Figure 1.--Here we see an unientified woman and her young children in Odessa within the German occupied Ukraine during January 1944. They are homeless. Notice how people are walking by giving litte notice. Presumably her husband is dead, but we do not have the full story. Another problem was food. The Germans issued rations only to people working for them. Strving people did not bother the Germans, in fact it was a part of the German goals in the East, pursued as art of the Hungerplan and Generalplan Ost. At the time, the Red Army was moving toward Odessa, but would not each the city until April.

German armies as a result of Barbarossa drove deep into the western Soviet Union, occupying the Baltics, Bylorussia, and the entire Ukraine. These of course were non-Russian areas. The Germans failed to occupy the Russian heartlnd. German units were on the outskirts of Moscow and attempting to encircle it. Lenningrad was cut off. But the Germans would advance no further into the Russian heartland. The Red Army counter-offensive (Sepember 1941) suceeding in driving the Wehrmacht out of most of the Russian areas of the Soviet Union. What the Red Army found as they liberated Russian villages (December 1942-March 1942), confirmed their worst fears about the nature of the NAZI enemy. The Red Army offensive wreaked enormous damage on the Wehrmacht and liberated a much of the Russian areas occupied by the Germans, but it left the Germans in control of large areas of the western Soviet Union. What the NAZIs failed to appreciate was that much of the areas conquerred were the non-Russian areas of the western Soviet Union (the Baltics, eastern Poland, Bylorussia, and the Ukraine). These areas included enormous resources, but the Russian heartland remained unoccupied and the Red Army rapidly began forming new divisions to replace those lost in 1941. Despite the German advances, control of the Russian areas of the Sioviet Union gave the Red Army to recruit and build divisions at a much greater pace than the Germans. German intelligence significantly underestimated the Soviet capacity to form new divisions. Hitler for his part had expected his conquests in the East to feed the German war economy. In fact, the reources from the east barely fed the enormous German and Axis ally armies deployed there. It did, however, deny those resources to the Soviets. And the mot important was food. The area occupied by the Germans included mich of the most productive agricultural land of the Soviet Union--the incredibly productive back soil district. This created enormous food shortages in the unoccpied Soviet Union. And as priority was given to the Red Army, Soviet civilians were forced to survive on extemely low rations. The situation was even worse in the German occupied areas. The German goal was to depopulate the East as part of Generalplan Ost and to destoy the industrial cites turning the East into a giant agricultural zone for German colonists. As a result, the Germans had no desire to use available food to feed the population in the occupied areas. Rations were only assigned to those working for the Germans in some way. The Wehrmact attempted to get farms, mines, and even some factories back into operation to support the war effort. Those who did not work for the Germans in some way faced starvation.

Extent of German Occupation

German armies as a result of Barbarossa drove deep into the western Soviet Union, reaching Lennkingrad abnd approching Moscow. They occuppied the Baltics, Bylorussia, and the entire Ukraine. These of course were non-Russian areas. The Germans failed to occupy the Russian heartlnd. German units were on the outskirts of Moscow and attempting to encircle it. Lenningrad was cut off. But the Germans would advance no further into the Russian heartland. What the NAZIs failed to appreciate was that much of the areas conquerred were the non-Russian areas of the western Soviet Union. Much if the ear was eastern Poland abd the Baktics, not the pre-War Soviet Union.

Red Army Winter Offensive (December 1941)

The Red Army counter-offensive (Sepember 1941) suceeding in driving the Wehrmacht out of most of the Russian ethnic areas of the Soviet Union. Zhukov had been building up his reserves. Zhukov strategy was to bleed the Wehrmacht as it drove toward Moscow, build up a powerful force, and then strike when the Wehrmacht had been weakened. This was a stategy that he used successfully on several occassions. Here he made full use of the Russian Winter that was handing a terrible impact on the unprepared German soldiers. The Soviet Siberian forces were well trained in Winter warfare. The Soviet buildup was completely indetected by German intelligence. Particularly important was the arrival of Siberian reserves which were withdrawm from the forces facing the Japanese in Manchuria. Zhukov launched his winter offensive against the Whermacht that had been stoped at the gates of Moscow and which had been severly affected by the cold weather. The Red Army struck (December 6). The resulting battle was probably the most important of the War. The Wehrmacht was stuned at the extent of the Soviet offensive, assuming that the staggering victories in the Summer had crippled the Red Army. There were no preparations made such as winter clothing or assessing the performance of weapons in extemely cold winter conditions. Hitler had assummed that the campaign would defeat the Soviets in a summer campaign before the onset of Winter. The Soviet offensive was a shock to the Germans who had thought that victory was within their grasp. The Soviets attacked with their Siberian veterans as well as new largely untested divisions. They were supported by artillery, T-34 tanks, and Katyusha rocket launchers. The Soviet armor unlike their German counterparts did not freeze up in the cold weather. For the first time in the War, The Soviets had the advantage of armor and mobility.

German Brutality

What the Red Army found as they liberated Russian villages (December 1942-March 1942), confirmed their worst fears about the nature of the NAZI enemy.

Damage to the Whermacht

The Red Army offensive wreaked enormous damage on the Wehrmacht Ostheer. Thos left the Ostheer a mucvh weaker force than was the case in June 1941. The Germans weoild not be ablke to fully replsce the men abd euipment lost. Theu would be able to launch another offensive in 1942, but not along the whole front as they did in 1941. They woulf have to choose just one section of the front and Hillker chose the soutyh necause og his desoerate need for oil. The Germbd cane up with the numbers of men, but not as many of the trained, experienced troops. And the armored divuins were down sduced with fewer tanks--mening reduced hitting power.

