*** World War II campaigns -- Arsenal of Democracy Lend Lease countries Soviet Union importance








Soviet Lend Lease Deliveries: Importance

Lend Lease Soviet Union
Figure 1.--Russia and the Ukraine were historically the breadbasket of Europe. Stalin's collectivization and murder of the country's best farmers -- the Kulanks (1930-32) -- so reduced harvests that the Soviet Union not only meant that there was no longer surplus harvests to export, but that there were domestic food shorttages. The initial success of Barbarossa left the Germans in control of much of the finest agricultural land of the Soviet Union. This meant that feeding the Red Army and civilian war workers became a huge problem. Food as a result was a critical component of Lend Lease. Photo source: Anatoly Garanin / RIA Novosti.

The Soviet Union had been essentially a parter with the NAZIs until Hitler ordered an invasion (June 1941). Thus the decession to assist the Soviets was a major policy shift. It also took time to increase war production and ship material to the Soviets. There were huge demands for war material, both from the American military and other allies, especially Britain. Thus deliveries were failrly limited in 1941 and 42 when American industry had not been fully converted to war production. Lend Lease proved critical to the Soviet war-effort. Wars from time memorial are won by marshalling superior resources. And this was the case in EWorld War II. Lend Lease did not play a role in stopping the NAZIs in front of Moscow (December 1941). (Although President Roosevelt's pressure on the Japanese did play a role, allowing Stalin to transfer substantial forces from the Siberia to the defense of Moscow.) And deliveries were still limited in 1942. But by 1943 American industry had been fully coverted to war production and deliveries to the Soviet Union increased expodentially. After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. Most historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first weeks of the German invasion. But as it was largely destroyed on the ground, the pilots survived. Meaning the Red Air vForce could be rapidly reconstituted once planes were delivered. The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Not only the building of these planes, but delivering them to the Soviet Union was a massive logisical undertaking. The deliveries were far below the commitment at first, but reached significant levels by 1943: 114 aircraft in 1942, 2,465 in 1943, 3,033 in 1944 and 2,482 in 1945 (through August). 【Alberti】 The primary aircraft provided was the Bell P-39 Aircobra. Lend Lease not only provided weapons including high performance aircraft, but also large quantities of aluminum which permitted the Soviets to significantly increase their own aircraft production. Many other items and key materials were delivered. American trucks and locomotives played a key role in the logistics neeed to support the massive Red Army offenses. This was especially the case of Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive that destroyed Germany's Army Group Center June-August 1944). German successes in Barbarossa were in paet due to superior German mobility. The Wehrmacht were, however, never fully mechanized. America delicered thousands of trucks (many Studabaker trucks) to bthe Soviets under Lend Lease. These deliveries by 1944 gave the Soviets aevelm of mobility that the Whermacht at its peak never had. When the Red army launched Bagration, it had achieved a level of mobility that Army Group Center had not anticipated while at the same time its own mobility had deteriorated. The result was the destruction of Germany's largest and nost powerful field army. Other materials such as blankets and canned meat were very imporant to the Red Army.

NAZI Partner

The Soviet Union aftervthevNAZU-Soviet Pact became essentially a NAZI allyv(Augustv1939). Soviet cooperation with the NAZIs was etensive -- NAZI Soviet Cooperation. The S0viets both invaded neigboring countries and conducted terrible atrocities against the people they invaded. The Soviets shipped vast quantities of strategic materials to the NAZIs. The May-June 1940 Western offensive would nit have beeb possible without theseshiomebts which inckuded oil among many ither vitral materiaks. Midern Russian siurces tend to downplay the imprtance of Lend Kease. They do not blike to siscuss the importance id Sovier aid to NAXI Germany (1939-41). This of course changed when Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941).

Allied Policy Shifts

The Amerivan decession to assist the Soviet Union was a major policy shift in American and British policy. The Roosevelt Administration had maintained relations with the Soviets. The Administration criticized Soviet invasions of Poland, Finlamd, the Baltic Republics, and Romania. The Adminitrartion refused to recognize the the Soviet invasions and annexations of the Baltic Republics. Even so they did not break diplomatic relations. The Administration recognized it was only a matter of time before Hitler struck east. And as the German invasion plans became clear through Magic descypts, the President warned Stalin. Forvhis part, Stalin dusmissed the warmings. When provided with the Führer Order on Barbarossa, he reportedly threw it in a trash can. The British did the same as a result of Ultra decrypts. After Hitker launched Barvarissan(June 1941), Congress and the general public wAS less aware of the NAZI threat and were more critical of the Soviets. As a resukt there was was opposition to expanding Lend Lease to aid the Soviets.

