|
Singapore was the keystone of Britain's military position in the Pacific. Japan took the large well supplied British garison at Singapore with surprising ease. British General Percival has been sharply criticized. The defense of Singapore was bady planned. The Japanese offensive down the Malay Peninsula was briliantly executed. The key factors were that the Japanese were able to achieve aerial and naval mastery that was never anticipated in British defense planning combined with the surprising mobility of Japanese ground forces. Pearl Harbor left the American Pacific Fleet unable to respond to the defense of the Philippines, let alone Singapore. Two of Britain's most powerful ships Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent without air cover and sunk by Japanese bombers. 【Gilbert】 Churchill was outraged and Percival's surender. It was Percival's seeming willingness to so quickly surrender that enraged Churchill. The British 8th Division had been rushed to Singapore after it was already too late. The fall of Singapore was a military catastrophy of emense proportions. Japanese forces within 6 months moved through Burma to the border of India in the West and New Guinea in the South. Australian trops had garisoned Singapore, after previously sending forces to North Africa, left the country virtually undefended. Only the intervention of American carriers in the Ciral sea blocked Japanese expansion further south.
The Japanese conquest of Malay also presented the Allies with a critical problem. The world's rubber production was centered on the Malay Peninsula. And rubber was a vital war material. Singapore's fall would have consequences after the War. The prestige of the British Empire has been irreperably damaged.
Singapore is an island located at the tip of the Malay Peninsula. The Malay Peninsula was a natural roadblock to mariners wishing to move between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Thus the tip of the Maly Peninsula and the ajoining Straits of Malacca were of enormous importance. It is why so many pirates located in the area. Singapore Island was separated from the mailand by the Straits of Johor. To the north is what is now the Malaysian state of Johor. At the time of World War II, the British had constructed a causeway and bridge to link Singapore Island with the mainland.
Singapore has been of importance since maritime trade between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific has been of importance. The earliest accounts of Singapore come from the Chinese whose mariners and traders were active in the Pacoific. Mongol Emperors were known to send trade missions and Chinese traders recognized the importance (14th century). The history of Singapore has been tied up with both the Malay Peninsula and the archepeligo that is now Indonesia, especially Sumatra and Java. The Nagarakretagama, a Javanese epic poem refers to a settlement on an island belived to be Singapore (1365). There was reportedly a mixed Malay-Chinese population. Archeological evidence suggest that Singapore was at the time a thriving port. Singapore is known to have been a thriving trading port of the Malacca Sultanate abd subsequently the Sultanate of Johor. The Malay Peninsula because of its strategic importance became a target for adversarial European colonial powers. The Portuguese were the first to arrive and establishing a fort at Malacca (1509). The Portuguese as part of their effort to seize control of the area and dominate the Strits of Malacca attacked and burned the settlement (1613). Singapore island thus foer a time declined into obscurity. The Dutch challenged the Portuguese (17th century). The Dutch managed to estblish control of the major ports in the area. Their primary focus was on the spice trade. They adopted policies to discorage traders from other countries. This eventually led to conflict with the British, especially after trade between British India and China grew, in part because of the British promotion of the opium trade. Friction increased when the Dutch actively descouraged British use of Dutch ports. The British appointed Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles as the Lieutenant Governor of the British colony at Bencoolen (1818). He for some time saw the need for a British presence on the Malay Archipelago. Raffles wanted to establish the Dutch by founding a new port along the Straits of Malacca--the main sealane for the vital India-China trade. He convinced Lord Hastings, the Governor-General of India and his superior at the British East India Company, to sponsor an expedition to find a site for a new British base. He landed on Singapore Island (1819). Singapore rapidly grew to one of the most impprtant ports in Asia. As becuse of the ship trafic between India and China, Chinese workers and merchantment soon became the dominant ethnic group in Singapore.
Singapore was one of the smallest Britiish colonial possessions. It was also the most strategically located British possession in Asia and the Pacific. Located at the entrance to the Straits of Malacca,it dominated one of the world's major sea lanes. The British primarily concerned with Imperial Germany and to a lesser etent Tsarist Russia did not at first see Japan as a threat. In fact, a nabal treaty with Japan assisted the Japnese in buiolding a modern navy. Until the rise of Japan after World war I, there was no real challenge to British dominance of the area. Singapore was garrisoned with a small military force. Royal Navy vessels occassionally called, but no sizeable fleet operated out of Singapore. Even so, the Brirish position in Asia seem unshakeavkle and Singapore was at the center of it. As Japan became a major power, the importance of Singapore increased. Singapore came to be the keystone of Britain's military position in the Asia and the Pacific. Singapore not only dominated the Straits of Malaca,but was one of the finest natural anchorages in the Pacific. Any power attempting to attack Britain's asian possesions east if iundia woulkd have to take Sinapore. And protected by a well armed garrison and the Royal Navy, Singapre seemed impregnable.
