colonies. Vichy thus continued to controll Tunisia. Vichy controlled Tunisia played not role in the conflict in the Western Desert (1940-42).
Tunisia in 1940 was a French colony. After the fall of France, a French Goverment was established in an unoccupied zone with a capital at Vichy. This Government while not totally controlled by the Germans, collaborated with them in many ways. One of these was the Holocaust. A Vichy law of October 4. 1940 provided that "foreign nationals of the Jewish race" would be detained in "special concentration camps". [Laskier, North Africa, p. 65-66.] Additional legislation in 1941 were imposed in Tunisia, although we do not yet have full details. The situation worsened after Operation Torch, the Allied landings in North Africa (November 1942). Unlike Morrocco and Algeria, there were no Allied landings in Tunisia. Tunisian Jews, about 4,000, were forced into labor camps where because of the harsh conditions some died. [Arbitol] There were schools for Jewish children. We are unsure how they vared during the Vichy period and German occupation. Some Jews were deported to the European death camps, presumably during the German occupation. Reports suggest that the Germans began constructing extermination camps in Tunisia. We can not yet confirm this. If true, these plans never materialized because of the Allied military campaign. Hitler with the assistance of Vichy commanders rushed in reinforcenents despite the deteriorating situation at Stalingrad. This prevented the Allies from seizing Tunisia immideately. The presence of the Italians, retreating from Libya, may have been a moderating influenmce. Allied forces by December 1942 reached Tunisia. This only prolonged the inevitable, ut the major urban centers where the Jews lkived were in German hands for several months. Tunis and Bizerte fell May 7 and the last remaining German units surrendered may 13, 1943. [Ward]
The British 8th Army in Egypt under its new commander Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery methodically prepared a final offensive against Rommel and the Afrika Korps. The battle was fought at El Alemaine. This was the last defensible point before Alexandria and the Suez Canal. The British had stopped the Afrika Korps here in a desperate battle after a string of defeats. They also stopped a second German attack. The the two sides settled down. Men and supplied flowed into Egypt. Most of the supplies came from America, including the new M-4 Sherman tank in large numbers. Oil was available from Iraq. The situation was very different for Rommel. OKW had instructed him not to pursue the British into Egypt. Men and supplies were limited. The primary German focus was on the desperate struggle in the Eat. And much of what was sent was sunk by the British on Italian cargo ships crissing the Mediterranen. Here Mlta was a major factor. Oil was a particular problem. As Bengazi was within range of British ar attack, most of the fuel had to be trucked over 1,000 miles from Tripoli. Thus the Germans used up much of the fuel landed, trucking it east to Egypt. Montgomery launched a carefully orcestrated offensive at El Alamein (October 23). Rommel was recuperating in Germany. He rushed bck only to find the Afrika Korps desintegrating under the assault of superior British forces. Rommel defied Hitler's orders to stand nad fight and oversaw the retreat of his Panzer Army back into Libya (November 4, 1942). It would prove to be the longest retrat in military history. Many of Rommels Italian allies were left in the desert as the Germans comandered all available vehecles and fuel.
The Allies invaded Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch under the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower (November 8, 1942). Torch was a political decesion. General Marshall opposed it. President Roosevelt decided, however, that America needed to begin to use its forces somewhere, despite the fact that resources were limited and the men not yet fully trained. Preime-minister Churchill wisely disuaded the Americans from a cross-Channel invasion before the Allies were ready. Churchill since World war I had an interest in the Meditrranean and there was a great deal to be gained there. And most importantly, North Africa was on the outer limits of the German military reach and logistical capability. Seizing Vichy North Africa would in effect turn the French Empire to the Allied cause. It would also support the British offensive in Egypt and finally ensure the destruction of the Afrika Korps. Success would open the Mediterranean to Allied shipping. And North Africa in Allied hands would provide bases for further Allied advances.
Torch landings in Tunisia were impossible because of Axis airfieds in Sardinia and Sicily. The plan was to dash east and seize the Tunisian ports before the Germans could react, thus trapping the retreating Afrika Korps. Torch was planned before Montgomery launched his El Alamein offensive, but by the time of the landings, the Afrika Korps was in full retreat.
