** World War II campaigns -- Arsenal of Democracy Lend Lease countries Soviet Union importance air war








Soviet Lend Lease Importance: Air War


Figure 1.--Most of the American P-39 Bell Aircobras went to the Soviet Union to help reconstitute the Red Air Foirce which had been largely destoyed on the ground (June 1941). The Western Allies priority was for fighters with high altitude performance so they could escort the bombers pounding the Reich. The air war in the East, however, was largely fought at lower alditudes. The Red Air Force’s primary mission was ground support for the Red Army. Thus the P-39 was with excellent low akditude charactetristics was useful. The Soviets used the P-39s for low alditude patrols to protect the assault aircraft like the more famous Ilyushin Il-2 Stormovik attacking German ground targets. Many of the Red Air Force aces as a result flew the Amnerican Aircobras here seen in Soviet colors..

After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. And of course that is what Soviet historians who valued their lives said. And this has continued to be the case even after Stalin died. The Soviet Union did not want to share the honor for defeating the NAZI tyranny. This of course shows a towering degree of chutzpah given that during the Great western Campaign and the Battle of Britain (1940), the Soviet Union was fueling the NAZI War machinme with huge quantities of strategic mnaterials. Most Western historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first week of the German Barbarossa invasion (June 1941). The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Not only the building of these planes, but delivering them to the Soviet Union was a massive logisical undertaking. The deliveries were far below the commitment at first, but reached significant levels by 1943: 114 aircraft in 1942, 2,465 in 1943, 3,033 in 1944 and 2,482 in 1945 (through August). [Alberti] That totaled 8,094 aircraft- a primary example of Russinn misig=fornmation. Western sources provide much larger numbers of American ircraft, the British provided aircraft as well, although in smaller numbers. The figure we see in the literature is something like 18,000 aircraft. Various sources dance around this number. Variations can be attributed to different sources as well as some aircraft were lost in transit. Thus there there is a difference between sent and received. This number is fairly well established because there are detailed British and Americans records as to what was sent. The primary aircraft provided was the Bell P-39 Aircobra. This was an aircraft the United States did no value highly, but the Soviets had a higher regard. There were, however, quite a range of different aircraft in varying numbers were provided the Soviets. Lend Lease not only provided planes, including high performance aircraft, but necessary spare parts. Also large quantities of aluminum which permitted the Soviets to significantly increase their own aircraft production. A Russian historian writes, "About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment. [Butnitski] Another important contribution was high grade (octane) aviation fuel, need by high performance fighters. The Soviets were so short of aviation fuel that they designed an engine which could operate on diesel fuel.

Down Playing Lend Lease

After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. And of course that is what Soviet historians who valued their lives said. An nit inlky do Soviet historians diwb-p;lay Lend Leasr, they use the term 'insignificant'. [Soviet Ministry] And this has continued to be the case even after Stalin died. The Soviet Union did not want to share the honor for defeating the NAZI tyranny. This of course shows a towering degree of chutzpah given that during the Great Western Campaign and the Battle of Britain (1940), the Soviet Union was fueling the NAZI War machinme with huge quantities of strategic mnaterials. Most Western historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. And while the official Sobiet histories downplayed or even breducukled Anerican aid, the provate remarks of topmleaders and many Red aur Fircde pilots paint a different pucy=ture. According to the top Soviet genrral, ""People say that the allies didn't help us. But it cannot be denied that the Americans sent us materiel without which we could not have formed our reserves or continued the war. The Americans provided vital explosives and gunpowder. And how much steel! Could we really have set up the production of our tanks without American steel? And now they are saying that we had plenty of everything on our own." [Zhukov] Only men like Zukov dared to speak oopenly about this. A Russian historian proviudes a fair summary. "there us no need to either iverestimate or belittle the importance of the Allies' help. They dud what they coiukd. Politiucans of ciurse, alwaus pursue theur own ebds." [Kotelnikov, p.536.]