The World War I naval conflict was centered in Europe and despite all the attention given to U-boats, the principal naval action was the Allied blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary. And it was in the Northsea that the powerful British Home Fleet faced the Kaiser's Highseas Fleet. It was the greatest challenge to Britain since Trafalgur (1805). There was, however some naval actions in the Pacific. Some of the German ships trying to get home, fought actions off Chile and the Falklands. Britain had forged a naval alliance with Japan in the years before World War I, primarily as an ally against the expanding Tsarist Empire. Assistance provided by the British was an important factor in the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05). When World War I broke out the Japanese oportunistically joined with the British to attack German possessions in China and the Pacific. This gained Japan strategic islands in the south Pacific. Actually the Japanese had more in common with the authoritarian Germans than the democratic British, but it was the German possessions they coveted and they did not feel ready to challenge the powerful Royal Navy. After the German squadron in the Pacific was destroyed and the German possessions seized, the Japanese would eventually dispstch a destroyer force to aid the Allies in the Mediterranean. The ideological proclivities would come into play in World war II and the opportunity to taken on not only the British and Dutch, but the Royal Navy as well. All three possessed valuable colonial possessions in the Southern Resource Zone {SRZ)
Britain was financially devestated by World War I and wanted to prevent another naval arms race. This meant major adjustments to Britains long-term policy of maintaining naval dominance. Japan on the other hand desired to expand its navy. The United States was intent on both limiting naval building and limiting Japanese expansion. Some British officials thought a naval conflict woukd result with the U.S. Navy. American officials made it clear that British naval cooperation with Japan woukd have to end. Eventually the British realized that their best option was cooperatrion with the United states. The British joined with the Anerican effort, even abrigating its naval Traty with Japan. The Washington Nacal Treaties established limits on naval building. It was, however, hugely unpopular in Japan. Admiral Yamamoto understood that the Trearty was actually benficial, but that is not how it was interpreted in military circles.
Singaporre at the time of World War I was a major port, but there was no major base defending the port. The British, largely because of Japan's program of naval exopansion, decided that a modern naval base was needed at Singapore. Construction began (1923). Funds were limited by Britain's financial situation. Military spending was not popular after World war I. Construction thus proceeded slowly. This changed with the Japanese seizure of Chinese Manchuria (1931). Japanese aggression highlighted a need for atrong base at Singapore. Important elements of the base were completed (1938). One of the most important facilities was the the King George VI Graving Dock which was opened (Match 1938). It was over 300 meters long, the largest dry dock in the world when opened. This mean that the largest naval vessels could be serviced at Singapore. The base was finally completed (1941). It was defended by artillery protected by concrete emplacements and the new Tengah Airfield. The base looked impressive indeed. There was also a 275 meter floating dock--the third largest in the world. The base had facilities for old 60,000 workers to man the dry docks, giant cranes, and machine shops. There were protected underground storage for water, fuel, and ammunition. A self-contained town was also built on the base. It could house 12,000 Asian workers and had movie theaters, hospitals, churches, and sports fields. It looked impregnable on paper and the oress began billing it as
"Gibralter of the East." The above-ground tanks were designed to hold sufficent fuel to supply the entire Royal Navy for 6 months. The problem was that the British at the time were fighting for their life in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. Very limited naval resources could be spared for the Pacific. Singapore was designed to be the base for aacific fleet, but as war approached in the Oacific was a naval base without a fleet to defend it. The Brtish strategic doctrine was that Singapore was capable of resisting a Japanese seige for at leadst 6 months which would give the Royal Navy time to assemble a relir=ef force.
Authorities in Singapore, bith the British commanders and colonial administration, were convinced that they could withstrand a Japanese assault. Compared to Britain, the British in Singapore were rekatively unaffected by the War. Their major concern was to supply thecriubber abd tin needed by the British war efoort in Eurooe and North Africa.
The British assumed that the Japanese assault would come from the sea. The jungles of the Malay Peninsula were seen as inpenitable to a modern mechanized army. Coastal artillery included 15 inch guns to protect the base. Machine-gun bunkers were built along the southern coast.