The Germans as late as Ovctober had begun to think they had finally turned the corner in War. It looked like they fially had Stalingrad, the control of which would severely crimp the Soviet war economy in part because it would crimp oil shipmets from the Caucasses. They controled almost all of Europe. The Afrika Korps in the Westen Desert was only 90 miles from Suez. The U-boats were wreaking havoc in te North Atlantic. Tunisia at the time was a Vichy trritory of no imprtance. In the space of 2 weeks everything changed. The British Eighth army broke through at El Alamein and the Afrika Korps was in full retreat west toward Tuniaia (November 2). A few days later the Allies landed in Morocco and Algeria (November 8). Within days they were driving east toward the all important Tunisian ports (Bizerte and Tunis). Suddenly Tunisia which had been a Vichy backwater took on considerable importance. And Hitler with virtually no consideration through reenforcements he had long denied Rommel into holding Tunisia. The Fifth Panzer Army constituted in Tunisia would be much larger than the Afrika Korps. And he ordered the German forces in France into the Vichy Unoccpied Zone (November 11). It is unclear just what was on Hitler's mind. Saving the Afrika Korps possibly. Preventing the Aliies from securing a base to invade Italy and overthrowing Mussolini seems likely. At the time, Western Arnms had not yet done well against the Germans. It is likely that in Hitler's mind that a German Army in Tunisia could score yet another Blitzkrieg triumph. And with the precieved victory at Stalingarad, that was not implausable. And while German transports aircraft were rushing men and material south into Tunisia, two Soviet Armies struck in the East in the midst of a blinding snowstorm (November 19). They encircled the Sixth Army in Stalingrad--some 220,000 mwn, 100 tanks, 1,800 arillery piecs, and 10,000 vehicles. Hitler a week before at the Munich celevrations of the NAZI Beer bHall Putch had explained his mindset, "There will no longer be any peace offers. coming from us," he shrieked. Comparing himself to Kaiser Wilhelm II, there bow stood at helm of the Reich a man who "has known nothong but struggle and with it one principle: Strike, strike and strike again!"
Hitler immediately decided to resist the Allied offensive and ordered substantial forces rushed to Tunisia, even as the Soviets surround the 6th Arny at Stalingrad. German troops begun to arrive in Tunisia (November 9, 1942). This was possible because Vichy authorities in Tunisia cooperated with them. The initially small German force was heavily reinforced by air. Hitler poured planes, men, and tanks into Tunisia by air and sea. The Vichy foirces in Tunisia did not interfere. The intervention committed a substantial part of the German strategic reserve. It did not seem dangerous at fitst because the Soviet forces in Stalingrad seem on the point of collapse. This changed when the Red Army launched Operation Uranus (November 19). Within days the Sixth Army in Stalingrad was cut off. The commitment of mobile forces to Tunisia reduced the ability of the Wehrmacht to respond the Red Army offensive in Stalingrad. Luftwaffe units in Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy that had been positioned to pound Malta, attacked and slowed the advancing Allied columns. Torrential December rains turned the countryside and rudimentary roads into a quagmire. The Allies thus lost the race to the Tunisian ports. They were thus unable to catch the retrating Afrika Korps and instead were forced to fight a protracted struggle. Hitler had bought 6 months, but it would prove to have been bought at a heavy price.