Destruction of the Red Air Force (June 1941)

The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first week of the German Barbarossa invasion (June 1941). Most of the Red Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the fiurst week. This was possible because of Stalin's orders. The Soiviet Union hads nothing like the British Chain Home Network early warning system. The German commanders ccomplished what the Luftwaffe commanders hoped to do in Britain (August 1940). And Stalin was so sure that Hitler would not attack that he allowed the Lufwaffe before the invasion to fly reconosance fligts over Soviet territory while not ordering reconmisance flights over German occupied territory. As a result when the German struck they had detailed information on Red Air Force dispositions. Stalin ordered frontier units not to fire to avoild any accidental outbreak of hoStalkin had olenty of warmings, not inly from his own intelkigence system, but from Churchilland Rooseveklt as well, based in Ukltra and Magic decrypts. It was actuyally dangerous for Soviet binteligiunce and military officers to forward warmings if German prepatatiins. Given what had occurred to Soviet military officers in the Great Purges, Soviet commanders tended to follow orders from Stalin scrupulously. The one savung grace of beng destroyed on the ground was that most of the pilots survived.

Air War in the East

Most historical accounts of the air war available in the West deal with the Luftwaffe campaigns in the West and the subsequent Allied strtegic bombing campaign. The air war on the Eastern Front is much less studied by Western historians. This is somewhat surprising as Germany and the Soviet Union when the War began had the two most powerful air forces. The Luftwaffe essentially destroyed the Red Air Force during the first few days of Barbarossa. As a result the Red Air Force was not a factor during Barbarossa. The Red Army during the Barbarossa had to fight with virtually no air cover. This graduaally changed and by 1943 the Red Air Force was again an important factor in the War. Several factors were involved here. The Soviets did have a substantial aeronautics industry and the Soviet war plants that had been moved east by 1943 had reached full production. America through Lend Lease was delivering planes to the Soviets. The Allied strategic bombing campaign forced not only forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw assetts from the Eastern Front to defend German cities. In addition the bombing disrupted German production as well as casused substantial lossess in German fighters. Many accounts of the air war do not give sufficent attention to the impact on the Luftwaffe of engaging the Allied bombers even before long-range fighter cover became available.

American Commitment

Lend Lease was designed to save Britain (March 1941). When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, both the Americans and Briutish committed to aiding the Soviets. Given hSoviet aggressions as a NAZI ally attacking neignoring countries, there was some reluctance in the U.S. Congress, but this was quickly overcome by President Roosevelt. The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Not only the building of these planes, but delivering them to the Soviet Union was a massive logisical undertaking.

Soviet Desperation (June 1941)

The Germans scored huge victories in the early phase of Barbarossa. There were massive losses of men and equipment. The Soviets were after the war described KLend Kease as "insugnificant", but that it nor what they were saying during the War. And h=given the destructioin of the Red aur Firce at the outset of Barbarossa, aircraft were high on their agenda. One Russian historian writes, "On 30 June (1941), a list of cargoes that the Siviet Uniin needed was handed over .... RThe Siviets wanted to receive everything at once. ... the list included 3,000 foghters and 3,000 bombers. To fulfill such an order , the USA would have had to completely cut off exports to othr countries (including Great Britain) and curtail deliveries to its own air force." [Kotelnikov, p.37] Such numbers were impossible in 1941 as America was not yet at war. And nitablt the Anerican Communist Party and associated front groups were under irders from Moscow to oppose military spending and defense preparadeness programs.

Congressional Authorization (August/October 1941)

The initial LendLease Act was intended to supply Britain. Thus Congressiinal action was needed to authorize aid to the soviet Union, especially as actions had been taken to limit arms sales because the Soviet Union was a NAZI ally and like the NAZIs invading other countries. This took severakl weeks. The first step was to remove restructiins on sales. The first such actioin was Secretary Stimson authirizing the sale of 200 P-40 fighters (August 1). At the time thius was the top of the line American fighter. The Soviets before Lend Lease was yet authoriuzed, immeduateky purchased 59 of the fighters along with engines, propellers, 10,500 bombs, and 408,000 shells. Before Octiber 30, the Soviets spent $92 million on such purchases, meaning actual cash purchases, not Lend Lease financing. [Kotelnikov, p. 38.] Now a million dollars in 1941 was a lot more than a billion dollars today. Even so access to the financing for really large purchases required participation in Lend Lease. It And this took a little longer for Congress to act. It was finally accomplished (October 28). Two days later, Congress authorized an interest free loan of $1 billion to ger the oprogram moving. Eventiualy a credit line of $1 trillion was opened for the Soviets. This was gane changing. It essentially opened up America;s indiusyrial might to the Soviet war effort. In addition, the Soviets also made direct purchases using cash and gold, although this was relar=tively small compared to Lend Lease. The idea was to get as much military equioment and supplies to the Soviet mikitary as rapidky as posible., Paynrnt was to begin 5 years after the War ended and be stretched out over 10 years. In fact the loans would be paid off pennies on the dollar.