There was a small local defense force consisting of 4 battalions of British Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps and a small civil defense organization which was trained primarily to serve as air raid wardens, fire fighters, medical personnel, and debris removers. Unlike the Amerucans on the Philippines, the British did not recruit Singapore's Asians. The British doubted both their loyalty and capability.
As Europe moved toward war, Britain found itself in a difficult position. Like America, it had focusd its limited military aviation budget on bombers, oprating under the dictum, "The bombrr wil alwaysd get through." As a result, the British very nearly entered World War II with biplane fighters. The Royal Navy air arm did enter the War with biplanes. They belatedly began building advanced fighters. This meant that fighter production in the first 2 years of the War was devoted to the defense of France and Britain. Litttle was left over for the defense of thr colonies. Even such a imoportant outpost as Malta was defended by only three obolete bipanes. Singapore and Malaya did have fighter defenses, but they were composed of the nearly obsolete Brester Buffalo, purchased in America. The Buffalo is often referred to as the worst fighter of World War II. And Singapore only had the Buffalos because the RAF judged that they were not capable capable of European operations against German aircraft. 【Denis, et. al.】 Before Pearl Harbor, there was no recognition of the Japanese air capabilities. The British had 169 Bufalos. In ddition to the limited capbilitis of the Bufflos, the pilots were not well trained. They were operated by Royal New Zealasnd Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal Air Force. Japanese fighters quickly establised air superiority over Malaya and Singapore. 【Farrel and Pratten, pp. 38, 98, and 101.】 The Commonwealth pilots were able to shoot down a few Japasnese aircraft before the Buffalos were shot down or withdran. Some 100 Hawker Huricanes reacvhed Singapore shortly after Pearl Harbor. They operasted from Singapore and Dutch Sumastra. The Jspanese destroyed most on the ground because of the absence of any early warning system. This left Sinapre without any air cover.
Neither American or British commanders accurately assessed the Japanese military capacity. Britain had withdrawn most of its fleet to the Atlantic and Mediterranean, but the United States had advanced its Pacific Fleet inclusing nine battleships to the still not fully developed naval base at Pearl Harbor. Most commanderzs did not think the Japsnese Imperal Navy was on a par with the American and British counterparts. But the most serious mistake was the underestimztion of Japanese aviation. There was no realization of the capability Mitsubishi Zero and the well trained and experienced Japanese pilots. Nor were Allied planners aware of the Japanese Long-lance Torpedo which outclassed Allied torpedoes. As a result both military commandersand political leaders badly underestimsted what Japan was cable of militarily. Their long term calculation that it would be suisidal for Japan to go to war with the United States and British Empire was correct, but they did not realise that Japan in 1941 possessed a commanding balance of forces in the Pacific. Of course a factor here was Barbarossa. Japan had dedcided on war at a time that it looked like the Soviet Union was near collspse. By the time of Pear Harbor, however, the Red Army had stoped the Whermacht in its tracks and launced a major offensive before Moscow. Had the Wehrmacht succedded in the Soviet Union, the ballance of power would not have been so decisively stacked against the Axis.
It was the Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor that brought America into the War. While Pearl Harbor was a stunning tactical victory, it was a strategic blunder by the Japanese of incaluable proportions. It was a stunningly successful military success, brilliantly executed by the Japanese. Eight battle ships, the heart of the American Pacific fleet were sunk or destroyed. But the three carriers that were Yamamoto's main target were not at Pearl. Despite the success of the attack, it was perhaps the greatest strtegic blunder in the history of warfare. The Japanese attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor changed everything. A diverse and quareling nation, strongly pacifistic was instantly changed into a single united people with a burning desire to wage war and the undustrial capacity to do so with an intensity unlike any country in history. The issolationism that President Roosevelt had struggled against for over 7 years instantly disappeared. Even Lindburg asked for a commision to fight for the United States. Pearl Harbor left the American Pacific Fleet unable to respond to the defense of the Philippines as had been planned , let alone Singapore.
Two substantial Japanese convoys carrying ground troops from bases in Hainan and southern Indochina landed at Singora and Patani in southern Thailand and Kota Baharu in northern Malaya (December 8). The landings in Thailand were possible because the Japanese buildup in Indochina was used to pressure Thailand and forced the countfy to join the Axis. General Yamashita Tomoyuki commanded the Japanese offensive. The Japanese with little opposition secured a foothold on the Malay Peninsula.