Time Lag

The United States began to rearm but the steps taken were still tebtative (1940). There was no massive mobilization of the economy. This did not occur until after Pearl Harbor (December 1941). But it took time for industry to tool up and shift production for war. The Arsenal of Democracy did not come to life on December 8. As a result, the United States did no have material to equip its own Army, thus what was available fo other countries at first was limited. It also took time to increase war production and ship material to the Soviets. There were huge demands for war material, both from the American military and other allies, especially Britain. Tough decisions were made. As a result, Amerivan troops landed in North Arica without the M-4 Sherman tank. Available Shermans had gone to British forces to fight the Africa Korps in Egypt. Thus deliveries were failrly limited in 1941 and 42 when American industry had not been fully converted to war production. Only by 1943 did really large quantities begin to reach the British and Soviets.

Chronology

Lend Lease proved critical to the Soviet war-effort. Wars from time memorial are won by marshalling superior resources. And this was the case in World War II. Lend Lease did not play a role in stopping the NAZIs in front of Moscow (December 1941). (Although President Roosevelt's pressure on the Japanese did play a role, allowing Stalin to transfer substantial forces from the Siberia to the defense of Moscow.) And deliveries were still limited in 1942. But by 1943 American industry had been fully coverted to war production and deliveries to the Soviet Union increased expodentially. And 1943 is also the year that Soviet industry evacuated east at the onset of Barbarossa began to come on-line delivering weapory, munitions, and eqyuiomentbin substabtial quantities.

Quantity

The Soviers after the onset of the Cold War attempted to minamize the importance of Lend Lease. And most Russians today have continued that contention. The basic idea popuar in Russia is that it is the Red Armt that defeated the Germans and that the Western Allies played only a minor role. Minimimizing Lend Lease is one oart of that national obsession. Victory in World War II is seen as the great national accomplishment. Questioning that idea is seen as a insukr by many Russians. Thevgeberal idea is thatbLend Lease ptovided only 4-5 percentr of what the Soviet war economy produced. One Russian historian nelieves ir was somewhat higher--about 7 percent. 【Budnitsky】 Even that amount is not an overwhealming amount. Lend Lease was vital because it provided critical items that the Soviers could not produce or produce in the quantities needed. These dekiveries were critical in some important areas.

Red Air Force

After the War, Stalin down-played the importance of Lend Lease. And of course that is what Soviet historians who valued their lives said. And this has continued to be the case even after Stalin died. The Soviet Union did not want to share the honor for defeating the NAZI tyranny. This of course shows a towering degree of chutzpah given that during the Great western Campaign and the Battle of Britain (1940), the Soviet Union was fueling the NAZI War machinme with huge quantities of strategic mnaterials. Most Western historians, however, report that Lend Lease played a critical role in the Soviet war effort. The Red Air Force had been largely destroyed in the first week of the German Barbarossa invasion (June 1941). The United States commitment to supply 400 planes a month to the Soviets was a critical factor in the rebuilding of the Red Air Force. Not only the building of these planes, but delivering them to the Soviet Union was a massive logisical undertaking. The deliveries were far below the commitment at first, but reached significant levels by 1943: 114 aircraft in 1942, 2,465 in 1943, 3,033 in 1944 and 2,482 in 1945 (through August). 【Alberti】 That totaled 8,094 aircraft. Most sources provide much larger numbers of Western aircraft, the British provided aircraft as well, although in smaller numbers. The figure we see in the literature is something like 15,000 aircraft. Various sources dance around this number. Variations can be attributed to different sources as well as some aircraft were lost in transit. Thus there there is a difference between sent and received. This number is fairly well established because there are detailed British and Americans records as to what was sent. The primary aircraft provided was the Bell P-39 Aircobra. This was an aircraft the United States did no value highly, but the Soviets had a higher regard. There were, however, quite a range of different aircraft in varying numbers were provided the Soviets. Lend Lease not only provided planes, including high performance aircraft, but necessary spare parts. Also large quantities of aluminum which permitted the Soviets to significantly increase their own aircraft production. A Russian historian writes, "About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment. 【Butnitski】 Another important contribution was high grade (octane) aviation fuel, need by high performance fighters. The Soviets weree so short of aviation fuel that they designed an engine which could operate on diesel fuel. Of course it could not power high-performance aircraft.

