World War II: Mobilization of the Red Army

Red Army mobilization
Figure 1.--The Red Army suffered an estimated 4 million casualties (men killed and captured) during Barbarossa, but despite that horific battering it was larger when the Germans reached Moscow than at the beginning of the campaign. Over 5 million reservists were caslled up to form 300 new divisions. The scene here taken by a German soldier is unidentified, but probably taken during Barbarossa. The dead boy here would have not consripted, but many boys attached themselves to Red asrmy units, often afteerr their parents were killed or village burned down.

The Germans not only failed to accurately access the Soviet capability to move war industry plants and restore production, they also failed to gage how quickly the Red Army could mobilize and equip new units. Red Army losses in Barbarossa were massive, both in men killed and even more so in POWs taken. The losses wweere so massive that the Wehrmaht had by the time they approasched Moscow (November 1941) narrowed the man power disparity with the Red Army. Long lines of shattered POWs winding their way west to makeshift camps, comvinced the Whrmacht at all levels that the Red Army had been broken. The numbers astonisdhed OKW. They assumed that the Red ASrmy had been bled dry. The Soviet Offensive before Moscow in turn shattered the Whermacht (December 1941). It helped restore the numerical superority of the Red Army. The Soviets could afford massive losses, the Germans could not. Not only did the Whermacht misguage the strength of the Red Army at the start of the War, they badly assessed the speed with which the Soviets could form and equip new units. A factor here was that although the Germans occupied a huge area of the western Soviet Union, much of it was the non-Russian areas acquired in 1939 from the Poles and the Baltic Republics or in the south the Ukraine. The Soviets still had most oif the Russian heartland from which new units could be recruited and this was a larger population than the German population. (here had Hitler not raged a racial war of extinction, the Germans could have had access to a sunstantia population in the occupied areas of the East that was anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevick which would have significantly narrowed the population inballance.) Not only did the Soviets have aarge population base to mobilize, but the Red ASrmy was very proficient in rapidly forming new units. During the rest of the war in the East, the Germans were constantly surprised with the appearance of new units. And beginning in 1942, the numerical disparity between the Wehrmacht and Red Army steadily moved in the favor of the Soviets.

Relative Force Size (June 1941)

Hitler assembled what Goebbels claimed was the greatest concentation of forces in world history. They were correct. The relative parity between the two forces was the result of the Germans concripting a very large pasrt of the available manpower pool. The Soviets had called up only part of the available man power. Barbarossa was premised on destoying the Red Army in the same kind of Blitzkrieg opoeration that had suceeded in the West. Germany did not have manpoower reserves or the needed stovk piles of raw materials to fight a protracted war, especially as Britain was not yet defeated and America was supporting Britain and even beginning to wage a undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic.

Soviet force

The Soviet Union had an army of 303 divisions and 22 brigades (4.8 million troops) (June 1941). Out of that force, 166 divisions and 9 brigades (2.9 million troops) were stationed in the western military districts. The Soviet western defenses were divided into Three Fronts (Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern). Stalin had insisted on moving foirces west to secure the areas seized during the early phase of the War with NAZI Germany as an ally (1939-40). This meant moving out of prepared defensives into exposed, vulnerable positions.

German force

The Germans invasion force was massive. It totaled 153 divisions and more than 3 million men. It was the high point of the NAZI war effort. It was a much more powerful force than had struck in the West. And Hitler would never again be able to assemble a force of such magnitude. The Axis divisions were equipped with 600,000 million motorized vehicles, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, and 2,740 air planes. Finish, Hungarian, and Romanian divisions accompanied the Wehrmacht and were soon joined by Italian divisions and the Spanish Blue Dvision. With the allies, the Germans deployed a force of 181 divisions (German and Soviet divisions were of varying sizes) and 18 brigades (5.5 million troops). [Glantz, p. 15.] Much of this force was not German, but Axis allies (Romanian and Italian) and Finish. Except for these Finns, the Axis allies were not as well equipped or trained as the Germans or have the same commitment to the struggle.