This included the vital British air base at Kota Baharu. Japanese long-range bombers began raiding Singapore. The British plan for defending Singapore was base on an attack from the sea and the naval guns defending Sinapore were in fixed positions pointing out to sea. The Britishassessment was that the Malay jungles were inpenetrable for a modern army with heavy weapons.
After the Japanese occupied southern Indochina ad the Americans embargoed crude oil, it was clear that Japan which had joined the Axis would attemot to seize the Dutch oil fields in the Dutch East Indies. American and British codebreakers had learned that a Japanese strike was iminent. A Royal Navy task force made up of two of Britain's most powerful ships Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent without air cover. The battleship Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser Repulse and four escorting destroyersas dispatched to Singapore. The ships reached Singapore (December 2). An accompanying aircraft carrier had run aground while en route. Thus the Brurish force lacked air cover. The importance of air cover was not yet fully appreciated. The Prince of Wales was the most modern battleship in the Royal Navy. After the Japanese landings, the Admiralty ordered the Prince of Wales and Repulse to intercept further Japanese lanfding forces. At the time the Royal Navy commnders were unaware that the Japanese had taken all British airbases in northern Malaya and there would be no air support. Royal Navy commanders still believed that the Japanese could not sink a battleship maneuvering at high speed on thechigh seas. Japanese bombers sank both ships (December 10). Until this time American and British naval commanders, and many Japanese commnders (except Yamamoto), were convinced tht the backbone of the fleet was the battleship. These assumptions were overturned by the sinking of the two British ships. Churchill writes in his mnemoirs thast he had decided after Pearl Harbor to order the ships to join up with what was left of the U.S. Pacific fleet, but before arrangements could be made and the orders issued, the ships were gone. 【Churchill, p. 510.】 With these two battleships gone, the Pacific War would become a largely American undertaking. American naval commanders actually had no choice, but to adjust their thinking as the battleships of the Pacific fleet had been sunk or destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The only capital ships availavle were the carriers which ironically had been Yamaoto's primary target.
Singapore was the keystone of Britain's military position in the Pacific. Japan took the large well supplied British garison at Singapore with surprising ease. British General Percival has been sharply criticized. The defense of Singapore was bady planned. The Japanese offensive down the Malay Peninsula was briliantly executed. The key factors were that the Japanese were able to achieve aerial and naval mastery that was never anticipated in British defense planning combined with the surprising mobility of Japanese ground forces. Pearl Harbor left the American Pacific Fleet unable to respond to the defense of the Philippines, let alone Singapore. Two of Britain's most powerful ships Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent without air cover and sunk by Japanese bombers. 【Gilbert.】 Churchill was outraged and Percival's surender. It was Percival's seeming willingness to so quickly surrender that enraged Churchill. The British 8th Division had been rushed to Singapore after it was already too late. The fall of Singapore was a military catastrophy of emense proportions. Japanese forces within 6 months moved through Burma to the border of India in the West and New Guinea in the South. Australian trops had garisoned Singapore, after previously sending forces to North Africa, left the country virtually undefended. Only the intervention of American carriers in the Coral sea blocked Japanese expansion further south. The Japanese conquest of Malay also presented the Allies with a critical problem. The world's rubber production was centered on the Malay Peninsula. And rubber was a vital war material. Singapore's fall would have consequences after the War. The prestige of the British Empire has been irreperably damaged.
Japan took the large well-supplied British garison at Singapore with shocking ease. The British garrison outnumbered the attacking Japanese force. British General Percival has been sharply criticized. The defense of Singapore was badly planned. The Japanese offensive drive down the Malay Peninsula was briliantly executed. The key factors were that the Japanese were able to achieve aerial and naval mastery that was never anticipated in British defense planning combined with the surprising mobility of Japanese ground forces, in part achived by bicycles. The British 8th Division, badly needed in the Middle East, had been rushed to Singapore after it was already too late. The fall of Singapore was a military catastrophy of emense proportions. This was part of the 6-moths following Pearl Harbor of unrelenting Japanese victories (December 1941-May 1942). Japanese forces moved through Burma to the border of India in the West (April 1942). Their seizure of north eastern New Guina in the south (March 1942). The Pilippins fell (May 1942). Then the Japanese victories stopped ourside of China. What had occured was the British had defeated poorly armed and trained colonial forces. Beginninging in New Guinea and the Solomons, the Japanese would favce well armed and trained combat forces supported by air and naval forces. Australian troops had garisoned Singapore, after previously sending forces to North Africa, this left the country virtually undefended. Only the intervention of American carriers in the Coral Sea blocked Japanese expansion further south (May 1942). The Japanese conquest of Malaya also presented the Allies with a critical problem. The world's rubber production was centered on the Malay Peninsula. And rubber was a vital war material. Allied victoriea first occurred at sea -- Midway (June 1942). This meant that America men a material could flow to the Pacific. Singapore's fall would have consequences after the War. The prestige of the British Empire has been irreperably damaged.