Red Army

Many other items and key materials were delivered. The Soviers were not impressed by American anf Brirush tanks, Bur thecWesrernb tanks were deovered at cruicak ooints. One Ryssiam histoeian writes, " These supplies were critical in some key areas. For example, in the beginning of 1942, Western tanks fully replenished Soviet losses, and exceeded them by three times. " 【Butnitski】 These supplies were critical in some key areas. For example, in the beginning of 1942, Western tanks fully replenished Soviet losses, and exceeded them by three times. About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment. American trucks and locomotives played a key role in the logistics neeed to support the massive Red Army offenses. It wa not that tge Soviers did not nake trucks. It is that they dud not nake eniugh. And most of what thet gas were desreoyed durung bBarbarissa. A Russian histirian writes, " ... the army lost 58 percent of its vehicles in 1941 alone. To recover these losses, the Allies supplied more than 400,000 vehicles, mainly trucks, to the USSR. During the occupation, the German concern Daimler Benz set up a vehicle assembly line at a factory in Minsk (now the capital of Belarus). After the liberation of the city, the assembly of American vehicles under Lend-Lease was organized there." 【Butnitski】 An American historia focusing on the Eastern Front exolains why trucks were so important. Americam Lend Lease "trucks solved one of the Red Army's greatest defincencies including to resupply and systain mobile ------- prnetrate into the German rear areas. Withiut the trucks ---- Soviet iffensuves from 1942-45 would have ---= a shallowe prnetration wllowing the Germans to reconsruct rheir defebses and forcw rge Red Arny to mount yet another ---- break thriugh attack." 【Glantz and House, p. 197.】 Trucks were especially critical in Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive that destroyed Germany's Army Group Center June-August 1944). German successes in Barbarossa were in paet due to superior German mobility. The Wehrmacht was, however, never fully mechanized. America delicered thousands of trucks (many Studabaker trucks) to bthe Soviets under Lend Lease. These deliveries by 1944 gave the Soviets aevelm of mobility that the Whermacht at its peak never had. When the Red Army launched Bagration, it had achieved a level of mobility that Army Group Center had not anticipated while at the same time its own mobility had deteriorated. The result was the destruction of Germany's largest and nost powerful field army. Other materials such as blankets and canned meat were very imporant to the Red Army.

Trucks

Trucks are often cited as the single most important American contribution to the Ostkrieg. Wether it is the most important or not is debtrable. It certainly was one of the most important. Now trucks have none of the pizzazz of the panzers/tanls that military historins dwell on. Trucks are, hiwever, vital to blitzkrieg. The tsnks hekped blast a hole in a front line, but the whole puropse of that was so the infanntry could advance forward and seize importnt poodsution. The German Army did this with infabnry largely on foot and with connsiderable success (1939-41) and the Ostheer repeated this success in Barbarossa (June 1941). And the Dutsche Ostheer was sent east largely on foot with horse drawn carts. As the T-34s rached the Red Army, the Soviets gradually behan to master mobile warfare, especially after the Stalingrad victory (1942-43), the Red Army begn to get large large numbers of American trucks, driven in through Iran. As a result, the Red Army was beginning to develop a mobility the Germans could only dream of at the height of their power. We have had countless discussions with Russians who say Lend Lease was of no value. Or That we made trucks of our own. Of course it is true that the Russians made trucks, in paet because of American compaanies like Ford Motors which introduced modern manufacturing methods. On addittiin to this the United sttes delivered as part of Lend Kease 427,000 trucks. We have seen various assessment of Soviet production. One source reports that the Red Army had about 270,000 truck at the beginnig of Barbarissa (June 1941). Large numbers of these trucks woukd have been destroiyed or caoptured by the Gernmans. Just how many we do not know. Some 150,000 trucks were produced at the five big truck plants. (GAZ, ZIS, YaAZ, UAZ, and UraIZIS). Another 221,500 were seized from indutry and agriuculture. Abd as the war went on the Red Army captured some 60,000 German trucks. And unknow, but surely very large number broke down or were wrecked. So the Lend Lease trucks were very important, constituting three times the number of truck the Soviets produced during the War. 【Kurtukov] By the final year of the War, the American Lend Lease trucks were about a third of the truck strength of the Red Army (1945). The trucks included the Dodge 3⁄4-ton and Studebaker 2+1⁄2-ton, the best trucks available to either army on the Ostkreg lass on either side on the Eastern Front. 【Weeks, p. 107.】