Barbarossa (June 22)

The German offensive smashed into the Soviet Union (June 22). The Luftwaffe had overflown the border areas before Barbarossa and thus knew where the Red Air Force field were. After the first day, the Red Air Force was crippled. The German invasion force was divided into three forces (Army Groups Noth, Center, and South) and within daysas deep within Soviet territory. Progress in the south lagged behind progress in the north and center, in part because Stalin had massed powerful armored formations in the south (the Ukraine) knowing it was a priority German target. Also the invasion in the south relied more on the poorly equipped and less mobile Romanians. German Panzers smashed through the disorganized Red Army resustance, encircling Red Army strong points. The result was heavy casualties and even larger numbers of men traped in the swweping encirclemnents. Vast quantities of equipment, tanks, and artillery was destroyed or captured.

Mobilization

Stalin was staggered by the German invasion. He was convinced that Hitler with Britain undefeated would never dare attack the Soviet Union. This is why the Red army was so unprepared. Stalin even rediculed and disciplined subordinates who pointed to evidence of an impending German attack. He was convinced that it was all a British plot to draw the Soviet Union into the War. Stalin withdrew after news of invasion. It was a month before he regained his composure. One of the first measures taken was to stepping up the mobilization that was under way before the invasion. Thus by the end of the month, the Red Army had called up 5 million reservists, and this does not account for the millions not in the the reserve that would be called up. This meant that the Red Army would field 600 divisions. [Glantz and House, p. 68.] It should not be thought that Stalin was so foolish as to trust his ally Hitler. He never did, he just believed that the Hitler would not be so rash as to attack with Britain undefeated. He believed that the German attack would not come until 1942. And the Soviets were involved in a major effert to strengthen and enlasrge the Red Army to be prepared when the attack came. As a result of the mobilizations, the strength of the Red Army actually increased as the Wehrmacht was chewing up divisions in the West. Red Army losses in Barbarossa were massive, both in men killed and even more so in POWs taken. One estimate suggests that despite losing 46 divisiions, the Red Army's strength was 401 divisions (August 1). [Glantz, p. 15.] The Germans not only failed to accurately access the Soviet capability to move war industry plants and restore production, they also failed to gage how quickly the Red Army could mobilize and equip new units. The Germans were totally unaware as to just how many new units were being created and how rapidly this was taking place.

Force Balance (November 1941)

The Germans had not fully evaluated the Soviet forces they faced. They accurately estimated the Red Army force of 300 divisions. They had no idea, however, how rapidly the Soviets could tap into their vast manpower pool. The German assumed that they would smash the Red Army before reservists and new recruits could be effectively mobilized. The German calculation was so flawed that by November OKW estimates of Red Arrmy soldiers killed and taken priosoner were higher than their pre-War estimates of the size of the Red Army. The Panzers achieved one Kesselschlacht after another. There were 12 major Kessels Tbe Germans took over 0.6 million men at Kiev--the largest encirclement in the history of warfare until the mass German surrenders at the end of the War. Long lines of shattered POWs winding their way west to makeshift camps, convinced the Whrmacht at all levels that the Red Army had been broken. And in fact the Red Army had lost an incredible 4 million men in just 4 months of fighting. It is difficult to believe that any other country could have survived such losses. But Hitler by making Barbarossa a racial war left the Russians and oher Soviet nastionaslities no real choice. The numbers astonisdhed OKW. Hitler and the German commanders believed that the Red Army had been bled dry. They could not understand how Soviets defenses could be stiffening and tiotally discounted the possibility of a Red Army Winter offensive. The Red Army losses were in fact so massive that the Wehrmaht had by the time they approached Moscow (November 1941) narrowed the man power disparity with the Red Army. The Wehrmacht summarized theheir achievemnent, "November 22nd marks five months since the German Wehrmacht moved against the threat of a Bolshevist attack from the east. In that time, it has occupied 1.7 million square kilometers of the territory of the Soviet Union, containing three-quarters of its industry, and 75 million of its inhabitants. It has simultaneously taken 3,792,600 prisoners and destroyed 389 divisions; including battle casualties we may estimate total Soviet losses at over 8 million casualties." ["Nach fünf", p. 595.] The Wehrmacht had overestmated its achievements, but the reality of 4 million men lost and 100 divisions destroyed was stark enough.