Ethnicity

The Red Army Winter Offensive liberated much of the Russian areas occupied by the Germans. This is significnt bdecause the ethnic Russians were the core of support for the Soviet regime abd resistabce to the NAZIs. Other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union were less committed to Soviet Comminism and domination by the Russin majority. Resisr=tbce from the miknorority ethiniv groups were a matter of concern by Soviet autirities and they were a target od Stalinisdt terror, mosdt priominntlky the Ukranians. This is descibed in great detasil by Solzhenitsyn who describes the experinces of the varius ethic, rekigious, and sociatal groups tatgeted by the NKVD. [Solzhenitsyn] This is something the Germans could have used to wage the Ostkrieg, but because of Germanan brutality and dsire to murder the Soviet populations by the tens of millions (Generalplan Ost), the Ukranians and others had no real choice, but to support the Soviets.

German Control

The Soviet Union was unusual in Europe because for several years, therewas bith an unoccupied zine still fughting as well as an occupied zone. And these areas were fought over at least twice and in some areas multiple times. The resulting destruction was ednormpus. Some 80-90 million Soviet citizens, nearly half of the country's poulatuon were occupied by the Germans at some point of the War. [Pennington] This varied as the militry camnpigns ebbed and flowed. German treatment of the occupied people of the East is one of the great crimes of history. The Jews were immediately murdered. Most were shot. Some 2.5 of 5 million Soviets Jews were murdered. Most were shot in the Holocaust by bullet. Only about 2 percent of the Jews in the occupied areas survived. Himmler though that shooting Jews was too trasumsatic for thec SS men involved, which is why after 1941, the Germans shifted to gas chanbers. The Germans also began preparations for the eventul murder of the Slavic population. This began with starvation and the Hungerplan. The whole purpose of the War was to obrain the food and resources of the East for the German peoplw which meant denying them to the population of the people living there. It was not people cught n the crissfire of war, it was the intential Herman policy of mass murder. The East was to be ckared of its population to make the wa=y for German colonists. Onr reason the Germans did not occupy Leningrad in 1941 was that by surrounding it, they hoped the population would starve, aving them therouble of shooting them. And some 1 milliom did. The Hungerpln was applied to Red rmy POWs, some 3 milliom persished in German habds, starved todeartg. This was diner by the Wehrrmcht, nott the SS. The Red Army Winter Offensive drove the Germans back from Moscow (December 1941), but it left the Germansxm in control of large areas of the western Soviet Union. They invcluded the Baltics, eastern Poland, Bylorussia, and the Ukraine. These areas included enormous resources. Hitler for his part had expected his conquests in the East to feed the German war economy. In fact, the reources from the east barely fed the enormous German and Axis ally armies deployed there. It did, however, deny those resources to the Soviets. And the mot important was food. The area occupied by the Germans included much of the most productive agricultural land of the Soviet Union--the incredibly productive back soil district. This created enormous food shortages in the unoccpied Soviet Union. And as priority was given to the Red Army, Soviet civilians were forced to survive on extemely low rations. The situation was, however, even worse in the German occupied areas. The German goal was to depopulate the East as part of Generalplan Ost and to destoy the industrial cites turning the East into a giant agricultural zone for German colonists. As a result, the Germans had no desire to use available food to feed the population in the occupied areas. [Pennington] Rations were only assigned to those working for the Germans in some way. The Wehrmact attempted to get farms, mines, and even some factories back into operation to support the war effort. Those who did not work for the Germans in some way faced starvation. Many of the collective farms continued to operate. The Germans had more trouble getting the factories and mines working. Huge mumbers of homes were destroyed. Families were broken up. Humdreds of thousands of children were orphaned. The Germans used the occupied areas as a pool of slave labor. About 5 million Soviet citizens, mostly womn, were transported to thr Reich for war work and classified as Ostarbeiter. About half came from the Ukraine. Many were worked to death, but unlike Jews they had a chance to survive, depnding largely on gtheir assignment. [Spoerer and Fleischhacker] Himmler in a 1943 speech to high-ranking SS officers told them, "Whether or not 10,000 Russian women collpse from exhaustion while digging a tank ditch, interests ne only so far as the tank ditches completed for Germany." Of ciourse at the time, the idea that Gemany was going to lose the war was not yet clear to Himmler. A further tragedy was that when the survivors were liberated, many were raped by Red Army soldiers and treated as collaborators by Soviet authorities after te War (1945).

Unoccupied Area

The Russian heartland remained unoccupied and the Red Army rapidly began forming new divisions to replace those lost in 1941. Despite the German advances, control of the Russian areas of the Sioviet Union gave the Red Army to recruit and build divisions at a much greater pace than the Germans. German intelligence significantly underestimated the Soviet capacity to form new divisions.

Sources

Pennington, Reina. Surviving Total War at Home," World War II Symposium (January 18, 2014).

Solzhenitsyn, Alexsanddr I. Trans, Thomas P. Wjitney. The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-56: An Experiment in Literary Investigation (Harper & Row: New York, 1973), 660p.

Spoerer, Mark and Jochen Fleischhacker. "Forced laborers in Nazi Germany: Categories, numbers, and survivors," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 33, No. 2 (2002). pp. 169-04.

Created: 11:39 AM 3/23/2016
Last updated: 5:40 AM 10/22/2021