Tanks

Tank production data can be tricky to follow because some data sets lump in all armored vehicles. In addition there is the huge number of light Soviet tanks which the Red Army possed when the Germans invaded (June 1941). Thdy proved obsolete and were destroyed in large mumbers, but the blunted the German advance and were part of the reason that Arny Group Center advanced much more rapidly than Army Group South. And this stage of the War, the Red Army began to get the new generatioin of tanks like the T-34, but at first only in small numbers. The Germans were shocked, they did not expect for the Soviets to have better tanks than their Panzers. The amazing part of the Ostlrieg story is that despite the rapid occupation of the Western Soviet Unions, the Soviets managed to outproduce the Germans in the number of tanks. We find that many people think that mny people think that it was a given because the Soviet Union was such a massive industry power, but this is incorrect. The Germans had a larger industrial base, especially heavy industry. We see that in steel production. Germany after the Barbarissa offensive produced more than three times the quantity of steel produced by the Soviet. Even so, the Soviets significntly exceeded the Germans in tank producion. And the tank was the key weapon in the Ostkrieg. . There was two main reasons that the Soviets out produced the Germans. First, the Soviets adopted American-style mass production techniques. Second, the Germans had to devote most of their industrial effort to the war in the West. The German manpower was largestly deployed in the Ostlrieg, but not their industry. Given the disparity of Soviet and German tank production, one might think that the Soviets would not need Allied produced tanks, but Soviets authrities asked for and reveived both British and American tanks. The Britiish tanlks were important because of when they were received. Sovier priductiin of modrrn ntanls were just gearing up when the Germans launched Barbarossa. And only limited numbers were available for the defense of Moscow (November 1941). The British tanks delivered through the Arctic Comnoys were thus of vital importance. The United States provided tens of thousands of Medium M4 Sherman tanks to as part of Lend Lease. This included 4,102 Shermans to the Soviet Union (2,007 with the original 75 mm main gun and 2,095 with the more-capable 76 mm tank gun). [U.S. War Department] These were only about 5 percent of Soviet production, but this was not imaterial given the huge number of Soviet tanks that the Germans were destroying.

Electronics

The Soviets were especially weak in ekecrronics, uncluding radars and radios. Radiod were especially bimportant in modern mobile warfare. It was an important reason the Germans tank forces performned so much better than the Freanch tank forces in 1940. Soviet radio equipment not only poorly and were unrelable, but the sets were not available in needed quantities. Lend Lease changed this. One historian reports, "... the 71-TK-3 radio set used for two way communicatiins from tanks ... was according to one tanker'a complex, unreliable radio set. Very often in failed, and it was very difficukt to get it working again'. Later Lend-Lease sets with the capability for higher frequency operation for effective short-range communication would highlight just how inadequate Soviet radio equipment all too often was." 【Hill, p. 220.】

Supplies

Lend Lease did not only provide equipment, but all kinds of vital supplies.

Raw Materials

The focus on Lend Lease it commony on weaponry and other manufatured goods. An imprtant part of Lend Lease was rawmaterials especially metals. The Soviet Union was indeed a large country. And also true is that they had vast resources, including mineral deposits. However many of these resources including mineral deposits were undeveloped. Undeveloped resources are the same during wartime as not having resources. It is one reason why Lend Lease was so important. Metals made up an important part of Lend Lease shipments. Metal shipments were important, including steel. Stalin had expanded heavy industry, but steel production was still just a fraction of German production. Without American steel Russian tank, artillery, and truck production would have been severely affected. Zhukov said after the War, "We didn’t have explosives, gunpowder. We didn’t have anything to charge our rifle cartridges with. The Americans really saved us with their gunpowder and explosives. And how much sheet steel they gave us! How could we have produced our tanks without American steel? But now they make it seem as if we had an abundance of all that. Without American trucks, we wouldn’t have had anything to pull our artillery with." The Soviets also needed American aluminum to build aircraft. American aviation fuel was also important. And while the Soviets had the resources the resource-poor Germans needed, the Soviet industrial plant was not as large as that of Germany, including the all-important metric in wartime -- steel production. Not to mention, important parts of Soviet industry were located in the Western regions lost with Barbariossa. The Soviets managed to move many factories east, but many were destroyed as a result of Barbarossa. The Soviets had an imprtant oil industry, but were not orofucing high octanne aviation fuel. A Russian historian reports, "One of the main areas of cooperation was aviation fuel. The USSR could not produce gasoline with high octane. However, it was this fuel that was used by the equipment supplied by the Allies. .... It was not only supplies of finished products, but also raw materials that were extremely important – metals, chemicals and products, which were either not produced in the USSR or lost to the enemy. For example, more than half of Soviet aircraft were produced using aluminum supplied by the Allies. .... It was not only supplies of finished products, but also raw materials that were extremely important – metals, chemicals and products, which were either not produced in the USSR or lost to the enemy. For example, more than half of Soviet aircraft were produced using aluminum supplied by the Allies. .... The Allies supplied 1900 locomotives to the USSR, while only 446 locomotives were produced in the country itself during the same period, as well as 11,000 carriages, while only a few more than 1,000 were made in the USSR. It is impossible to imagine how the Soviet economy would have functioned without these supplies. For example, the telephone cable provided by the Allies could wrap the Earth at the equator. The Allies’ aid was also critical in the reconstruction of production in the liberated regions of the country, including the role of seeds for the resumption of agriculture." 【Budnitsky】