Soviet Offensive before Moscow (December 1941)

The Soviet Offensive before Moscow in turn shattered the Whermacht (December 1941). The Soviet offensive inflicted irreplaceable losses to the Axis. The massive Axis army that invaded the Soviet Union had by January 1942 lost a quarter of its strength amd huge quantities of tanks, artillery, and supplies. These losses of men and material by the Wehrmacht were especially grevious and Germany did not have the manpower resources or industrial capacity to fully repace and reequip a new army. The Soviet losses were actually greater than the German losses. Casualties have been estimates at 1.9 million Soviets and 0.6 million Germans. [Nagorski] The combined 2.0 million casualtes dwarf all other battles and indeed exceed those in almost all other wars. While the Soiviet losses were huge, they could be replaced and the Germans consistently underestimated the Soviet ability to raise new divisions. The losses in manpower and equipment were massive. It helped restore the numerical superority of the Red Army. The Soviets could afford massive losses, the Germans could not. The Germans had already mobilized the bulk of the men of military age. The Soviets had only began to utilize their manpower reserve.

Russian Heartland

A factor here was that although the Germans occupied a huge area of the western Soviet Union with a great deal of Soviet industrial and agricultural capoascity, much of it was the non-Russian areas acquired in 1939-40 from the Poles and the Baltic Republics or in the south (the Ukraine) and territory seized from Romania. The Soviets still held most of the Russian heartland with the great bulk of the Russian populsation. And here the population remained loyal. And from the Russian hearland new units could be recruited and this was a larger population than the German population. And most of the Russian areads overran were liberated by the Red Army in its 1941-42 Winter OIffensive.

German Population

The German population from the onset of the War was aerious disadvantage for Hitler in any effort to conquuer Europe, the British Empire and the Soviet Union. This was especually the case because Hitler was determined to wage a racial war of extinction. Here had Hitler not insisted on a racial war of extinction, the Germans could have had access to a substantial population in the occupied areas of the East that was anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevick which would have significantly narrowed the population inballance. Hitler did not think he needed them and he thought that arming these potential allies would create prblems in the post-War era that would follow the anticipated German victory. Hitler and Himmler had plabs for the Ukranians and other Slavs and he did not want them armed. The plan prepared by Hitler's SS was Generalplan Ost. Even after Barbarossa failed, Hitler still resisted arming these potential allies or making any offer of independence. The behaviior of the SS and Wehrmacht in the East made i very clear even to anti-Bolsheviks what the NAZIs had in store for them. They saw what the Germans did for the Jews and the logical next questiion was, "Are we next?"

Growing Sovier/German Inballance

Not only did the Soviets have a large population base to mobilize, but the Red Army was very proficient in rapidly forming new units. During the rest of the war in the East, the Germans were constantly surprised with the appearance of new units. And beginning in 1942, the numerical disparity between the Wehrmacht and Red Army steadily moved in the favor of the Soviets.

America

Not only did Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union result in the mobilization of the the Red Army, but the United States was also mobilzing. The United has for the first time in its history instituted a peace time draft, largely in reponse to the fall of France (1940). And the draft was reauthorized (1941). America at the time of Barbsarossa was rearming, albeit slowly. It was also taking stern measures agsainst the Axis, embasrgoing oil exports to Japan and launching an undeclared war against German U-bosats in the North Atlantic. These were all steps short of full mobilization. This all changed with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and Hitler's decesion to declare war on America (December 11, 1941). Thus the German Wehrmacht not only found itself at the outer reaches of it supply lines, stuck in the snows of Russdia, assaulted by a obilized Red Army, but now facing the other world super power in the West. While it would take some time for America to build its army and retool its industry, isolationism had evaportsated anb\d the build up of a united and dertermined America was now underway.

Sources

Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus (University Press of Kansas, 1998).

Glantz, David M. and Jonathan M. House. When Titans Classhed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler ((Lawrence: University Press iof Kansas, 1995).

Nagorski, Andrew. The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Battle that Changed the Course of World War II (Simon & Schuster, 2007), 366p.

"Nach fünf Monaten Ostfeldzug," Militar-Wochenblatt Vol. 126, No. 22 (November 28, 1941), pp, 595-98.






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Created: 4:22 AM 7/8/2009
Last updated: 4:22 AM 7/8/2009