The Japanese occupied Singapore from February 1942 until the Emperor surrendered, ending the War (August 1945). They made it the capital of thir southern conquests, renamed it Shonan--"Light of the South". It became the principal ancorage for the Imperial Fleet. Not only was it a marvelous anchorage with thanks to the British excellent fortifications, but it was located close to the oilfields in the Dutch East Indies, Japan's primary objective in going to war. The fleet had to be anchored in Singapore because by 1943, the American submsarine campaign was making it increasingly difficult to get the oil from the Dutch East Indies oil fields to the Home Islands. Singapore was closer to the oilfields and the Americans submarine patrols were largely to the north seeking to isolate the Home Islands. Thus went the Imperial Fleet staged its long anticipsted final effort to repel the Americans, most of the fleet units sallied forth from Singamore (October 1944). Only the carrier decoy fleet sailed from the Home Islands. After the victory at Letye, the American offense moved north toward Okimawa and the Home Islands. Singapore with the Imperial Fleet destroyed became a backwatrer with little military significance.
The most tragic aspect of the Japanese victory was the fate of the POWs. The Japanese interened European and Australian prisoners at Changi on the eastern end of the island. The 2,300 European civilians were moved into the prison. The Japanese conquest came as a great shock as the British had heavily censored newspapers and the civilians had noidea they were even in danger. The 15,000 British and Australian POWs were interned at Selarang barracks located closeby. The Pows sufferd from insuffient rations, nadequate medial care, and brutal guards. After the conquest of Burma (May 1942), the Japanese set out to conquer India. Supplying the forces involved proved a challenge. After Midway (June 1942), the Japanese had to concentratec their naval and air assetts in the South Pacific to confront the U.S. buoldup. This made it difficult to supply forces along the Indian border by sea. Their sollution was the Siam-Burma railroad. Logistics was the principal Japanese problem concerning the invasion of India. The sollution was a railway across Siam (modern Thailand) and Burma linking up with the existing rail system the Bitish had already built in Burma. The link was made at Moulmein. Allied naval power after the Midway disaster meant that supply deliveries through the Indian Ocean port of Rangoon would be difficult. The Japanese, however, still controlled the South China Sea and supplied could be landed in Thai ports near Bangkok and then transported by rail to Japanese forces in Burma. POWs were set to work on the railroad. Most of the construction took place in Siam. It becamne knoen as the Death Railway. The men worked under terrible conditions and were provide only starvation rations. The resulting death toll was horific. The Japanese also conscripted civilians for forced labor. In addition the Japanese used the POWs as well as Chinese civilians to build another Singapore airfield at Changi which they completed (May 1945). he Asian POWs were treated differently. There were 600 Malay and 45,000 Indian troops. The Japanese gave them the opportunity to change sides and give their allegiance to Emperor. Many refused to do so. The Japanese treated those who refused brutally. Their fate varies. Some were executed outright, tortured, imprisoned, or transported for forced labor in Thailand, Sumatra, or New Guinea. About 20,000 Indian troops were pressured to join the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army (INA). The Japanese organized the INA theoretically to fight for India's independence from Britain the British, but in fact to add India to the Japanese Empire.
The Japanese Kempeitai (military secret police) committed numerous atrocities against the civilian population of Singapore. Treatment was largedly based on one's ethnicity. Their policy was 'Sook Ching', meaning 'purge through purification'. This was the effort to get rid of civilians seen as anti-Japanese. Men were rounded up and taken to deserted spots around the island and shot there. Most were Chinese. The Kempeitai established a network of informers around the island to help them identify those who were anti-Japanese. They were well-paid by the Kempeitai and did not have to fear being arrested. Japanese soldiers patrolled the streets and commoners had to bow to them when they passed by. Those who failed to do so would be beaten or even arrested. Singapore was not a city before the British arrived. It was an island with a small village used by pirates. As a result, the ethnic mix of Singapore has always been different than the Malay Peninsula as a whole. Immigrant ethnic groups have played a very important role from the time Sir Stamford Raffles established a trading post on the island (1819). One estimate suggests at that time there were about 880 Malays and aboriginal tribes and about 20 to 30 Chinese on the island. Only a few years later there were about 3,000 Malays and more than 1,000 Chinese. We are not sure what the ethnic mix was at the time of the War. We think that the Malays were the majority, but there was a very large Chinese community along with a few thousand Europeans, mostly British and Australian. The Japanese interned the Europeans who were held under terrible conditions for the rest of the world. The Chinese fared even worse. They were subjected to a sweie of attrocities. After the War, Japan admitted that they had killed 5,000 ethnic Chinese in Singapore. By all accounts this is a gross understatement. Singapore sources suggest that the killing was about 50,000 Chinese. Some sources believe that the figure is higher.