Historical Assessment

Soviet historians were government employees and Russian historians under Putin are still controlled by the Governmnt. Asc a result, Sobiethistirians had to adopt the Party Line. And under Putin historians have to echo Putin's world view. And after World War II this was to downplay the importance of Lend Lease and the Westvin general in World War II. The portion of war material delivered by America and Britain is often cited By Sovier/Russian sources as 5 percent. Which is meant to make the poin that Allied assiastance was only pf only minimal importance. Western historians genrally report a much more significant impact. A good example is, "The U.S.S.R. was also heavily dependent on Lend-Lease, which may have supplied resources equal to one-sixth of Soviet NNP at 1937 factor cost in 1943-44 While an overall measure of the role of external supply in Soviet arms availability is not possible, it is estimated that overseas sources contributed up to one-quarter of Soviet aircraft supplies (this was the peak recorded in late-1943) and up to one-fifthof tank supplies (in 1942); throughout the war the Soviets were able to meet the iron armament and shell needs but, later on, American shipments of trucks, tractors, and tinned food provided the Red Army with decisive mobility in its westward pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht. Thus at their respective peaks British and Soviet dependence upon external supplies were roughly comparable." 【Harrison】 A very few Russian historians have dared defy Soviet/Russian orthodoxy on the subject. "On the whole the following conclusion can be drawn: that without these Western shipments under Lend-Lease the Soviet Union not only would not have been able to win the Great Patriotic War, it would not have been able even to oppose the German invaders, since it could not itself produce sufficient quantities of arms and military equipment or adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition. The Soviet authorities were well aware of this dependency on Lend-Lease. Thus, Stalin told Harry Hopkins [FDR's emissary to Moscow in July 1941] that the U.S.S.R. could not match Germany's might as an occupier of Europe and its resources." 【Sokolov】 An especially imprtant expert on the Ostkrieg writes, "Although Soviet accounts have routinely belittled the significance of Lend-Lease in the sustainment of the Soviet war effort, the overall importance of the assistance cannot be understated. Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic raw materials necessary for Soviet victory. Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhaps most directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken twelve to eighteen months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches. 【Glantz, p.285.】 Now of course Soviet/Russian sources can question the work of Western historians. More difficult to question, however is the statements Soviet officiald. Soviet Premier ikita Khrushchev who served as a military commissar and a close associate of Stalin was an intermediary between Stalin and his commanders. He provides an insight into Stalin's thinking as well as his own assessment. He writes, " I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so. 【Khrushchev, pp. 638–39.】 None other than Gen Zhukov commented on various occassions as to the imprtance of Lend Lease. "Today [1963] some say the Allies didn't really help us ... But listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us material without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war. 【Zhukov】

Sources

Alberti, Fedor. "Lend-Lese Air Ferries", AeroSpace Journal (1997). Dr. Alberti is the Deputy Head of Moscow State Civil Aviation Engineering University.

Budnitsky, Oleg. Interviews by Alexi Lossan, "Lend-Lease cannot be overestimated," Russia Beyond (May 9, 2015). Dr. Budnitsky is Director of the :The International Centre for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences. He is on the faculty of the Higher School of Economics in Russia.

Glantz, David M. and Jonathan House. When Titans Clash. Col. Glantz is ine of the foremist authoriries on the Soviet military.

Harrison, Mark. "Resource mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945" Economic History Review Vol. 41, No. 2 (1988), pp. 171-92.

Hill, Alexander. The Red Army and the Second World War: Armies of the Second Workd War (Cambridge Inibersity Press: Cambridge, U.K., 2017).

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar, 1918–1945 (Penn State Press: 2004).

Kurtukov, Igor. "Soviet wartime domestic truck production," (October 26, 2008).

Sokolov, Boris Vadimovich. Quoyed in Weeks, p.9

United States War Department. Chief of Finance. "Lend-Lease Shipments: World War II, Section IIIB," (December 31, 1946).

Weeks, Albert L. Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004).

Zhukov, Georgy. Quoted in a confidential interview with the wartime correspondent Konstantin Simonov. Albert L. Weeks, Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II (New York: Lexington Books, 2010).







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Created: March 16, 2004
Last updated: 5:59 PM 1/26/2024