Tunisia had largely stayed out of the War until the Totch invasion. As the Allies rushed east for the Tunisian ports and Rommen retreated west toward Tunisia, the colony became the focus of the War for the Western Allies. Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps occupied the Mareth Line (French fortifications near Libyan-Tunisian border. To the north, the Fifth Panzer Army defended the Tunisian ports. A chain of parallel mountains separates coastal Tunisia from the arid Saharan interior. A plain exists between the two mountain chains (dorsals). The British Titch foirce advanced east in the north along the coast toward the Tunisuan ports. The American Torch force moved east further south hoping to cut off the Afrika Korps. The advancing American army had set up important airfields and supply dumps in the west. Rommel attacked U.S. forces sending his panzers through the Kaserine Pass in the Tunisian dorsals (February 14, 1943). The goal was to break through the American positions, seize needed supplies, and envelop the British in the north. Rommel planned to drive through the Kasserine Pass, then move northwest seizing an Allied supply base at T�bessa and then drive to the coast and trap the Allied units in Tunisia. It was a baptism under fire for the fledling U.S. Army. The U.S. II Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. Poor coordination and outright animosity between Von Arnem in the north and Rommel in the south weakened the Axis position and Rommel's force proved inadequate to exploit his victory at Kasserine. The Americans rapidly recovered, supported by effective artillery fire and air support. Kasserine was aelatively minor engagement. German commanders saw Kasserine as an indication that the Americans were aelatively weak opponent. For the Americans it was the beginning of the creation of an effective armed force that would in less than two yeats land in Normandy and with the British and Canafians liberate Western Europe. Eisenhower movecd rapidly to remove commanders not up to to the task and replace them with those thast were. Kasserine while a German victory exposed the fundamental weakness of the German advebture in North Africa. They did not have sufficient strength to defeat either the British or Americans and the conflict basically provided a vast school for both armies, instructing them on how to fight the modern war that the Germans had developed. Eisenhower gave George S. Patton, who had commanded the landings in Morocco, command of II Corps. The Americans had a great deal to learn about modern war, but after Kasserine the learning curve was steep. Hitler's decession to contest the Tunisia delayed the Allied victory, but it also meant that he deployed substantial forces that he could not supply because of overwealming Allied naval and air supperority. Thus the final surrender was very costly. With the German surrender, over 275,000 prisoners of war were taken (May 13 1943).
The fighting in Tunisia ended ended with the German surrender (May 1943). The Allies had lready begun planning for the next step toward Europe--Sicily. Tunisia then became a staging area for the next major Allied operation, the invasion of Sicily. A look at the map could tell even a military novice that Sicily was next. Allied intelligence, however, managed to confuse the Germans. Tunisia proved to be more than a staging area. It was in Tunisia that the Americans met the Germans for the first time. The inexperienced Ametican army learned a gret deal about fighting the Germans in Tunisia and would learn more in Sicily. It could ot have been a better introdution to combat for the Americans. The Germans were strong enough to put up a fight, but not strong enough to pose a real threat to the American Army. It took the Britih 3 yeats to learn how to fight the Germans. The American leaning curve would be much sharper as would be seen in Sicily. And Tunisia ws also perfect for the Sicily preparations. The bulk of Allied combat forces at the end of the fighting were located in northeastern Tunisia. And Sicily was located only about 150 miles to the east. With the Siclian invasion (July 1943), the bulk of the Allied troops departed Tunisia.
As World War II swirled around them, Tunisian nationalist politicans had to make sence about what was happning znd hat it meant for Tunisia. Few Arabs understood the power dymamics. Not dis they understand what German racism might mean if the Germans had won the War. Nor did they understand what dealong with Fascist/NAZI colonial powers would mean rather than France. Habib Bourguiba, was the leading figure in the Neo-Destour party, and had been exiled to France. The Germans secided, however, to detsin him and take hoim to Rome. He wa feted there to gain his support for Italian jurisdiction. He was themn brought back to Tunisdia after the German intervention. Bourguiba maintained his pro-independence without becoming anti-French. His French wife may have influenced him. Some Destour leaders were in contradst pro-Germa. For them, anyone who fought France was their ally. And they were imporessed with German military victories. some had been willing to work with the German thinking it a way to get rid of the French. Other afinities such as abti-Semitism are difficulr to assess. Bourguiba had a better understanding of the powers arayed against the Germans. Moncef Bey after the Allied Torch landings and German intervention not understanding who would win, declined to take sides. He did, however, continue his nationalist policies and appointed the first Tunisian government since France had seized controlmin 1881. It included some some pro-Allied individuals. After the Allied victory (May 1943), French settlers denounced him as a German collaborator, an interesting charge as Tunisian Vicchy officials had collaborated with the Germans. Of course what they disliked was Moncef's nationalist policies. The French deposed him (late-1943), charging him with collaboration. Bourguiba managed to developed connections with the Americans which helped deflect charges of collaboration. After the war along with Salah Ben Yusef he began to rebuild the Neo-Destour political organization.
Perkins, Kenneth J. A History of Modern Tunisia (University of Cambridge: 2004).
Ward, Seth. "The Holocaust in North Africa," May 10, 1999.
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