Figure 1.--The primary British interest in Palestine was for stability and order so they could focus on stooping first the Italians and then the Germans from advancing east from Libya into Egypt and seizing the Canal. Thus the 1939 White Paper sought to sharply limit Jewish emigration to placate the Arabs. This of course was done at the same time desperate Jews were fleeing the German Holocaust. Even so, many Arabs but not all looked with considerable favor on th advancing Italians and Germans, both because of they might defeat the British and because of their anti-Semitic sentiments. Few Arabs seems to have given any thought as to what an Italian or German occupation might mean for them. The press caption here read, "Private E.H. ("lofty") Stafford, of Newcastke, brushes up his Arabic with the aid of a small Arab lad in Palestine, while Private R. Burgoyne stands on sentry duty." The ph otograph is dated June 26, 1940, only days after the French surrender to the Germans. Source:Department of Information.

Winston Churchill became Prime Minister (May 1940). Churchill had been sympathetic to the Zionist cause. The Jewish Agency hoped that the limits on immigration based on the White Paper to curry Arab favor would be reversed. The Arab Revolt (1936-39) posed a threat to Suez and the British wanted to prevent a reoccurance. At this time some military cooperation occurred between the British and the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency hoped that the British might equip a Jewish Division to fight with the British Army. While this did not occur, the British trained Jewish commando units which became the nucleus for the Palmach. The British also trained Jewish volunteers in sabotage, demolition, and partisan warfare. Many spoke spoke German or Yiddish which was useful. This was the first intensive military training given to Jews in Palestine. There was no British efforts to establish an Arab militia. This is the best testimony to the Arab political orient ation at the time. And there proved to be considerable Arab cooperation with Germans during the War. Even so, many Arabs but not all looked with considerable favor on the advancing Italians and Germans, both because of they might defeat the British and because of their anti-Semitic sentiments. Few Arabs seems to have given any thought as to what an Italian or German occupation might mean for them. The Grand Mufti objected to constitutional protections for minorities put forward by the British. He seems to have been totally oblivious to Berman and Italian occupation policy which did not subject people a role in their own government. Nor do they seem to have understood just how the race -obsessed Germans viewed the Arabs. The British decided that the immigration restrictions detailed in the white Paper had to be maintained to prevent the Arabs from turning even more strongly to the Axis. This meant that at a time when the NAZIs were rounding up Jews for the Holocaust, the Royal N avy would be used to prevent Jews from escaping the Holocaust. The British policy in Palestine is not one of their finest moments. In fairness to the British, however, it has to be understood that after the fall of France (June 1940) they stood alone against the NAZIs. The British defiance of the NAZIs was a key factor in the eventual Allied victory. In the end it was that Allied victory which prevented the NAZIs from killing the half the Jewish population of Europe which survived the Holocaust.

Created: 1:12 AM 12/26/2013
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