Aircraft Deliveries

Aircraft deliveries were far below the commitment at first, but reached significant levels by 1943. A Russian source duggests 114 aircraft in 1942, 2,465 in 1943, 3,033 in 1944 and 2,482 in 1945 (through August). [Alberti] That totaled 8,094 aircraft--an obvious example of Russian misinfoirmation. Western sources based on hard data provide much larger numbers of Allied aircraft, the British provided aircraft as well, although in smaller but not insignificant numbers. The figure we see now being bused in the literature is something like 18,000 aircraft. Various sources dance around this number. Variations can be attributed to different sources as well as some aircraft were lost in transit. And it should be stressed that there are diufferences in such terms as ordered, produced, shipped, and actually delivered. Gering material to the Soviets was a lot more difficult than to Britain. The Artic convoys in particulat were perilous., Only after mod 1943 did the convoys begin arriving largeky untouched. All of thehis Thus there there is a difference between sent and received. This number is fairly well established because there are detailed British and Americans records as to what was sent. One historian writes, "The USSR received 15,481 American aircraft and 3,384 British. Of the overall number of 18,865 machines, almost 17,000 were combat types." [Sokolov, Role, p. 579.] The U.S. State Department provides comparable numbers. The list 14,798 aiurcraft allocated and 14,018 finally delivered. The British sent 2.53 Hurrucanes, 143 Spitfire VBs 1,188 and Spitfire IXs, and a small number of other aircraft. Not all of tgese plans, hoewever, actyually reached the Soviets. [U.S. State Deoartment] Britain's primary delivery route was the perilous Arctic convoys. Which when totaled comes out about 18,000. Anither source hahas a lower number of hurrucanes, which would reduce the total to les tan 17,000. A recently published source also uses the 18,000 figure, but obliously there is not a big differencve between 17,000 and 18,000 planes.

Aircraft Types

The Soviers got a wude variety oif aircraft types from America and Britain. In terns of fughters this inckuded the P-39, P-40, and P0-51 as well as Huricanes and Spitfires. The primary American aircraft provided was the Bell P-39 Aircobra. This was an aircraft the United States did no value highly, but the Soviets had a higher regard. A factor here was that the Americans and British needed a high laditude fighter to porotect the bomber streams. On the Eastern Front, much of the air combat took place al lower alkditudes where the P-39 perfomed well. While Soviet historians denegrate U.S., aid, this was not the case for Red Air Force pilots. Notably, half of the 10 highest scoring Soviets aces primarily were flying P-39s. Grigoriy Rechkalov scored 44 victories in Airacobras. Pokryshkin scored 47 of his 59 victories in P-39s, making him the highest scoring P-39 fighter pilot of any nation, and the highest scoring Allied fighter pilot using an American fighter. [Saltzman and Searle, p. 114.] And this dies not even take into account his shared victories, ome of which were achieved with the P-39. There were, however, quite a range of different aircraft in varying numbers were provided the Soviets. Bomvers included the B-25s, A-20 Boston, Mosquitos, Typhoons, and other, often insmall numvers. Othger aircraft inckuded the calalinas and C-47s. The full lost bis very long. Lend Lease not only provided planes, including high performance aircraft, but necessary spare parts. In addiution to this list, they acquired several maircraft by cgange, sucg as B-29 Superforts which landed in the Soviet Union after being damaged over northern Japan. Stalin ordered that eexact replicas be built.