The ethnic-Chinese feared the Japanese before they seized control of the Island. Their behavior and harsh treatment of the Chinese only confirmed their preconceived attitudes. This essentially made it impossible for the Japanese to win the Singaporeans over to their vision of the Japanese East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, a euohenmism for the Japanese Empire. The Japanese also demanded that prominent Chinese leaders and businessmen a $10 million "gift" to show their good well and as reparation for their previous support for the Chinese Nationalists. The Chinese- and English-language schools were pressured to adopt Japanese as the language of instruction. The Malay schools were treated differently. They were allowed to continue using Malay, which the Japanese accepted as the indigenous language. The Japanese-controlled schools gave considerable attention to physical training and teaching Japanese patriotic songs along with pro-Japanese propaganda. Most perents responded by simply keeping their children home. Enrollment at the schools plumeted. Only about 7,000 children attended the Japanese-contolled schools. The Japanese pursued other policies to replace Chinese and English with Japanese in Singapore. They set up free Japanese language classes at night. Workers were given bonuses and promotions for learming Japanese. Even so they made little headway during the nearly 4 years of occupation. Singapore had bee a vibrant commercial center under British rule. This change dramatically under Japanese rule. This was due to both Japanese policies and the War. Goods from Europe and India were cut off from the west. From the East Chinese goods had also been largely cut off by the war here and Japanese factoriees converted for war production provided very limited trade. Thus Singapore's economy based on entrep�t trade largeky dried up. The major source of employment was with the Japanese naval base. But the decline of the economy as well as Japanese policies in Malaya itself mean that food and other consumer products were in short supply. Chinese businessmen had no choice but to collaborated with corrupt Japanese officials and a black-market soon developed. The result was huge increases in prices for even basic commodities. The Japanese paid for products with virtually withless military script which was essentially disguised condiscation. The result was spiraling inflation. Unscruplous speculation, profiteering, bribery, and corruption became common place.
As the War turned against Japan, conditions in Singapore only worsened. The U.S. Navy finally developed an effective torpedo and the campaign against the Japanese Maru (merchant marine) fleet began in earnest. This further marginalized Singapore.
Conditions in Singapore continued to deteriorate. The Japanese strictly censored the news, but information about Japanese defeats filtered in, especilly the Allied reconquest of Burma. This mean that the Allies would next target Malaya and Singapore. Civilians braced for another bloody battle. The Japanese had been strenthening their defenses. Now it is the Japanese who would have to defend Sinapore without a fleet. It is also why they built another airfied at Changi.
The Emperor's decesion to surrender prevented that. Japan formally surrendered to the Allies (August 15, 1945). Japanese authorities in Singapore did not at first announce defeat and surrender to the public. Only a week later were newspapers allowed to report what had happened. The Japanese military withdrew to an internment camp that they had prepared and stocked with supploes at Jurong. Commonwealth troops arrived aboard British warships (September 5). They were jubilantly welcomed by a long-suffering civilian population who cheered along a 5-kilometer parade route. The Japanese military commander in Singapore formally surrendered to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied commander in Southeast Asia on the steps of the Singapore municipal building one week later.
Churchill, Winston S. Memoirs of the Second World War (Bonanza Books: New York, 1957), 1065p.
Dennis, Peter, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior, and Jean Bou. (2008). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History 2nd ed.. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press: 3008).
Farrell, Brian and Garth Pratten. "Malaya 1942,".Australian Army Campaigns Series–5. (Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Army History Unit, 2011).
Gilbert.
Navigate the Boys' Historical Clothing Web Site:
[Return to Main Pacific War page]
[Return to Main World War II Chinese-Japanese War page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[POWs]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
[Return to CIH Home page]