Relative Importance

Addressubg the importance of Lend Kease, a Russian historian writes, "About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment. [Butnitski] Now supplying 15 percent of the Red Air Force's aircraft can hardly be called insignificant--the term used to sescribe Kend Kease by the Soiviuet Ministry pf Defense. {Sivuet Minisdtry] Perhaps modestly important, but not insignificant. The use iof the term 'insugbifucant' reveals that the Mibisttry is ebgaged in Coild War politics and not serious history. Now any assessment of the imprtance of Lend Lease to the Red Aur Force has to deal with the question Butnitski addresses, the relative proportion of Allied supplied aircraft to Soviet aircraft. We have a good if not preciuse fix on the quantitity of Allied aircraft. Butnitski suggesrts 15,000, we beiieve that 18,000 is a more accurate figure, but the difference betwee the two figures is not large. And it is a fairly accurate figure as it is based on hard Western sources. But what about Soviet aircraft production? Here we have to turn to Soviet sources which can not be seen as reliable as Wertern sources, but they are the only data available. One Russian historian writes, "According to ... official data, the number of combat aircraft manufactured in the Soviet Union throughout the war totals 112,100 (however, this figure is currently believed to be understated too). The result will be apprioximately 18,000/112,100 (i.e some 16boercent of the domestic manufacture ...." [Kotelniko, pp. 76-77.] This appears to be the calculation Butnitski made. Another Russian historian less tied to the Russian establishment writes, "Allegedly, from July 1941 thriugh August 1945, the Soviet Union produced 112,100 combat aircraft. Mist likely, the pointbhere is that Soviet production of aircraft durungbthe years was overstated two fold owing to consciously overstated bookeeping during the war years themselves. Informatioin about the sharp fall in work ependitures on the output of units of primary types of aircraft and tanks in the USSR in 1941043 indirectly coinfirms this idea." [Sokolov, p. 576.] If this was true, than Ameriucan and Brutish aircraft madeup something like 30 percent of the Red Air Force on the Eastern Front. [Sokolov, p. 579.] A very substantial contribution to the war effort. destruction of the Luftwaffe took place in the sklies over German cities.

Aluminum

The United States not only provided aircraft, but played amajor role in Soviet prodyction. This was through the shipment of large quantities of aluminum. This vital light-weight metal was key to aircraft production. American Lend Lease shipments of aluminum permitted the Soviets to significantly increase their own aircraft production. A Russian authir writes, "... Soviet aircraft and ebgine factories ran, to a considerable extent on imported equiopment, raw materials and semi-finished products -- thus Soviuet aircraft, to a certain extent, were alsso influenced by the Lend-Lease prigram." [Kotelniko, p. 536.]

Aviation Fuel

Another important American Lend Lease contribution to the Red Air Force was shipments of high grade (octane) aviation fuel, need by high performance fighters. The Soviets were so short of aviation fuel that they designed an engine which could operate on diesel fuel. Of coorse it could not be used in high-performance aircraft. For this you needed high-grade fuel. The Soviet operation of American and British aircraft created a problem. The fireign aircraft could nit run well mon low grade Siviet aviation fuel. A Soviet author explains, "They required good fuel and quality oil -- for example , the Rolls Royce Merlin ... ran on an octane rating of 87, ... the powerful Twin Wasp engines ... consumed fuel with an even hiugher qulaity, with an octane rating of 97-100. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union mostly utilized B-70 and B-78bac=viatiion fuel (with the figure in the designation standing for the octane number). Attempts to operate imported aircraft with Soviet fuel reesulted in a loss of popwer and engine failures. Beginning from the middle of the war, efforts were made to pperate thee foreign aircraft with only goof fuel, so ften, it was pure imported fuel." [Kotelnikov, pp. 82-83.] Aircraft engines are desiugned to operate with a certain octane range, but no matter how brikllkaint thec design you are nit going to get thame perfirmamnce out of low grade as high grade fuel. One readson the Allied fighters outcklassed the Geramn fighters in the last 2 years of vthe War, us that the alklies had access to high grade fuel and the Gernans did not. This the performance of Soviet fighters could be mporoved by access to high grade aviatiion fuel. Npow the design of the enhines may not have l;ermitted the use og pure high grade fuel, but a miuxture at some proportion could have improved performance, vital for fighter aircraft.

Sources

Alberti, Fedor. "Lend-Lese Air Ferries", AeroSpace Journal (1997). Dr. Alberti is the Deputy Head of Moscow State Civil Aviation Engineering University.

Budnitsky, Oleg. Interviews by Alexi Lossan, "Lend-Lease cannot be overestimated," Russia Beyond (May 9, 2015). Dr. Budnitsky is Director of the :The International Centre for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences. He is on the faculty of the Higher School of Economics in Russia.

Kotelnikov, V. Lend Lease and Soviet Aviation in the Second World War.

Saltzman, B. Chance and Thomas R. Searle. (2001). ntroduction to the United States Air Force. (Airpower Research Institute, Air University Press: 2001).

Sokolov, Boris. The Rolee of Lend Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941-45.

Soviet Ministry of Defense. Lekand Fetzer, trans. Ray Wgner, rd. The Soviet Air Force in World War II (early 1970s). This is the official Socviet history published by the Ministry of Defense.

U.S. State Department. "Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR."

Zhukov, Gregory. KGB sureveilance recording (1963).







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Created: 2:04 AM 9/11/2020
Last updated: 2:04 AM 9/11/2020